

Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta:

Śrī Harṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*

Volume 1

*Editors:*

Bimal K. Matilal

*Spalding professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford University, England*

J. Moussaieff Masson

*Professor of Sanskrit, University of Toronto, Canada*

*Editorial Board:*

Etienne Lamotte

*University of Louvain, Louvain, Belgium*

Daniel H. Ingalls

*University of Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.*

John Brough

*St. John's College, University of Cambridge, England*

# Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta:

Śrī Harṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*

by

P. E. Granoff

*Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada*



D. Reidel Publishing Company

Dordrecht:Holland / Boston:U.S.A. / London:England

**Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data**



Granoff, P.E., 1947-

Philosophy and argument in late Vedānta.

(Studies of classical India ; 1)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Vedānta. 2. Reasoning. 3. Knowledge, Theory of (Hinduism).  
4. Śrīharṣa, 12th cent. Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā. I. Śrīharṣa, 12th cent.  
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā. II. Title. III. Series.

B132. V3G62 181:48 78-9135

ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9824-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9822-3

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9822-3

---

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,  
P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico  
by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc.  
Lincoln Building, 160 Old Derby Street, Hingham,  
Mass. 02043, U.S.A.

All Rights Reserved

Copyright © 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland  
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or  
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,  
including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and  
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner



*For T.S. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī  
and  
in memory of my father  
Dr. M.A. Granoff*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	ix
Introduction in Sanskrit	xiii
Acknowledgements	xxxv
I. Preface	1
Notes to the Preface	58
II. The Introduction to the <i>Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā</i>	
Translation and Commentary	71
Notes to the Translation	209
Bibliography	257
Index	267

## FOREWORD

Śrīharṣa is recognised as one of the greatest exponents of what is generally known as the Śaṅkara school of Advaita Vedānta. The Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara has been commented upon, explained, expounded and developed in its various ramifications by several generations of scholars, commentators and original thinkers for over a thousand years. Even today it is claimed to be one of the two traditional schools of Indian Philosophy which have survived and have modern adherents while most other schools have died of old age on Indian soil. The only other school that has survived is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or what is now called the Navya-nyāya. Both Advaita Vedānta and Navya-nyāya have attracted the attention of modern scholars and philosophers (of both India and abroad), who are acquainted with Western philosophy and whose interest in the study of Indian philosophy has not simply been limited to the history of Indian thought or Indology.

Modern exponents of Advaita Vedānta are numerous. With a few notable exceptions, however, most modern authors of Vedānta try to expound and modernise the Advaita system from either a speculative and personal point of view or from a superficial viewpoint of Kantian philosophy or Hegelian Absolutism. Such a method has seldom achieved the sophistication and respectability that is normally expected in the context of modern (chiefly western) philosophic activity. Besides this unfortunate turn of events, we have to note also that the form “Vedānta” has acquired a very cheap, popular connotation. Thus, any vague and enigmatic statement that even remotely suggests that this real, everyday world, is an illusion and that there is a Universal Absolute Reality, is taken to be a ‘profound’ writing on Vedānta. There is we see a bewildering variety of such publications on Advaita Vedānta, and ordinary men of both the East and West seem to be swallowing book after book of this kind.

Standard Advaita texts written in technical Sanskrit for over a thousand years, are, however, very different. Even a cursory glance at these texts will belie such distorted impressions as a modern academic philosopher may derive from the popular publications on Advaita. Even when one finds it hard to agree with the philosophic conviction of the Sanskrit Advaita

writers, one nevertheless finds it difficult not to admire greatly the intellectual honesty of these authors as well as the professional sophistication of their philosophic methodology. It is undeniable that these authors examined their own doctrines as well as those of their rivals in the context of the Indian tradition of philosophic debate and abstruse logic. They intended their writings to be available for rational discussion. As I have noted elsewhere, "They were writing for intelligent and critically minded readers and not pleading for the silence of mystic communion."<sup>1</sup>

Śrīharṣa's contributions to the field of Indian philosophy may be summed up in two broad points. (1) He presented the Advaita school with an independent philosophic method which uniquely suited the rational discussion of its monistic doctrine of the ineffable truth. (2) Through his incisive critique of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories of *pramāṇas* in general, and of the definitions of the logical and epistemological concepts of Udayana in particular, he paved the way for the rise of the Navya-nyāya school of Śaśadhara, Maṇikanṭha and Gaṅgeśa, who introduced abstruse and mind-boggling technicalities in the formulation of definitions of such logical and epistemological categories as reason (*hetu*), inference (*anumāna*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*). To take the second point first, Śrīharṣa's trenchant criticism of Nyāya categories had a salutary effect on the Indian philosophic scene, and philosophic sophistication of later authors of both Nyāya and Vedānta deepened as a result. But for Śrīharṣa, an Advaitin might observe, who could have dreamt that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī would appear later in the Advaita tradition?

Śrīharṣa's philosophic method was essentially that of what was known as *vitaṇḍā* in the Indian textual tradition. The tradition mentions three types of 'formal' philosophic debate; *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*. The first was characterized by the philosopher's search for the truth while the second was mainly dominated by disputant's drive for victory. The third type of debate, called *vitaṇḍā*, occupied a unique position in philosophic parlance. In a *vitaṇḍā*, *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.44 notes, a thesis or a position is refuted but no counter thesis is established. Vātsyāyana described it as a disreputable form of debate, for, he thought, it was unfair to let the debater get away simply with the refutation of a position and not allow the opponent to examine his own position. Obviously, Vātsyāyana's disapproval stems from the fact that Nāgārjuna and other Mādhyamika writers sometimes used such a debate to refute any philosophic thesis or position. Emptiness, argued Nāgārjuna, is not a position to be defended.

In spite of Vātsyāyana's criticism, many Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers agreed

that *vitandā* could be a legitimate form of debate, not simply a *useless* wrangling.<sup>2</sup> It is even possible that a philosopher who is actually free from passion and selfish motives such as victory, would undertake this form of debate.<sup>3</sup> In fact this form of debate is particularly suitable for a number of philosophers, viz., the sceptics, the agnostics, mystics, and those who believe in some ultimate reality that is ineffable in principle.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Śrīharṣa saw the unquestionable value of such a debate and adopted it as his principal philosophic method. For an *advaitin*, according to him, does not need to prove his position; the truth for him is supposed to be self-evident. The business of philosophy is thus regarded by Śrīharṣa as consisting simply in the refutation of all rival views. And hence the title: KHAṆḌANA 'refutation'.

One of the effective ways of refuting a thesis is to show that the assumption of its truth leads to some absurd consequences. Absurdities are an embarrassment to the philosophers; they are also, as G. Ryle pointed out, the original goad to philosophic thinking.<sup>5</sup> Thus, if the opponent in a debater cannot effectively resolve the absurdities of his position, then the debater can claim that the opponent stands refuted. Śrīharṣa was a champion of this method of refutation, as the following book of Dr. Phyllis Granoff will show.

The study of Śrīharṣa needs no apology for anybody interested in the philosophic thought of India. His work is an important landmark in the history of Indian philosophy. It goes without saying that even a modern professional philosopher will benefit and derive insights into the philosophic problems of formulating definitions of the criteria of knowledge and truth, from a careful study of Śrīharṣa. The following pages of Dr. Granoff offer such a challenge for the modern mind. It is a pity that because of the difficulty and technicalities of Śrīharṣa's style, very few scholars have trodden upon this rather "forbidden" track. Dr. Granoff should thus be congratulated for being a pioneer in this field. But what is more surprising is that she has accomplished her task admirably well.

In the Introduction, Dr. Granoff has summarized the main arguments of Śrīharṣa against the Nyāya definitions of *pramā* and *pramāṇas*. Criticism of other philosophical schools are also mentioned in this connection. This is followed by an annotated translation of the first section of *Khaṇḍana*. Pandit Śrīnivās Śāstrī, one of the great savants of India today, has written a Sanskrit introduction to Dr. Granoff's work. Panditji has noted carefully where Dr. Granoff, has made original contributions to the study and interpretation of Śrīharṣa, for which the readers should consult the Sanskrit Introduction that follows.

In publishing this book, we are launching a new series where we intend to publish a number of titles every year under what we have called *Studies of Classical India*. Works dealing with religion, philosophy, literature, history and cultural history of ancient and classical India will be included in this series. It is hoped that this will stimulate serious research in the field based on original sources and enlivened with new insights, perspectives and points of view.

*All Souls College,  
Oxford.*

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See B.K. Matilal: *The Logical Illumination Indian Mysticism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Thus, for example, both Uddyotkara and Vācaspati politely disagreed with Vātsyāyana's interpretation of *viṭaṇḍā*. Udayana referred to a view of one Śānātani, according to whom *viṭaṇḍā* is two-fold inheriting the essential characteristics of *vāda* (motivated by search of truth) or *jalpa* (motivated by search for victory).

<sup>3</sup> Venkatanātha notes that a *viṭaṇḍā* may be undertaken by either a *vijigīṣu* (one desirous of victory) or a *vītarāga* (one freed from selfish motives). See *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* (Chowkhamba), p. 166.

<sup>4</sup> Matilal, *op. cit.*, p. 17 f.

<sup>5</sup> G. Ryle: *Philosophical Arguments*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 6.

## प्रस्तावना

मधुमयभणितीनां मार्गदर्शिनं भगवन्तं वाल्मीकिं महाकविमारभ्य नैके महाकवयोऽमृत-  
निष्यन्दिवाग्भरीभी रसिकास्तर्पयन्तो भारतभुवमलंचक्रुः । नैकेषु दर्शनेषु कर्कशतर्केषु  
चानितरसाधारणीं नैपुणीमावहन्तोऽसंख्याकाः संख्यावन्तो नैकनिबन्धनप्रणयनसमवासदिगन्तय-  
शसो व्यराजन्त इति विदितचरमेव समेषां विदुषाम् । तेषु च बहवोऽसंशयमुत्तमं  
स्थानमर्हन्ति । अथापि श्रीहर्षो यादवं स्थानमाक्रामति न तथान्यः कोऽपीत्युक्तिर्नातिशयोक्ति-  
तामावहति । कविराजराजिमुकुटालंकारहीर-श्रीहीरपुण्यपुञ्जपरिपाकवशाच्छ्रीमामल्लदेव्यां  
श्रीहर्षो जज्ञे । न केवलमेषो नैकेषां गुरुणां संनिधौ शास्त्रोक्तविधिना सर्वाणि शास्त्राण्यध्य-  
शीष्टापि तु प्रबलेनोपासनेनापि महतीं पाण्डितीमलब्ध इत्येतदीयनैषधकाव्यगतप्रथमसर्गाव-  
सानश्लोके “तच्चिन्तामणिमन्त्रचिन्तनफले” इति पदेन सम्प्यग्न्यायते ।

कविसार्वभौमोऽयं स्वीयनैषधीयचरित आत्मानं जितेन्द्रियचयमुपवर्णयति । एतत्काव्यान्ते  
तथा खण्डनखण्डखाद्यग्रन्थान्ते च

“ताम्बूलद्वयमासनं च लभते यः कान्यकुब्जेश्वरा-  
द्यः साक्षात्कुरुते समाधिषु परब्रह्मप्रमोदान्वम्”

इति निर्देशेनात्मनो व्यवहारदशायां कान्यकुब्जेश्वरसभायां ताम्बूलद्वयलारूपप्रकृष्टगौरवं  
समाधिषु भूमात्मानन्दानुभवं च प्रकाशयन्निजजन्मनः कृतकृत्यतां प्रकटीचकार । अयं च  
द्वाविंशतिसर्गात्मकनैषधीयचरितमन्यान्यपि बहूनि ग्रन्थरत्नानि व्यररचदिति नैषधीयचरित-  
सर्गावसानश्लोकेभ्योऽवगम्यते । षष्ठसर्गावसानगतः

“षष्ठः खण्डनखण्डतोऽपि सहजात्क्षोदक्षमे तन्महा-  
काव्येऽयं व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः”

इति श्लोकः खण्डनखण्डखाद्याख्यस्य महाग्रन्थरत्नस्य निर्मितमवगमयति । तत्प्रणीता  
अन्ये नवसाहस्राङ्कचरित-शिवशक्तिसिद्धि-छन्दःप्रशस्ति-अर्णववर्णन-गौडोर्वीशकुलप्रशस्ति-  
श्रीविजयप्रशस्ति-स्थैर्यविचारणप्रकरण-ईश्वराभिसंध्यादयो ग्रन्था अस्माकं दौर्भाग्यवशाद्विलय-  
मगमन् । खण्डनखण्डखाद्यं नैषधीयचरितं च द्वयमेवेदानीं वरीवर्ति । आभ्यां भारतीयाः  
सर्वे विद्वांस एककण्ठ्येन विशिष्टं स्थानं ददत इति “नैषधं विद्वदौषधम्” इत्यादिकयाभि-  
युक्तोक्त्या सुगमम् । स्वयमेव कथकः कविः श्रीहर्षो नैषधान्ते खण्डनखण्डखाद्यग्रन्थान्ते च

“ग्रन्थग्रन्थिरिह क्वचित्क्वचिदपि न्यासि प्रयत्नान्मया  
प्राज्ञमन्यमना हठेन पठिती मास्मिन्खलः खेलतु ।  
श्रद्धाराद्धगुरुश्लुथीकृतदृढग्रन्थिः समासादयतु”

इति पद्येन ग्रन्थद्वयेऽपि बहवस्तत्र तत्र ग्रन्थयः स्थापिताः श्रद्धाराद्धगुरूपदेशेनैव ग्रन्थयः शिथिलीभवन्तीति वदन् ग्रन्थद्वयस्य माहात्म्यं दुरुहत्वं संप्रदायानुसारिगुरुमुखैकज्ञेयत्वं स्वस्य चानितरसाधारणं पाण्डित्यं गुरो शस्त्रे च माहान्तं विश्वासं संप्रदायागतशुद्धिं च प्रदर्शयति ।

अत्र विषये कानिचनोदाह्रियन्ते । तथाहि — नैषधे नवमे सर्गे इन्द्रादिदेवैर्दमयन्तीसकाशं दूतत्वेन प्रहितो नलो दमयन्त्या वंशनामधेये पृष्ठः

“महाजनाचारपरम्परेद्धी स्वनाम नामाददते न साधवः ।

अतोऽभिधातुं न तदुत्सहे पुनर्जनः किलाचारमुचं विगायति ॥” (9.13)

इति भैमीं प्रति वदन्स्तत्कथनमनतिप्रयोजनं मन्वानोऽत्यल्पे प्रमेये बहुशब्दरचनं प्रतिपादनीयार्थसंकोचश्च गिरो गरी मितेन शब्देन सारभूतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादनमेव वाग्मित्वमित्यर्थकं

“गरौ गिरः पल्लवनार्थलाघवे मितं च सारं च वचो हि वाग्मिता” (9.5)

इत्यभिधत्ते । एवं नलमुखेन कथयन्कविकुलललामभूतो गभीरस्य सारभूतार्थस्य मितैः शब्दैः प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यात्मकं वाग्मित्वं सदाचारपरिपालनप्रवर्तनादिरूपमाचार्यत्वं च स्वस्य प्रकटयति । इन्द्रादिदेवपरिणयविषये तवाभिप्रायं कथयेति नलेन पृष्टा दमयन्ती यादृशीं रीतिमवलम्ब्य नलः स्वनामकथनं प्रतिषेधति तादृशीमेव रीतिमवलम्ब्य

“परेण पुंसा हि ममापि संकथा कुलाबलाचारसहासनासहा” (9.16)

इति प्रतिवाचिकं प्रतिषेधति । “हृदाभिनन्द्य प्रतिबन्धनुत्तरः” (9.17) इति पद्येन दमयन्तीप्रयुक्तया प्रतिबन्धानुत्तरो नलो हृदा भैमीमभिनन्दतीति वदन्कविमूर्धन्यः परोक्ताभिरेव युक्तिभिः परं मूकीकृत्य परसिद्धान्तो दूषणीय इत्यस्मान्छिक्षयति

अस्योपमाः प्रायेण वेदान्तादिशास्त्रार्थविषयिण्यः । यथा — नलेन दूत्ये प्रहितो हंसो दमयन्तीसकाशं संचरति । निरुपमसौन्दर्यं तं हंसं दमयन्ती सखीनां नेत्राणि तदन्यविषयग्रहविमुखानि सन्ति प्रापुरिति वर्णयन्कविरत्र दृष्टान्तं कथयति — यतव्रतानां चेतांसि विमुक्ततत्तद्विषयग्रहाणि सन्ति तदेकं निरुपाख्यरूपं ब्रह्म प्राप्नुवन्तीति ।<sup>1</sup> दमयन्ती च स्वशरीरसमीपं चरन्तं हंसं ग्रहीतुकामा यत्नान्निश्चलतां जगाह इति वदन्कवितल्लजोऽयमत्र दृष्टान्तमभिदधाति — मुनेर्मनोवृत्तिः स्वीये शरीरे संनिहितं चरन्तं हंसं परमात्मानं ग्रहीतुकामा



यत्नान्निश्चलतां गाहृत इति ।<sup>1</sup> पूर्वोक्तदृष्टान्तद्वयप्रदर्शनेन कविः परब्रह्मप्राप्तिविषये सर्वेभ्यो बाह्येभ्यो विषयेभ्यः सर्वात्मना मनसो निवृत्तिं हृदयगुहायां संनिहिते परमात्मनि मनो-वृत्तेर्नैश्चल्यं चैत्यौपनिषदं साधनद्वयं<sup>2</sup> कमनीयया पद्धत्यास्मानुपदिशति । एतत्साधनद्वयं स्वस्मिन्परिपूर्णं तिष्ठतीति च प्रतिसर्गान्ते

“श्री हर्ष.....सुतं

श्रीहीरः सुषुवे जितेन्द्रियचयं मामल्लदेवी च यम् ।”

इति मुक्तकण्ठमुद्घोषयति ।

अन्तःपुरं प्रविष्टं नलं दृष्ट्वा भैरव्यानन्दमय्यभवत् ।<sup>3</sup> बहुषु रक्षकेषु सत्स्वपि विनैव प्रति-बन्धवार्तां कथमयमन्तःपुरं प्रविष्ट इति तस्या अनिर्वचनीयो मोहोऽविवेकोऽतिशयेनासीत् । अत्र तस्या आनन्दावस्थां मोहावस्थां च मुक्तसंसारिदशाभ्यामुपमिमानः कविचक्रवर्ती “रसं ह्येवायं लब्धवानन्दीभवति”<sup>4</sup> इत्युक्तां मुक्तस्थितिं “अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः”<sup>5</sup> इत्युक्तां भवत्तरानिर्वचनीयमोहवत्त्वरूपां संसारिस्थितिं च स्मारयति ॥

कविकण्ठीरवोऽयं निर्गुणनिष्ठोऽप्येकविंशे सर्गे नलस्य पञ्चायतनपूजावर्णनप्रकारव्याजेन हरिहरादिमूर्तिः स्तुवन् स्वस्य व्यवहारदशायां सगुणे ब्रह्मण्यनितरसाधारणीं भक्तिं प्रदर्शयति । स्थालीपुलाकन्यायेन केचन श्लोका अर्थतः प्रदर्श्यन्ते । यथा — त्रिपञ्चाशच्छ्लोकेऽन्धकारस्य सूर्यतेजःप्रकाशनेऽभिलाष इव जडस्य जनस्य मम स्वप्रकाशपरमात्मवर्णनेऽभिलाष इति, चतुःपञ्चाशच्छ्लोके चातकदम्पत्योरत्यन्तमुपरि वर्तमानो मेघोऽविषयोऽपि तत्रैवोत्कण्ठितयोजनलदानेन तृप्तिं यथा संपादयति तथा वाङ्मनसयोरविषयोऽपि परमात्मा वाचा स्तुतो मनसा ध्यातश्च स्वयमेवानुगृह्णातीति, सप्तदशोत्तरशततमे हे विश्वरूप प्रपञ्चनिर्मातः परमाणुरूपे मम मनसि तव वैभवं कियद्धारयामि यथाकिंचनः काञ्चनपर्वतमधिगम्य सर्वस्वीकाराभिलाषोऽपि निजवस्त्रेऽत्यल्पमेव काञ्चनं बन्धुं शक्नोति तथा सकलगुणवर्णनाभिलाषे सत्यपि सामर्थ्याभावादत्यल्पमात्रगुणवर्णनं मुशकमिति, एकादशोत्तरशततमे श्लोके हे भगवन् क्रीडयापि तव नाम ये वदन्ति ते नरकेभ्यो नैव बिभ्यति तेभ्य एव नरका भीताः पलायन्त इति नामसंकीर्तनमाहात्म्यं, चतुर्दशोत्तरशततमे विशिष्य रामनाम्नोऽतिशयितं प्राभवं च कविराजोऽयं वर्णयति ।

विष्णवतारभूतं भगवन्तं बुद्धं

“यत्तव स्तवविधौ विधिरास्ये चातुरीं चरति तच्चतुरास्यः ।

त्वय्यशेषविदि जाग्रति शर्वः सर्वविद्ब्रुवतया शितिकण्ठः ॥”

(21.91)

<sup>1</sup> 3.4

<sup>2</sup> KU. 2.1

<sup>3</sup> 8.15

<sup>4</sup> TU. 2.5

<sup>5</sup> B.G. 5.15

इति श्लोकेन हरब्रह्मापेक्षयातिशयितमुपवर्ण्यं

“एकचित्तततिरद्वयवादिन्नत्रयीपरिचितोऽथ बुधस्त्वम् ।

पाहि मां विधुतकोटिचतुष्कः पञ्चबाणविजयी षडभिन्नः ॥” (21.88)

इति श्लोकेन मां रक्षेति प्रार्थयमानः कविसार्वभौमोऽयं स्वस्य सर्वमतसामरस्यं स्फोरयति ॥

श्रीहर्षस्य न केवलं काश्मीरेषु पण्डितेषु बौद्धेषु तदितरेषु च निकटपरिचय आसीदपि तु तेष्वतिशयितादरबुद्धिरासीत् । यतः षोडशसर्गान्ते

“काश्मीरंमंहिते चतुर्दशतयीं विद्यां विदद्भिर्महाकाव्ये” (14.131)

इति वदन्नयं तेषां चतुर्दशसु विद्यासु पाण्डित्यं तैर्महितत्वेन स्वकाव्यस्य परमोत्कर्षं च मन्यते ॥

खण्डनखण्डखाद्यस्य च श्रीविद्यासागर-चित्सुखाचार्य-शङ्करमिश्र-रघुनाथ-वरदपण्डित-परमानन्दसूरिप्रभृतिभिः कृताष्टीका उपलभ्यन्ते ।

द्रविडश्रीलक्ष्मणशास्त्रिभिः चौखम्बामुद्रणालयद्वारा संपादिते खण्डनखण्डखाद्यपुस्तके भूमिकायां खण्डनखण्डखाद्यमिति नाम्नोऽर्थ एवं वर्णितः

“खण्डनरूपं पदार्थलक्षणादिखण्डनरूपं खण्डखाद्यं नाम पाकविशेषो वैद्यग्रन्थोक्तः । खण्डखाद्याख्यः पाकविशेषो यथा रोगनिरसनपूर्वकबलपुष्ट्याद्याधानहेतुस्तथायमपि ग्रन्थः खण्डनरूपो वादिमतानि तिलशः खण्डयित्वा ब्रह्माद्वैतप्रतिपत्तिश्रद्धाद्याधानहेतुर्भवन् परमानन्दास्वादनक्षमयोग्यतासंपादको भवति” इति ।

खण्डनखण्डखाद्यग्रन्थप्रादुर्भावकालविषये

“षष्ठः खण्डनखण्डतोऽपि सहजात् क्षोदक्षमे तन्महा-

काव्येऽयं व्यगलन्नलस्य चरिते सर्गो निसर्गोज्ज्वलः ॥”

इति नैषधीयचरितषष्ठसर्गविसानगतपद्याधै

“यथा च परिहृतचापलमात्मतत्त्वामृतसरसि निमज्ज्य रज्यति निरायासमेव मानसं तथाहमकथययं नैषधचरितस्य परमपुरुषस्तुतो सर्गं”

इति खण्डनखण्डखाद्यग्रन्थप्रथमपरिच्छेदे खण्डनयुक्तिप्रदर्शनप्रस्तावान्ते विद्यमानं वाक्यं चालोच्य नैषधनिर्माणानन्तरमेवामुं ग्रन्थं श्रीहर्षः प्राणैषीदिति बहवोऽभिप्रयन्ति । श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयास्तावत्पूर्वोक्तं पक्षमुपपाद्य तत्रार्शचि प्रदर्श्य नैषधचरित-षष्ठसर्गविसान एव ग्रन्थरत्नमिदं निरमास्त कविरिति युक्तियुक्तं प्रदर्शयन्ति । ताभिर्बहु-श्लोकप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं विस्तरेणाभिहितोऽयमर्थः संग्रहेण प्रदर्श्यते । तथा हि —

एकस्मात्पुरुषादुत्पन्नौ यमलौ सहजावुच्येते । तथा कालव्यवधानेनापि संभूतौ सहजौ कथ्येते । परमपुरुषस्तुतिप्रतिपादक एकांविशे सर्गे मानसचापलपरिहारोपायप्रदर्शन-पूर्वकमात्मतत्त्वप्रतिपादनं स्पष्टतया नोपलभ्यते । अतः षष्ठसर्गप्रणयनसमकालमेव

खण्डनग्रन्थः प्रणीत इत्युक्तिर्युक्ततरेव भाति । यद्यप्यादितः षट्सु सर्गेषु वाच्यविधया परमपुरुषस्तुतिर्नोपलभ्यते तथाप्यस्य काव्यस्यान्यापदेशेन तत्त्वार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्परमपुरुषस्तुतिपरत्त्वमुपवर्णयितुं शक्यते । यथा गुणिनिष्ठगुणाभिधानं स्तुतिस्तथा तत्त्वार्थस्य परमपुरुषस्य परब्रह्मणश्चिन्तनप्रतिपादनादिकमपि । जीवात्मा तदन्य-विषयेभ्यो मनो व्यावर्त्यं तत्पदार्थप्राप्तौ तीव्रेच्छया श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनैः सता ब्रह्मणा संपन्नो भवतीति यथाध्यात्मिकग्रन्थेषूपवर्ण्यते तथैव नलदमयन्त्योर्वर्णनमुप-लभ्यते । प्रथमसर्गीयः

“दिगीशवृन्दांशविभूतिरीशिता

दिशां स कामप्रसरावरोधिनीम् ।

बभार शास्त्राणि द्दशं द्वयाधिकां

निजत्रिनेत्रावतरत्वबोधिकाम् ॥”

(1.6)

इति षष्ठः श्लोको नलस्य शिवावतारत्वं व्यञ्जयति । द्वितीयसर्गीयः

“अधिगत्य जगत्यधीश्वरा-

दथ मुक्तिं पुरुषोत्तमात्ततः ।

वचसामपि गोचरो न यः

स तमानन्दमविन्दत द्विजः ॥”

(2.1)

इति श्लिष्टः प्रथमश्लोको “ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्म भवति” इति श्रुत्युक्तप्रकारेण “मोक्षमिच्छे-ज्जनार्दनात्” इति स्मृत्युक्तप्रकारेण च ब्रह्मविदः पुरुषोत्तमात् तत्त्वार्थोपदेशद्वारा ज्ञानप्राप्त्या मोक्षं संसारबन्धनिवृत्तिमधिगत्य वचसामगोचरमखण्डमात्मानन्दं द्विजन्मा यथानुभवति तथायं हंसः पक्षी पुरुषोत्तमान्नलात्करग्रहणबन्धनान्मुक्तिं प्राप्य वाचाम-गोचरं सुखमन्वभूदित्यर्थं प्रतिपाद्य नलस्य पुरुषोत्तमत्वं स्थिरीकरोति । एवं षष्ठ-सर्गीयस्य

“चित्रं तदा कुण्डिनवेशिनः सा

नलस्य मूर्तिर्ववृते नदस्या ।

बभूव तच्चित्रतरं तथापि

विश्वैकदृश्यैव यदस्य मूर्तिः ॥”

(6.8)

इत्यष्टमश्लोकस्य सर्वजनैरवलोकनीयं नलस्य शरीरमिन्द्रादिदेवदत्ततिरस्करिणीविद्या-बलेनावलोकनीयमासीदित्येतदाश्चर्यम् । एतदपेक्षयाप्याश्चर्यतरं तद्यन्नलस्य मूर्ति-विश्वैकदृश्यासीदिति विरोधं प्रदर्शयिष्यामि विश्वस्मिन्नेकदृश्या निरुपमसौन्दर्या वर्तत इति विरोधपरिहारं संपाद्य व्याख्यातारो वाच्यार्थं वर्णयन्ति । ध्वन्यर्थस्तावन्नलः परं ब्रह्मैवेति । तथा हि — नलस्य मूर्तिर्नदस्या इत्यनेन मुण्डकोपनिषदि प्रथमखण्डे “यत्तदद्रेश्यम्” इति प्रतिपादितं ब्रह्मव नल इति सूच्यते । विश्वस्मिन् जगति नलस्य

मूर्तिरेकैव दृश्या ज्ञेया नान्यदित्यर्थबोधकेन ‘विश्वैकदृश्या इति पदेन नलो ज्ञेयं ब्रह्मेति व्यज्यते । विमुक्तात्मान इष्टसिद्धौ निरूपयन्ति — जगति ज्ञेयं चैतन्यात्मकं ब्रह्मैव यत अज्ञातमेव ज्ञानेन प्रकाशयते । अज्ञानस्य च कृत्यमावरणं प्रकाशप्रतिबन्धः । तच्चावरणं प्रकाशवस्तुन एव संभवति नास्वप्रकाशस्य जडस्य । ज्ञानेन चावरणं प्रकाशप्रतिबन्धकं निवर्त्यते । प्रकाशवस्तुनो ब्रह्मण एव प्रकाशप्रतिबन्धरूपमावरणं संभवति । ज्ञानेन प्रकाशगतावरणस्यैव निवृत्तिः संपाद्यते । चैतन्यावच्छेदकत्वाद्वटपटादिप्रपञ्चस्याज्ञातत्वं ज्ञातत्वं च भक्त्या व्यवह्रियत — इति । तदनुसारेण जगति नलस्वरूपमेकमेव दृश्यं ज्ञेयमित्यत्रोक्तं सुश्लिष्टम् । ‘न दृश्या’ इत्यत्र प्रतियोगिवाचकस्य दृश्यपदस्य दृशिकर्म ज्ञानविषयोऽनावृतचित्तादात्म्यं प्राप्य भासमान इत्यर्थः । ‘विश्वैकदृश्या’ इत्यत्र दृश्यपदं दृशिना ज्ञानेनावरणनिवृत्तौ सत्यां प्रकाशयोग्यमर्थं बोधयति । तथा तृतीयसर्गीये

“तदेकलुब्धे हृदि मेऽस्ति लब्धुं  
चिन्ता न चिन्तामणिमप्यनर्घ्यम् ।

चित्ते ममैकः सकलत्रिलोकी-

सारो निधिः पद्ममुखः स एव ॥”

(3.81)

इत्येकाशीतितमेऽमूल्यचिन्तामणिलाभे वा पद्मशङ्खादिनवनिधिप्राप्तौ वा न मेऽभिलाषोऽपि तु त्रिलोक्यां सकलपदार्थसारभूतस्य नलस्य प्राप्तावेवेति दमयन्त्युक्तिरूपे श्लोके विद्यमानेन ‘सकलत्रिलोकीसार’ इति पदेन लोकत्रयगतसकलवस्तुसारभूतमुपनिषत्प्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्मैव नल इति, निधिपदेन सकलानि यत्र निधीयन्ते सुषुप्तौ सर्वे प्राणिनो यत्र विश्राम्यन्ति तद्ब्रह्मैव नल इति, पद्ममुखपदेन पद्मान्मुखमारम्भो निर्गमो यस्येत्यर्थकेनाब्जयोनिर्ब्रह्मा नल इति च ध्वन्यते । तद्वत्प्रथमसर्गीयेण

“मनोरथेन स्वपतीकृतं नलं

निशि क्व सा न स्वपती स्म पश्यति ।

अदृष्टमप्यर्थमदृष्टवैभवा-

त्करोति सुसिर्जनदर्शनातिथिम् ॥”

(1.39)

इति श्लोकेन दमयन्ती प्रतिदिवसं स्वप्नावस्थायां स्वपतिं नलं पश्यतीति प्रतिपाद्य तदव्यवहितोत्तरेण

“निमीलितादक्षियुगाच्च निद्रया

हृदोऽपि बाह्येन्द्रियमौनमुद्रितात् ।

अर्दशि संगोप्य कदाप्यवीक्षितो

रहस्यमस्याः स महन्महीपतिः ॥”

(1.40)

इति पद्येन स्वप्ने दमयन्त्या दृष्टं नलस्य रूपं न वास्तवमिति तद्वाधपुरःसरं रहस्य-भूतमबाधितं नलस्वरूपं प्रदर्शयते । तथा हि—‘निमीलितादक्षियुगात्संगोप्य’ इत्यनेन जाग्रदवस्था व्यावर्तिता । ‘कदाप्यवीक्षितः’ जाग्रत्स्वप्नावस्थयोरदृष्टो महारहस्य-भूतोऽपरिच्छिन्नानन्दस्वरूपः स महीपतिर्नलो दमयन्त्यै सुषुप्त्या प्रदर्शितः । सर्वा-सूपनिषत्सु सुषुप्तौ सर्वप्राणिनां विश्रमस्थानं यदनवच्छिन्नानन्दरूपं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादितं तन्महद्ब्रह्मस्य नल इति । किं च दमयन्त्याः परब्रह्मरूपनलप्राप्तौ परिपूर्णा साधनसंपदं प्रदर्शयति कविकुलचूडामणिः —

“कथाप्रसङ्गेषु मिथः सखीमुखा-

तृणोऽपि तन्व्या नलनामनि श्रुते ।

द्रुतं विधूयान्यदभूयतानया

मुदा तदाकर्णनसज्जकर्णया ॥”

(1.35)

इत्यात्मकेन मिथो गोष्ठीप्रसङ्गे सखीभिर्नलनामके तृणविशेष उक्तेऽपि भटित्यन्यत्सर्वं दूरीकृत्य नलकथाश्रवणतत्परासीद्दमयन्तीत्यर्थबोधकेन पद्येन

“श्रुतः स दृष्टश्च हरित्सु मोहा-

दध्यातः स नीरन्ध्रतबुद्धिधारम् ।

ममाद्य तत्प्राप्तिरसुव्ययो वा

हस्ते तवास्ते द्वयमेकशेषः ॥”

(3.82)

इत्यात्मकेन दमयन्ती हंसं वदति — हे हंस, नलो मद्गृहमागतानां द्विजोत्तमानां मुखारविन्देभ्यो बहुधा श्रुतो विजातीयप्रत्ययानन्तरितसजातीयप्रत्ययप्रवाहरूपेण ध्यानेन विषयीकृतश्च । नलप्राप्तौ प्राणान्धरिष्यामि नो चेन्न । एतद्वयं तव हस्ते वर्तते । तयोरुभयोरन्यतरं शेषय इत्यर्थकेन पद्येन च । आभ्यां नलरूपब्रह्मविषयक-श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनसंपन्ना जीवात्मस्थानापन्ना दमयन्तीति प्रतिपाद्य ब्रह्मप्राप्तौ साधनानि दर्शितानीति । श्री Phyllis Granoff महाभागाः पण्डितानां विस्मयावहेनैतादृशार्थप्रदर्शनेनात्मनः शास्त्रेषु कूलकषं पाण्डित्यं प्रतिभातिशयमनन्य-साधारणं व्याख्यानचातुर्यं च प्राचीकशन् । तासां व्याख्यानपद्धतौ न कोऽपि दोषमुद्धाटयितुमीष्टे ॥

छान्दोग्योपनिषदि षष्ठाध्याये द्वितीयखण्डे “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तद्वैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तस्मादसतः सज्जायत । कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” इति दृश्यमानं वाक्यजातं स्पष्टतयासतः कारणत्वं खण्डयत् सतः कारणत्वं व्यवस्थापयति । श्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादा असत्कारणवादं बहुधा खण्डयित्वा ब्रह्मसूत्रोप-निषद्भाष्यादिषु सत्कारणवादं व्यवस्थापयामासुः । तदवाचीनाः सर्वेऽपि ब्रह्मादिनः

सत्कारणवादपक्षमेवाद्विद्यन्ते । प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि जगतः सत्त्वं बोधयन्ति । श्रुतिस्तावद्वैतं निषिध्याद्वैतं बोधयति । यदि श्रुत्या प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां सर्वथा प्रामाण्यमपह्नियेत लोके व्यवहारविप्लवः स्यात् । लोकस्तावत् प्रमाणेन प्रमितेऽर्थे प्रवृत्त्य समीहितमर्थं साधयति । अतः सर्वात्मना प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यापहारो नाङ्गीकृतो ब्रह्मवादिभिः । ते च व्यवहारोपपत्तये द्वितीयस्य प्रपञ्चस्य व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । सत्त्वं नाम बाधाभावः । कालत्रयेऽपि यस्य बाधो नास्ति तत्पारमार्थिकसत्, व्यवहारदशायां यस्य बाधो नास्ति परमार्थदशायां बाधोऽस्ति तद्व्यावहारिकसत्, यस्य च व्यवहारदशायामेव बाधोऽस्ति तत्प्रातिभासिक सदिति त्रिविधसत्त्वमङ्गीकृत्य व्यावहारिक-प्रातिभासिकसत्त्वयोरुपपत्तयेऽनिर्वचनीयपदार्थोत्पत्तिं च मन्वते । द्वैतप्रपञ्चस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम् । द्वैतस्य ज्ञानेन बाध्यमानत्वात्सत्त्वं नोपपद्यते । प्रतीयमानत्वाच्छ-शशङ्कादितुल्यमत्यन्तासत्त्वमपि न संभवति । अतः सदसद्विलक्षणत्वरूपस्तृतीयः प्रकारोऽङ्गीक्रियते । व्यावहारिकसत्त्वाङ्गीकारेण प्रपञ्चमृष्टिमुपपाद्य ब्रह्मणः कारणत्वप्रतिपादकान्यौपनिषदानि वाक्यानि सङ्गतानि भवन्तीति ।

इमं ब्रह्मवादिनां सत्कारणवादं श्रीहर्षो नाङ्गीकुरुते । खण्डनग्रन्थारम्भे “प्रमाणादयः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्ततया सिद्धाः पदार्थाः सन्तीति कथकाभ्यामभ्युपेयम्” इति सत्कारणवादिभिरुपक्षितं पक्षमसत्कारणवादिनां माध्यमिकानां पक्षमवलम्ब्य खण्डयति । प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्य वाग्व्यवहारः प्रवर्तनीय इति पक्षखण्डनावसरे “सौज्यमपूर्वं प्रमाणादिसत्त्वानभ्युपगमात्मा वास्तम्भनमन्त्रो भवताभ्यूहितो नूनं यस्य प्रभावात् ..... भगवत्पादेन वा बादरायणीयेषु सूत्रेषु भाष्यं नाभाषि” इति वदंश्छ्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादानामप्यसत्कारणवादोऽभिमत इति मन्यते ।

“परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः” इत्युक्तरीत्या सत्त्वनिषेधेऽसत्त्वमसत्त्वनिषेधे सत्त्वमिति नियमानुरोधाल्लोके सदसदिति प्रकारद्वयमेव वर्तते । सर्वकालाबाध्यत्वं सत्त्वम् । तच्चाद्वैतस्य ब्रह्मण एव । असत्त्वं च द्वैतस्य । असदपि द्वेधा वर्णयितुं शक्यते । क्वचिदप्यप्रतीयमानमत्यन्तासच्छशशङ्कादि । प्रतीयमानं बाध्यं च घटपटादीति । सदसद्विलक्षणत्वरूपं तृतीयं प्रकारं व्यावहारिकसत्तां च खण्डनकारो नाभ्युपगच्छति । तस्यायमभिप्रायः । अधिष्ठाने ब्रह्मणि प्रतीयमानः प्रपञ्चो मिथ्येत्यद्वैतवादिनः सर्वे वर्णयन्ति । मिथ्यात्वं च प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वम् । यत्र यत्प्रतीयते तत्रैव कालत्रयेऽपि तन्नास्तीति यावत् । व्यावहारिकसत्तां प्रातिभासिकसत्तां चाङ्गीकुर्वाणा अपि प्रतीयमानानां त्रैकालिकनिषेधमुपगच्छन्त्येव । अतस्त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगिनां पदार्थानां सत्त्वाङ्गीकारापेक्षयासत्त्वाङ्गीकारः समुचितः असत्त्वसाधनाय च प्रमाणं नान्वेषणीयम् । व्यवहारस्तु प्रतीयमानैरेव पदार्थैः सिध्यति । व्यवहारगोचराणां पदार्थानां सत्तां विनैव संवृत्तिसत्त्वरूपात् सत्त्वज्ञानादेव प्रवृत्त्यादिकमुपपादयितुं शक्यत एव । यदि प्रपञ्चस्यासत्त्वमङ्गीक्रियते

प्रातिभासिकव्यावहारिकयोर्वैलक्षण्यं न सिध्येत् । उभयोरप्यसत्त्वाविशेषात् । न कोऽपि लोके शुक्तिरजतादितौल्यं घटपटादिप्रपञ्चस्य मनुते । शुक्तिरजतमसत्यं घटपटादिकं सत्यमिति चावगच्छति । अतः प्रपञ्चस्य व्यावहारिकसत्तानङ्गीकारे सर्वव्यवहारविप्लवः स्यदिति क्रियमाणा माशङ्कां श्रद्दहर्ष एवं समादधाति ।

व्यवहारस्योपपत्तये सत्त्वज्ञानमेवापेक्षितं न तु पदार्थसत्त्वम् । व्यावहारिकप्रातिभासिकयोरसतोरपि बाधे विलम्बाविलम्बौ वैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शकौ । सत्त्वज्ञानरूपभ्रमविषयमसन्तं पदार्थमेव “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते” इत्यादिसृष्टिश्रुतयोऽनुवदन्ति । द्वैतं कार्यमसन्मन्यमानः श्रीहर्षः खण्डनकारस्तत्कारणस्य सत्त्वं नाङ्गीकुरुते । वैतण्डिकः सन्द्वैतस्य सत्त्वं वासत्त्वं वा स्वयं नैव साधयति । प्रपञ्चसत्त्ववादिभिर्नैयायिकप्रभृतिभिर्नैव सत्त्वमुच्यते तत्खण्डयते । सत्त्वासत्त्वरूपं प्रकारद्वयमेव न तृतीयः प्रकार इति परैरङ्गीकारात्कारणत्वादिनाभिमतानां पदार्थानां श्रीहर्षेण कृतं सत्त्वखण्डनमसत्त्वे पर्यवस्यति । न तावतायमसत्त्वं व्यवस्थापयति ।

असत्कारणपक्षमभ्युपगच्छतः श्रीहर्षस्य मते “यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत्प्रयन्त्यभिर्संविशन्ति” “तत्सृष्ट्वा । तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य । सच्च त्वच्चाभवत्” इत्यादितैत्तिरीयश्रुतीनां, “कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” “तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति” “सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिषो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति” इति छान्दोग्यश्रुतीनां च का गतिरिति चेदुच्यते । प्रपञ्चसत्त्ववादिनां मतेऽपि प्रपञ्चगोचरप्रवृत्त्यादिव्यवहारे प्रपञ्चसत्ता न कारणमपि तु तत्सत्त्वज्ञानमेव । सत्त्ववादिनस्तज्ज्ञानं प्रमां मत्वा तद्विषयाणामपि सत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । असत्त्ववादिनस्तादृशं सत्त्वज्ञानं भ्रम इति कथयन्ति । भ्रमात्मककार्यसत्त्वज्ञानानुरोधेन कारणेऽपि संवृतिसत्त्वात्मकं सत्त्वज्ञानमभ्युपगम्यत एव । तावता कारणत्वेनाभिमते निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मणि भ्रान्तिसिद्धः सत्त्वधर्मोऽणुमात्रेणापि न संबध्यते । बौद्धवन्निरधिष्ठानभ्रममनङ्गीकर्तृणामद्वैतिनामविद्यादशायां कार्यसत्तामतिमनुरुध्य कारणे ब्रह्मणि सत्त्वप्रकारकभ्रमविशेषत्वमभ्युपगम्य श्रुतिर्वदति “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्” इति । यथा वस्तुतोऽसत्पदार्थगोचरप्रवृत्तावपि सत्त्वप्रकारकज्ञानमेव कारणत्वेनापेक्ष्यते न तथासत्त्वप्रकारकज्ञानमिति लोकानुभवमनुसृत्य “कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति” इति श्रुतिः ‘सत्’ सत्त्वप्रकारकज्ञानविशेष्यभूतं कार्यं ‘असतः’ असत्त्वप्रकारकविकल्पविषयात् कथं जायेतेत्याक्षिप्य सत्त्वप्रकारकज्ञानविशेष्यादेव कारणाज्जायत इति “सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्” इति परिहारं संपाद्य “एकमेवाद्वितीयम्” इति सत्त्वासत्त्वादिसकलद्वितीयशून्यं स्वप्रकाशमखण्डानन्दरूपं ब्रह्मेत्युपसंहरतीति ॥

नन्वेवं सति “सौगतब्रह्मवादिनोरयं विशेषो यदादिमः सर्वमेवानिर्वचनीयं वर्णयति । तदुक्तं भगवता लङ्कावतारे

‘बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।

अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः ॥’

इति । विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तं पुनरिदं विश्वं सदसद्भ्यां विलक्षणं ब्रह्मवादिनः संगिरन्ते । तथा हि — नेदं सद्भूवितुमर्हति । वक्ष्यमाणदूषणग्रस्तत्वात् । नाप्यसदेव । तथा सति लौकिकविचारकाणां सर्वव्यवहारव्याहृत्यापत्तेः” “न वयं भेदस्य सर्वथैवासत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छामः । किं नाम । न पारमार्थिकं सत्त्वम् । अविद्याविद्यमानत्वं तु तदीयमिष्यत एव । तदेव च कार्यकारणभावोपयोगि” “स्यादप्येष पर्यनुयोगो यद्यविद्याविद्यमानभावं भेदं पारमार्थिकमभेदमिच्छन्तोऽपि प्रत्यादिशामः” “अस्त्येव ह्यविद्याविद्यमाने घटतज्ज्ञाने बाध्यत्वम्” “अविद्याव्यवस्थिता तु तज्जन्यता न पारमार्थिकेन तदजन्यत्वेन विरुध्यते” “अद्वैतं हि पारमार्थिकम् । इदं पारमार्थिकेन भेदेन विरुध्येत न त्वविद्याविद्यमानेन । तस्मादविद्याव्यवस्थितं भेदं तद्वोधं चोपजीवन्त्या न परमार्थाद्वैतबुद्धेरुपजीव्यबाधः” “तदेवं भेदप्रपञ्चोऽनिर्वचनीयः । ब्रह्मैव तु परमार्थसदद्वितीयम्” इति वदन् खण्डनकारः स्वयमविद्यादशायां प्रपञ्चस्य सदसद्विलक्षणत्वरूपमनिर्वचनीयत्वं व्यावहारिकसत्तां चाङ्गीकरोत्येव । किं च सत्त्ववादिनानिर्वचनीयत्ववादिनं प्रत्यन्ततोऽनिर्वचनीयत्वस्य सत्ताङ्गीकृतैव भवतेति कृतमाक्षेपं परिहर्तुमभिहितेन “तदेतदनाकलितपराभिसंधेः प्रत्यवस्थानम् । यो हि सर्वमनिर्वचनीयसदसत्त्वं ब्रूते स कथमनिर्वचनीयतासत्त्वव्यवस्थितौ पर्यनुयुज्येत । सापि हि कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चपरसर्वशब्दाभिधेयमध्यनिविष्टैव । परस्यैव तु व्यवस्थयैवं पर्यवस्यति — निर्वचनप्रतिक्षेपादननिर्वचनीयत्वम्, विधिनिषेधयोरेकतरनिरासस्येतरपर्यवसायितायास्तेनाभ्युपेतत्वात् । ततः परकीयरीत्येदमुच्यते अनिर्वचनीयत्वं विश्वस्य पर्यवस्यतीति” इति वाक्यसंदर्भेण स्पष्टतया ज्ञायते यच्छ्रीहर्षस्य सदसद्विलक्षणत्वरूपमनिर्वचनीयत्वमभिमतमेवेति । तस्माच्छ्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाभिः खण्डनग्रन्थवास्तवार्थप्रतिपादनपरे स्वकीये निबन्धेऽसत्कारणवादोपक्षेप्तुः खण्डनकारस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं व्यावहारिकसत्त्वं चानभिमतमेवेति यत्प्रतिपादनं तत्कथं संगच्छत इति केचिदाक्षिपेयुः । तमाक्षेपमेवं समादधति श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाः स्वकीये निबन्धे । तथा हि—

“वस्तुतस्तु वयं सर्वप्रपञ्चसत्त्वासत्त्वव्यवस्थापननिवृत्ताः स्वतःसिद्धे चिदात्मनि ब्रह्मतत्त्वे केवले भरमवलम्ब्य चरितार्थाः सुखमास्महे” इति वदन् खण्डनकारस्तुशब्देन पूर्वोक्तब्रह्मवादिमतापेक्षयात्मनो वैलक्षण्यं प्रकाशयन्कुत्रापि सत्त्वव्यवस्थापने वासत्त्वव्यवस्थापने वा न मम प्रवृत्तिरपितु स्वतः सिद्धे स्वप्रकाशे ब्रह्मणि केवले सुखेन स्थित इति निरूपयति । अयं यत्र यत्र ब्रह्म परमार्थसदिति वदति तत्र तत्र ब्रह्मणि पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं न व्यवस्थापयति । एतन्मते पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं व्यावहारिकसत्त्वं प्रातिभासिकसत्त्वमिति प्रकारत्रयं नास्त्येव । पारमार्थिकसदिति पदेन स्वतः सिद्धं स्वप्रकाशं ब्रह्मोच्यते । यत्र भेदप्रपञ्चस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वमुल्लिखति तत्र विधिनिषेधयोरेकतरनिरासस्येतरपर्यवसायितेति



परोक्तरीत्या निर्वचनीयत्वाभावमभिप्रैति । भेदस्य बहुत्र विशेषणतयाविद्याविद्यमानत्व-  
मभिधत्ते । संप्रदायानुसारिणो यथा 'अविद्यायां' भावरूपेज्ञाने सति 'विद्यमानं' वर्तमानं  
सदितिव्यावहारिकसत्ताबोधकत्वेनाविद्याविद्यमानपदं व्याख्यान्ति न तथा व्याख्यातव्यम् ।  
अविद्यापदस्यानादिवासनासिद्धो भ्रमोऽर्थः । ज्ञानार्थकविद्धातोर्निष्पन्नस्य विद्यमानेतिपदस्य  
प्रतीयमानमित्थं । अविद्याविद्यमानेतिपदस्य भ्रान्त्या प्रतीयमानं भ्रमविषय इत्यर्थः ।  
भ्रान्तिसिद्धस्य न कोऽपि सत्तामभ्युपगच्छति । अत एव सत्त्वासत्त्वव्यवस्थापनाद्विनिवृत्ता  
वयमिति कथयति श्रीहर्षः । "व्यावहारिकीं प्रमाणादिसत्तामादाय विचारारम्भः" इति  
खण्डनग्रन्थं दृष्ट्वायं ग्रन्थकारः 'प्रमाणादीनां' लोकसिद्धपदार्थानां 'व्यावहारिकी'  
व्यवहारकालेऽबाध्यां सत्तामभ्युपगच्छत्येवेति बहूनामनाकलिततत्पूर्ववाक्यानां भ्रमो  
भवति । "कतिपयप्रतिपत्तृकतिपयकालतथात्वावगमादेव प्रायेण लौकिको व्यवहारः  
प्रतीयते । तादृशश्चायं सत्त्वावगमः कथाङ्गः" इति पूर्ववाक्यमस्ति । विचारस्याङ्गत्वेन  
प्रमाणादिसत्ता नापेक्ष्यतेऽपि तु भ्रान्तिरूपं सत्त्वज्ञानमेव । सत्त्वावगमस्यैव कथाङ्गत्ववर्णने  
प्रमाणतया बौद्धग्रन्थानां वाक्यमुल्लिखति "एतत्तदुच्यते व्यावहारिकीं प्रमाणादिसत्ता-  
मादाय विचारारम्भः" इति । अस्य वाक्यस्य प्रवृत्त्याद्युपयोगि प्रमाणादिसत्त्वज्ञानं  
कारणत्वेन स्वीकृत्य विचारारम्भ इत्यर्थः" इति ॥

लौकिका विचारकाश्च सर्वे ज्ञानमवलम्ब्यैव व्यवहरन्ति । तच्च ज्ञानं लोके विषय-  
रूपितमेवानुभूयते । ज्ञानस्वरूपनिरूपणविषये शास्त्रकारा विप्रतिपद्यन्ते । नैयायिकास्तावत्  
— निराकारं ज्ञानं सर्वदा विषयेणैव निरूप्यते । अत एव "न ग्राह्यभेदमवधूय धियोऽस्ति  
वृत्तिः" इत्युदयनाचार्याः । तच्च ज्ञानमात्मविशेषगुणः समवायसंबन्धेनात्मन्युत्पद्यते ।  
क्षणद्वयमवस्थाय नश्यति । तच्चास्वप्रकाशं ज्ञानान्तरेणैव गृह्यते — इति वदन्ति ।  
भट्टमीमांसकानां मुरारिमिश्राणां मते च ज्ञानमस्वप्रकाशमेव । यतो भट्टमते विषयगतया  
ज्ञाततया फलेनात्मगतमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानमनुमीयते । मुरारिमिश्रमते व्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं  
नैयायिकवदेवानुव्यवसायेनैव गृह्यते । प्राभाकरमीमांसका ज्ञानं सविषयकं स्वप्रकाशं च  
वदन्ति । तन्मते ज्ञाने ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं ज्ञातेति त्रिपुटी भासते । बहुव्रीहिसमाससिद्धपदं प्रधान-  
मन्यपदार्थमेव प्रतिपादयति न गुणीभूतं पदार्थम् । अथापिल म्बकर्णेति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहु-  
व्रीहिस्थले समासपदाप्रतिपाद्यमपि गुणभूतं लम्बकर्णमादायैव समासपदं स्वप्रतिपाद्यं प्रधान-  
मन्यपदार्थं प्रतिपादयतीति यथा वैयाकरणा वदन्ति तथामी अपि घटमहं जानामीति  
घटविषयकं व्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं स्वाविषयं ज्ञानमात्मानं चादायैव स्वविषयघटादि-  
व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयतीति ।

बौद्धप्रभेदो योगाचारोऽपि ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशं वदति । आचार्यधर्मकीर्तिज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाश-  
तामेवं साधयति — ज्ञानेन विषयः प्रतीयत इत्यविवादम् । विषयज्ञानयोर्मध्ये किंचन  
ग्राह्यं किंचन ग्राहकमस्ति । ग्राह्यग्राहकयोः सारूप्यं विना तद्भावं एव न संभवति ।

यत्किञ्चित्सारूप्यं संपाद्य ग्राह्यग्राहकभावोक्तौ द्वयोः पाषाणयोरपि यत्किञ्चित्सारूप्यमस्तीति ग्राह्यग्राहकभाव आपद्येत । अतः सर्वात्मना सारूप्यं वक्तव्यम् । यदि ज्ञानस्य विषयरूप-  
तामभ्युपगम्य ग्राह्यग्राहकभाव उपवर्ण्येत तदा विषयस्य जडरूपत्वाज्ज्ञानमस्वप्रकाशं  
संपद्येत । अतो विषयस्य ज्ञानरूपतां संपाद्य ग्राह्यग्राहकभावो वर्णनीयः । तदा विषयो ज्ञायत  
इत्युक्तौ ज्ञानेन स्वमेव ज्ञायत इत्यर्थः संपद्यते । ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यत्वे तस्याप्यन्यज्ञान-  
वेद्यत्वमित्यनवस्था प्रसज्येत । तस्माज्ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमित्येवाभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । तच्च ज्ञानं  
ग्राह्यग्राहकोभयस्वभावम् । एकस्मिन्नेव ज्ञाने प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमितिर्व्यवहारः परिसमाप्यते ।  
ज्ञानस्य विषयाकारता प्रमेयम् । ग्राहकाकारता प्रमाणम् । स्वसंवित्तिश्च फलम् । यथोक्तम्—

“यदाभासं प्रमेयं तत्प्रमाणफलते पुनः ।

ग्राहकाकारसंवित्त्योस्त्रयं नातः पृथक् कृतम् ॥”

इति । अनाद्यविद्यावासनाविलासविपर्यासिततत्त्वदर्शनतया ज्ञानमेव ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्ति-  
भेदवदिव लक्ष्यते । अविद्याविरतौ तु स्वच्छमेव तत्संपद्यते । तदुक्तम् —

“नान्योज्जुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात् स्वयमेव प्रकाशते ॥

अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥”

इत्यर्थरूपरहितं संविन्मात्रं क्षणिकसंतानात्मकं पश्यन् दुःखसंसृतिं परिहृत्याभयं निर्वाण-  
माप्नोतीति योगाचाराः ।

जैना अपि स्वपरावभासि ज्ञानमिति वदन्तो ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशं वर्णयन्ति । उक्तं च  
प्रमाणमीमांसायाम् (1.1.3) — अर्थोन्मुखतयेव स्वोन्मुखतयापि ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासात्  
स्वनिर्णायकत्वमप्यस्ति । नन्वनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः । मैवं वोचः ।  
ज्ञातुर्ज्ञातृत्वेनेवानुभूतेरनुभूतित्वेनैवानुभवात् । न चानुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वं दोषः । अर्थापेक्षयानु-  
भूतित्वात् । स्वापेक्षयानुभाव्यत्वात् ... न च स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधः । अनुभवसिद्धेऽर्थे  
विरोधासिद्धेः । अनुमानाच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धिः । तथा हि ‘ज्ञानं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति  
प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत्’ इति ।

शङ्करभगवत्पादा ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्ये (2.2.28) उत्पत्तिविनाशशालिनो विज्ञानस्य स्वयं-  
सिद्धसाक्षिभास्यत्वं निरूपयन्ति । तत्रैव भामत्यां वाचस्पतिमिश्रा अप्यन्तःकरणविकारस्य  
जडात्मकस्यानुभवस्य स्वयंसिद्धसाक्षिभास्यत्वं सविस्तरं वर्णयन्ति ।

खण्डनकारो माध्यमिकपक्षमवलम्ब्य सत्कारणवादं खण्डयित्वा स्वप्रकाशवादोपक्रमे “अपरे  
पुनश्चेतसोऽपि शून्यताङ्गीकारे मनःप्रत्ययमनासादयन्तः सर्वमिदमसदेव विश्वमित्यभिधातुं  
सहसैवानुत्सहमाना मन्यन्ते — विज्ञानं तावत्स्वप्रकाशं स्वत एव सिद्धस्वरूपम्” इति

वदति । अस्यैव प्रकरणस्योत्तरत्र “तदेतत्तु श्रुत्या प्रमाणेनोपलक्षणन्यायात्तात्पर्यतः प्रकाशयते । तेन परमार्थतोऽभिधानाभिधेयभावविरहे तात्पर्यतः श्रुतिस्तस्मिन्नविद्यादशायां पराभ्युपगमरीत्या प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । वस्तुतस्तु स्वात्मसिद्धमेव चिद्रूपम्” इत्यादि च कथयति । उपक्रमगतवाक्यं दृष्ट्वा बहवो व्याख्यातारो विज्ञानवादिमतान्तराद्येन स्वप्रकाशवादमुपक्षिप्य ब्रह्मवादिमतेनोपसंहरतीति व्याख्यान्ति । प्रगल्भमिश्रो योगाचारमत-साधारण्येन स्वप्रकाशरूपं ब्रह्म साधयितुं वेदान्तिमतमाहेत्यवतारयन्त्यपरे पुनरिति ग्रन्थम् । केवलं वरदपण्डितो वेदान्तिमतमुपक्रमत इत्यवतारयत्यमुं ग्रन्थम् । श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदया नैकतन्त्राण्यालोड्योपलभ्यमानाभिः सर्वाभिव्याख्याभिः सह खण्डनग्रन्थमपि नैकवारं परिशील्य निरभिनिवेशं स्वकीये निबन्ध एतत्प्रकरणार्थं सम्यङ्ग्रूपयन् । तासामभिप्रायं संग्रहेण विवृणोमि ।

प्रायेण बहूनां व्याख्यातॄणां “सर्वमिदं विश्वमसदित्यभिधातुं सहसैवानुत्सहमानाः” इति “चेतसोऽपि शून्यताङ्गीकारे मनःप्रत्ययमनासादयन्तः” इति च वाक्यं दृष्ट्वा योगा-चाराणामभिप्रायकथनपरमिदमिति भ्रमः संजायते । तेषां भ्रान्तेरिदं कारणं भवितुमर्हति यद्ब्रह्मस्वप्रकाशतावादेन यद्युपक्रमस्तर्हि ब्रह्म चेतःपदेन नैवाभिदध्यादग्रन्थकारः । सर्वेऽपि शास्त्रकारा उत्पत्तिविनाशशीलमेव पदार्थं चेतःपदेन वर्णयन्तीति । तस्माद्योगाचारमत-साधारण्येन ज्ञानप्रकाशतां प्रारभ्याद्वैते ब्रह्मणि परिसमापयतीति युक्ततरं मन्यन्ते व्याख्यातारः । स्यादप्ययमभिप्रायो यदि शङ्करभगवत्पादतदनुयायिवच्छ्रीहर्षोऽज्ञातसत्ताकं प्रपञ्चं, तदाकारमन्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपमनुभवं, तस्य तदतिरिक्तस्वप्रकाशसाक्षिचैतन्यभास्यत्वं चाङ्गीकुर्यात् । अयं संप्रदायसिद्धं मतमुल्लङ्घयैवाभिनवगुप्ताचार्यवद्वटपटादिविषयकं सर्वं ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशं ब्रह्मचैतन्यं मन्यते । असत्कारणवादनिरूपणावसरेऽसदपि घटादिज्ञानमुप-पादकमिति वदतो ग्रन्थकारस्यायमभिप्रायः । यथा त्रिविधसत्ताया अङ्गीकर्तारो वेदान्ति-नोऽनुपहितचैतन्यस्य पारमार्थिकत्वेऽप्यन्तःकरणाद्युपाधेमिथ्यात्वेन तद्विशिष्टचैतन्यस्य जीवस्यापि न पारमार्थिकत्वं संभवतीति तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्थलेऽन्तःकरणादिरूपमुपाधि दूरीकृत्य त्वंपदलक्ष्यार्थस्य शुद्धस्य चैतन्यस्य तत्पदलक्ष्यार्थक्यमभिदधति तथा ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशब्रह्मचैतन्यस्य घटादिविषयरूपितत्वं संवृत्तिसिद्धम् । अतोऽसदर्थघटादिविषय-विशिष्टत्वेन भासमानं ज्ञानमपि भ्रान्तिरूपत्वेनासदिति ।

अयं योगाचारमतसिद्धस्य क्षणिकस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्व साधयितुं नैव प्रयतते । ज्ञान सामान्यं ब्रह्म चैतन्यं मन्यमानः प्रतीयमानविषयादेरसत्त्वं च विचिन्त्य वेदान्तिसिद्ध-ज्ञानस्यैव स्वप्रकाशत्ववर्णनपुरःसरं “तदेतत्तु श्रुत्या प्रमाणेनोपलक्षणन्यायात्तात्पर्यतः प्रकाशयते । ... स्वात्मसिद्धमेव चिद्रूपम्” इति ग्रन्थेन ब्रह्मत्वं द्रढयति । श्रीहर्षो ज्ञानस्य स्वतःचिद्रूपत्वमङ्गीकुर्वन्नपि तस्य स्वप्रकाशतासाधनार्थमनुमानमर्थापत्तिं च प्रमाणयति । तथा हि — न कोऽप्युदिते ज्ञाने ‘अहं जानामि वा न वा’ इति संदिग्धे, न वा ‘न जानामि’

इति विपर्यस्यति, नैव वा 'ज्ञानाभाववानहम्' इति प्रमिणोति । तस्माद्यत्र यत्र जिज्ञासितस्य ज्ञानस्य संशयविपर्ययव्यतिरेकप्रमाणामभावस्तत्र तत्र प्रमितत्वमित्यन्वयेन, यत्र यत्र प्रमितत्वाभावस्तत्र तत्र संशयविपर्ययव्यतिरेकप्रमाणामभावाभाव इति व्यतिरेकेण च संशय-विपर्ययव्यतिरेकप्रमाभावेषु प्रमितत्वनिरूपितव्याप्तिमवगत्यानुमिनोत्पुदितं घटादिज्ञानं प्रमितं तद्विषये संशयाद्यभावादिति । ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वं विना प्रमितत्वं नोपपद्यत इति प्रमितत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वं कल्पयति । न चानुव्यवसायेन व्यवसायग्रहणादन्यथापि (स्वप्रकाशत्वं विनापि) व्यवसायात्मकस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रमितत्वं शङ्कनीयम् । अगृहीतं ज्ञानं विषयं न प्रकाशयतीत्युत्सर्गनियमानुरोधेनानुव्यवसायस्यापि ग्रहणाय तदन्यज्ज्ञानं ग्राहकं कल्पनीयं तस्याप्यन्यदित्यनवस्था दुष्परिहरैव । तस्मादन्यथोपपत्त्यसंभवाज्ज्ञानस्य प्रमितत्वसिद्धये तदुपपादकं स्वप्रकाशत्वं कल्प्यते । विद्यासागरप्रभृतयो व्याख्यातारः प्रमाणानधीनप्रकाशत्वरूपं स्वप्रकाशत्वं वदतः श्रीहर्षस्य प्रमितत्वसाधकानुमानार्थापत्ति-प्रमाणविषयत्वाङ्गीकारे विरोधः स्पष्ट इति नैयायिकानामाक्षेपमुद्भावयन्ति । वस्तुतोऽनव-सरोऽयमाक्षेपः । यतोऽनत्रस्थाभीत्योदयनाचार्या ज्ञानं सर्वदा ज्ञेयमेवेति नियमं नाङ्गीकुर्वते । तन्मते पूर्वोक्तमनुमानमर्थापत्तिप्रमाणं च निर्दोषत्वेनाभिमतम् । अतो नैयायिकोक्तं प्रमाण-मनुवदन्तं श्रीहर्षं प्रति नैयायिकस्यायमाक्षेपोऽशक्यसंभवः । तस्माद्विद्यासागरप्रभृतीनां नैयायिकोक्ताक्षेपोद्घाटनग्रन्थो नाञ्जस्यं लभते ।

ज्ञानस्य नियमेन वेद्यत्वं नाङ्गीक्रियते । ज्ञानविषये प्रवृत्त्यादिस्तु ज्ञानगतया स्वरूपसत्तया जन्यत इति नानवस्थायाः प्रसक्तिरिति वदन्तं नैयायिकमेवं पृच्छति श्रीहर्षः — ज्ञान-सद्भावे यदि प्रमाणं नोपन्यस्यते तदा स्वरूपसत्तापि कथं सिध्येत् । प्रमाणाभावे सा वित्तिः सतीति को वक्तुं शक्नुयात् । असत्येव सा किमर्थं न भवतीति । इममाक्षेपं नैयायिक एवं समाधत्ते — घटादिविषयकज्ञान उदिते घटादिविशेषविषयकज्ञानत्वेन तत्सद्भावे प्रमाण-स्याप्रवृत्तावपि सामान्यतो ज्ञानं गृहीतमेव भवति । यतः पश्चादुदितज्ञानविषयिणी जिज्ञासा भवति । ज्ञानरूपधर्मिणः सामान्यतो ग्रहणं विना तत्र विशेषरूपेण जिज्ञासा नैवोदेतुमर्हति । जिज्ञासोत्तरं विशेषज्ञानसद्भावे घटादिविषयव्यवहारसत्ताथवा घटादिविषयकस्मरणं प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । समानविषयकज्ञानं विना समानविषयकप्रवृत्तिर्वा समानविषयस्मरणं वा नोपपद्यत इति ।

कस्मिन्न्यायग्रन्थे इदं समाधानमुपलभ्यत इति न कोऽपि व्याख्यातोदलिखत् । श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदया एवोदयनाचार्यैः प्रणीत आत्मतत्त्वविवेके कुसुमाञ्जली परिशुद्धौ चोपलभ्यमानमेकीकृत्य श्रीहर्षो नैयायिकपूर्वपक्षमुपक्षिपतीति विद्वज्जनहृदयङ्गमं न्यरूपयन् । तथा हि —

उदयनाचार्याः प्रमेयसद्भावेऽवश्यं प्रमाणेन भवितव्यमिति नियमो नास्तीति मन्यन्ते । यदि प्रमाणं विनापि प्रमेयसत्त्वमङ्गीक्रियते तदा दशमद्रव्यस्य सप्तमरसस्यापि

सत्त्वमापद्येतेत्याशङ्क्य व्यापकानुपलब्ध्या सप्तमरसादिर्नास्तीति वदन्ति । प्रथमं प्रमाणं विनापि प्रमेयसत्त्वमङ्गीकृत्य पश्चाद्व्यापकानुपलब्ध्या प्रमेयं नास्तीति वदद्भिर्बुद्धयनाचार्यैर्वक्तव्यं व्यापकानुपलम्भो विषयाभावप्रयुक्तो वा प्रमाणाभावप्रयुक्तो वेति । यदि विषयाभावप्रयुक्तस्तदा विषयाभावः कथं ज्ञातव्य इति प्रष्टव्यम् । तत्रापि व्यापकानुपलब्ध्येत्युक्ते इयं द्वितीया व्यापकानुपलब्धिः किंप्रयुक्तेति पुनःपर्यनुयोगः समस्त्येव । तत्रापि पुनर्विषयाभावादित्युक्तौ सोऽपि कथं ज्ञातव्यः । पुनर्व्यापकानुपलब्ध्येति चेदनवस्था । यदि प्रमाणाभावप्रयुक्तो व्यापकानुपलम्भस्तदा स्वोक्तनियममङ्ग इति मत्वा श्रीहर्ष उदयनाचार्यान् पृच्छति “घटसत्तां हि व्यवहरता प्रामाणिकेन तत्र प्रमाणसङ्कावो वाच्यः । यदि प्रमाणमनुपन्यस्य सास्तीत्यङ्गीक्रियते तदा वैपरीत्यमेव किं न स्यात् ... सर्वप्रमाणसत्तानिवृत्तेर्वस्तुसत्तानिवृत्तिनियतत्वात् । अन्यथा सप्तमरसादेरप्यापत्तेरिति व्यक्तमनवस्थादौःस्थ्यमस्वप्रकाशवादिनः स्यात्” इति ।

श्रुतिषु “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” “सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म” “ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्” इत्यादीनि बहून्यद्वैतब्रह्मप्रतिपादकानि वाक्यान्वुपलभ्यन्ते । श्रीमच्छङ्करभगवत्पादवाचस्पतिमिश्रप्रभृतीनां मतेनेमानि वाक्यानि ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तत्वेन प्रपञ्चो नास्तीति बोधयन्ति । “सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म” इत्यत्रापि बाधायां सामानाधिकरण्यं वर्णयन्ति श्रीशङ्कराचार्याः । ब्रह्मसूत्रे तदनन्यत्वाधिकरणे (2.1.14) वाचस्पतिमिश्राः कथयन्ति “अनन्यत्वमित्यनेन न वयमभेदं ब्रूमः किं तु भेदं व्यासेधामः” इति । प्रपञ्चो ब्रह्मैवेति वदन्तः श्रीशङ्करतदनुयायिनो ब्रह्म प्रपञ्च एवेति न वदन्ति । प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मानन्यत्वाङ्गीकारेऽपि न ते ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चानन्यत्वमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । तथाङ्गीकारे प्रपञ्चगतजाड्यादिधर्माणां ब्रह्मणि प्रसक्तिः स्याद्यतस्ते प्रपञ्चव्यावहारिकसत्तामङ्गीकुर्वन्ति । किं च सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणमिति न्यायेन ‘सर्वं ब्रह्म ब्रह्म सर्वम्’ इति वाक्यस्य ‘सर्वमेव ब्रह्म ब्रह्मैव सर्वम्’ इत्यर्थो वर्णनीयः । ‘ब्रह्मैव सर्वम्’ इत्युक्तौ परिच्छिन्नप्रपञ्चापेक्षया “त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि” इति श्रुत्युक्तप्रकारेण ब्रह्मणोऽतिशयितमहत्त्वात्प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मानन्यत्वोक्त्या न ब्रह्मणो महत्त्वहानिः । ‘सर्वमेव ब्रह्म’ इत्युक्तौ “पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि” इति श्रुत्युक्तप्रकारेण ब्रह्मपादांशभूतो यः प्रपञ्चः स एव ब्रह्मेत्यर्थः संपद्यते । तथा च ब्रह्मणो महत्त्वहानिः प्रसज्येतेति प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मानन्यत्वाङ्गीकारेऽपि न ब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चानन्यत्वमङ्गीकार्यमिति संप्रदायानुसारिवेदान्तिनां हृदयम् ।

श्रीहर्षो ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्याविद्याप्रतीयमानतात्मिकामसत्तां वदन्नविद्याप्रतीयमानप्रपञ्चानन्यत्वबोधनेऽपि ब्रह्मणि जाड्यप्रसक्तिर्महत्त्वहानिर्वा न सम्भवतीति मत्वा प्रपञ्चब्रह्मणोरभेदं मन्यमानः “सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म” इत्यादिवाक्यस्याभेदे सामानाधिकरण्यं मनुते । अयमभिनवगुप्तप्रणीतेषु ग्रन्थेषु कृतभूरिपरिश्रमस्तदुक्तन्यायान् संचार्य ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोरभेदं व्यवस्थापयति । किं च घटादेर्मृदनन्यत्वाङ्गीकारे मृदोऽपि घटाद्यनन्यत्वमर्थसिद्धमेव ।

अन्तःकरणाद्युपाधिर्ब्रह्मैवेति ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वेन तस्य सत्त्वं नास्तीति वदतां संप्रदायानुसारि-  
वेदान्तिनामन्तःकरणाद्युपाधिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्मसूत्रेषु “स्मृतेश्च” इत्यादिषु  
ब्रह्मान्यत्वं वर्णयतां विरोधः स्पष्ट एव । यतो विशेषणस्यान्तःकरणाद्युपाधेर्ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वेन  
सत्त्वानङ्गीकारे विशिष्टस्यापि जीवस्य भिन्नत्वेनासत्त्वमर्थसिद्धमेव । शिवपुराणेऽपि चतुर्थ-  
संहितायां त्रिचत्वारिंशोऽध्याये

“शिवः शिवः शिवश्चैव नान्यदस्तीति किञ्चन ।  
भ्रान्त्या नाना स्वरूपो हि भासते शङ्करस्तदा ॥  
यथा समुद्रो मृच्चैव सुवर्णमथवा पुनः ।  
उपाधितो हि नानात्वं लभते श रस्तथा ॥  
कार्यकारणयोर्भेदो वस्तुतो न प्रवर्तते ।  
केवलं भ्रान्तिबुद्ध्यैव तदभावे स नश्यति ॥  
सर्वं शिवः शिवः सर्वं नास्ति भेदश्च कश्चन ॥”

इति श्लोका दृश्यन्ते । “सर्वं शिवः शिवः सर्वं नास्ति भेदश्च कश्चन” इत्यंशः श्रीहर्षोक्तं  
ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोरभेदमेव द्रढयति । अद्वैतश्रुतिः सर्वात्मनाभेदं बोधयति । घटः पटाद्भिन्न इति  
प्रत्यक्षादि घटपटयोर्भेदं बोधयति । इदं घटपटभेदावगाहि प्रत्यक्षं घटपटयोरभेदावगाहि-  
ज्ञानस्यैव बाधकं भवितुमर्हति । एकस्मिन्विषय उदिता भेदविषयिणी प्रमा तत्रैवाभेदाव-  
गाहिनीं मतिं बाधत इत्युत्सर्गनियमः । अद्वैतश्रुतिर्घटपटभेदप्रत्यक्षस्य तद्विषयघटपटतद्भे-  
देभ्योऽभेदबोधने निराबाधं प्रवर्तते । घटः पटाद्भिन्न इति प्रत्यक्षं घटपटयोरेव भेदमवगाहते  
न तु स्वस्माद्धटपटयोर्भेदमवगाहते । घटात्पटाच्च ज्ञानस्याभेदे बोधिते सति तदभिन्नाभिन्नस्य  
तदभिन्नत्वमिति न्यायेन घटाभिन्नज्ञानाभिन्नपटस्य घटाभिन्नत्वं सिध्यत्येव ।

एवं नैयायिकप्रभृतीनां भेदवादिनां मते निरस्ते सति सर्वस्य वस्तुनः परस्परं भेदाभेदादी  
जैनः शङ्कते — घटपटादिभेदावगाहि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हतीति । तन्मतं “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र  
आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” इत्यत्र “एकमिप्युपादाय यदेवकारमप्युपादत्ते श्रुतिरेकमेवेदमतिरूपा  
तदैकान्तिकमैक्यं बोधयतीति भेदाभेदेनाप्यशक्यसमर्थनं घटपटादिभेदावगाहिप्रत्यक्षादि-  
प्रामाण्यं” इति खण्डयति ग्रन्थकारः ।

श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदया विना न कोऽपि व्याख्याता कुत्र कुत्र कस्य कस्य मत-  
मनूद्य खण्डयतीति प्रतिपादयति । अस्मिन्नद्वैतप्रकरणेऽपि तासां व्याख्यानचातुरी सर्वाति-  
शायिनी प्रकाशते ।

श्रीहर्षोऽद्वैतपदेनाभेदमभिप्रेति । तं चाभेदमुत्तरत्र “तच्चाद्वैतं ‘ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वं’ इति  
श्रुत्यर्थेन सहैक्यमापन्नं ब्रह्मैव स्यात् । ‘विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म’ इति श्रुत्या च ज्ञानात्मकतया  
व्यवतिष्ठते” इति ग्रन्थेन ज्ञानानन्दात्मकं ब्रह्मेत्युपसंहरति । श्रीहर्षः संप्रदायानुसारिमत-

मुल्लङ्घ्यैव सर्वस्याभेदमुपपाद्य तं चाभेदं ब्रह्मात्मनोपसंहरन् ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोरात्यन्तिकमैक्य-  
मुपवर्णितवानिति स्वकीये निबन्धे ताभिर्नैकयुक्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं व्यवस्थापितम् । स्थाली-  
पुलाकन्यायेन किञ्चिदिव मया प्रदर्शितम् । अधिकं तु तदीयग्रन्थतोऽवगन्तव्यं सुधीभिः ।

श्रीहर्षो ग्रन्थान्ते “ग्रन्थग्रन्थिरिह क्वचित्क्वचिदपि न्यासि प्रयत्नान्मया” इति वदति ।  
खण्डनग्रन्थस्य च महद्भिराचार्यैः प्रणीता बह्व्यष्टीका वर्तन्ते । तास्ववलोकितासु खण्डने  
ग्रन्थकारेण कुत्र कुत्र ग्रन्थः स्थापित इति न वयमवगन्तुं शक्नुमः । श्री Phyllis Granoff  
महाभागानां निबन्धदर्शनानन्तरं त्वस्मिन् ग्रन्थे तादृशग्रन्थः कुत्र कुत्रेति सम्यगवयमव-  
गच्छामः । श्रीहर्षहृदयं यथा श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदया जानन्ति न तथान्य  
इत्युक्तिर्नातिशयोक्तिरिति तदीयनिबन्धं परिशीलयतां स्पष्टं भायादेव । खण्डने बहुषु स्थलेषु  
ग्रन्थकाराभिप्रायमविदित्वा व्याख्यातारो ग्रन्थार्थं विवृण्वन्ति । श्री Phyllis Granoff  
महोदया एव ग्रन्थकृदाशयं यथावदुद्घाटयन्ति । तेषु कानिचन स्थलानीह प्रदर्श्यन्ते ।  
तथाहि —

उत्पत्तेः प्राक्कालीनं सामग्रीसत्त्वं कार्यजन्मनो नियामकम् । तथा दर्शनात् । इति वदन्तं  
नैयायिकं प्रति श्रीहर्षस्य “तर्हि ममापि कालान्तरस्थमपि तदसत्त्वं तदातनकार्यजन्मनो  
नियामकम् । तथा दर्शनादेव” इत्युत्तरं दृश्यते । श्रीचित्सुखाचार्या अस्य ग्रन्थस्य “यथा तव  
सामग्रीक्षणोत्तरक्षणत्वाविशेषेऽपि प्रथमक्षण एव कार्यजन्म नोत्तरेष्वेवं मम कारणस्यासत्त्वा-  
विशेषेऽपि पूर्वक्षणावच्छिन्नमेव तदसत्त्वं कार्यजन्मनो नियामकं तथा दृष्टत्वात्” इत्याशयं  
वर्णयन्ति । शङ्करमिश्रा अपि चित्सुखाचार्यवत्सामग्र्याः कार्योत्पत्त्यव्यवहितप्राक्क्षण एव  
सत्त्वमङ्गीकृत्येवं ग्रन्थं व्याख्यान्ति । सामग्र्याः क्षणिकत्वं कार्योत्पत्त्यव्यवहितप्राक्क्षणा-  
वच्छेदेन सामग्रीघटकस्य फलोपधायकस्यादृष्टस्य सत्त्वेन वाद्ध्यप्रतिबन्धकविनाशस्योत्पत्त्या  
वा वक्तव्यम् । तच्च नैयायिकसिद्धान्तविरुद्धम् । यत उदयनाचार्यास्तदीयग्रन्थेषु पदार्थानां  
स्थिरत्वं स्थापयितुं बहुप्रकारेण क्षणिकत्ववादं खण्डयन्ति । श्रीहर्षादवाचीनेन वर्धमानोपाध्या-  
येन “प्रागभावेतरयावत्कादाचित्कारणप्रागभावानाधारः कार्यप्रागभावाधारः क्षणः सामग्री”  
इति वर्णितं सामग्रीलक्षणमत्र स्वीकृत्य श्रीहर्षग्रन्थखण्डनं शङ्करमिश्राणामनुचितमेव । किं  
चैतादृशक्षणं सामग्रीत्वेनोपपाद्य “सामग्री सत्त्वं पूर्वक्षणमात्रे” इति वदंश्शङ्करमिश्रा एकस्यैव  
क्षणस्याधाराधेयभाववर्णनेन प्रसक्तं स्वस्थित्यपेक्षस्वस्थिकत्वरूपमात्माश्रयं कथं वारयितुं  
शक्नुयुः । यत आधारस्थित्यपेक्षाधेयस्थितिरिति । क्षणिकत्वाक्षणिकत्वरूपप्रकारद्वयस्यैव  
सत्त्वेन सामग्र्याः क्षणिकत्वाङ्गीकारेऽक्षणिकत्वसिद्धान्तभङ्गः । अक्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमे क्षणिक-  
त्वभङ्गः । “परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः” इति न्यायेनोक्तप्रकारद्वयोत्तीर्णतृतीय-  
प्रकाराभावान्नैयायिकानां सदसद्विलक्षणत्वरूपप्रकारखण्डनमशक्यं भवेदिति वर्धमानोक्त-  
सामग्रीलक्षणमसङ्गतमेव । वर्धमानोपाध्यायेन श्रीहर्षोक्तमाक्षेपं निरसितुमेवैतादृशं सामग्री-  
लक्षणमुल्लिखितमिति प्रतिभाति । यतः श्रीहर्षात्पूर्वतनन्यायनिबन्धनेष्विव लक्षणं नोपलभ्यते ।

यदि खण्डनकारात्पूर्वमेव सामग्रीलक्षणमिदमभविष्यत्तदा श्रीहर्षस्य नैयायिकोक्तसामग्री-सत्त्वनियामकताखण्डनप्रकारो नैवावकाशमलप्स्यत । कार्योत्पत्त्यव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणे रूपसामग्री न कार्योत्पत्त्यव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणे तिष्ठेत् । सामग्र्याः कार्यात्प्राक्सत्त्वमङ्गीकुर्वतां नैयायिकानां पक्षं खण्डयता ग्रन्थकारेणैतादृशक्षणे रूपसामग्री नाभिप्रेतेति श्रीशङ्करमिश्राणां व्याख्यान-मप्यव्याख्यानम् । “सामग्रीसत्त्वं पूर्वक्षणेमात्रे । तदसत्त्वं च सार्वत्रिकमिति महद्वैषम्यम्” इति श्रीहर्षं खण्डयित्वा “तथापि कार्यमप्यसदेवेति हृदयम्” इति शङ्करमिश्राणां ग्रन्थ-काराभिप्रायवर्णनं नैव समञ्जसं भवति ।

“ममपि कालान्तरस्थमपि तदसत्त्वं तदातनकार्यजन्मनो नियामकम् । तथा दर्शनादेव” इति ग्रन्थेन स्वपक्षस्य नैयायिकपक्षसामग्र्योक्त्यर्थप्यसङ्गता तथापि नैयायिको यं सन्तं वदति तं श्रीहर्षः पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाभावेनासदित्युक्त्वा तस्य कार्यकारणभावोपपत्तये व्यावहारिक-सत्तामङ्गीकरोति । अतो द्वयोः पक्षयोः साम्यम् — इति भूषामणिकारैः कृत ग्रन्थकाराशय-वर्णनमप्यत्यन्तमसङ्गतम् । श्रीहर्षो वैतण्डिकः सन् कथायां प्रवृत्तः सत्कारणवादखण्डन-प्रसङ्गेऽसत्कारणं भवितुमर्हतीति वदति । कारणत्वसाधनाय यदि व्यावहारिकसत्ता-मङ्गीकुर्यात्तदा पक्षरूपेऽसति व्यावहारिकसत्तारूपहेतोरसिद्धिः । असिद्धिवारणाय पक्षे हेतोः साधने वैतण्डिकत्वबङ्गः । यत्र सत्ता नास्ति तदसदिति लक्षणलक्षितमेवास्त्यदार्थं स्वीकृत्य तस्य कारणत्वं कथयति ग्रन्थकारः । उभयोः पक्षयोर्यदि साम्यं तदा सतोऽसदिति नामान्तरं प्रकल्प्य कारणत्वोक्तौ सत्कारणवादो नैव खण्डितः स्यात् । तस्मान्न कोऽपि व्याख्याता ग्रन्थकृदाशयं बुध्वा व्याचक्ष्यौ ॥

पदार्थस्थिरत्ववादिनो नैयायिकाः सामग्री कार्यजन्मनः प्राक् तिष्ठतीति वदन्तः कार्योत्पत्तेः पूर्वं खण्डकाले बहुक्षणघटिते सा तिष्ठतीत्येवामिप्रयन्ति । कार्यजन्मनः पूर्वं खण्डकालघटकान् बहून् क्षणांस्तित्ठन्त्यपि सामग्री यथा तेषु क्षणेषु न कार्यमुत्पादयति तथास्माकमपि कालान्तरस्थमपि सामग्र्यसत्त्वं कालान्तरे न कार्यजन्मनियामकम् । अपि तु तदातनकार्यजन्मन एव नियामकमिति श्रीहर्षग्रन्थाभिप्रायं वर्णयन्त्यः श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाः सर्वानतिशेरेते । किं च खण्डनकार उत्तरत्र सामग्रीलक्षणखण्डनावसरे क्षणिकसामग्रीमुल्लिख्य नैव खण्डयति । अतो ज्ञायते श्रीहर्षपूर्वतननैयायिकाः सामग्रीसत्त्वं कार्यजन्मनः प्राक्तनखण्डकाल इत्येवामिप्रयन्तीति ॥

सत्कारणवादिनां कारणसत्त्वेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानं भवति । असत्कारणवादिनां केवलं व्यतिरेक एव । व्यतिरेकोऽप्यनियतः । यदा कारणाभावस्तदा कार्याभावस्यावश्यम्भावो नास्ति । नित्यासतः कारणस्याभाव एव कदाचित्कार्योत्पादो दृश्यते । अन्वयस्तु नित्यासतः कारणस्य न क्वचिदपि भवतीति नैयायिकेन कृतमाक्षेपं परिहरति खण्डनकारः “न, तुल्यत्वात् । अन्वयो. नास्तीत्यभ्युपगच्छताप्यन्वयोपगमात् । अन्वयस्यापि सत्तान्तर्भावेन कथितदोषापत्तेः” इति ।



विद्यासागरोऽप्राप्तप्रतिषेधायोगादसतोऽन्वयो नास्तीति वदता नैयायिकेनान्वयोऽङ्गीकृत एवेति ग्रन्थाशयं वर्णयति । स चात्यन्तमसंभवि । यतः प्राप्तिरपि यत्र कुत्राप्यपेक्ष्यते वा यत्र प्रतिषिध्यते तत्रैव वेति विकल्पे सति यत्र कुत्रापि प्राप्त्यपेक्षा चेन्नैयायिकेनान्वयाङ्गीकारात्तन्निषेधोऽसति कर्तुं शक्यत एव । यत्र प्रतिषिध्यते तत्रैव प्राप्त्यपेक्षा चेद्भ्रान्तिसामान्यस्य विलोपप्रसङ्गः । शुक्तौ रजतं निषिध्यते । तत्र रजतस्य प्राप्त्यसंभवात् ।

चित्सुखाचार्यास्तु “नियतपूर्वसत्त्वरूपस्यान्वयस्यापि घटादिस्वरूपसत्त्वस्येवालीकस्याङ्गीकारात् । स चास्माकमपि कारणनियमज्ञानहेतुरस्ति” इत्येतद्ग्रन्थाभिप्रायं वर्णयन्ति । तदप्यत्यन्तमसंभूतम् । नियतपूर्वसत्त्वं कारणत्वम् । न त्वन्वयः । अन्वयो नाम केवलं सत्त्वम् । ग्रन्थकारेणोत्तरत्र “आस्तां प्रतिबन्दिग्रहग्रहः । कथं पुनरसतः कारणत्वमवसेयम् । प्राक्सत्त्वनियमस्य विशेषस्यानभ्युपगमात् । असत्त्वस्य चाविशेषादिति चेन्न । इदमस्मान्नियतप्राक्सदिति बुद्ध्या विशेषात्” इति वास्तवं समाधानमभिधीयते । यदि तदेव समाधानमेतद्ग्रन्थार्थत्वेन वर्ण्यते तदोत्तरग्रन्थस्योत्थितिर्न स्यात् । किं च चित्सुखाचार्या अन्वयो नास्तीत्यभ्युपगच्छता मयान्वय उपगम्यत एवेति श्रीहर्षोक्तित्वेन वर्णयन्ति । “सत्तामसतीमभ्युपगच्छतापि सत्ता मयाभ्युपगतैव । अन्यथा कासावसती” इति पूर्वतन-ग्रन्थेनोक्त एवार्थोऽनेनापि ग्रन्थेन वक्तव्यो भवति । अन्वयपदार्थः सत्ता, सत्ता नास्तीत्यभ्युपगच्छता मया सत्ताया अभ्युपगमादिति । एवमर्थकरणे “अन्वयस्यापि सत्तान्तर्भावने कथितदोषापत्तेः” इत्युत्तरग्रन्थः ‘सत्त्वमनन्तर्भाव्यान्वयमङ्गीकरोषि त्वम् । अहं तु सत्त्वमन्तर्भाव्यान्वयमङ्गीकरोमि’ इति नैयायिकाक्षेपं मनसि निधायासत्याः सत्ताया अङ्गीकारं विना तवापि नान्या गतिरित्येवमवतारणीयः । तथा चान्वयोपगमादित्येतत्पर्यन्तमेकं वाक्यम् । अन्वयस्येत्याद्यपरं वाक्यमिति चकारं विनापि वर्णनीयं भवति । अत्र स्थले न कोऽपि व्याख्याता यथावद्ग्रन्थकृदभिप्रायं वर्णयति ।

कारणनियमहेतुरन्वयव्यतिरेकौ । “अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्” इत्युत्तरीत्यान्वयस्यापि सत्तामन्तर्भाव्य हेतुत्वं न वक्तुं शक्यते । अतोऽसन्तावन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कारणनियमहेतुरित्येवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कारणम् (1)

तौ चासन्तौ (2)

सर्वेषां कारणानामन्वयव्यतिरेकवत्त्वम् (3)

इति त्रयमङ्गीकर्तव्यमन्वयव्यतिरेकवादिभिः । असतः कारणस्यान्वयो नास्तीति वदता नैयायिकेन त्वयासत्कारणस्यान्वयोऽभ्युपगन्तव्य एव भवति ।

किं चासतोऽन्वयाभावात् कारणत्वं नास्तीति प्रसाध्य सतः कारणत्वं व्यवस्थापनीयम् । तदैव “अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्” इत्युक्तिर्निरस्ता भवति । यदि सोक्तिर्निरस्ता

भवति तदैव सतः कारणत्वं सिद्धं भवतीत्यन्योन्याश्रयदोषश्च स्पष्टः । इति ग्रन्थकृद्भृदय-मुद्राट्य सर्वातिशायिनीं व्याख्याचातुरीं प्रकटयन्ति श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाः ।

पदार्थानां स्वरूपसत्त्वमवलम्ब्यैव कार्यकारणभाव उच्यते । सतां यथा स्वरूपात्मकं सत्त्वं विद्यते न तथासतः । तस्मादसतः कारणत्वोक्तिः सर्वथासंभविनीति नैयायिकाक्षेपस्य परिहारपरं “स्वरूपसत्त्वं स्वरूपाद्धटाद्यात्मनो नाधिकम् । असतोऽपि स्वरूपं स्वरूपमेव । न ह्यसन् घटादिर्न घटादिः । तथा सति ‘घटादिर्न’ इत्यपि न स्यात् । असतोऽघटादित्वात्” इति खण्डनग्रन्थं विद्यासागर एवं व्याख्याति — असत्पदस्याभावोऽर्थः । यथा भावस्य स्वरूपं वर्तते तथाभावस्यापि । यथा भावः कारणं तथाभावोऽपि । अप्रसिद्धस्य प्रतिषेधा-संभवादभावस्यापि प्रतिषिध्यमानत्वेन ‘असन्’ अभावात्मको घटादिर्घटादिरेवाङ्गीकर्तव्य इति । उदयनाचार्याः प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कार्यं प्रति कुसुमाञ्जल्यादौ कारणत्वं प्रतिपादयन्ति । तदेव कारणत्वं श्रीहर्षो नैयायिकं प्रति स्वमतानुसारेण साधयतीत्युक्तिर-सङ्गता । प्रकृतासत्कारणवादसन्दर्भविरुद्धा च । उदयनाचार्या विधिमुखेन प्रतीयमानत्वं भावत्वं निषेधमुखेन प्रतीयमानत्वमभावत्वमिति वदन्ति । विधिमुखेन प्रतीयमानमेवा-सत्पदार्थं मन्यमानस्य श्रीहर्षस्यैतादृशाभिप्रायवर्णनं तदाशयानभिज्ञताप्रयुक्तम् ।

चित्सुखाचार्याः — असतो घटादिस्वरूपत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । अन्यथा घटादिरसन्नित्यभेदे सामानाधिकरण्यं न स्यात् । सत इवासतोऽपि स्वरूपसत्त्वाङ्गीकारान्न कारणत्वानुप-पत्तिरिति पूर्वोक्तग्रन्थं व्याख्यान्ति । एतदपि न क्षोदक्षमम् । यतो घटादेरसतः स्वरूपसत्त्वा-नङ्गीकारेऽसन् घटादिरिति सामानाधिकरणप्रयोगो न स्यादित्यर्थबोधनाय “न ह्यसन् घटादिः” इति वाक्यं पर्याप्तम् । “घटादिर्न” इत्यधिकतया विद्यमानं वाक्यं निरर्थकं भवेत् । उदयनाचार्याः कुसुमाञ्जलौ सामानाधिकरण्यमभेदाभावेऽप्युपपादयन्ति । एवमन्यदपि व्याख्यानं दोषसत्त्वादनादरणीयमिति तदीयनिबन्धे स्पष्टं प्रतिपादितमस्ति ।

अस्य ग्रन्थस्य श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदया एव यथार्थं वर्णयन्ति । उदयनाचार्या आत्मतत्त्वविवेके परिशुद्धौ चात्यन्तासतो विधिप्रतिषेधानर्हत्वं कथयन्ति । अतोऽसतो निःस्वरूपत्वादसन्न घटादिरिति प्रतिषेधोऽपि नैयायिकस्य न संभवति । प्रतिषेधाङ्गी-कारेऽसतः स्वरूपमभ्युपगतं भवतीत्यसत्कारणत्वं दुरपह्नवमिति ।

“अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेतकारणं तदसत्ततः” इति कारिकार्थविवरणप्रसङ्गे कारणवस्तु-स्वरूपे सत्तामन्तर्भाव्य तत्कारणं सच्चेति वदता नैयायिकेन प्रथमसत्ताविशिष्टकारणे सैव सत्तास्तीत्यभ्युपगमे स्वस्य स्ववृत्तित्वप्रसक्त्या प्रथमसत्ताविशिष्टे द्वितीयसत्तां विनिवेश्य कारणत्वं वक्तव्यम् । तदाप्यपरापरसत्तानिवेशेनापर्यवसानं प्राप्नोति । तस्माद्वितीयसत्तां विनिवेश्य कारणत्वं वदतः सर्वथैवासत्कारणं पर्यवस्यतीत्यभिप्रायपरो ग्रन्थो मुद्रितपुस्तक एवमस्ति—

“अन्यस्या विशिष्टवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे तामनिवेश्य कारणत्वमभ्युपगन्तुः सर्वथैवा-  
सत्कारणं पर्यवस्यति”

इति । अमुं ग्रन्थं यथाश्रुतं स्वीकृत्य व्याख्यातारोऽर्थं विवृण्वन्ति । एवं व्याख्याने  
“अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्ततः” इति कारिकाविवरणत्वं नैव संगच्छते । यतः “अथ  
सदपि सत्तामनन्तर्भाव्य कारणं तदानीमसदपि तत्तथास्तु” इति, “नान्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं  
तदसत्ततः” इति कारिकाविवरणस्योत्तरत्र सत्त्वात्तत्समानार्थवर्णनमत्र पूर्वार्धविवरण-  
प्रसङ्गेऽत्यन्तमसङ्गतम् ।

‘तामनिवेश्य’ इति स्थाने ‘तां निवेश्य’ इति पठनीयम् । तच्छब्दस्य पूर्वपरामर्शित्वात्पूर्व-  
मन्यशब्देन द्वितीयसत्ताया अभिधानात्तच्छब्देन द्वितीयसत्तामुपादाय “विनिवेश्य” प्रथम-  
सत्ताविशिष्टे निवेश्य कारणत्वोक्तौ सर्वथैवासत्कारणं पर्यवस्यतीति श्री Phyllis Granoff  
महोदया ग्रन्थार्थं निरूप्य विद्वल्लोकमानन्दतुन्दिलयन्ति ।

आमूलचूडं ग्रन्थं परिशील्यार्थविवरणे श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाः प्राथम्यमर्हन्ति ।  
व्याख्यातृभिर्बहुषु स्थलेष्वनवगता अर्थास्तदीयनिबन्धे सोपपत्तिकं निरूपिताः । कंचन कालं  
मया साकं खण्डनग्रन्थमपठन् श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाः । तदानीं तासां सर्वेषु  
शास्त्रेष्वप्रतिहतप्रसारां मतिं खण्डनग्रन्थविचारचातुरीं प्रतिभातिशयं च दृष्ट्वा कांश्चन  
मामान् खण्डनग्रन्थविचार एव कर्तव्य इति निर्णीयाहं दाक्षिणात्यमहाविद्यालय उद्योगमपि  
परित्यज्य ताभिः साकं तं ग्रन्थं पर्यशीलयम् । खण्डनग्रन्थसमुद्रं मतिमन्थानेन निर्मथ्य  
परमार्थसुधामानीय विबुधेभ्यः समर्पयितुं सामर्थ्यमास्वेव परिपूर्णं तिष्ठति । अविकत्थन-  
स्वभावाः श्री Phyllis Granoff महोदयाः स्वकीयनिबन्धविषये यदि

“न्यायमधीते सर्वः कुरुते कुतुकान्निबन्धमप्यत्र ।

अस्य तु किमपि रहस्यं केचन विज्ञातुमीशते सुधियः ॥”

इति दीधितिकारवाक्यमनुकुर्युस्तर्हि तदपि नास्थाने ॥

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the kind and generous assistance of T. S. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī, without whom none of this would have been possible. It was through long and hard hours of discussion with Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī that I came to realize the depth and beauty of Śrī Harṣa's words. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī's wisdom, of this world and the other, served me as a constant guide and companion in my travels through India. Although I take full responsibility for the opinions expressed in this work, my debt to my teacher is immeasurable.

I should also like to thank Mr. K. Venugopalan of the Deccan College, Poona. Mr. Venugopalan assisted me in such diverse tasks as locating references and manuscripts, and deciphering the commentary of Paramānandasūri. His knowledge and friendship were an invaluable aid to me. I am also grateful to Dr. V.W. Paranjpe at the Deccan College, Poona. Dr. Paranjpe procured for me several of the unpublished commentaries and read with me the anonymous commentary.

I enjoyed the assistance of other friends in India, too numerous to name individually, and of the following institutions: Deccan College, Poona; Bombay University; Benaras Hindu University; Adyar Library, Madras; Bhandarkar Institute, Poona; University of Trivandrum. The Deccan College and the Bhandarkar Institute made available to me their libraries, and the Bhandarkar Institute and other Institutes named here allowed me access to manuscripts in their collections.

At home, I wish to thank Professor D. H. H. Ingalls of Harvard University. Professor Ingalls gave unstintingly of his time and energy in correcting this work and suggesting various changes. I am also grateful to Professor M. Nagatomi for his constant help and encouragement, and to Professor J. Rosenfield who opened my eyes to the wonders of the East and without whose support this project could never have been completed. It was with the assistance of the Kingsbury Fund that I was able to study in India and write this work upon my return.

Finally, I should like to thank an old friend, Mr. Hans Raj of Kobe, Japan, who gave me my first Sanskrit Grammar and much timely advice. Dr. B.K. Matilal and Dr. Jeff Masson also encouraged me throughout my work. I take this opportunity to thank them for their assistance.

## PREFACE

For two hundred years, from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, the Indian sub-continent witnessed a maturation and a flourishing in all areas of culture which was perhaps never to be equalled in the centuries that followed. This was the time of the great kingdoms: of Rājārāja Choḷa in the South (985–1014 A.D.), the Solāṅkis in the West (950–1300 A.D.), the Paramāras in Malwa (Bhoja 1010–1055 A.D.) and the Chandellas at Mahoba (1000–1300 A.D.). It was a period of fervent religious devotion marked by tremendous activity in temple building. To Rājārāja Choḷa and his immediate successor belong the Bṛhadīśvara at Tanjore and the Śiva temple at Goṅgaikondacholapūra; the Solāṅkis have left us Sunak, Delmāl, the step-well at Pātan with its Mahāviṣṇu, and the remains at Siddhpur, their capital; the Paramāras, Un, Nemāwar and the magnificent structures to Śiva at Udayapur, M.P. The Chandella legacy of Khajurāho needs no mention, and yet these are but a few of the artistic achievements of these years. Likewise, in Sanskrit literature even the major monuments are too numerous to name: Bhoja's *Rāmāyaṇa Campū* (11th century), Dhanapāla's *Tilakamañjarī* (11th century), Somadeva's *Yaśastilaka Campū* (959 A.D.), the *Kathāsaritsāgara* (1029–1064 A.D.), Bilhaṇa's *Caurapañcāśikā* (1063–1076 A.D.), Jayadeva's *Gītāgovinda* (1150–1200 A.D.), Padmagupta's *Navasāhasāṅkacarita* (1000 A.D.), etc. In poetics, there is the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* of Rājaśekhara (900–950 A.D.), the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* of Ruyyaka (1135–1150 A.D.), the *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Maṃmaṭa (1050–1100 A.D.), the *Vakroktijīvitā* of Kuntaka (950–1050 A.D.), the *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa (1020–1050 A.D.),<sup>1</sup> and the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta (1014 A.D.).<sup>2</sup> It should not be surprising, then, to find that some of the most illustrious names in Indian philosophy also belong to this span of two centuries: in Jainism, the successors to Akalaṅka (9th century), Siddharṣi (906 A.D.), Prabhācandra (mid 11th century), Abhayadeva (12th century), Vālidevasūri (1087–1170 A.D.) and Hemacandra (1088–1172 A.D.); in Nyāya, Śridhara (991 A.D.), Bhāsarvajña (925–975 A.D.), Vācaspati Mīśra (late 10th and 11th centuries), Keśava Mīśra (1150 A.D.), Udayana (1025–1100 A.D.), Varadarāja (1150 A.D.) and Vallabha (1100–1125 A.D.); in Mīmāṃsā, the interpreters of Prabhākara, Śālikanātha Mīśra (900–950

A.D.) and Bhavanātha Miśra (1000 A.D.) and the commentator on Kumārila's works, Parthasārathi Miśra (1025–1075 A.D.); in Vedānta, Yamuna (950–1000 A.D.), Śrī Kaṇṭha (10th century?), Rāmānuja (1050–1139 A.D.), Abhinavagupta (1040 A.D.) and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 A.D.).<sup>3</sup>

Śrī Harṣa, thus, is the product of an unusual period in the intellectual and aesthetic history of his country. In many ways, however, he far surpasses both his immediate predecessors and his contemporaries, for he is perhaps the most vitally original and logically consistent of all of these thinkers.

The only biographical data we have about Śrī Harṣa come from his own statements in the *Naiṣadhīyacarita*. At the end of each *sarga* he gives the name of his father, Śrī Hīra, and his mother, Māmalladevī. In the closing verse to the *Naiṣadhīya* he further states that he was honored by the king of Kanyākubja, the modern Kanauj. The same verse is repeated in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. Scholars identify this king with either the Gāhaḍavāla Govindacandra (1104–1151 A.D.)<sup>4</sup> or Jayacandra (1168–1200 A.D.).<sup>5</sup> Of Śrī Harṣa's activities, nothing factual is known.<sup>6</sup> Like many of his milieu, he was a prolific writer.<sup>7</sup> Today there remain only two lexicons, yet unpublished, the *Amarakhaṇḍana* (Madras ms. no. R. 1595) and the *Dvirūpakōśa* (Madras ms. no. R. 1604), and the *Naiṣadhīyacarita* and the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. Of these, the *Amarakhaṇḍana* is said to be a product of Śrī Harṣa's earliest literary efforts. It would seem that the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* was composed before the *Naiṣadhīyacarita* was completed (*Naiṣadhīya* 6. 113) and the *Dvirūpakōśa* only after the *Naiṣadhīya* as it mentions that work.<sup>8</sup>

The *Naiṣadhīyacarita* and the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, the one a poem often lusty and the other a philosophical treatise ascetic in tone, seem at first diametrically opposed. That Śrī Harṣa himself did not so regard them is evidenced by his citing of the *Naiṣadhīya* in the *Khaṇḍana*, p. 125 Sam (see note 170 to the translation). Throughout the *Naiṣadhīyacarita*, the reader is intensely aware of its author as a deeply religious man and a scholar of Vedānta, Nyāya and Buddhist texts.<sup>9</sup>

The *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is Śrī Harṣa's own detailed exposition of these philosophical and religious principles which he espoused. It consists of an introduction, here translated, in which Śrī Harṣa directly sets forth his own views, and of a series of debates in which he then refutes the definitions of the categories proposed by his opponents. Had he tried, he could have left us no more complete record of the workings of his mind, and of the varied but futile efforts of the other schools in coming to terms with the world

around them. The *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is thus a unique document in Indian philosophy. It is at once an intensely personal interpretation of the Vedānta, and a sharp critique of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Jain tenets. To the student, it affords a panoramic view of the types of argument employed in Indian philosophy, and the vital issues with which the different systems were concerned.

The purpose of this preface is twofold: one, through a study of the refutation of two categories, “*pramā*” or “valid knowledge” and “*pratyakṣa*” or “perception” to try to identify some of Śrī Harṣa’s opponents and determine the means he employs to refute them, and two, to comment upon Śrī Harṣa’s position amongst the members of his own school, emphasizing his departure from his tradition, and exploring the possible sources for his singular views.

### 1. ŚRĪ HARṢA AND HIS OPPONENTS

Śrī Harṣa in the first chapter of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* refutes the definitions of “valid cognition” and “the means of valid cognition”, perception, inference, presumption, non-awareness, and testimony. His antagonists include the Naiyāyikas Udayana, Vācaspati Miśra, and Bhāsarvajña; the Mīmāṃsakas Kumārila and Prabhākara; the Buddhists Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, and Prajñākaragupta, and the Jains Pūjyapāda, Vidyānanda, Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, among others. In general, the refutation of their doctrines proceeds along two lines: (A) the refutation of statements actually intended by the opponents as definitions of given categories, and (B) the refutation of statements originally intended for other purposes but which could in accordance with the opponents own assertions also be taken as definitions. For the most part the refutations in the first chapter belong to class A. Throughout, Śrī Harṣa’s method of argument is consistent, and accords with what he himself carefully describes in his introduction to the text (pp. 193–194 Chow, 72 Sam). Śrī Harṣa does no more than to show that the opponents’ own doctrines contradict themselves. The advantage of such a procedure Śrī Harṣa also tells us (pp. 72, 74–75 Sam). Should the opponent deny a statement (x) which Śrī Harṣa urges against him, he will still only be contradicting himself and defeating his own purpose, for that statement (x) is but a paraphrase of the opponent’s own admissions. In this manner, Śrī Harṣa sets up a debate in which his opponent is virtually cornered. The only ways in which he can win are (1) if he can prove the validity of his definitions despite the faults adduced, or (2)

if the arbiter of the debate should find that Śrī Harṣa oversteps the regulations he has set for himself and in fact urges against his opponent something which the opponent does not accept. The first of these two possibilities can be easily eliminated; the second remains for the modern reader as arbiter to try to determine. It is a difficult task, requiring careful reading of the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Jain and Buddhist texts, and upon it hinges the final decision as to the validity of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* even within its own context.

It is obvious that a debate of such a description is of limited extension. A fault as a statement made by a party *A* and adduced against that party *A* is valid only when that individual *A* is the *pūrvapakṣa*. Śrī Harṣa does close (pp. 752–753 Sam) with the general remark that his refuting principles or “*khaṇḍanayuktis*” as he calls them, are to be applied to any and every definition which one might postulate. But this leaves the reader in the end with a free choice. He can well accept the refutation of the Naiyāyikas *et al.* and yet maintain that philosophy has so far advanced as to be capable of giving us definitions of the objects in our world which could survive the attacks of a logician, even of Śrī Harṣa’s calibre. He need not, on the basis of this text alone, accept the unreality of the world. On the other hand, along with Śrī Harṣa, even the modern reader might well conclude that the same faults could be adduced against any such definitions. This is another area in which the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is unique – it requires no suspension of belief, nor any ultimate commitment to its original principles. It is my contention, however, that Śrī Harṣa is definitely the most convincing of all Indian philosophers, if only because his task is so simplified by their inconsistencies. The support of this contention is another purpose of the following discussion. It is impossible without a detailed examination of at least a few of the definitions and refutations which the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* contains.

The first definition of valid knowledge given is “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*” (pp. 130–218 Sam), “Valid knowledge is an experience of the essence of an object”. This is the definition of Udayana in the *Lakṣaṇamālā* (p. 1). It is similar to that of Samantabhadra in the *Āptamīmāṃsā* (6th century A.D., verse 101), of Pūjyapāda in his commentary to the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvāti (5th or 6th century A.D., p. 5) and of Akalaṅka (9th century A.D.) in his *Tattvārtharājāvārttika*, p. 19: “*tattvajñānaṁ pramā*”, “Valid knowledge is a knowledge of the essence of an object”. Śrī Harṣa undertakes the refutation of this definition using a method that he will use elsewhere, by



exploring the various possible meanings of its component words, “*tattva*”, “thisness” and “*anubhūti*”, “experience”.

He first concentrates upon the Naiyāyikas, taking “*tattva*” and citing Vācaspati Miśra in the *Ṭīkā*, p. 35 N.E., Jayantabhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 8 and Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 96 N.E. All remark that “*tattva*” means the essence of an object: “*tasya bhāvas tattvam*”, “*tattva* is the state of it”. Śrī Harṣa immediately replies that there is a major difficulty in so explaining “*tattva*” in the present case, as no referent is here provided for the pronoun “*ta*”. The definition is the first in the *Lakṣaṇamālā* and nothing precedes it. By Udayana’s own admission, also in the *Parīśuddhi* (pp. 288 N.E., 291 N.E.), in the absence of a specific referent the word is meaningless. This is Śrī Harṣa’s first criticism of the definition “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*” and it is important to note that it could be a direct quote from the *Parīśuddhi*: “*abhidhānāparyavasānāt. Śabdavyāpārāparyavasānāt, tachhabdasya pūrvaprakrānta evārthe saṅketitātāt, tadanabhidhāne ’vācakatvaprasaṅgād iti bhāvaḥ*” (p. 288 N.E.) – “Because it would end up without denotative power. That is to say, because it would end up devoid of any significant verbal function, as the pronoun, ‘*ta*’ refers only to that which has previously been designated, and when nothing has been so named it must end up being devoid of meaning.” The method of debate, to show that the opponent’s doctrines are contradicted by those very doctrines which he admits is here perfectly exemplified. Śrī Harṣa has combed the Nyāya texts for their explanation of the term “*tattva*”, cited it and denied its validity by another paraphrase from their sources.

The discussion then continues with a principle endorsed by Kumārila in the *Tantravārttika* 2/1/16/48, p. 48, and perhaps equally admissible to the other *sadvādins*. The pronoun “*ta*” need not have a directly expressed object, but might refer to anything at all in the speaker’s mind; in this case, to some object of knowledge. This permits Śrī Harṣa to pass on to an intricate refutation of another definition advanced by Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 93 N.E., “*Saiva buddhiḥ svarūpāvasthitenārthena nirūpyamānā pramā*” and p. 96 N.E. “*dharmisvarūpeṇopadhīyamāno ’nubhavaḥ pramaiva*” – “That very knowledge described by an object in its natural state is valid knowledge”, and “That knowledge which is limited by the very nature of a locus of qualities can only be valid”. “*Tasya bhāvaḥ*” means the very essence or the natural form of an object. Thus, “*tattvānubhūti*” means an experience of an object in its natural form; “*svārūpānubhūti*” as the *Parīśuddhi* terms it.

To understand the force of Śrī Harṣa's refutation, it is necessary first to understand Udayana's intentions. Udayana held that knowledge is neither intrinsically valid nor invalid. Validity is a quality which is determined by the type of object which a cognition takes. If an object ( $x$ ) of a knowledge  $A$  exists in nature, then that knowledge  $A$  is valid. If not, the knowledge is invalid. Taking the classic example of error in Indian philosophy, the perception of a conch shell as silver, this cognition must be invalid, as silverness does not in fact exist in the shell. Silverness is, in Udayana's terminology, an "*asvarūpaprakāra*" or an unnatural modifier. It is not an attribute of the conch shell in its natural form. It is thus Udayana's intention that the cognition of silverness as an attribute of the conch is not an experience of an object in its natural form, and thus is not a valid cognition.

Śrī Harṣa replies that the definition as formulated cannot be so interpreted. His refutation centers around the Naiyāyika understanding of what it means to say that "silverness" is an attribute of an object ( $x$ ) and what exactly is implied by a knowledge of silverness as an attribute of that ( $x$ ). According to the Naiyāyika "silverness is an attribute of ( $x$ )" means that "silverness inheres in ( $x$ )". The cognition of silverness as an attribute of the conch is thus no more than a cognition of silverness, inherence and the substratum. It now becomes impossible to understand the significance of Udayana's remark "silverness is an unnatural modifier" and to exclude the invalid cognition from the present definition of *pramā*. All of the three elements presented in the cognition, "silverness", inherence (*samavāya*), and "thatness" (*idamṭā*), do actually appear in their natural form. This is known as this, silverness as silverness and inherence as inherence. It makes no difference that the inherence of silverness does not exist in the shell. Inherence is still known as inherence and it is a natural form: it exists somewhere in nature. Thus the definition "*svarūpānubhūtiḥ pramā*" is applicable to a false cognition and suffers from overextension. This is sufficient refutation of Udayana's remarks in the *Parīśuddhi*, and once again Śrī Harṣa makes clear that his refutation is in full accordance with Naiyāyika admissions by citing an example (p. 133 Sam). Just because a person is not at home does not mean that he ceases to exist in nature!

Śrī Harṣa then proposes that the Naiyāyika slightly modify his definition to express more clearly the meaning he obviously intends. Cognition  $A$  of an object ( $x$ ) at a given time and place is valid only when that object ( $x$ ) does exist at that time and place (p. 133 Sam). The cognition of silverness in a conch shell would no longer be covered by this definition as silverness does not exist at the locus in which it is perceived to occur. Unfortunately, the

definition is now contradicted by another Naiyāyika admission. To the Naiyāyika time is one and space is one. Time cannot exist in any other time as no other time is admitted to exist, and nothing can exist in itself. Similarly with space.<sup>10</sup> The definition is thus inapplicable to any cognition of time or space, for it is not possible to say that time<sub>x</sub> perceived to exist in time<sub>y</sub> does exist at that time. By the Naiyāyika's own doctrine, the definition suffers from *avyāpti* or too limited extension.

Śrī Harṣa allows the Naiyāyika to offer that a cognition of time is valid without that time existing at any other time, and a cognition of space is valid without that space existing on another space. The reply Śrī Harṣa gives is noteworthy, for it is an argument he will often employ. What the Naiyāyika has in effect now done is to compose two separate definitions. A cognition of an object is valid if that object exists at the time and place at which it is perceived. A cognition of time and place is valid if the time and place are perceived in accordance with their natural form. Both of these definitions suffer from too limited extension. Definition<sub>1</sub> will not apply to valid cognitions of time or place and definition<sub>2</sub> cannot be employed for a valid cognition of an object. In all cases the words in a definition must carry the same meaning. If they mean different things in different cases, then where a term in case<sub>1</sub> alone must carry a meaning (*x*) the definition so conceived could never apply to case<sub>2</sub>.<sup>11</sup> That the words of a definition must always mean the same thing is a principle endorsed by Udayana himself in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 341.

To avoid the faults inherent in the proposal of two definitions, the Naiyāyika is next permitted to redefine the word "*tattva*" to mean uniformly that the object of knowledge exists in that very form in which it is experienced. The reply to this is again indicative of Śrī Harṣa's general methods. If the Naiyāyika intends that an object (*x*), cognized in a certain form, must *sometime* exist in that form, then the false cognition of a black pot as red would be valid; for, at a later moment the pot will be fired and red in color. This statement is in fact nothing but a reapplication of Udayana's remark in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 110 N.E. quoted in the *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 45. "*Nanu pūrvaṃ tāvat tadavastha eva asavāsīt. etāvataiva jñānam astu yathārtham. na. Pākarakte śyāmatāpratyayasya yathārthatāprasāṅgāt*", "But at least it was formerly in that state. For this reason alone let the knowledge be valid. No. For then it would result that even the knowledge of blackness with respect to an object fired red would be valid knowledge." Udayana is here arguing against an opponent who maintains that memory is valid knowledge. The opponent's contention is that memory does indeed

represent an object as it actually existed. Udayana answers that then the knowledge of a fired red pot as black must also be valid as it too represents the pot as it in fact existed. Śrī Harṣa takes this statement, turns it around, and employs it now to refute Udayana. If a cognition of an object which reveals that object as it exists, without regard to time, be considered to be valid, then the false experience of an unfired black pot as red would have to be correct, as it likewise represents its object as it exists, albeit in a future moment. Śrī Harṣa's originality here lies less in his formulation of new arguments than in his extremely skilful manipulation of his opponent's own remarks. Once again he has utilized a *pūrvapakṣa* assertion to refute that *pūrvapakṣa*. It is obvious that by Udayana's doctrine of time as one, the above overextension cannot be avoided by insisting that a cognition of an object in a given form is valid only when that object does so exist at the time at which it is perceived. Time can never exist at the time of anything at all.

The next major point of interest in Śrī Harṣa's destruction of the word "*tattva*" appears on p. 134 Sam, "*etena kāraṇam tattvam iti nirastam*", "And thus is refuted the notion that *tattva* means cause". This appears to be a curious remark and belongs to the class of refutations termed (B) above. Unlike the Buddhist, the Naiyāyika does not invariably admit that an object of knowledge must be the cause of that knowledge. This is impossible in the case where knowledge takes a future or past object. The Naiyāyika holds to the doctrine that only the existent can be a cause. (*Kuṣumāñjali*, p. 413; p. 57 Sam, and translation, pp. 87 ff.) Whence then comes the statement, "A knowledge of a cause is a valid knowledge"? In the *Tīkā*, p. 24 N.E., occurs a discussion on the determination of the validity of knowledge. An opponent urges that the validity of knowledge cannot be known through any external means: not through another cognition taking the same object, nor through an awareness of successful activity, nor through a cognition of anything invariably connected with the given object. Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 80 N.E., further clarifies these alternatives, particularly the second, which he notes is an inference with a product as its mark. For the present, both Udayana and Vācaspati Miśra settle on this: the validity of knowledge is inferred from the presence of purposeful activity.<sup>12</sup>

Udayana's intention is the following. When one has a perception of silver, if he is able to take that silver and use it, perhaps as currency, then that silver must be real and its cognition valid. Had he perceived silverness in a conch shell, he would have found no such success in achieving his desired aim with the worthless mollusc. In this manner, from the fact that one's goal is accomplished, the reality of an object of cognition may be inferred. It is to

be recalled that the reality of the object constitutes the validity of knowledge for both Udayana and Vācaspati Miśra.<sup>13</sup> From the context of the passages in both the *Ṭīkā* and the *Pariśuddhi* it is clear that *arthakriyākāritva*, purposeful activity, is meant as a means to know validity and that no definition is here intended. This still leaves much to be explained before one can account for Śrī Harṣa's introduction of the definition, "*Kāraṇānubhūtiḥ pramā*", "Valid knowledge is an experience of a cause".

I would assume Śrī Harṣa's process of reasoning to be the following. Udayana has thus far stated in the *Lakṣaṇamālā* that "*tattvānubhūti*" is valid knowledge, and further told us in the *Pariśuddhi* that the "*tattva*" or "*tathātva*", meaning reality of an object, can be inferred from purposeful activity, a product serving as a mark. This statement is not strictly correct. From a product, one infers a cause. If as Udayana asserts, by "*arthakriyākāritva*" is meant an inference from a product, then the only thing that can be known by such an inference is the prior association of an object (*x*) with a given locus, or its causality, and nothing else. We now arrive at the definition, "Experience of a cause is valid experience". Śrī Harṣa is somewhat devious here, but not unjustified. Udayana often suggests a definition, like the present and "*saṃyakparicchitiḥ pramā*" (*Kusumāñjali*, 4.5, pp. 475, *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 192) and then does not explain it. The only recourse in such a situation is to search his works and find a suitable explanation. This Śrī Harṣa does. Udayana repeatedly speaks of "*pramāṭva*", validity, as a quality determined by the objects of knowledge. A cognition of the "*tattva*" of an object is a valid cognition. "*Tattva*" cannot mean simply "*svarūpa*", or natural form, as that possibility has already been denied. The next logical step is that it means that aspect of an object which is inferred and, it is stated, then determines the validity of knowledge. By Udayana's own assertion that the mark is a product and the inference is of a cause from its product, the inferred "*tattva*" can only be the given object's causality.

The refutation of this definition is equally complex. On page 134 Sam, Śrī Harṣa summarily states that the definition will involve (1) lack of proof, (2) *ātmāśraya* or the dependence of one thing upon itself and (3) *apasiddhānta* or admission of the tenets of the Naiyāyika's arch-opponent, the Buddhist, that all things are momentary and that existence is nothing but causal efficiency. The first of these is not difficult. The Naiyāyika himself admits that some things are not causes of anything else, for example the destruction of the last thread of a cloth or the measure of an atom. The second reason is in one way easily accountable. If only an experience of a cause is valid

experience, then for (x) to be an object of valid knowledge it must have causality. Now, for this causality or *kāraṇatva* to be an object of valid cognition the same must be true; it must likewise have causality. If that very causality resides in itself, *ātmāśraya* results. If another, then there ensues an infinite series all of which must be known at a given moment to determine the validity of any knowledge, an obvious impossibility. The third requires more explanation. The Naiyāyika admits a perception of an object at time<sub>1</sub> and time<sub>2</sub> and yet allows that the object remains the same. It is on the basis of this recognition of physical entities which endure over a given period of time that Udayana in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (pp. 106 ff.) sought to establish the non-momentariness of all objects. He is now forced into admitting that for a cognition to be valid its object must be a cause. Thus, a pot qualified by attributes (x), (y), and (z) at a time<sub>1</sub> must be a cause, and a pot qualified by (x), (y), and (z) at time<sub>2</sub> must also be a cause for their cognitions to be valid. The question remains, a cause of what? It is my guess that the *ātmāśraya* mentioned above serves as the reason why the Naiyāyika must now accept that a pot qualified by (x), (y), (z) at time<sub>1</sub> can only be a cause of a pot qualified by (x), (y), (z) at time<sub>2</sub> and thus that all things are momentary. It is not possible to say that a pot qualified by (x), (y), (z), is in fact a cause at time<sub>1</sub> but only of its own knowledge, and the definition “*kāraṇānubhūtiḥ pramā*” can be accepted without any reversal of the Naiyāyika doctrines on permanence. This would be tantamount to the following assertion: “*x-y-z-viśiṣṭavastu svapramāṃ prati kāraṇaṃ yasmāt tasmāt tajjñānaṃ pramā. Pramāṭve siddhe pramāṭvaṃ siddhyate*”,<sup>14</sup> “Since the object qualified by attributes (x), (y) and (z) is the cause of a valid cognition of which it is the object, therefore that very cognition of which it is the object must be valid. Validity can only be established once that same validity has already been shown.” The Naiyāyika can only assert that the pot qualified by (x), (y), (z) at time<sub>1</sub> is the cause of a pot qualified by (x), (y), (z) at time<sub>2</sub>. Objects are now different and produced at every instant, or momentary as the Buddhists insist. Once it has been admitted that all objects at every moment in time give rise to other like objects, it is also to be admitted that existence is no more than such a causal efficiency. Existence can no longer be, as the Naiyāyika defines it, the inherence of the eternal universal *sattā*. This *sattā* must also be a cause of a similar *sattā* in the next moment and thus transitory. In accepting the definition, “*kāraṇānubhūtiḥ pramā*”, then, the Naiyāyika would be guilty of the major fault of admission of his enemy’s cardinal principles – that all is momentary and that existence does not exceed causal efficiency.

This concludes the examination of the term “*tattva*”. It has progressed in complication from step (1) a simple citing of a Naiyāyika definition and refutation of it by a direct paraphrase of another Nyāya tenet, (2) application of another definition in the *Parīśuddhi* and refutation of that definition by another Nyāya doctrine, slightly varied, and (3) the refutation of a third possibility actually never intended as a definition but legitimately conceived to be so. These three differing means are Śrī Harṣa in capsule; all further refutations will proceed along similar patterns. The most elaborate of these refutations, that of the term “*anubhūtitva*”, “experience”, now follows (p. 136 Sam), and it will be to our advantage to outline some of its salient features.

Śrī Harṣa opens his refutation of “*anubhūtitva*” with a direct question, another of his favorite methods<sup>15</sup> – exactly what is meant by the term “experience”. The alternatives cover all the possibilities admitted by the Naiyāyikas: (a) *anubhūtitva* is a universal inherent in experience (*Parīśuddhi*, p. 93 N.E.), (b) it is an attribute, “being other than memory” (*Ṭīkā*, p. 35, N.E., p. 313 N.E.; *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 2; *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 11,<sup>16</sup> and *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 124), (c) it is an attribute, “being devoid of the defining characteristics of memory” (*Parīśuddhi*, p. 110 N.E.) and (d) it is an attribute, “being a knowledge the particular cause of which arises immediately prior to the arising of that knowledge itself” (*Parīśuddhi*, p. 106 N.E.). These four suggestions are once again taken from the Nyāya texts in a process similar to that described earlier. (a) is directly mentioned, “*jātyā hi buddhir anubhavaḥ smṛtiśca*” (*Parīśuddhi*, p. 93), “For knowledge is either experience or memory by reason of the presence of a given universal.” The second is alluded to in the *Ṭīkā* when it is said that any experience other than memory can be valid. It might be suspected that this quality, “being other than memory”, is meant as the defining characteristic of experience, here used in apposition to that term. The third statement is similarly culled from the *Parīśuddhi*. Udayana asserts that by validity he means something which is limited to the locus of the quality, “being an experience”, and yet inheres in a knowledge which lacks two of the defining characteristics of memory: dependence upon prior cognition and invalidity. Now, for validity to coexist with “*anubhūtitva*” and “*smṛtilakṣaṇarahitatva*”, “being devoid of the defining marks of memory”, two situations are possible. *Anubhūtitva* itself may be nothing more than this “*smṛtilakṣaṇarahitatva*” or it may be pervaded by “*smṛtilakṣaṇarahitatva*”. Śrī Harṣa is thus fully justified in assuming that Udayana might be defining “experience” as the absence of the essential marks of

memory. The fourth is a direct statement from the *Paṛiśuddhi*. It is curious to note that Udayana does seem to allow two different explanations of “*anubhūtitva*”. It is either a universal or a general adventitious attribute. The *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 11, following upon Udayana similarly admits both!

The refutation of *anubhūtitva* as a universal will occupy the next thirty-five pages of the text (pp. 136–170 Sam) and centers around proving that it is not possible to consider *anubhūtitva* as a universal which inheres in a given group and is absent from another. *Smṛtitva*, “memory”, and *anubhūtitva*, “experience”, must both be present in at least one form of cognition, recognition or *pratyabhijñāna*. They thus cannot be universals, as they are subject to the fault of *sāṃkaryā*, or co-existence. For two attributes to be universals, for example, “*ghaṭatva*”, “potness”, and “*paṭatva*”, “clothness”, they must exist in a certain relationship to a higher universal “*dravyatva*”, “substanceness”, of greater extension, and yet never be found together. “*Anubhūtitva*” and “*smṛtitva*” would violate this rule, co-existing as they do in recognition.<sup>17</sup>

It remains for Śrī Harṣa to prove that for his opponents recognition must be a single cognition in which memory and experience both function. This proof begins on p. 139 Sam, again with a question, “What is recognition?” This time the answers cover all schools of Indian philosophy. (a) It is two knowledges, one memory and the other experience. (Buddhists. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, pp. 110–111; Prajñākaragupta, p. 22; cited Abhayadevasūri, *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, pp. 84, 107). (b) It is one knowledge, in part memory and in part experience (Mīmāṃsakas. *Brhatī* with *Rjuvimalā*, pp. 238–239; *Śloka-vārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, śloka 229, p. 202; *Upamāna Pariccheda*, śloka 9–10, pp. 436–437; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 22). (c) It is one knowledge, memory (Jains. *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 335), and (d) It is one knowledge, experience. (Naiyāyikas. *Paṛiśuddhi*, p. 280 N.E.; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 474; *Tīkā*, pp. 230–231 N.E.)

Śrī Harṣa first refutes alternatives (a) and (c) and shows *sāṃkaryā* in the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. He then takes the Naiyāyika suggestion and through an illustration of the contradictions involved in an admission of recognition as experience alone, reduces it to the Mīmāṃsaka contention with the same fault.

The Buddhist and Jain explanations are denied on the strength of the observation that in recognition we have a new understanding of the identity of an object characterized by a time<sub>1</sub> and place<sub>1</sub> in the past with that very object at time<sub>2</sub> and place<sub>2</sub> in the present.<sup>18</sup> This cannot be the content of memory which grasps only that which has been previously perceived. The



Jains stand refuted. Should the Buddhist assert that the identity of an object at different times and places can be grasped by experience, then, since identity is a relative concept or “*sāpekṣapadārtha*”, the identity of a past ( $x$ ) and a present ( $y$ ), it will also have been admitted that the past time and place are grasped by this one experience. There is now no need to assume that memory functions at all in recognition. Once it has been conceded that experience is capable of revealing previously known objects, memory becomes superfluous. The Buddhist, who would have recognition involve two separate knowledges, memory and experience, is defeated.<sup>19</sup>


The first refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka notion of recognition is similarly conceived. Memory may make known the previous time and place, and experience the present time and place, but what could possibly connect the two as attributes of a single object? (pp. 140–141 Sam.) On pp. 142–143 Sam, in the further discussion of the Mīmāṃsaka conception of recognition as a single knowledge in part memory and in part experience, is first mentioned the fault of *sāṃkaryā* at which Śrī Harṣa eventually aims. Where a single knowledge is admittedly both memory and experience, the two universals, “*smṛtitva*” and “*anubhūtitva*”, must coincide. Memory makes known the object as qualified by “*tattā*”, a previous time and place. Experience makes known that same object as qualified by “*idaṃtā*”, the present time and place. Now to avoid *sāṃkaryā*, or the co-existence of the universals “experience” and “memory”, it can be assumed that although both do exist in a single knowledge, the knowledge itself can be divided into two definitely marked portions on the strength of an adventitious quality. This quality might be thought to be the objects by which such a knowledge is described. “Memory” exists in that portion of the knowledge delimited by its object, the previous time and place (*tattāvacchinnajñāna*), and “experience” in that portion of the knowledge delimited by its object, the present time and place (*idaṃtāvacchinnajñāna*). It is this suggestion which Śrī Harṣa summarily rejects. The one object, the locus of the attributes *tattā* and *idaṃtā*, must be revealed by both memory and experience. Thus, recognition, defined by this single locus (*dharmyavacchinnajñāna*) would be possessed of both *smṛtitva* and *anubhūtitva*. No separation of the two universals on the basis of object is possible.

The Mīmāṃsaka is allowed to offer that another adventitious quality may divide this knowledge (p. 143 Sam). “Memory” will exist in that part of the knowledge defined by an attribute, “being produced by the mental traces”, and “experience” in that part of the cognition limited by the attribute, “being born of the sense organs”. Thus *anubhūtitva* and

*smṛtitva* could be confined to specifically limited regions of the same entity and the fault of *sāṃkaryā* or co-existence would not arise. To this Śrī Harṣa replies that the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine agrees with the Naiyāyika (1) in making the validity of knowledge contingent upon the sort of object to which it is directed, and (2) in confining validity to experience alone.<sup>20</sup> The knowledge of the *dharmin* or locus of the qualities “*tattā*” and “*idaṃtā*”, being both memory and experience, would be both valid and invalid. Thus although the Mīmāṃsaka might escape the fault of *sāṃkaryā* in the case of one set of universals, “memory” and “experience”, he will not escape it in the case of “validity” and “invalidity” which he admits can only be restricted by the nature of the objects of a given cognition, and not by its causes as well.

Śrī Harṣa notes that for the Prābhākara, in whose doctrine knowledge is self-aware, a further inconsistency results. Memory would be recognized even in that portion of the knowledge which reveals *idaṃtā*, the present time and place, and experience would be recognized even in that portion which reveals *tattā*, the previous time and place. This remark, analogous to the above, is somewhat difficult to grasp at first and requires brief elucidation. The Mīmāṃsaka has assumed that the knowledge, “*so 'yaṃ ghaṭaḥ*”, “this is that pot”, is both memory and experience, and that the universal “memory” resides in that knowledge as defined by one cause, and the universal “experience” resides in the same knowledge as defined by a different cause.

The problem with such an assumption is represented in the following diagram. The entire knowledge, *as a whole and possessed of both universals “experience” and “memory”* must still be connected with each object, the



pot, the present time and place, and the past time and place. The Mīmāṃsaka has been forced to abandon the position that *anubhūtitva* resides only in that portion of the knowledge delimited by the present time and place (*idaṃtāvaccinnajñāna*) and that *smṛtitva* is likewise connected only with *tattā*, the past time and place, as both memory and experience function in making known the *dharmin*, the locus of these two qualities. Knowledge possessed of the universal “memory” must therefore be connected with *idaṃtā*, the present time and place, and knowledge possessed of the universal “experience” must be connected with *tattā*, the past time and place. Where cognition is self-valid, one should be aware of the present time and place as an object of recollection, and the past time and place as an object of experience. This is contradictory to general observation.

The refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine is continued to page 145 Sam with an examination of the causes of this dual-natured knowledge. The conclusion is thus reached that recognition cannot be as either the Buddhists or the Jains imagine it, and that if it be as the Mīmāṃsakas contend, then “memory” and “experience” must exist in one cognition. “Experience” cannot be a universal.

Śrī Harṣa now turns all his efforts to refuting the Naiyāyikas who remain. He reapplies the arguments previously urged against the Mīmāṃsakas, that neither the mental traces nor the sense organs are capable of revealing the identity of a past object with a present object, as neither grasps both the past time and place and the present time and place. The mental traces act only with respect to a formerly cognized object, and the sense organs act only with respect to that with which they are in contact. With this as an opener, Śrī Harṣa then takes the opportunity to destroy one of Udayana’s most favored conceptions (p. 147 Sam) and one of his many improvements over the doctrines of Vācaspati Miśra. Vācaspati Miśra had held that the sense organs could in fact grasp an object without contact when they were aided by the mental traces. It would thus not be correct to assert that the identity of a past object with a present object cannot be revealed by experience. Vācaspati Miśra’s reasoning here actually involves the fallacy of circuitous argument (*anyonyāśraya*), *pratyabhijñāyāḥ smṛtitvābhāve siddhe, indriasyāsambaddhagrāhitvaṃ kalpāyitum śakyeta; tatkalpitate sati ca pratyabhijñāyāḥ smṛtitvābhāvaḥ siddhyate*. Once it has been established that recognition is devoid of the universal “memory”, it is possible to assume that the sense organs can function without the requisite contact. And only after that assumption has been made is it possible to establish that

recognition is devoid of the universal “memory”.

Probably for this reason, Udayana chose to avoid considering anything extraordinary about the means of recognition. He argued that the sense organs do grasp a past object, but through a well-established relation known as “*sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā*”.<sup>21</sup> This is an indirect relation which does not demand that the sense organs are in direct contact with the object to be revealed. It requires only that the object act as a qualifier of a particular locus which is itself related to the sense organs. A standard example of this relation is in the perception of an absence. The absence of red in a blue cloth is grasped by the eye. This absence is an attribute of the cloth which is in physical contact with the ocular sense.

The first objection to this relation which Śrī Harṣa offers is that if it were admitted no doubt would be possible, “Is this the same man I saw before, or not?” The logic behind this statement is complicated. Just as the question of relation between the sense organs and *tattā* arises in recognition, so does it arise with respect to the object of doubt. Doubt involves not only experience, but also memory. An object, for example, a post, is seen and its similarity to a man is noticed. The attribute, “*puruṣatva*”, “manness”, is then remembered and a complex but single cognition, “is this a man or a post”, arises. In the *Ṭīkā*, p. 235 N.E., an objection is refuted that such a cognition cannot be mere perception as it must also be memory. The object in contact with the sense organs is either a man or a post. If it is a post, then “manness” is only recalled. Vācaspati Miśra gives the same answer as he does in the case of recognition. There is nothing to prevent that the sense organs in combination with the mental traces grasp “manness” with which they are not in contact. The cognition, doubt, is thus entirely experience. Udayana should be expected likewise to reply with the same answer that he gave for recognition. The sense organs are in fact in contact with the previously known alternative, “manness”, and thus the whole is one experience. If Udayana accepts Vācaspati Miśra’s account of doubt, allowing the sense organs to grasp an unconnected object, he must also accept it in the case of recognition. Formulation of the concept of *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* would there be unjustifiable.

It is not difficult to see now that if doubt requires the presence of the relation *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* for the cognition of the recalled alternative, and if it is also said that this same contact is the very cause of definite knowledge, then doubt of the identity of a previously seen and presently seen object could never come to be. Certainty and doubt must be contradictory (see note 54 to the translation). The same contact, *saṃ-*

*baddhaviśeṣaṇatā*, cannot serve as the cause of both. This is made clear in the statement on p. 151 Sam, “*Doṣe satyapī vastunaḥ saṃskāreṇa, saṃskārasyātmanā, tasya manasā, tasya manasā, tasya ca bāhyendriyeṇa pratyāsattyapekṣana eva tadarthaprakāśaniyamopapatteh kaḥ pratyāsattyaapuraskāras tvaṇmate syāt?*” “Since even in the presence of a fault, the determination of the object to be presented to cognition is only possible in dependence upon the contact of the object with the mental traces, the mental traces with the soul, the soul with the mind, and the mind with the external sense organ, how could there possibly be any notion of dispensing with the said contact in your doctrine?” The doubt, “Is this the same man I saw before or not?”, requires the contact of the present man with the eye, the eye with the mind, the mind with the soul, the soul with the mental traces and the mental traces with the past time and place. Where that very relation is also accepted as the sole cause of valid recognition, doubt would be impossible. The certainty thereby arising would preclude the possibility of any further doubt.

Intervening between pp. 147 and 151 Sam is a brief refutation of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* concept that doubt is a universal inhering in knowledge (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 19; Śrī Harṣa, p. 150 Sam). The most significant point which Śrī Harṣa makes in this interlude is in effect a veiled criticism of Udayana. The appropriate page reference is p. 148 Sam. Udayana defends doubt against an objector in the *Parīśuddhi*, pp. 268–269 N.E. An opponent urges that doubt cannot be defined as a cognition in which neither of the two alternatives is definitely determined. In fact, it consists of two definitive cognitions, one of the presence of an attribute and the other of the absence of that same attribute. Udayana replies that once two conflicting opinions arise, neither can be definitely accepted, and thus doubt as a wavering, undecided cognition must be admitted as a separate category. Śrī Harṣa here simply remarks that if an object having an attribute (*x*) is revealed in part of the cognition which Udayana terms “doubt”, then that part of the cognition must be *valid* determination. The second part of the cognition revealing the absence of attribute (*x*) will also be no more than a second determination of the absence of that (*x*). Śrī Harṣa does not detail his reasoning, but it is not difficult to imagine. According to Udayana the validity of knowledge is an adventitious quality determined by its object. One cognition may be both valid and invalid depending upon its differing objects. Validity is thus not of an entire cognition, but only of a part of that cognition as delimited by a given object. Applying this view to the case in question, if alternative (*x*) exists, then by

Udayana's own principles, that part of the cognition which takes (x) as its object must be valid determination. The part revealing the absence of (x) must be invalid determination. There is no more occasion for lack of determination in the cognition "is this a man or a post" than there is in the cognition "this is silver". The statements of Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi* and in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 172, (1) that doubt is "*viruddhobhaya-prakāravaddharmyavalambin*"<sup>22</sup> or revealing of an object as qualified by two mutually contradictory attributes, and (2) that for this very reason doubt cannot be determination, but in fact constitutes a separate class of invalid cognitions, are meaningless. By Udayana's own admissions validity and invalidity apply not to a cognition as a whole but to that one cognition as limited by each of its objects. In each portion so defined by a single attribute there can be no question of multiple contradictory attributes. Each part of the cognition must thus be valid or invalid determination.

The manner in which Śrī Harṣa has thus far refuted Udayana, by urging that *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* cannot serve as the relation between the sense organ and the past time and place, as then doubt would be impossible, and by urging that the very concept of doubt as an indefinite cognition of two opposing alternatives is contradictory to the Naiyāyika notion of validity and invalidity of knowledge, is typical of Śrī Harṣa at his most difficult. The reasons he offers are not at all explained. The material can indeed be found in Udayana's own texts; however, the task of locating it is not an easy one. Śrī Harṣa remains entirely faithful to his original contentions. *Sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* is denied by the opponent's own interpretation of how doubt is produced, and his own insistence that the causes for definite cognition and the causes for doubt cannot be the same. Likewise, the impossibility of doubt as a whole is proved by Udayana's understanding of validity and invalidity.

The final refutation of *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* appears on pp. 152–153 Sam. The said relation cannot operate in the case in question. For *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* to operate one further qualification is necessary. The attribute which is to be grasped (in this case, *tattā*) must reside in a locus itself perceptible to the sense organ which is to grasp that attribute. Śrī Harṣa proposes that this is a necessary general rule. Wherever indirect relation is to apply, the quality to be revealed must *always* exist in a locus which can be grasped by the sense organ in question. He allows only one exception to this rule, and that is in the perception of an absence of a particular quality where that absence always resides on a locus which is *never* perceptible to

the given sense organ.<sup>23</sup> The sight of the absence of color in wind is one such case. The Naiyāyika maintains that the absence of color in wind is visible. Now the absence of color exists only on a locus which can *never* be revealed by the eye. Śrī Harṣa here urges that this is in fact the only case in which the above general rule may be violated. He forces his opponent to admit as much by demonstrating what ensues upon failure to concede that *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* must require that the locus of the attribute to be grasped is perceptible to the sense organ operating. If one permits *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* to function without this restriction, the absence of the universal “earthness” in atoms of water would be visible to the unaided eye. This requires some explanation. According to the Naiyāyika, water atoms are always in direct contact with the ocular sense – they exist everywhere. The absence of “earthness” is an attribute of these atoms. The conditions for *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* are thus fulfilled: the object, the absence of “earthness”, is a qualifier of the water atoms which are directly connected with the eye; the eye is in contact with the mind, and the mind with the soul. Only by assenting to the necessity of the general rule that the locus of that absence must also be perceptible can the Naiyāyika avoid this unwarranted conclusion. It is important to note that Śrī Harṣa here does not advance a general rule and then independently prove its validity. Again, he does no more than to indicate to the Naiyāyika what the Naiyāyika’s own assertions tacitly imply. The Naiyāyika accepts *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 440; *Pariśuddhi*, p. 280 N.E.). He also insists that the only requirement for the perception of an absence is that its counterpositive must be perceptible, and not its locus as well (*Kusumāñjali*, pp. 241–242). Given this last contention, the restriction of *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* to cases where the attribute to be grasped must reside on a locus within the range of the given sense organ is the only thing that can eliminate the above conclusion that an absence of “earthness” in water atoms would be visible. This necessary modification of *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* in turn makes it impossible for the relation to apply to *tattā*. *Tattā* is not on a locus, the mental traces, perceptible to any sense organ. The fault of p. 146 Sam now stands. Recognition cannot be experience alone. The new awareness of the identity of the past object and the present object is beyond the range of the sense organs.

The refutation proceeds on p. 154 Sam with a denial of the possibility that the mental traces themselves can serve as the contact (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 474) and that the mind acts as the sense organ and grasps *tattā* as a direct attribute of the soul. In such an event, where the mind is connected to the

soul by *saṃyoga* and the soul to *tattā* by means of the mental traces, the conditions of *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* would be satisfied. *Tattā* is a qualifier of the soul. The soul is not only connected to the sense organ, the mind, but is also grasped by that organ.

The remainder of the page is devoted to a refutation of the doctrine of Vācaspati Miśra (*Ṭikā*, pp. 230–231 N.E.) which Udayana had sought to transplant. The refutation is substantially the same as that of Udayana's interpretation. Whatever serves to account for recognition must also serve to account for the experience of a previously cognized object in doubt. It is contradictory to assert that a single cause can give rise to both determination and lack of determination.

The sections from pp. 156–170 Sam merely apply all the above reasoning to every cognition which is considered as memory. Should Udayana maintain that the mental traces are the contact between the sense organ and the object of past experience in recognition (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 474), then he must do so elsewhere in memory. There is no difference between the following situations:

- |                  |                                       |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|
| (a) Memory:      | Mind-----Soul-----●----- <i>tattā</i> |
| (b) Recognition: | Mind-----Soul-----●----- <i>tattā</i> |

where in each case, the dotted lines indicate first direct physical contact, then inference, and finally the mental traces. Thus, either memory must also be experience, or recognition must be memory.

The opponent is allowed to protest that “*saṃskārādhīnatvamātra*”, or “being dependent upon the mental traces alone”, is not what determines that knowledge is memory, but the fact that there is no additional contact of an external sense organ with an object. Thus, memory which lacks any additional contact is memory, and not experience, but recognition which does require further sense organ–object contact is in fact experience, despite the similarity in the contact required for the rise of these two types of knowledge. This is a view expressed not only by the Naiyāyika (*Ṭikā*, p. 35 N.E.; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 474) but also by the Prābhākaras (*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 124–125) and the Sāṃkhya-yoga school (*Yogavārttika*, p. 44). The present purpose of the introduction of this concept is to deny that memory will be experience if the mental traces can serve as the contact of the mind with a previously known object. Śrī Harṣa's reply is simple: lack of determination (*avinigama*). By the same token, what is to prevent one from asserting that experience is any knowledge in which the mental traces do not function as causes? The Naiyāyika contention that recognition is experience



would then be destroyed. Śrī Harṣa thus concludes on p. 157 Sam that the Naiyāyika doctrine of recognition as experience alone is impossible. Recognition must involve both memory and experience and *anubhūtitva* cannot be a universal as it there coexists with *smṛtitva*.

The argument continues on p. 160 Sam where Śrī Harṣa in a slightly different manner attacks the division of experience and memory and the concept that “*anubhūtitva*” is a universal. In the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 110 N.E., and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 193, Udayana explicitly denies that memory can be valid knowledge on the grounds that it reveals an object in a past state which no longer obtains. This assertion is deceptively simple. The Naiyāyika maintains that memory makes known a previously cognized object. Udayana now states that it also makes known an object as limited by a past time and place. But common sense tells us that the pot which we saw yesterday we saw as a pot in the present, and not in the past. How then can a past time and place, expressed by the Sanskrit philosophers as an attribute, *tattā*, be recalled? Udayana answers this question in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 245. Remembrance of an object as conditioned by a former time and place is possible only because we assume that following the experience of that object, “that is a pot”, we also have an experience of its “pastness”. Memory then follows upon these two simple experiences and reveals both the pot, once seen, and its pastness, also once known. (“*Atītakālāvachchedaś cānubhavottarakālaṃ tadanubhavagocaraḥ*”, “And the limitation of the past time and place is itself the object of another experience following in the wake of the original experience of the object.”)

Śrī Harṣa here refutes this contention in a manner similar to that of the *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Kiraṇāvalī* and after it the *Līlāvatī*, pp. 620 ff. Udayana’s arguments may be reduced to the following:

- (a) Memory is different from experience.
- (b) Memory is invalid as it reveals the past condition of an object and that past state is no longer in existence.
- (c) The past condition of an object can be recalled as it has in fact been previously experienced.

Udayana here is guilty of circuitous reasoning, *anyonyāśraya*. As Śrī Harṣa himself states, the revelation of “pastness” in memory must in fact be a new experience and not memory at all. It is not legitimate to assume that “pastness” has also been previously experienced and is subsequently recalled: *Smarāṇasya pūrvādhigatārthatayānubhavabhinnatve siddha eva tadbhedasyānyathānupapattyā pūrvatāyā api pūrvānubhavagocaratvam*

*siddhyate. Pūrvatāyāḥ pūrvānubhavagocaratve siddhe ca smaraṇ-asyādhigatārthatayānubhavabhinnatvaṃ siddhyate.* Only once it has been established that memory is distinct from experience because it reveals only those objects which have been previously known, can one assume that “pastness” has also been previously known, in order to account for that distinction. But only when it has been proved that “pastness” is the object of a previous knowledge can it be said that memory differs from experience because it reveals only those objects which have been previously known. Śrī Harṣa now closes with the statement that since it is the Naiyāyika’s own contention that all memory does in fact reveal the past state of an object (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 574), then it must also be admitted that all memory in part involves experience. *Anubhūtitva* cannot be a universal because it coexists with *smṛtitva*, not only in recognition, as shown thus far, but also in all cognitions termed memory. Once again Śrī Harṣa has defeated the Naiyāyika with Naiyāyika principles, urging the presence of circuitous reasoning which the Naiyāyika cannot deny.

From here (p. 161 Sam) the discussion passes to an objection to this last assertion, the Naiyāyika tenet that a previous time or place is always revealed in memory. The objection is that of the Prābhākara who holds to the peculiar doctrine that all knowledge is valid and that error consists in part of memory in which “pastness” is eliminated from our awareness.<sup>24</sup> Śrī Harṣa’s refutation of Prābhākara is not difficult; it is an example of a type of argument he employs against all the *sadvādins* throughout the introduction. It is a *pratibandhi*, showing that whatever fault the Prābhākara adduces in his opponent’s doctrine that same fault will accrue to him as well. By the general rule, “*yatrobhayoḥ sāmyaṃ na tatraikaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ*”, “Where the fault accrues to both no one is to be penalized” (*Śloka-vārttika*, *Śūnyavāda*, śloka 252), neither doctrine is to be criticized for a fault which exists on both sides.<sup>25</sup> The most notable point in this refutation is that Śrī Harṣa refutes the Prābhākara from the standpoint of the Nyāya school. He utilizes Nyāya concepts to this end. The implication of this procedure is clear. The Prābhākara objections to the Naiyāyika’s conception of memory as involving an understanding of a past time and place are not valid. All memory records “pastness”. This brings us back to Śrī Harṣa’s original argument. If all memory involves a knowledge of the past, and if this knowledge of the past cannot be recollection but must be experience, then all memory must be composite in nature. It must consist of both memory, and experience. “*Anubhūtitva*” cannot be a universal as it exists together with “*smṛtitva*”. Śrī Harṣa has successfully demonstrated their co-existence, first in recognition and now in all memory as well.

The importance of this last demonstration of *sāṃkaryā* in memory is made clear on p. 170 Sam where the refutation of *anubhūtitva* as a universal is concluded. Śrī Harṣa permits an objection similar to that raised by Hemacandra in the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 39. Hemacandra argues that recognition is neither memory, nor experience, nor a combination of the two. Recognition must be admitted as an entirely different type of cognition. It is thus not correct to deny that *anubhūtitva* can be a universal because it exists together with *smṛtitva* in recognition. Unfortunately, this will no longer solve the problem. It has just been shown that these two universals will also coexist in every cognition subsumed under the general heading “memory”. Hemacandra is defeated. The Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka could never agree to Hemacandra’s novel interpretation of recognition. For both of them validity is confined to experience alone. If recognition were other than experience, it would be invalid.

Before continuing with our investigation, still of the first definition, “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*”, it is perhaps advisable to pause and analyze what Śrī Harṣa has thus far accomplished. He has taken a definition, originally advanced by the Naiyāyikas, and first refuted it solely with Naiyāyika arguments (the refutation of the term “*tattva*”). He then proceeded to examine the word “*anubhūtitva*”. He assumed as a first explanation that “experience” is a universal and showed that in all doctrines of Indian philosophy, because of the nature of memory and of recognition, the fault of *sāṃkaryā* or the co-existence of this universal with another universal, “memory”, cannot be avoided. This demonstration of *sāṃkaryā* in all the schools lends to Śrī Harṣa’s refutation of the Nyāya definition an air of finality and completeness which it would otherwise not have had. It removes any doubt the reader might have that even if the Naiyāyika were wrong, one of Śrī Harṣa’s other opponents might be correct and validity might be capable of being so defined by the Mīmāṃsaka, Buddhist or Jain. If such a doubt remained, Śrī Harṣa would fall short of demonstrating his main contention, “*sarvāṇi lakṣaṇāṇy anupapannāni*” (p. 131 Sam), “No definition is possible in any school of philosophy”. For the sake of simplicity, Śrī Harṣa first dispensed with the Buddhist and Jain interpretations of recognition, and then illustrated the co-existence of the universals, “experience” and “memory” in the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. He forced this same fault on the Naiyāyika, proving that recognition can never be considered as experience alone. In the process Śrī Harṣa has also denied the applicability of “*sambaddhaviśeṣanātā*” as a cause of recognition, destroying Udayana’s improvement upon his predecessor’s doctrines. He

has likewise denied the validity of Vācaspati's explanations of the rise of recognition, refuted the possibility of doubt as the Naiyāyikas understand it, and demolished the Prābhākara notion of error. The discussion of "experience" as a universal is thus far more complex than one might first suspect. It is a masterpiece of logic and organization.

The discussion now passes to the second alternative, that "experience" means "being devoid of a quality, 'memory' ". Śrī Harṣa refutes this alternative by showing that this attribute "being devoid of 'memory' " (*smṛtitvarahitva*) must still exist in memory, and thus as a definition of experience it will be overextended. Once again he makes his refutation applicable to all schools of Indian philosophy. Whether the attribute "being devoid of 'memory' " is to be understood as "being possessed of an absence of the general quality 'memory' " (*smṛtitvābhāvavattva*) as the Naiyāyikas and Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas assume, or as the very nature of a locus when considered with respect to "memory" (*smṛtitvapratīyogikam āśrayasya svarūpam*) as the Buddhists, Sāṃkhyas and some Prābhākaras admit (*Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 201; *Nayaviveka*, p. 161; *Prabhākaravijaya*, p. 56; *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 34), or as a knowledge of the locus at which something is to be denied, as other Prābhākaras maintain (*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 287), it will still reside in memory.

The reason why such an absence of the general attribute "memory" must be present in memory as well as in experience is a result of the Indian philosopher's division of absences into two main types, a relational absence or *samsargābhāva*, the absence of a pot on the stove, and a reciprocal absence or *anyonyābhāva*, the difference of the pot from its locus. By "*smṛtitvarahitva*" the opponent clearly intends a relational absence; however, Śrī Harṣa denies that any difference between the two can be established. A reciprocal absence or difference from the general attribute "*smṛtitva*" certainly exists in memory as well as in experience. Memory, the substratum, and "memory" the general quality are indeed different. It is conceivable that a like argument refuting Nyāya categories on the premise that no difference can be established between a relational and a reciprocal absence had been employed prior to Śrī Harṣa, by Jayarāsi in the *Tattvopaplavasimha*, pp. 4–5.<sup>26</sup> For details of the refutations of the specific definitions of relational absence and reciprocal absence the reader is referred to note 141 of the translation.

One of the most interesting points of this discussion of the second interpretation of "*anubhūtitva*" appears between pp. 185–190 Sam. It is a general rebuttal of the Naiyāyika concepts that an absence is by nature the

negation of its own counterpositive, and that the counterpositive itself is nothing more than the absence of that absence. Now if the contradiction between (x), the *pratiyogin* or counterpositive, and (y), the *anuyogin* or absence, is that (x) is itself non-y and (y) is by nature non-x, then to deny the existence of (x) would be to propound its total non-existence or (y). Whatever is considered the counterpositive of an absence would thus be an absolute fiction. To avoid this unwarranted conclusion the Naiyāyika is permitted to urge that the contradiction between (x), the counterpositive and (y), the absence, is not that they are mutually negating, but only that they cannot exist at the same time and in the same locus. This is known as *sahānavasthāna*. Under this theory, to deny (x) would not imply that (x) nowhere exists, or that its absence (y) is omnipresent, but only that (x) cannot occur where (y) occurs. Śrī Harṣa's reply on p. 187 Sam is one of his finest in the whole of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. "Then it still will have been admitted that the counterpositive and its absence do sometime exist together." His logic is thus: If *sahānavasthāna* or lack of co-existence is the only contradiction between an absence (y) and its counterpositive (x), then this lack of co-existence, itself an absence, will likewise imply not the total non-existence of its own counterpositive, the co-existence of (x) and (y), but only the non-existence of that counterpositive at the same time and place as its own absence, non-co-existence or *sahānavasthāna*. Thus it must logically be admitted that somewhere, (x), a counterpositive, and (y), its absence, exist together.<sup>27</sup>

Another difficulty with the admission that the only contradiction between an absence and its counterpositive is that they cannot co-exist is given on p. 190 Sam. If it is admitted that there is no more opposition between the two than an inability to reside together in one locus, then there would be no difference between the relation which obtains between an absence and its counterpositive and that which obtains between two universals, for example, "cowness" and "horseness" which also can never exist together. Now, it is observed that both "cowness" and "horseness" can in fact be denied at the same locus, in a tree, etc. Similarly, it would also have to be admitted that an absence and its counterpositive can both be denied in a given substratum. The Naiyāyika objection to the classic Vedānta denial of both the existence and non-existence of the world is now meaningless.

All of this discussion is to be seen as an attack against Vācaspati Mīśra and Udayana who both hold that an absence and its counterpositive are *parasparānātmaka* or by nature the denial of each other (see references, note to translation 89). The *Nyāyamañjari*, p. 56, for the very reason that

Śrī Harṣa here urges against Udayana, namely, that then the denial of any counterpositive would result in its being an absolute fiction, does not admit any more contradiction between the two than lack of co-existence. This is a clear example of another procedure of argument which Śrī Harṣa outlines in the introduction (text p. 128 Sam). He acts as an *ekadeśin*, urging against Udayana the faults enumerated by the Naiyāyika Jayantabhaṭṭa, and then goes on to contradict them both on p. 190 Sam with the final assertion that the Naiyāyika could then take no exception to the classic Vedānta doctrines.<sup>28</sup> It is also one more instance of his pointing out the inherent inconsistencies in the totality of his opponents' assertions.

This discussion of the second interpretation of "experience" as "being devoid of the general attribute 'memory'" concludes on pp. 200–204 Sam with still another superb example of how Śrī Harṣa uncovers the absurdities in the Naiyāyika doctrines. It has thus far been shown that the definition, "*Smṛtitvābhāvo yatra sānubhūtiḥ*", "Experience is that knowledge in which there exists an absence of the general attribute, 'memory'", will apply to memory as well if that absence is considered as a reciprocal absence. The *pūrvapakṣa* attempts to avoid this fault of overextension by slightly modifying the definition, inserting the particle *eva*, "only". The definition now reads, "*smṛtitvābhāva eva yatra sānubhūtiḥ*", "Experience is that knowledge in which there exists *only* the *absence* of the general attribute 'memory'." His intention is that the introduction of the particle *eva* will eliminate the possibility that the presence of the quality "memory" also exists in the locus in question. The definition, then, could apply to experience alone. In experience exists only the absence of the quality "memory" and not its presence as well, whereas in memory exist both.

Śrī Harṣa's reply to all this hinges upon the notion of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana discussed earlier that a presence (*bhāva*) and an absence (*abhāva*) are mutually negating (*parasparānātmaka*). The particle *eva* in any such conception is meaningless. Its introduction was intended to exclude *bhāva*, the presence of "memory", but where an absence is by nature the negation of its own counterpositive, an assertion of that absence itself implies as much! Similarly, should the Naiyāyika, as he does on p. 201 Sam, redefine experience as "*smṛtitvābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvo yatra*", "Experience is that knowledge in which there is an absence of the quality 'serving as the locus of both the presence of memory and the absence of memory'", then the definition must still apply to memory as well, in accordance with the same conception of an absence and its counterpositive as mutually negating. Once the Naiyāyika has admitted the reciprocal absence

of the quality “*smṛtitva*” in memory (*smṛtitvānyonyābhāva*), if *bhāva* and *abhāva* are mutually opposing, then he cannot also admit the presence of *smṛtitva* in the same locus. Thus the Naiyāyika is forced into an admission of *sāmānādhikaranyābhāva* beyond his control. Moreover, he is now caught in a maze of contradictions. He admits in memory the presence of *smṛtitva* and the absence of *smṛtitva*, and by that admission their co-existence (*sāmānādhikaranyā*). At the same time, by the rule that an absence and a presence are by nature the negation of one another, he must also concede that the two, *smṛtitva* and its absence, in fact lack co-existence. The Naiyāyika cannot urge that a reciprocal absence and its counterpositive are not mutually negating and that such a situation applies only to relational absences, because thus far he has failed to establish any difference between these absences.

The arguments employed thus far against the Naiyāyika are on page 205 Sam reapplied to all other doctrines, even where an absence is not recognized as a reality beyond the existence of the particular locus in which a particular entity is denied. As before, this removes the doubt that in another opponent’s conceptual scheme of the world the definition of experience as the locus of the absence of the general quality “memory” might be valid.

The refutation of the third alternative, that “experience” is an attribute, “being devoid of the defining marks of memory”, begins on p. 208 Sam. It is merely a reapplication of the arguments against the second alternative. Once more, this absence of the defining marks of memory, considered as a reciprocal absence, would apply to memory as well. The definition suffers from overextension.

Śrī Harṣa next takes the opportunity to cite and refute some of these defining marks of memory which experience is said to lack. “*Grhītasya jñānaṃ smṛtiḥ*”, “Memory is a knowledge of that which has been previously known”, is the definition advanced by Śālikanātha Mīśra in the *Rjuvimalā* p. 52, the *Yogasūtra Tattvavaiśārādī*, p. 44, and the *Pañcapādikā*, p. 56. Śrī Harṣa rejects it as had Jayarāśi before him in the *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, p. 7, and Śālikanātha Mīśra in the *Prakaranapañcikā*, p. 119. The definition will apply as well to the continuous experience of a single object, “*dhārāvāhikajñāna*”. It is not possible to assume that each phase of this series grasps a new object and that the definition is thereby without fault. Such an assumption in fact involves circuitous reasoning, *anyonyāśraya: grhītagrāhitvasya smṛtilakṣaṇatve siddhe, dhārāvāhikajñānasyāsmṛtitvād agrhītagrāhitvaṃ siddhyate. Dhārāvāhikajñānasyāgrhītagrāhitve siddhe, tādrśalakṣaṇaṃ*

*siddhyate*. Once it has been established that grasping the previously grasped is the definition of memory, it can be established that continuous cognition, not being memory, does not grasp that which has been previously grasped. And once it has been established that continuous cognition does not grasp that which has been previously grasped, such a definition of memory can be established.

The next definition, “*Sāpekṣajñānam smṛtiḥ*”, “Memory is dependent knowledge”, is the definition of Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 110 N.E. and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 245. It is also found in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 125. The definition, “*saṃskāramātrajātva*”, “being born of the mental traces alone” (*Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 104), is refuted with a paraphrase of a cardinal Buddhist tenet, “*sāmagrītaḥ sarvasaṃbhavena lakṣaṇasyāsaṃbhavāt*”, “The definition is impossible as everything is born of a collocation of causes” (*Pramāṇavārttika*, 3.53; cited *Bhāmātī*, p. 454 on 2.2.19; *Ātmatattvavivēka*, p. 245; *Tikā*, p. 230 N.E.). The refutation of the definition, “*asādhāraṇataddhetukadhītva*”, “having the mental traces as its unique cause”, which is similar to another definition advanced by Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 106 N.E., employs the principle that a knowledge of causality as a general relation requires a prior knowledge of a universal or common attribute (see translation note 35). Whatever the common attribute might be amongst all members of the group, “memory”, let that be the definition. This is a rejoinder which Udayana himself urges against an opponent in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 463. The *Kusumāñjalivistara* gives the general *nyāya*, or rule behind it: “*taddhetor evāśya taddhetutve madhye kiṃ tena ?*” “When what is required for (x) can itself account for (y), of what use is (x), stuck there in the middle?”

The refutation of the fourth explanation of “experience” as “a knowledge the particular cause of which arises immediately prior to the rise of that knowledge itself”, is refuted by the same rule. To know causality, one must know a general and common attribute. Let that attribute alone serve as the definition of the group. This concludes Śrī Harṣa’s refutation of the individual components of the first definition of valid knowledge, “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*”, “Valid knowledge is an experience of a true object”.

Śrī Harṣa thence proceeds to a destruction of the same definition as a whole. This is actually the reverse of the process which he outlines in the closing passages of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, p. 725 Sam, in which he states that refutation of specific words should follow general criticism. Śrī Harṣa now urges that the definition, “Valid knowledge is an experience of a



true object”, is inadequate as it will also apply to a cognition, produced by invalid means, but in fact revealing an object as it really exists. Such a cognition must be determination; it cannot be invalid because it is a form of doubt. This is the most noteworthy point here raised, “*na ca vaktuḥ samśaya eva, niścayakābhāvāt. Ekatarakoṭivavahāras tu kṛṣyādipravṛttivād iti yuktam, tatrāpy āhārarūpaikakotiniścayāsthānāt. Anyathā, samśayasya koṭidvayaniścayasamuccayāpatteḥ*”; “Nor is it possible to assume that the speaker is in doubt, lacking any determinant, but that he speaks of one alternative just as the farmer acts [on the assumption of one alternative, that his sowing will give rise to crops]. For even in that case, you must not resort to a wilful false determination of one alternative. Otherwise, it would come to pass that doubt is nothing but a combination of two determinations, one for each alternative.”

This remark is similar to the tactics Śrī Harṣa employed above, p. 148 Sam. Śrī Harṣa there attacked Udayana’s conception of doubt, arguing that by Udayana’s own assertion that the validity of a cognition is to be determined on the basis of its individual objects (x), and (y), the cognition termed “doubt” must be in part valid and in part invalid. The present statement is analogous to this former remark in denying of doubt the character of indeterminacy. It similarly highlights another major conflict in the Nyāya doctrine.

Vācaspati Miśra (*Tīkā*, p. 29 N.E.) clearly held that activity can proceed from doubt. Interestingly enough, however, he also criticized the Prābhākara theory of error, *akhyāti* or non-discrimination. It is to be recalled that the Prābhākara theory of error maintains that no knowledge can be false. Error arises only from a lack of knowledge, a failure to distinguish between something that is actually being experienced, and something that is being remembered. Such an ignorance, it supposes, leads an individual to act and speak as if the two objects, the one experienced, and the one recalled, were in fact known as one. Against all this, Vācaspati Miśra urged that under such a theory, just as a failure to grasp difference might lead to an activity, so should a failure to grasp identity lead to an inability to act. This conflict between the cause for activity and the cause for cessation of activity would prevent the rise of any behavior with respect to a given object of knowledge (*Tīkā*, p. 163 N.E.; *Bhāmātī*, p. 15).

Vācaspati Miśra seemed not to see that the knowledge of (x) and of its absence of which doubt is said to consist might also be considered as sufficient cause for behavior [the knowledge of the existence of (x)] and at the same time, as a cause for quiescence [the knowledge of the absence of (x)].

To assert that doubt leads to activity and yet criticize the Prābhākara as Vācaspati Miśra does is thus contradictory. Jayantabhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyakalikā*, p. 4, differs not from the views of Vācaspati Miśra. Udayana, it would appear, recognized their inherent inconsistencies. In the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 77 N.E., Udayana asserts that the doubt which leads to activity is in fact “*utkaṭaikaakoṭi*”, “stronger in one alternative”. This is reiterated in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 171–172.

Śrī Harṣa in his general refutation of “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*” here refutes this concept. He argues that it is not possible to avoid the inconsistencies in Vācaspati Miśra’s view by assuming that in certain cases doubt leads to a false determination of one of the presented alternatives. In the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 268 N.E., Udayana had stressed that certainty does not arise when two conflicting possibilities are known. Now he asserts that it will. Behind this assertion is the idea that not only “*ubhayaviruddhatva*” or the contradiction between the two alternatives revealed is the determinant of doubt, but also “*samabalatva*”, or the equal strength of those alternatives. This reasoning is circuitous: *Samśayasyāniścayatve siddhe tatkāraṇatayā samabalatvam api kalpāyitum śakyate. tatsiddhe ca samśayasyāniścayatvam api vaktum śakyeta*. Once it has been established that doubt is an uncertain cognition, it is possible to assume that equal force [of the alternatives therein revealed] is a cause of that lack of certitude. And once it has been established that equal force is a cause of the lack of certitude, it is possible to establish that doubt is an uncertain cognition. Thus, Udayana defeats himself, and Vācaspati Miśra’s contentions remain impossible because of their inherent contradictions. It cannot therefore be assumed that a knowledge of a given fact though arrived at by incorrect means must be doubt and thus not covered by the definition, “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*”. The definition is overextended.

What Śrī Harṣa has in fact done here is (1) to allow Udayana to refute Vācaspati Miśra’s notion that doubt can give rise to activity, (2) to refute Udayana by showing that the admission of a definitive cognition, even false, in the presence of a knowledge of two mutually opposing facts will destroy Udayana’s reason for proving that doubt cannot be determination, and (3) to show that for both Udayana and Vācaspati Miśra the definition “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*” will therefore include the cognition of an existing object arrived at by invalid means. It is an excellent example of his allowing one Naiyāyika to refute the next, and finally himself as well. It also requires that the reader supply all of the above process of reasoning. The refutation of the first definition of valid knowledge continues to p. 218 Sam with a documentation of the last assertion, (3).

The second definition of valid knowledge (p. 218 Sam), “*yathārthānubhāvaḥ pramā*”, “Valid knowledge is an experience which corresponds with its object”, is given by the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, p. 48; the *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 489; *Kusumāñjali*, pp. 451, 455; *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 6; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 183; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 110 N.E.; *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 210 K and *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, p. 2. The refutation proceeds along much the same lines as that of the first definition. Śrī Harṣa opens with an investigation of the meaning of the term “*yathārtha*”. He first suggests that it is a synonym of the word “*tattva*”, a suggestion justified in the light of the fact that, as we have seen, Udayana does elsewhere define valid knowledge as “*tattvānubhūti*”. It is obvious that were this the case, the definition would stand refuted by all the previous arguments. Śrī Harṣa then takes the dictionary meaning of “*yathā*”, “similarity”. The definition thus implies, “valid knowledge is an experience which is similar to its object”. The main principle which Śrī Harṣa will employ to destroy such an interpretation is that it is inconsistent with Udayana’s assertion in the *Parīśuddhi*, pp. 81, 96 N.E. and the *Āmatattvaviveka*, p. 317, that all experience is valid with respect to the locus of a qualifier, and may be invalid only with respect to an attribute. It is thus the doctrine of this school that a single cognition is in part valid and in part invalid. Unfortunately, the definition of validity here stated makes no provision for such partial validity of a cognition, but refers only to the validity of a single cognition as a whole. This is the principle behind Śrī Harṣa’s rejection of “*yathārthānubhāvaḥ pramā*”; it remains to be seen how he applies it in specific cases.

A definition of *pramā* must distinguish a valid knowledge *A*, “this is a conch shell”, from an invalid knowledge *B* of silverness in that conch shell, “this is silver”. Śrī Harṣa first urges (p. 219 Sam) that the present definition is not equal to its task. It will include cognition *B* which is in fact similar to its object in that both the entity cognized and the cognition of that entity are qualified by the attribute “*idaṃtā*”, “presentness”. The definition is overextended. Should Udayana reply with his doctrine of partial validity, saying that he admits that cognition *B* is valid for “*idaṃtā*”, then Śrī Harṣa reminds him that the same doctrine of partial validity also recognizes that all experience is valid for a locus of qualities. Udayana should thus define valid knowledge simply as experience, “*anubhūti*”, and leave off the unnecessary modifier “*yathārtha*”. If Udayana would justify that the cognition *B*, “this is silver”, is valid on the basis of its similarity to its object in the possession of “*idaṃtā*”, then he must also justify that all experience is valid on the basis of a similarity to the substratum cognized. As for Prabhākara, so for Udayana

there would be no such thing as an invalid experience. The essence of Śrī Harṣa's refutation thus far is that Udayana must either abandon his notion that all experience is valid for a locus, or he must abandon the qualifier "yathārtha", "similar to its object", in the present definition. The definition defines the validity of a cognition as a whole and not with respect to its specific objects ( $x$ ) and ( $y$ ). This in effect demolishes the definition as it actually appears in the Nyāya texts.

As with "*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*", on p. 133, Śrī Harṣa similarly allows his opponent here to rephrase his definition and make explicit his intentions (p. 222 Sam): "A knowledge is valid for those of its objects to which it has similarity and not for any other of its objects to which it is not similar". The Naiyāyika hopes that the overextension of the definition to include the invalid cognition of silver in a conch shell will now be avoided. The knowledge "this is silver" will be valid for the locus and the attribute "thisness". Both the object and the knowledge are alike in bearing these qualities. The knowledge will not, however, be valid for "silverness". It is only the knowledge which is limited by "silverness" as its object; the entity cognized is devoid of this attribute. Śrī Harṣa takes exception to this last remark. It is not true that the entity cognized is in no way limited by "silverness". One does say, "This is the conch shell which I knew as silver." Thus, "silverness" is an attribute of both the knowledge and the shell, and the knowledge does bear similarity to its object with respect to this "silverness". The definition remains overextended. It is not possible to remove this fault without running into the difficulty of *ananugama*, making the definition so specific to a single case that it can nowhere else apply (see note 11).

The refutation of the third definition of valid knowledge, "*saṃyak-paricchittiḥ pramā*", "Valid knowledge is complete experience", is slightly more complicated. The definition is Udayana's in the *Kusumāñjali*, 4.5, p. 475, and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 192. It is also offered in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 11, and is similar to that of the Jains, "*saṃyagjñānaṃ pramā*", "Valid knowledge is complete knowledge" (*Pramāṇaparikṣā*, p. 51; *Nyāyakumudacandra*, vol. 1, p. 74; *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 2). The *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* in which "*saṃyakparicchitti*" is used as a synonym of "*tattvaparicchitti*" (p. 12) requires no further comment, and the possibility that as Udayana also gives the definition "*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*" the two are meant to carry the same meaning is dismissed by referring to the immediately preceding section. The dictionary definition is then taken and refuted, and on p. 224 Sam Śrī Harṣa finally undertakes the destruction of

Udayana's conceivable intentions. The refutation is of type (B) (compare "*kāraṇānubhūtiḥ pramā*" above).

In the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 96 N.E., Udayana remarks that validity can be inferred from an inferential mark which he terms "*tajjātīyatva*" or "belonging to that class". He further explains that in the case of perception this mark will mean "*lakṣaṇasahacaritalakṣyaviṣayañāna*" or "being a knowledge of an object along with its defining mark". As in the case of "*arthakriyākāritva*", "purposeful activity", as an inferential mark (*Pariśuddhi*, p. 80 N.E., and above, p. 8), this mark is also not meant as a definition of validity but only as a means of knowing validity. Śrī Harṣa takes it here as a definition. He is thoroughly justified in so doing, by the Naiyāyika's own admission that a definition is itself nothing more than an inferential mark by which "*vyavahāra*" or designation is known (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 383; *Ṭikā*, p. 186 N.E.; *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 75). In view of the impossibility of everything else which Udayana suggests, it is not at all improper that Śrī Harṣa does propose "*tajjātīyatva*" as a definition of validity, synonymous with the term "*saṃyaktva*". This is the origin of the statement, p. 224 Sam, "*viśeṣasahitadharmiparicchitti*", "a cognition of a locus along with an attribute". It is a paraphrase of the *Pariśuddhi* "*lakṣaṇasahacaritalakṣyaviṣayañāna*".

Śrī Harṣa replies to his proposal that the definition will be guilty either of overextension or of underextension. If the word "*viśeṣa*", "attribute", means any attribute at all, then the definition will equally apply to the invalid cognition of the conch as silver. Such a cognition does represent an object along with some attribute, "silverness". If Udayana intends that in each particular case a specified attribute must be revealed, then, where the cognition defined is that of a conch shell, the attribute must be "conch shellness" (*śuktitva*), and the definition of this cognition will be "*śuktitvasahacaritadharmiparicchittiḥ pramā*", "Valid knowledge is the experience of a locus along with conch shellness". Obviously enough, such a definition could never apply to a valid cognition of any other object. "*Prthivīvasahacaritadharmiparicchitti*", or "the experience of a locus along with earthness", is not an "experience of a locus along with conch shellness", and so would always be invalid (compare note 11). It might be noted that this limited conception of "*tajjātīyatva*" is in fact in keeping with the original statement in the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 96 N.E., "*tatra dravye gandhavati prthivīñānam ity ādi*", "In the case of a substance possessed of smell, the knowledge of earth, etc."

On page 226 Sam Śrī Harṣa continues his refutation of this limited

interpretation of the definition with a specific attack on the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 232. Udayana in the *Kusumāñjali* expresses a view similar to that offered in the *Parīśuddhi*. It must be admitted that there is a means of knowing the validity of knowledge which itself cannot be subject to any doubt of its own correctness. A *pūrvapakṣa* asks, “Just what is this thing which can never give rise to doubt?” Udayana replies that it is some attribute, the perception of which determines that a cognition is valid, and the absence of a knowledge of which determines that a cognition is invalid. He further states that it must be admitted that there exists such an attribute. Otherwise, were all factors governing validity known and yet validity absent, then there would be no possibility of even contradicting a given cognition. A contradicting cognition is generally recognized to be a cognition of an attribute missed by the incorrect observation.

Śrī Harṣa responds to this by saying that no such attribute can be named. In admittedly incorrect cognitions, whether in sleep or those derived from false statements, the same attributes are perceived as in the correct cognitions of the waking state. If Udayana’s “*lakṣaṇasahacaritalakṣyaviṣaya-jñāna*” means “*lakṣaṇena saha lakṣyasya jñāna*”, or “knowledge of an object along with a knowledge of a defining attribute”, then invalid cognitions would be valid. Even in error, an object is still experienced along with a certain attribute. The definition is overextended.

Śrī Harṣa permits Udayana one more attempt to clarify his intentions. It is not that an object (*x*) is known and that a quality (*y*) is also known at the same time, but that an object (*x*) which actually possesses that quality (*y*) is known as so constituted. This will avoid the undesirable consequence that an incorrect cognition, even one derived from a false remark, “This is silver”, would be valid. No false cognition is of an object which is actually qualified by the attribute therein revealed. Śrī Harṣa rejects this by the same reasoning as he did the first resolution of the compound. If the word “*lakṣaṇa*” or “*viśeṣaṇa*” can mean any attribute at all, then the cognition “this is silver” will still be valid. It does represent an object, a conch shell, as qualified by its own attribute, “thisness”. If the term “*viśeṣaṇa*” must specifically mean “conch shellness”, here unrevealed, then the definition “a cognition of an object possessed of conch shellness is a valid cognition” will nowhere else apply. It is underextended (see note 11).

In closing his refutation of this third definition, “*saṃyakparicchittih pramā*”, Śrī Harṣa remarks that the entire concept of the *Kusumāñjali* and the *Parīśuddhi* that a knowledge of a particular attribute prevents invalidity is contradictory to another Naiyāyika tenet. The Naiyāyika admits the

existence of “*āhāryasamśaya*” or assumed doubt, “*āhāryaviparyaya*” or assumed error, and “*tarka*”, or reasoning (*Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 222 on the first, and p. 171 on *tarka*). All three arise with the awareness of the specific attributes of an object in question. The Naiyāyika is once more defeated by his own admissions.<sup>29</sup> The Jains are also refuted by the sum of arguments here urged against the Naiyāyika, if “*saṃyaktva*” means “*tattva*”, “*yathārthatva*” or “*saviśeṣaṇatva*”.

The next definition of valid knowledge considered, “*avyabhicāryanubhavaḥ pramā*”, “Valid knowledge is unfaltering experience”, is endorsed by Udayana (*Pariśuddhi*, p. 266 N.E.), Vācaspati Miśra (*Ṭīkā*, p. 24; pp. 186–187 N.E.), and Jayantabhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 12). A similar definition is given by Vālidevasūri, *Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṇkāra, sūtra* 18, p. 3, “*jñānasya prameyavyabhicāritvaṃ prāmāṇyam*”, “The validity of knowledge is its unfaltering with respect to its own object”. Śrī Harṣa suggests that the term “*avyabhicāritva*” means “*arthāvinābhūtitva*”, “never occurring in the absence of its object”. This is a remark which he takes from the *Ṭīkā*, p. 24 N.E., and the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 81 N.E. Its refutation is accomplished by an *atideśa* or reapplication of the arguments thus far employed.

As a fifth definition Śrī Harṣa offers “*avisamvādyanubhavaḥ pramā*”, “Valid knowledge is undisputed experience” (p. 231 Sam). This is the definition of the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, p. 37; the *Aṣṭaśatī* and *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 171; the *Siddhivinīścaya*, p. 146; *Akalaṇka’s Granthatrayī*, p. 14; the *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 251; *Bhojavṛtti* on the *Yogasūtras*, p. 4, and the *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.1 and all other Buddhist texts. With this definition Śrī Harṣa moves from the Naiyāyikas to the Buddhists and Jains.

In his typical fashion, he opens the examination of the definition with an appraisal of the term “*avisamvāditva*”. He first cites the alternatives given in the *Ṭīkā*, p. 24 N.E., and *Pariśuddhi*, pp. 80–81 N.E. (see above p. 9). He merely adds to them a fourth, “*anyat*”, “something else”, which he will fill in with the Buddhist and Jain conception of this word. The only remark to be made about Śrī Harṣa’s treatment of the first three suggestions is that it all falls into category (B). Udayana intends these factors as marks to know the validity of knowledge and not as definitions of validity.

The refutation of the Buddhist interpretation of “*avisamvāditva*” is more interesting. Śrī Harṣa opens with a statement on p. 235 Sam intended to represent the Buddhist view, “*arthakriyākāriṇiṣayatvaṃ vāvisamvāditvaṃ*”, “*avisamvāditva* means having as its object something which leads to fruitful activity”. The first problem is how he arrives at this gloss from

Dharmakīrti's "*avisamvāditvaṃ cārthakriyāsthitiḥ*", "*avisamvāditva* is the presence of fruitful activity". It would seem that the Buddhist understood the phrase, "*arthakriyāsthitiḥ*", "presence of fruitful activity", in two ways: (1) *sākṣād viṣayatāsaṃbandhenārthakriyā jñāne tiṣṭhati*, purposeful activity exists in knowledge directly as its object, and (2) *svajanaka-viṣayatasaṃbandhenārthakriyā jñāne tiṣṭhati*, purposeful activity exists in knowledge indirectly as being the product of the object of that knowledge. In other words, both a cognition of successful activity and a cognition the object of which leads to successful activity are valid.<sup>30</sup> Alternative (2) resolves itself into Śrī Harṣa's gloss, "*arthakriyākāriṇiṣ-ayatva*", "having an object which leads to purposeful activity". For the sake of simplicity Śrī Harṣa assumes this alone to be the definition, and refutes the first assertion, that a cognition of successful activity is always valid, in the process of refuting the definition.

Śrī Harṣa first denies the validity of Dharmakīrti's definition by urging that if by the word "*arthakriyā*" is meant activity in general, then the definition will be overextended. It will include invalid cognitions. Even a conch perceived as silver does have some causal efficiency, if not as silver, still in its own capacity as a conch. It is not possible to assert that a cognition of an object is valid only when that object as perceived leads to successful activity – that is to say when an object perceived as silver can be used as silver. The reason for this is that it is difficult to determine that (x) acts as (x). One can only know that it does, and that knowledge may be false. This is the refutation of the interpretation (1) above of "*arthakriyāsthitiḥ*". It is not true that all cognitions of causal efficiency are valid. One cannot assume that the definition implies an exclusion of sleeping states where an activity is perceived in the absence of that activity (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, vol. II, p. 949, Abhyadevasūri, *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, pp. 14–15). It is not possible to establish the difference between the sleeping and the waking states without first establishing a difference between the existential status of the objects therein experienced. This in turn requires a distinction between valid and invalid cognition. To preface any definition of valid cognition with "*svapnabodhetaratve sati*", "being other than the cognitions of the dream state" would thus involve a *cakraka*: *pramālakṣaṇa-siddhe sati, tadabhāvāt svapnajiñānam apramā; svapnajiñānasyāprāmatye siddhe jāgradbodhasya tato bhinnatvaṃ siddhyate. Jāgratsvapnayor bhedo siddhe, "svapnānyatve sati avisamvāditvaṃ" iti pramālakṣaṇaṃ siddhyate*. Once the definition of valid cognition has been established, it is possible to say that dream cognition, lacking that definition, must be invalid. And once



it has been established that dream cognition is invalid, it is possible to demonstrate that waking cognitions differ from dream cognitions. Finally, once the difference between waking and dream cognitions has been established, the definition of valid cognition as “undisputed knowledge which is other than dream knowledge” can be established.<sup>31</sup>

Śrī Harṣa then cites and refutes Prajñākaragupta, “*abhiprāyāviśaṃvādāt pramāṇaṃ sarvaṃ ucyate*”, “All validity is calculated on the basis of conformity with one’s intentions” (Śrī Harṣa p. 235 Sam; Prajñākaragupta, p. 6). I would suggest that the purpose of introducing this explanation at this juncture is to attempt to ward off the overextension adduced above.<sup>32</sup> Śrī Harṣa has urged that if “*arthakriyā*” means any activity in general, then the definition will apply as well to invalid cognitions. A conch still functions as a conch. Under Prajñākaragupta’s new interpretation, this overextension should be avoided. It is not the activity of a conch which is intended by the individual who perceives the conch as silver, and moves to pick it up. Śrī Harṣa is quick to reply that the definition will none-the-less still apply to cognitions in the dream state, where one does have a knowledge of his intended purpose as fulfilled, despite the unreality of that wish-fulfilment.<sup>33</sup>

The next suggestion of the Buddhist, that “*avisamvāditva*” means “*prāptiyādiyogyatā*” or “the ability of the object to be attained, etc.”, appears in the commentary of Manorathanandin to the *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 3, Dharmottara’s remarks on the *Nyāyabindu* (*Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 19), and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, pp. 479, 984. The refutation is by *atideśa*. *Prāptiyogyatā*, ability to be attained, as Kamalaśīla himself noted, can only be inferred from a knowledge of actual attainment. Such a knowledge can also occur in sleep and thus might well be false. The definition remains overextended.<sup>34</sup>

It is intriguing to note that this is the one definition of Dharmakīrti which Śrī Harṣa directly refutes in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. He devotes no effort to it, and closes on p. 236 Sam with a comment which amounts to little more than a disparaging remark that Dharmakīrti’s doctrines are nothing but a lot of complicated nonsense. In view of Śrī Harṣa’s reverence towards the Mādhyamika Buddhists (see translation and notes), his intolerance of Dharmakīrti seems at first unexpected. In fact, it is not. It is perfectly consistent with Śrī Harṣa’s main contention that nothing can be defined. To assert the existence of self-valid consciousness alone and then to proceed to define the objects of the visible world, *pramā*, *pratyakṣa*, etc., is a contradiction in terms. To further qualify these definitions by the statement that they are “conventional” is even more meaningless. It is tantamount to

the admission that they are invalid. In that case, one might as well accept the equally invalid definitions of the Naiyāyikas. Independent efforts at formulating new definitions are useless. Should Dharmakīrti assume that his own definitions surpass the others, Śrī Harṣa simply points out here that they do not – a fact which Dharmakīrti himself must have recognized when he termed their objects “*vyāvahārika*” or “conventional”.

The next definition of valid cognition which Śrī Harṣa discusses (p. 236 Sam) is “*abādhitānubhūtiḥ pramā*”, “Valid cognition is uncontradicted experience”. This is given in the *Nyāyāvatāra*, verse 1, and defended by Siddharṣi in the commentary to that work, pp. 35–36. Śrī Harṣa’s argument against it is not unique; it had been employed before him by the *Tattvopaplavishī*, p. 2; *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, pp. 17, 127; *Ātmātattva-viveka*, p. 335; Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 24; *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 172 and *Vidhiviveka*, p. 115.

The following definition is that of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, pp. 11–12 which holds that “validity” is a universal and valid cognition is to be defined as any knowledge possessed of that universal. The refutation is a general one which will be employed again (pp. 239, 673 Sam). The definition “*pramātva*” cannot give rise to our knowledge of a cognition as valid simply because it exists in that cognition. Were that the case, wherever *pramātva* exists, no one would ever doubt the validity of his cognition. If *pramātva* is to be known by means of another mark which exists throughout all examples of valid cognition, then by the rule “*Taddhetor evāsyā taddhetutve madhye kim tena ?*” (see p. 28 above) it makes better sense to consider that mark as the definition of validity, and not the universal “*pramātva*” which that mark makes known. Nor is it legitimate to insist that since the distinguishing marks for *pramātva* are many, it is necessary to admit *pramātva* in addition to them, as the one attribute common to all valid cognitions. Only this will account for the fact that all such knowledges are known under the same term as “valid cognitions” (see p. 138 Sam). For, as Śrī Harṣa replies, these marks have already been refuted. *Pramātva* as a definition could never be known.

Lastly, Śrī Harṣa refutes the definition of Kumārila, “*śaktiviśeṣaḥ pramā*”, “Valid cognition is a particular type of power” (p. 238; Sam; *Ślokavārttika*, *Codanāsūtra*, *śloka* 47, p. 45). The same definition is cited and refuted by Abhayadevasūri in the *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, pp. 3–4 ff. It is also possible to consider the definition as that of Siddhasena, *Nyāyāvatāra* verse 1, cited in the *Ṭikā*, p. 35 N.E., and *Parīśuddhi*, p. 113 N.E. Śrī Harṣa’s refutation is but a reapplication of the statements which he made

against the Buddhist's "*prāptiyogyatā*". A *śakti* is *kāryānumeya*, or inferred by a given product and yet that product might itself be falsely perceived. There is nothing to prevent the stated definition from suffering from overextension.

This concludes the refutation of definitions of valid knowledge. At least the general means by which Śrī Harṣa demolishes his opponents should now be apparent. There is nothing at all in the replies summarized thus far to which a given opponent might take exception. This is most clearly evident in the case of the Naiyāyikas, whose works abound. In review, the first definition, "*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*", was refuted by showing: (1) that "*tattva*", as the Naiyāyika defines it, is by his very admissions meaningless; (2) that "*anubhūtitva*", "experience", cannot be a universal, again by the Nyāya doctrine that *sāṃkaryā*, co-existence, must be avoided; (3) "*anubhūtitva*" also cannot be anything else the Naiyāyika has offered as "*abhāva*", an absence, may refer to "*anyonyābhāva*", a reciprocal absence as well as to "*sam-sargābhāva*", a relational absence. Every attempt made to distinguish these two types of absences fails by the Naiyāyika's own rule of an absence and its counterpositive as *parasparānātmaka*, "mutually negating", or by his insistence that an absence cannot take an absolute fiction as its counterpositive, etc. Similarly, "*yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*" is rejected as being contradictory to Udayana's assertion that a single knowledge can be both valid and invalid, and that a definition cannot be underextended or overextended but must exhibit *samavyāpti*, equal extension.<sup>35</sup> "*Sam-yakparicchittiḥ pramā*" violates the same rule and is contrary to the Naiyāyika acceptance of *tarka* (reasoning), *āhāryasamśaya* (wilfully assumed doubt), and *āhāryaviparyaya* (wilfully assumed error), which he admits are born of an awareness of all particulars and yet are invalid. A Jain definition, "*abādhitānubhūtiḥ pramā*", is refuted directly with a Jain argument; Abhayadevasūri says the same. Śrī Harṣa, it would seem, does indeed fulfil the conditions he has set for himself in the introduction, if the interpretations of the *pūrvapakṣa* doctrines given here are correct. The major reservation I would have with the above discussion is in the treatment of the definition of Dharmakīrti. Śrī Harṣa does seem to be within reason in his refutation of Dharmakīrti; however, that refutation appears almost too facile for such a brilliant opponent.

In the next section of the first chapter are refuted definitions of the instrumental cause, as a prelude to the destruction of the individual *pramāṇas*,

the instrumental causes of valid knowledge. The opponents are primarily Udyottakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana (in the *Vārttika*, *Ṭikā*, *Parīśuddhi*, *Kusumāñjali* and *Ātmatattvaviveka*). The instrumental cause is discussed at length in the *Ṭikā*, pp. 37–38 N.E., and the *Parīśuddhi*, pp. 115–116 N.E. Śrī Harṣa's refutations (pp. 239–275 Sam) employ the same principles as above, and are marked by frequent repetition. In several cases he urges the same underextension. The given definitions will not apply to a certain type of instrumental cause which in giving rise to another instrumental cause, only later gives rise to the activity in question. One such case is the following: “*hastenāgninā pākaṃ karoti*”, “He cooks with fire by means of his hands”. The hand is to be considered an instrumental cause of the act of cooking. Most of the definitions of the instrumental cause which the Naiyāyikas propound do not cover it. The Naiyāyika cannot assert that the definitions are not thereby underextended since the hand is not really a cause of cooking at all, but only a cause of the cause of cooking, namely fire. The same logic might be applied to the agent as well. The agent does not directly cook; he first acts in such a way that the instrumental cause, fire, can accomplish its task. In technical language, the *kartr* or agent is necessary to establish the *vyāpāra* or subsidiary function of the *karaṇa*, the instrumental cause. (For the notion of *vyāpāra*, the reader is referred to what follows.) Thus, the cases of the agent and the hand are substantially the same. If the agent is a cause of cooking, then the hand must also be so. If the hand is only a cause of a cause, then the agent must also be only a cause of a cause. As the second of these suggestions is untenable for the Naiyāyika, the first remains. The hand is an instrumental cause and as such must be included in any definition of the instrumental cause. Repeatedly Śrī Harṣa argues that it is not. The given definitions are all underextended (pp. 242, 254, 256, 261, 270 Sam).

On pp. 248, 250 Sam, Śrī Harṣa reintroduces the Naiyāyika conception of a presence and an absence as mutually negating in order to refute Udayana's favored definition of the instrumental cause, “*kriyayāyoga-vyavacchedena, saṃbandhi karaṇam*”. The instrumental cause is that which is associated with an activity without any interruption whatsoever in their contact” (*Kusumāñjali*, pp. 475, 476; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 115 N.E.; *Tārīkīkarakṣā*, p. 6). On pages 253 and 254 Sam, he reapplies the Naiyāyika principle that time is one.

Udayana is next permitted to paraphrase this definition, stating that it means no more than the following: “The instrumental cause is that which, combined with its *vyāpāra* or functional activity never fails to give rise to the

desired product” (p. 256 Sam). This permits an examination of another concept of major importance in all schools of Indian philosophy – the concept of *vyāpāra*, subsidiary functional activity. Indian philosophers are unanimous in maintaining that the common grammatical cases signifying the different causes of an activity expressed by the verb apply to only one special class of causes, which they term “*kāraṅkas*”. A *kāraṅka* is a cause which is possessed of a subsidiary activity (*vyāpāra*). This subsidiary activity in turn participates in the production of the primary activity. It is common sense that the subsidiary act of raising and lowering the axe is necessary for the primary act of cutting.

Śrī Harṣa passes now to a refutation of one generally accepted definition of this subsidiary act, “*tajjanyam kāraṅgam*”, “that which is born of the cause and is itself a cause of the primary activity” (p. 256 Sam). He refutes it with reference to the Nyāya theory of inference. As in the case of the refutation of the first definition of valid cognition, “*tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā*”, so here does the refutation of a definition serve him the large purpose of attacking the major contentions of his arch-opponents. To understand Śrī Harṣa’s refutation, a brief look at the Nyāya pronouncements on inference is necessary.

The Naiyāyikas hold that the instrumental cause of an inference is the third knowledge of the inferential mark (*tr̥tīyalingadarśana*). The first knowledge of the mark is that gained in the cognition of invariable concomitance, “smoke is pervaded by fire”. The second knowledge of the mark is the knowledge that it exists in the locus (*pakṣa*) in which one desires to demonstrate the existence of the *sādhya*, the attribute which he wants to prove. In the inference of fire from smoke, this corresponds to a knowledge that the mountain has smoke. The third knowledge of the mark is a composite of the preceding two; it is a knowledge of the mark as pervaded by the *sādhya* and existent in the *pakṣa*. It is this that the Naiyāyikas consider the instrumental cause of inference (*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 113; *Vārttika*, p. 44 K; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 205; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 232 N.E.).

Returning to the present definition of the instrumental cause, Śrī Harṣa argues that Udayana’s definition is in fact inconsistent with his concepts of how an inference comes about. The paraphrase of the definition specifically requires that the instrumental cause is possessed of a *vyāpāra*, or secondary activity, which itself gives rise to the prime result. The third knowledge of the mark has no such activity. It leads directly to an inferential cognition, and to nothing else. There is no possibility that it has any *vyāpāra* to which it gives rise.

Udayana is next permitted to suggest that it is the second knowledge of the mark which is the instrumental cause of inference. This second knowledge, he asserts, gives rise to the third knowledge, which in turn leads to the inferential cognition. Both the definition of the instrumental cause and that of the functional activity would thus be satisfied. The third knowledge is born of the second and does lead to the prime act; the second knowledge, possessed of this *vyāpāra*, does always yield results.

To this Śrī Harṣa skilfully replies that such an interpretation is vitiated by still another of Udayana's famous assertions, *Kusumāñjali*, 3.22, pp. 445 ff. It is not possible to assert that the third knowledge of the mark as pervaded by the *sādhya* and resident in the *pakṣa* is in fact always produced by the second knowledge of the mark, whence it could be called the *vyāpāra* of that second knowledge. By the statements of the *Kusumāñjali*, it might very well be produced from another set of causes, and the definition of *vyāpāra* which requires that it be born of the second knowledge would remain unfulfilled. The reason for such an assertion on the part of Śrī Harṣa is that Udayana had argued in the *Kusumāñjali* that in the case of an absence and other objects which can only be known in combination with something else (*sāpekṣapadārthas*), a single *savikalpika* or determinate cognition will arise from the proper set of circumstances. Śrī Harṣa merely applies this reasoning to the present situation, the third knowledge of the inferential mark. It must likewise be admitted that if one remembers the relation of invariable concomitance through another means, perhaps the words of a second party, then, in the presence of the causes required for determinate cognition, a composite knowledge of the mark as pervaded by the *sādhya* and present in the *pakṣa* should arise directly, in place of the second cognition of the mark, the simple awareness that the mark exists in the *pakṣa*. The third knowledge of the mark is not always born of the second. Either the definition of *vyāpāra* is underextended, or if it is valid, the second knowledge of the mark has no functional activity and so cannot by Udayana's definition of the instrumental cause be regarded as the instrumental cause of inference. Udayana's assertions are all mutually contradicting: the present definitions of *karaṇa* and *vyāpāra* and the theories of inference are not mutually compatible.

On p. 266 Sam, Śrī Harṣa cites another definition of the instrumental cause, one that is also found in the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, p. 5, “*yadabhāvāt kartr̥karmanī kriyām na janayataḥ*”, “through the absence of which the doer and the object fail to produce the desired activity”. Śrī Harṣa claims that this definition contradicts the Naiyāyika assertion that God is

the agent in all activities (*Āmatattvaviveka*, pp. 395–396). Without the individual as *bhoktṛ* or enjoyer performing the action, God (the *karṭṛ* or agent) still does not produce pots. Thus, the definition is overextended, applying to us as agents. In our absence, the prime agent, God, does not perform his activity.

On p. 267 Sam is introduced and refuted yet another definition of the instrumental cause, “*caramavyāpāravattvaṃ karaṇatvaṃ*”, “Instrumental causality is being possessed of the last subsidiary action to function”. As before, the objection is raised that this definition is contradictory to the Naiyāyika theory of inference in which the third knowledge of the mark, devoid of subsidiary activity, is accepted as the instrumental cause. The Naiyāyika then suggests that it is the mental traces, involved in the recollection of invariable concomitance necessary for a third knowledge of the mark, which are the instrumental cause of inference. The third knowledge of the mark, to which the mental traces give rise, would serve as their subsidiary function. Śrī Harṣa retorts that this violates still another Naiyāyika doctrine. In the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 428, Udayana states that “*ajñātakaraṇatva*”, the property of “having an instrumental cause which is unknown”, is the defining mark of “*sākṣātkāritva*”, “immediateness”, in knowledge. If Udayana, in order to make his definition of the instrumental cause applicable to the instrumental cause of inference, assumes that the mental traces with the third knowledge of the mark as their functional activity constitute the instrumental cause of inference, then he will have admitted that inference is born of an unknown instrumental cause. It would thus have to be immediate knowledge. This the Naiyāyika denies. Once again he is caught in the web of his own inconsistencies.

In the refutation of the same definition, p. 271 Sam, Śrī Harṣa similarly employs Udayana’s remarks in the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 281 N.E., that “*indriyajatva*”, “being born of the sense organs”, is the defining mark of “immediateness”. He urges against the Naiyāyika the same unwarranted conclusion as that urged above. Given the Naiyāyika definition of *vyāpāra*, the sense organs with the third knowledge of the mark as their *vyāpāra* might well be considered the instrumental cause of inference. It is not possible to insist that the sense organs are not at all the cause of an inference. If they are to be a cause of the wider category, valid cognition (as in the case of valid perception), then they must also function with respect to the lesser class, inference. This is an application of Udayana’s own words in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 27–28, and the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 338, “*sāmānyam praty aprayojakatve, viśeṣaṇam praty aprayojakatavam*”, “That which does not

result in the larger category cannot act with respect to the smaller group". Neither here has Śrī Harṣa overstepped his self-imposed limitations of debate; Udayana is refuted by Udayana himself.

The discussion of the definitions of the instrumental cause concludes on p. 275 Sam with a refutation of another of Udayana's definitions in the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 116 N.E. In all these refutations, as we have seen, Śrī Harṣa indeed keeps his promise. He urges against the opponent only the opponent's own doctrines. The section differs slightly from the previous one on valid cognition and the following one on perception in dealing almost exclusively with the Naiyāyikas. The reason for this is that the other schools do not deviate from the many definitions of the instrumental cause offered by Udyottakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana. Throughout, Śrī Harṣa is not unaware of his other opponents; that he intends his refutations to apply to them as well is clear in his comments, "*seśvarapakṣe*", "*anīśvarapakṣe*", "in the case where one admits the existence of God", and "in the case where one does not admit the existence of God". The first will take care of the Naiyāyikas; the second, the Jains, Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas.

The first definition of perception is the definition which Vācaspati Miśra attributes to his preceptor, Trilocana (*Ṭīkā*, p. 226 N.E.). Śrī Harṣa opens his refutation in a manner slightly different from that observed above. He begins not by examining the individual terms employed in the definition, but by asking a general question, the purpose of formulating the said definition. (1) Is it to distinguish the category "perception" from similar and dissimilar categories? (*Ṭīkā*, p. 186 N.E.; *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 61.) (2) Is it to show the mark for *sākṣātkāritva* or "immediacy" in knowledge? (*Pariśuddhi*, p. 281 N.E.; *Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 41) or (3) Is it to make known proper usage with respect to the term "perception"? (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 383.) Once again, the alternatives are all taken directly from the opponent's sources.

By a series of dilemmas Śrī Harṣa first forces the Naiyāyika to admit that under (1), that from which perception is to be distinguished must be specifically stated as "any other means of valid knowledge" (cf. *Pariśuddhi*, p. 242 N.E.; *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 61). This phrase, "any other", implies a prior knowledge of the difference of the other means of valid knowledge from perception. Once this is known, then, by presumption is also known the difference of perception from the other means of valid knowledge.<sup>36</sup> The purpose of the definition has already been accomplished and the definition is now useless.



Śrī Harṣa permits the definition to stand despite this major incongruity and continues his refutation (p. 277 Sam). This is a practice he elsewhere observes. He first offers a general refutation, irrelevant to the details of a given statement, and then proceeds to a specific attack (cf. p. 80 Sam). He now turns to the problem of how one can know “*indriyajatva*”, “being born of the sense organs”, Trilocana’s defining mark of perception. He denies that this attribute can be inferred on the basis of Udayana’s remarks in the *Kusumāñjali*. In the *Kusumāñjali* Udayana states (1) on p. 457 that a product makes known a cause in general and not a specific cause, necessarily uniform in nature.<sup>37</sup> On p. 341 he states (2) that a definition must be one in all cases. Both these principles have been met with before. Likewise, the last comment on p. 278 Sam is but a repetition of previous arguments (pp. 211, 237 Sam). The Naiyāyika cannot urge against statement (1) that the uniformity of the product, perception, does in fact make known a uniform cause, and so this cause may well serve as a definition. By the general rule “*taddhetor evāsyā taddhetutve, madhye kiṃ tena*” (see above, p. 28), that very uniformity would make superfluous the present definition. The second, third and other suggestions as to the purpose of the present definition are similarly denied, pp. 279–282 Sam.

The second definition of perception (p. 282 Sam), “*bhāsamānākārendriyasamprayogajam pratyakṣam*”, “Perception is knowledge produced by the contact of the sense organs with the form being revealed in knowledge”, is that cited by Kumārila in the *Ślokavārttikā-Vṛttikāragrantha*, *śloka* 19 ff., p. 160. It is also discussed in the *Śābarabhāṣya*, p. 6 and the *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 48. Śrī Harṣa in his customary fashion first urges against the propounders of this definition the same overextension that they had urged against their own opponents: “*tenānyenāpi samyoge cakṣurāder yaduthitam viṣayāntarajñānam tat pratyakṣam prasajyate*” (*Ślokavārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, *śloka* 14, p. 102), “Thus, even knowledge of another object which was produced by contact of the eye with something else would turn out to be valid perception.”

There is a history to this definition which is of assistance in understanding the definition itself, the original objection here quoted from the *Ślokavārttika*, and Śrī Harṣa’s subsequent variations on the same theme. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 4 on perception reads “*satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām bud-dhijanma tat pratyakṣam*”, “Perception is the knowledge of the soul born of the contact of the senses with something present”. The question immediately arose whether this *sūtra* was actually to be considered as a definition of

perception, or only as a part of a larger statement that perception is not a valid means to know *dharma*. If it was meant as a definition, it was argued, then it would suffer from overextension. The invalid knowledge of silver in a conch shell is indeed produced by the contact of the sense organs and an existent, the conch shell itself. This is the essence of the objection of the *Ślokavārttika*, cited above. It was for this reason that the Vṛttikāra transposed the words “*sat*” and “*tat*” to yield the present definition, that perception is a knowledge which is born of the contact with the sense organs and the content of that knowledge. He had hoped thereby to prevent the overextension to the case of the invalid perception of silver in a conch shell. Such a knowledge is not born of the contact of the eye with the content of the knowledge, “silver,” as there is no silver present which might be conjoined to the visual sense.

It is at this point that Śrī Harṣa enters the discussion. He first asks the Vṛttikāra if the definition means to imply that perception is a knowledge born of the contact of the sense organs with the *entire* content of the knowledge, or if it is a knowledge born of the content of the sense organs with only *some of the objects* therein revealed. In the second case, Śrī Harṣa urges, the same overextension will still be present. The cognition of silver in the conch shell is still produced by the contact of the eye with *some* of its objects – “thisness” and the locus of the quality “silverness”.

Keeping the same interpretation of the definition, on p. 282 Sam, Śrī Harṣa deftly points out that there is another reason why this definition cannot be accepted in the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. It will also be guilty of the fault of underextension. Such a definition excludes valid *nirvikalpika* or indeterminate cognition. This is a direct result of Kumārila’s understanding of indeterminate knowledge in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, *śloka*s 111–113, p. 126 and *śloka*s 118–119, p. 129. Everything that appears in indeterminate knowledge must be in contact with the sense organs. It is only in determinate knowledge where memory is active that something unconnected with the sense organs may be revealed. It is obvious that any definition, “Perception is that knowledge in which *some* of the objects therein revealed are in contact with the sense organs”, can never apply to indeterminate cognition. Once again Śrī Harṣa has successfully shown that the opponent’s doctrines contradict themselves.

In pp. 284–290 Sam, Śrī Harṣa considers the first alternative meaning for this definition, “Perception is a knowledge born of the contact of the sense organs with all its objects”. This definition is guilty of another major flaw. A knowledge of an object (*x*) will now be valid for another object (*y*). Śrī

Harṣa adds but one word to the *Ślokavārttika* verse cited above and turns it against Kumārila for a second time: “*tenānyena (ghaṭādinā) api samyoge yad uthitaṃ viṣayāntarajñānaṃ (ghaṭādijñānaṃ) tad anyatra pratyakṣam prasajyate*”, “Therefore knowledge of one object produced by the contact of the sense organs with that object will be valid perception for another object.” This is so because it is impossible to restrict the meaning of “*bhāsamānākāra*”, “content of knowledge”, to any one knowledge. The whole of this discussion provides an interesting twist. Śrī Harṣa opens with the very verse of the *Ślokavārttika*, turned against its author, and closes by only slightly modifying the verse to fit an equally devastating consequence.

The discussion then passes to a third definition of perception, “*sākṣātkāritvaṃ pratyakṣam*”, “Perception is immediate knowledge”. This is endorsed by the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 11; *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta, p. 32; *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 104, 146; *Nyāyaratnākara* on *Ślokavārttika Pratyakṣasūtra*, śloka 137, p. 132; *Nyāyavatāra*, p. 47; and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 183. The *Kiraṇāvalī* adds the qualification “*avyabhicārī*”, “unfaltering”, an addition that is not necessary for the Prābhākaras who do not believe that experience can be in error. The Buddhists are divided; some add the word “*abhrānta*”, “not confused”, while others do not.<sup>38</sup>

Śrī Harṣa undertakes this refutation as he did the refutation of the first definition, not with a specific attack, but with a general question. How and why is this definition to be known? The arguments here center around Udayana’s conception of remarks in debate as *parārthānumāna*, or inferences for the sake of another. The reader is referred to the translation, pp. 166–168. On pp. 294–297 Sam, Śrī Harṣa offers six verses applicable against the Naiyāyika, Prābhākara and Jain. The opponent has thus far been forced to state that an individual knows “*sākṣātkāritva*”, or “immediacy”, by a means other than the statement of the definition. What he learns anew from its statement is by inference, and is only that the defining attribute is the cause of our applying the term “perception” to the objects in question. Śrī Harṣa had demolished this concept by indicating that in order to infer (x), in this case the practice of employing a given designation, one must have some prior knowledge of that (x). The purpose of the definition has thus been annulled. The hearer already knows that the word “perception” is to be applied to the given group. He now attacks the opponent’s first assumption, that immediacy can be known by any means at all. To know an object (y) one must have a knowledge of (y) in particular, and not just any knowledge. Thus, *y-nirūpitajñānāt y-sattā siddhyate*; the existence of (y) can only

be established by a knowledge described by (*y*) itself. This involves *ātmāśraya*. (*Y*) is both a cause when it delimits knowledge and a product. The existence of (*y*) depends upon that very (*y*) as a qualifier of the cognition which will serve as its proof. If, to avoid this, the *pūrvapakṣa* should assert that (*y*) as a qualifier of the knowledge in question is not the object (*y*), but some attribute belonging to the knowledge itself, then he will have accepted the Buddhist doctrine that the form of the object enters into knowledge. This is a violation of a principle which the Jains, Prābhākaras, and Naiyāyikas all endorse: knowledge is *nirākāra* or without form. (“*artheṇaiva viśeṣo hi nirākāratayā dhiyām*”, “Knowledge is qualified only by its object as it is itself without any particular form”, *Kusumāñjali*, p. 46.) Moreover, a further fault will result, once it is admitted that (*y*) is an attribute of knowledge. Just as other attributes of knowledge, “*anumāna*”, “inference”, etc., depend not on the objects of knowledge but on the causes of knowledge, so might this attribute (*y*) depend only on the causes of cognition. There is no longer any reason to accept the independent existence of objects of knowledge. The Jains, Abhayadevasūri, *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, p. 105, and Prabhācandra, *Nyāyakumudacandra*, Vol. I, p. 118, and Udayana, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 163, all recognize this last difficulty. Once *sākāravāda*, or the notion that knowledge takes the form of its object, is accepted, there is no more proof for the existence of the objects of cognition. This is the second time thus far that Śrī Harṣa has reduced his opponents to the position of their arch-enemy, the Buddhists. (cf. p. 134 Sam.) He will do so again (pp. 325, 611 Sam). And once more, his refutation employs his opponents’ own statements.

The specific refutation of “*sākṣātkāritva*”, or “immediateness”, begins on p. 301 Sam. The first explanation offered is that of the Jains for whom “*vaiśadya*” or immediateness in knowledge is the ability to perceive particular qualities as well as general common attributes (*Prameya-kamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 219; *Nyāyakumudacandra*, pp. 20 ff.; *Pramāṇan-ayatattvālokāṅkāra*, 2.3, p. 4). Such an interpretation is also provided by the commentaries to the *Yogasūtras*, *Bhojavṛtti*, p. 4 on *sūtra* 7, *Tattvavaiśaradī* on *sūtra* 6, p. 29, and *Yogabhāṣya*, p. 28. Śrī Harṣa’s destruction of the definition so conceived follows that of Bhavanātha Mīśra in the *Nayaviveka*, p. 79.

The next suggestion, that “immediateness” is the property “being produced by the sense organs” (p. 304 Sam), appears in the *Paṇīśuddhi*, p. 281 N.E. Something analogous to it is found in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 1.3.4, and it is recorded as a *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 48–49.

The refutation is the same as that employed before; a knowledge of causality depends upon a prior knowledge of a common attribute (pp. 211, 237, 278 Sam). The only thing of note here is that Śrī Harṣa first cites and denies a different refutation urged by another writer, before he gives his own. Perhaps one of the most intriguing questions which the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* raises is that of a previous work which might have served as its model. The Jains do refute the Naiyāyikas at length,<sup>39</sup> and Bhavanātha Miśra offers specific refutations of specific points of all his opponents. An attempt has been made both in this preface and in the translation and notes to point out similarities between the *Khaṇḍana* and prior texts. These similarities seem to be limited to a few scattered comments. The problem of an actual model remains unsolved. On pp. 306, 314 and 319 Sam, Śrī Harṣa again criticizes the refutations of a predecessor. The third of these, I believe, may provide a clue to the identity of the individual refuted here on p. 304, and on p. 306 Sam. The refutation is of a Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika definition, that *sākṣāttva* is a universal inherent in knowledge (*Vaiśeṣikadarsana*, p. 3, commentary on *sūtra* 5; *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 144; *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 57; *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 86). It is argued against this that there results the impossibility of *parāparabhāva* with the universal “*anubhūtitva*”. Universals must be of greater and lesser extension with respect to each other.<sup>40</sup> Now, *svapna* or sleep is not experience but memory, and yet it is immediate. Thus, one cannot say that “experience” is the higher universal and that “immediateness” exists only in the locus of “experience”. Nor can one maintain that “immediateness” is of greater extension and that “experience” exists only where immediateness exists. Inferential cognition would then not be experience. It is clear from this refutation that its propounder admits that sleep is memory. Such a view belongs to only two schools in Indian philosophy,<sup>41</sup> the Prābhākaras (*Nayaviveka*, pp. 76, 106; *Br̥hatī*, p. 55) and the followers of Abhinavagupta (*Īśvara-pratyabhijñāvimarsinī* with *Bhāskari*, pp. 154, 159). As a Prābhākara view it is mentioned and denounced in the *Pañcapādikā*, p. 55, and the *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, p. 69. Śrī Harṣa does occasionally employ Bhavanātha Miśra’s refutations (p. 301 Sam); however, none of the passages in question appears in the published text of that author. Could the arguments be quoted from the now lost *Bhedavādaśāstra* of Abhinavagupta, and could the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* be but a brilliant replay of that text? Doctrinally, Śrī Harṣa is often closer to the Kashmiri Śaivaites than to the classic Vedānta writers (translation notes 1, 45, 52,

103, 133, 162, 163, 168). The answer to this question can come only from a detailed study of both the Prābhākara and the Kashmir Śaivaite texts now published, or a location of the manuscript of the *Bhedavādaśāstra*. That Śrī Harṣa cites the refutations of a predecessor in these few places tells us at least that it is not impossible that there existed prior to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* a text, similarly organized, listing and demolishing the definitions of the *bhedavādins*.<sup>42</sup>

The next definition of immediateness, “*meyajanitatva*”, or “being produced from its object”, given on p. 305 Sam might be either that of Vasubandhu cited in the *Ṭikā*, p. 238 N.E., or a paraphrase of the Naiyāyika assertion that perception alone possesses the property of being caused by its own object (*Ṭikā*, p. 36 N.E.). The refutation employs the arguments offered against Kumārila’s definition on pp. 282 ff. Sam.

The next definition, “*yena pramite sati na pramitsā punar bhavati*”, “Immediate knowledge is that knowledge which, making known its object prevents the further rise of a desire to know”, is the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 183 N.E.; *Ṭikā*, p. 192 N.E.; and *Parīśuddhi*, p. 197 N.E. It is refuted by a statement deriving from common experience. One does still want to know even that which he has already perceived.

On p. 307 Sam, the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 428, and the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 266 N.E., definition, “*ajñāyamānāsādhāraṇakāraṇakānubhūtitva*”, “Immediate knowledge is a knowledge, the unique cause for which remains unknown”, is refuted. Śrī Harṣa adds the qualification, “*kāraṇaviśeṣaṇīkṛtabhāvatva*”, “where the cause is a positive entity”, in order for the definition to be denied for a follower of Kumārila as well. This technique of taking a Naiyāyika definition and insuring that it is also invalid in the other schools has been observed before. The principles employed in the refutation have likewise been met with above: that causality implies a prior knowledge of generality (pp. 176, 187, 209, 304, 305 Sam), and that only the existent can be a cause (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 413).

The definition “*avyavahitārthapramāṭva*”, “Immediate knowledge is an unimpeded valid cognition of an object” (p. 310 Sam) can be found in the *Ṭikā*, p. 192 N.E.; the *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, pp. 219, 340; *Prabhākaravijaya*, p. 26, and the *Rjuvimalā*, p. 73. Another definition of perception, “*jñānājanyañānatva*”, “being a knowledge not born of knowledge”, belongs to the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p. 29. The argument that neither definition would include determinate cognition occurs in the *Tārkikarākṣā*, pp. 36–37, where both definitions are assumed to be of the Prābhākara school.

On p. 315 Sam is considered another definition of the Prābhākaras, “*sākṣāddhīḥ svarūpadhīḥ*”, “Immediate cognition is a knowledge of the very essence of an object” (*Brhatī*, p. 69; *Nayaviveka*, p. 77; *Prabhākaravijaya*, p. 26). Śrī Harṣa’s remarks here should be compared to those in the *Tārkikarākṣā*, pp. 34–37. In addition, the very last statement on p. 315 Sam is to be seen as a refutation of Udayana’s doctrine in the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 266 N.E., that the time of the inferential mark is revealed in inference. The discussion then continues with another Nyāya suggestion, p. 317 Sam, that “immediate knowledge” is “*anupahitapratīti*”, or a “cognition of an object which is not externally limited”. The suggestion is to be found in the *Ṭikā*, pp. 189, 192 N.E., and the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 197 N.E.

In pp. 324–325 Sam, Śrī Harṣa tackles still another definition of Udayana, “*anumānādivyavacchedyatattadasādhāraṇakāraṇajanitadhī*” “Immediate knowledge is that which is not produced by the unique causes of the cognitions, inference etc., which are to be excluded from the present class, perception”. The refutation is of particular interest, in that Śrī Harṣa here exhibits considerable skill in showing that the definition is in contradiction to a Nyāya tenet of major importance. He remarks that this definition, involving a negative property, “not being produced”, would indicate that the Naiyāyika in fact accepts an absence as a sufficient cause for the designation and conception of a positive entity. This is in essence nothing but the doctrine of *apohavāda*, the doctrine of “exclusion”, of the Buddhists which Udayana labored to refute in the *Ātmātattvaviveka*, pp. 112 ff. According to the Buddhists, all designations and conceptions such as “cow”, etc., revolve not around a universal, “cowness”, but upon the exclusion of absences, “non-cowness”, etc., from the given group. Finally, the present definition and its refutation are of particular significance to us in this study of the ambience of Śrī Harṣa’s work in that Śrī Harṣa quotes and denies a remark by Udayana (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 455), “*vyavahāre sati nimittānusaraṇam*”, “One searches for a cause of a given designation when that designation has actually been observed”, with a comment, strikingly similar to one of *Śāntarakṣita*’s remarks in his commentary to Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanīyā*. Śrī Harṣa states, “*nimittasyānatyāpattidvārasyaiva kalpyatvāt*”, “Only that cause is to be assumed which does not lead to unwarranted conclusions” (p. 325 Sam). The *Vādanīyāvīpañcītārtha*, p. 27, offers, “*saiva kartavyā yā punar na paryanuyogam arhati*”, “Only that assumption is to be made which leads

not to further criticism". Perhaps we have one more source for Śrī Harṣa's arguments.

The long section on perception is at last concluded with a quote from the *Ślokavārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, *śloka* 2, p. 99, "*Lakṣaṇasyābhīdhāṇam tu kenāmsēnopayujyate*". Śrī Harṣa slightly alters the significance of Kumārila's remark: "Since, as has been shown above, all definitions of perception are fraught with inconsistencies, of what possible use might be their formulation?" This is not the first time Śrī Harṣa cites the *Ślokavārttika* out of context and for his own purposes (cf. p. 23 Sam).

This concludes our brief examination of Śrī Harṣa and his opponents. In short, Śrī Harṣa does refute the definitions of the *sadvādins* by illustrating the contradictions they imply of other *sadvādin* tenets. He makes use of a wide variety of *pūrvapakṣa* sources, from the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *Vārttika*, *Ṭīkā*, *Parīśuddhi* and the other works of Udayana, to the texts of Prabhākara, Śālikanātha Miśra, Bhavanātha Miśra, Kumārila, Parthasārathi Miśra, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Dharmottara, and the Jains. He is not bothered by repetition, and often uses the same argument against several definitions. The pattern which emerges from even this limited study reveals Śrī Harṣa in all cases as a master of critical argument on two planes. He can specifically refute a given definition through his vast knowledge of his opponent's doctrines, or generally attack a statement through the skilful manipulation of a few cardinal principles which his opponents admit: (1) A definition must carry the same meaning in all cases. (2) A definition must be known in order to accomplish its designed purpose. (3) Relationships of invariable concomitance demand a knowledge of a universal, but if (x) as a universal is necessary to establish (y), a definition, then (y) itself becomes superfluous, the aim of the definition being met by (x) alone. The arguments against the definition of valid cognition and perception are about equally divided. Most are refutations of the type (A) and approximately half are specific in nature.

The problem of a source for Śrī Harṣa's attacks against the Naiyāyikas, Jains, Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists remains. Prior works of all schools of Indian philosophy contain a number of passages refuting the doctrines of particular opponents. The Jains refute the Naiyāyikas, Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas; the Naiyāyikas, the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas; and the Buddhists, primarily the Naiyāyikas. In part, Śrī Harṣa shows similarities to many of these texts; in two cases to the *Tārkikarākṣā*, in the entire introduction to the Mādhyaṃika Buddhists



(see translation and notes), and throughout to the arguments of the Jains. But he is also fundamentally different from anything to be found in any of those works, in scope, skill and intention. He differs fundamentally from the *sadvādin* refuters in scope and intention, for they aim to establish the existence of the world as they conceive of it through a limited destruction of rival contentions. He differs in detail and sophistication from the extant Mādhyamika works (see translation). He is also totally unlike Jayarāśi in the *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, although both do repudiate the validity of the efforts of all schools of Indian philosophy in establishing the existence of the means of valid knowledge. For one, the subject matter of the two texts is not the same. Jayarāśi is pre-Vācaspati Mīśra, whereas Śrī Harṣa takes a good part of his definitions from Vācaspati and later writers. In addition, Jayarāśi does not concentrate solely on refuting definitions (cf. *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, p. 47, 94, etc., refutations of the Buddhist refutations of Nyāya tenets). The two similarly diverge in method. For the most part, Jayarāśi applies the same general arguments in all his refutations; he rarely urges, as Śrī Harṣa does, that a specific statement *A* is contradicted by another particular statement *B*. This results in an inordinate amount of repetition, even of entire paragraphs (cf. pp. 14, 41; 10, 43; 10, 44; 38, 45; 15, 67; 74, 75, 76; 65, 83; 31, 86; 57, 88; 46, 94; 49, 94; 48, 103, etc.). Jayarāśi also uses fictitious *pūrvapakṣas*, a practice which Śrī Harṣa scrupulously avoids (see p. 18, 1.4; p. 19, 1.7 ff.; p. 30; 34, 1.13; 35; 36; 49, 1.1; 51; 59, etc.). Finally, he is not consistent and does occasionally urge against an opponent something that the opponent does not admit, entering into independent proof (p. 6; 52; 60; etc.). The *Tattvopaplavasīmha* is thus far from the maturity of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, and there is no extant text which is conceived as a refutation for all definitions and at the same time displays the intensity of argument and the elaborate technique of specific refutation for which Śrī Harṣa is noted. We are left with two alternatives; either to conclude that Śrī Harṣa is as unique in his attacks on his opponents as he is in his interpretation of the Vedānta, or to surmise that he owes much to a predecessor whose work is now lost to us. A suggestion has been made that the second of these is true, and that the predecessor may be Abhinavagupta in the *Bhedavādaśāstra*. It remains just that, a suggestion, to be confirmed or denied with future research.

## 2. ŚRĪ HARṢA AS A VEDĀNTIN

In the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, Śrī Harṣa sets forth his

own philosophical views. It is at best rash to attempt an analysis of the man's thought on the basis of this meagre portion of only one of his many works. The introduction comprises approximately one-sixth of the text. None the less, from his statements there emerge a few ideas which radically differentiate Śrī Harṣa from his predecessors and followers in classic Vedānta. As these are discussed at length with supporting evidence for such an interpretation of the text in the translation and notes, they will only be briefly mentioned here.

It would appear that Śrī Harṣa was by far the most consistent of all Indian philosophers. The inconsistencies of the *sadvādins* he himself points out, and the inconsistencies of the *asadvādins*, the Buddhists and the Vedāntins, their opponents detailed. The major difficulty in the Buddhist and Vedānta doctrines centers around the existential status of the visible world. To say that the things we perceive do not exist is meaningless. No statement without substantial proof is worthy of consideration. Obviously enough, where nothing exists, proof itself becomes impossible, in the absence of its means (compare note 3 to the translation). There are several ways in which the *asadvādins* sought to avoid such criticism: (1) By denouncing any attempt to prove non-existence, (2) By showing that the existence of a means of proof is not necessary to accomplish that proof, and (3) By asserting that no one maintains that the objects of the visible world are non-existent whereby they could not serve as causes of proof. In fact, they are possessed of a provisional existence, which provisional existence being a result of a positive metaphysical force, *avidyā* or ignorance, vanishes with the appearance of truth. The last alternative became in time the cardinal doctrine of the Vedānta (compare Vācaspati Mīśra in the *Bhāmatī*; the *Pañcapādikā* and *Brahmasiddhi* references in the translation notes).

It is this which astonishingly enough Śrī Harṣa appears not to accept. I would suggest that his reasons might be the following. Śrī Harṣa consistently adheres to principle (1) and never independently proves anything at all. He merely shows that by the *sadvādin's* own admission the existence of the objects of our world is not defensible (cf. text pp. 193–194 Chow). The concept of *sadasadvilakṣaṇatva* is thus unnecessary. Śrī Harṣa's purpose is accomplished by a temporary reliance on *pūrvapakṣa* doctrines alone. Secondly, the concept of a third truth value is itself inadmissible. The debates on this subject in the classic Vedānta schools of which the *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* is a convenient compendium are indicative of the problems which the acceptance of *sadasadvilakṣaṇatva* and *avidyā* as a positive force entails. Moreover, Kumārila and the jains offer cogent argu-

ments against any interpretation of *saṃvṛtisattva* as a third truth value. If *saṃvṛti* is valid knowledge, then its object exists. If not, then the object does not exist. What further possibility is there? Knowledge cannot be both valid and invalid or somewhere in-between; its object therefore either exists or does not.

Śrī Harṣa's repudiation of *saṃvṛti* as somewhat valid and hence its object as provisionally existent is clear in his definition of *saṃvṛtisattva* as invalid knowledge of existence. This is also a result of his predilection for alternative (2) stated above. The entire first part of the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is a demonstration of the fact that the *sadvādins* can never prove that worldly activity demands the existence of the objects of cognition. It requires no more than a knowledge of that existence and such a knowledge may indeed be false. This interpretation of *saṃvṛtisattva* is in keeping with that of the early Mādhyamika Buddhist writers. It likewise removes any necessity for the admission of a third truth value. Existence is irrelevant. Knowledge of existence is all that is demanded, a knowledge of existence which is only temporarily uncontradicted. Śrī Harṣa thus radically differs from the other Vedāntins in his disavowal of the necessity that causes exist (cf. also note 25 to the translation), and hence of alternative (3), "*sadasadvilakṣaṇatva*".

His second major point of departure from his tradition is on the question of the relationship of Brahma to *prapañca*, the visible world. Is consciousness in fact non-different from its supposed objects? Śrī Harṣa's answer to this question would seem to be yes, contrary to Vācaspati Mīśra *et al.*, who deny the same. In his method of describing non-duality in the third section of the introduction by proving that knowledge must be identical with its objects, Śrī Harṣa is not only remote from his fellow Vedāntin writers, but also seems close to Abhinavagupta. Abhinavagupta maintains that there is no difference between knowledge and that which it reveals, and so all is but non-differentiated, self-valid consciousness. For details, the reader is referred to the translation notes 52, 103, 167, 168, 170, and note 1 to this preface.

These are the two main points at which Śrī Harṣa radically deviates from the generally accepted tenets of non-Kashmiri Advaita: the repudiation of a third truth value, *sadasadvilakṣaṇatva*, and the assertion of the absolute identity of the visible world and knowledge. The first is but a natural conclusion to the Mādhyamika Buddhist's reasoning; the second would appear to derive from another source. That the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* does in fact imply both is substantiated in the translation, com-

mentary, and notes. That Śrī Harṣa did consistently endorse these two views as his own, rather than temporarily accept them in an artificially conceived *viṭaṇḍā* in order to defeat the *sadvādins*, could only be known from a study of his now lost works.

In closing it must be mentioned that materials for this study, preface and translation, include both the published commentaries of Śaṃkara Mīśra (c. 1450 A.D.) and Vidyāsāgara (1275–1350 A.D.) and the following unpublished commentaries:

- (1) Paramānandasūri, manuscript in the Bhandarkar Institute, 27 folios in *Devanāgarī*. Includes the first *pariccheda* through *pratyakṣa* complete, and the beginning of the refutations of *anumāna*.
- (2) Anonymous Commentator, manuscript in the Bhandarkar Institute, 38 folios in *Devanāgarī*, and transcript from the L. D. Institute, Ahmedabad, a copy of which is in the possession of Esther Solomon, Gujarat University. Covers only the first *pariccheda*, *pratyakṣa* section and the beginning of the *anumāna* section.
- (3) Commentary of Varadapaṇḍita, transcript in *Devanāgarī*, in the Manuscript Library at Trivandrum, complete in 1136 pages. Another copy of this exists in the Adyar Library, also complete but in *grantha* script.
- (4) Commentary of Citsukha, manuscript from Benares Hindu University, incomplete in 968 pages.
- (5) *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, transcript from Bombay University, itself a copy of the transcript at Benares Hindu University. Both are in *Devanāgarī*. The Bombay copy contains 195 folios, the first 164 folios of which deal solely with the *pratyakṣa* portion of the first *pariccheda*.

Nothing is known about the dates of any of the above, with the exception of Citsukha, late 13th century. Paramānandasūri is definitely a Jain, judging from his name alone. The anonymous commentator is a Śaivaite, and most probably a Kashmiri, from the terminology he employs.<sup>43</sup> Both he and Paramānandasūri seem early from the language of their explanations. There is no question that Varadapaṇḍita is a Kashmiri Śaivaite. This is made clear in the opening verse in which he worships, “*Kāśmīreṣu śrītā kila śārādā*”. On p. 187 he also names himself as a commentator on Utpaladeva’s *Siddhitrāya*. The *Bhūṣāmaṇi* is the latest of the commentaries available, as it quotes from all of the previous commentaries, including that of Śaṃkara

āyyabhaṭṭa on the *Khaṇḍana*. The author of this *Bhūṣāmaṇi* is not the famed Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. This is apparent from his mostly erroneous remarks and his inability to name even his own *guru* (cf. ms. p. 43). He criticizes all the other commentators and is useful mainly as an aid to know what the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* does not mean, a necessary prelude to coming to any understanding of its actual intentions.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Śrī Harṣa in fact cites this work (p. 133), a product of Kashmiri scholarship, on p. 733 Sam. In addition, he bears a curious and tantalizing resemblance to Mahimabhaṭṭa. In the *Vyaktiviveka*, pp. 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, and 408. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that the *bhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vibhāvas* are not external realities, but exist only in the mind of the poet. They are thus *kṛtrima* or artificial as opposed to the *akṛtrima* or substantial physical entities which we experience in our daily patterns of behavior. He further remarks that since these emotional states and their bearers do exist only in consciousness, the end of poetry must be simply “*pratītiparāmarśa*” or the ultimate awareness of consciousness (p. 72). This is what makes the poet closest to the realization of truth and why in Kashmir Śaivism the *guru* must be a poet; for he has control over a state of creativity of which the ordinary individual is not aware – that moment at which the difference of objects from consciousness is not yet manifest. The experience of a poem thus approximates the experience of ultimate reality, Śiva as *paripūrṇa*, the abode of everything which we know. Mahimabhaṭṭa on p. 75 then logically concludes that the very question of whether the *anubhāvas* and *vibhāvas* as *gamyā* and *gamakā* exist has no relevancy. All that is required for the final aim is an invalid knowledge of their existence. It is obvious that by such an assertion is implied that even the relationship of causality inherent in *gamyagamakabhāva* does not in fact demand external existential reality. Mahimabhaṭṭa finally insists that the question of the existence of these invalid cognitions of the *bhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vibhāvas* is likewise fruitless. His logic is not clear; perhaps because it would lead to an infinite regress, and more likely because knowledge is *svataḥ siddha* and thus undoubted. It seems possible to me that Śrī Harṣa takes a clue from Mahimabhaṭṭa here, and extends these ideas to regard the entire world of *bhedaprapaṇca* as a great *kāvya* with consciousness as its basis. The main premise of the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is that the existence of all of the objects which we perceive, as the *sadvādins* understand it, is irrelevant and that an invalid knowledge of their existence is sufficient to account for all behavior. What Mahimabhaṭṭa says about poetry, thus, Śrī Harṣa says about the world.

Throughout the translation references have been made to Śrī Harṣa’s affinities with the Kashmir philosophers. Cultural contacts between Kashmir and North India abound. Within a few decades after the appearance of the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* upon that text. (Bhogilal J. Sandesara, *The Literary Circle of Mahāmātya Vastupāla and Its Contribution to Sanskrit Literature*, Singhi Jain Series, 33, Bombay, 1958, p. 154.) Vastupāla is said to have erected a *praśastisahita-kaśmīrāvatārasasvatīmūrti* (Girnar Inscriptions, *Archeological Report of Western India*, Vol. II, 1.6, cited by Bühler in his introduction to the *Sukṛtisaṃkīrtana* of Arisimpha, Singhi Jain Series, 32, Bombay, 1961). Hemacandra is said to have worshipped “*Devī, Kaśmīravāsini*” (*Prabhāvakacarita*, *Hemacandrasūricarita*, verse 39, p. 184, in the Singhi Jain Series, 13). In Bengal, the poet Dhoyika describes his *Kāvya* as a “*sārasvatamantra*” (*Pavanadūta*, 101) and Govardhana in his *Āryāsaptasatī*, 603, refers to the “*Kaśmīramālā*” of the *mantravids*. The *Prabandhakośa* of Rājasekharasūri (1348 A.D.)

records that Śrī Harṣa made two visits to Kashmir (pp. 54–58, Singhi Jain Series, 6) and history records an embassy of the Gāhaḍavāla king Govindacandra to King Jayasiṃha of the Lohara Dynasty of Kashmir. (R. C. Majumdar, *History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol. V. *The Struggle for Empire*, Bombay: Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan, 1957, p. 53). I would suspect that the Kashmiri poet Maṅkha in his *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* (Kāvyaṃālā, 3) provides adequate testimony for both of these facts. Verse 102, *sarga* 25, mentions that Govindacandra, the King of Kanyākubja sent the poet Suhala to the *Sabhā* of Maṅkha's brother. I would regard verses 83–84 as evidence of the presence of Śrī Harṣa amongst this noted group of savants. The verses read, “*Tikṣṇasārasvatajyotiranusyūtarasātmanā śrutibhyāṃ lihyate sadbhir yaśyoktiḥ pākam iyaśī, taṃ sa tarkamahāmbodhikumbhasaṃbhavam ārcicat Śrī-ānandaṃ snigdhadrīnyāsadīrghendīvaradāmabhiḥ*”. “*Śrī-ānanda*” is “*Śrī Harṣa*”. It is a common practice of poets to substitute synonyms for the sake of meter, euphony, and often merely to achieve greater “*vakratā*”, even where the word in question is a proper name. Compare Śrī Harṣa's own verses *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, 21.86–87, where the more common term “*gorocanā*” is expressed by the corresponding “*īrārucira*” and “*kumud*”. Maṅkha's substitution of “*ānanda*” for “*harṣa*” is not an isolated instance of this practice in the *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita*. In addition, one might compare the loose use of synonymous terms in the proper name of a contemporary Śaivite sect. The Kālamukhas are referred to as the Kālānanas, Asitavaktras and Kālāsyas in inscriptions and literature. See David Lorenzen, *The Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas* (University of California, 1972), p. 10.

There is thus a real possibility that some of the similarities between Śrī Harṣa and the Kashmiri philosophers are not merely incidental. At the present state of my knowledge of both topics, however, they remain only tentative suggestions. It is for this reason that all such speculation has been relegated to the notes. See translation notes 52, 103, 162, 168, 170 for further information.

<sup>2</sup> For all of these dates I am indebted to Mr. K. Venugopalan of the Deccan College who has devoted himself to the study of the chronology of Sanskrit literature. He was kind enough to make available to me a summary of some of his efforts in 141 pages.

<sup>3</sup> For the dates of Śrī Harṣa and Vallabha, the author of the *Nyāyalīlavatī*, and of Hemacandra, see also D. C. Bhattacharya, ‘Udayana and Śrī Harṣa’, *Siddha Bhāratī*, vol. II (Hoshiarpur, 1950), pp. 138–139, and note 5 below. R. Kṛṣṇnamachariar in his *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, reprinted (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970), p. 178, provides a summary of the previous arguments concerning the chronological position of Śrī Harṣa. Abhayadevasūri's date is discussed in the Hindi introduction to the *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 46, by Mahendra Kumar Śāstrī. Paṇḍit Suklalji Sanghavi in his introduction to the *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, p. v, places Abhayadevasūri slightly earlier in the eleventh century and Sandesara, *op. cit.*, dates him 1064 A.D. Vālidevasūri's date is given by Paṇḍit Mahendra Kumar Nyāyācārya in the Hindi introduction to the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 41. He formed part of the circle of savants surrounding Siddharāja Jayasiṃha. The date of Keśava Miśra is discussed by D. C. Bhattacharya in his *History of Navya Nyāya in Mithila*, Mithila Institute Series (Darbhanga, 1958), p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> D. C. Bhattacharya, ‘Udayana and Śrī Harṣa’, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>5</sup> R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 298 and R. S. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj* (Benaras, 1937), p. 124. According to the Hindi introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, by Govinda Narahari Vaijapurakar (Benaras: Acyuta Grantha Mālā, pp. 2–3, it was Rājasekharasūri who first suggested that Jayacandra of the Gāhaḍavāla dynasty was the patron of Śrī Harṣa (*Prabandhakośa*, p. 54). The commentator Gadhādhara on the *Naiṣadhiyacarita* preferred Govindacandra (R. Kṛshnamachariar, *op. cit.*, p. 183). This is accepted by D. C. Bhattacharya in all of his works.

It might be mentioned that a “*dīkṣita* Śrī Harṣa” is in fact named as a donor in the Kamauli copperplate grant of Jayacandra, V. S. 1231. (*Epigraphia Indica*, vol. IV, p. 124.)

There is considerable dispute as to the actual birthplace of Śrī Harṣa; for some remarks see the Hindi introduction mentioned at the beginning of this note. Although most of the comments there made are highly speculative in nature, in view of Śrī Harṣa’s close doctrinal connections with Kashmiri writers it is interesting to note that according to Vaijapurakar, the name of Śrī Harṣa’s mother, Māmalladevi, could be Kashmiri (p. 6). Nilakamala Bhattacharya, in his article, ‘The Naiṣadha and Śrī Harṣa’, *Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III (1924), pp. 159–194, was the first to propose that Śrī Harṣa was in fact a Bengali. He did so on the basis of certain local customs which the *Naiṣadhiyacarita* describes, and Śrī Harṣa’s predilection for an alliteration which, Bhattacharya suggested, would be effective only in a Bengali pronunciation of the sounds in question. This theory was denounced by R. C. Majumdar in *The History of Bengal*, Vol. I (Dacca: Dacca University Press, 1943), pp. 306–307, and then revived by D. C. Bhattacharya, “More Light on Sanskrit Literature in Bengal”, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XXII (1946), pp. 146–149. To me it still seems suspicious. The strongest evidence which Bhattacharya adduces is the alliteration implied by the proximity of the sounds “kṣa” and “khya”, “śa” and “sa” and “ya” and “ja”, which assumes that “kṣa” and “khya” are both pronounced “kkha” and that “sa” is changed to “śa” and that “ja” replaces “ya” at the beginning of a word. It must be remembered that like sound changes also occur in many Northern and Northwestern Prakrits, Ardhamāgadhī for one. They thus do not necessarily imply that Śrī Harṣa was a Bengali, but only that he wrote in Northern India during the medieval period. In addition, the identification of the now lost *Gauḍ-orviśapraśasti* as a panegyric of the Sena king Vijayasena is not tenable. If Majumdar is correct, Vijayasena was not “*Gauḍeśvara*”; the title was assumed only by his grandson, Lakṣmaṇasena in 1179 A.D. (*History of Bengal*, pp. 213, 220.) Nor is there any inconsistency in assuming that Śrī Harṣa wrote a praise of the Gāhaḍavāla Vijayacandra, his patron, and then a praise of the “*Gauḍeśvara*” Lakṣmaṇasena. Lakṣmaṇasena conquered Kāśī and defeated Jayacandra. Would it not have been natural for the poet to attempt to win the favor of his new and powerful ruler? Even the Kaḷachuri King Lakṣmaṇarājā I in his Kāritālāi inscription (841–842 A.D.) praised not the achievements of his own ancestors but those of his overlord, Govinda III, a Rāṣtrakūṭa king. (*Inscriptiorum Indicarum*, Vol. IV, p. 1xxi.) Finally, the comments of Rājasekharasūri in his *Prabandhakośa*, *Hariharaprabandha*, p. 58, that Harihara was a relative of Śrī Harṣa and from Gauḍa, and the assertions of the *Naiṣadha* commentators Caṇḍupaṇḍita (1279 A.D.), Iśānadeva (1332 A.D.) and Nārāyaṇa (1400–1634 A.D.?) and the later Vācaspati Miśra in the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* (p. 171) (see D. C. Bhattacharya, ‘More Light on Sanskrit Literature in Bengal’, *op. cit.*, p. 146, and K. K. Handiqui, *The Naiṣadhiyacarita and Śrī Harṣa*, Punjab Oriental Series, 23, Lahore, 1934, Introduction) that Śrī Harṣa came from Gauḍa need not mean that Śrī Harṣa was a Bengali and a protégé of the Sena king Vijayasena. The usage of the term “Gauḍa” was not restricted to the Rādhā



district of Bengal. Kalhaṇa in the *Rājatarāṅginī*, iv, 468, employs the word to indicate a far larger geographical region which includes Kanyākubja. Moreover, Lakṣmaṇasena calls himself the vanquisher of the rulers of Gauḍa (Majumdar, *History of Bengal*, p. 221). There is no question here that Gauḍa cannot refer to Bengal and the Senas. There is thus nothing to support an assumption that Rājaśekharaśūri and the others mean by Gauḍa, Bengal. To the contrary, there is adequate justification for assuming that as it did for Lakṣmaṇasena so does it mean for them the territory of the Gāhaḍavālas, far west of Sena rule. It remains therefore that Śrī Harṣa was patronized by the Gāhaḍavālas, and lived to see the reigns of Govindacandra and Jayacandra in Kanyākubja, as he himself states. As to his exact place of birth, nothing definite can be known.

<sup>6</sup> For the legends surrounding the circumstances of his birth and early learning see the Sanskrit introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, by Paṇḍit Lakṣmaṇa Śaṣṭrī David, Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 21 (Benaras, 1904–1914), pp. 6 ff. Śrī Hira, Śrī Harṣa's father is said to have been defeated in debate by Udayana and to have then worshipped the goddess Durgā for a son who might be capable of defeating his vanquisher. D. C. Bhattacharya accepts the historicity of the first part of this account, 'Udayana and Śrī Harṣa', *op. cit.*, p. 143. According to him it is recorded in Cāṇḍupāṇḍita's commentary to the *Naiṣadhīyacarita* (1296–1297 A.D.).

<sup>7</sup> For a list of the works attributed to Śrī Harṣa, see the Hindi introduction, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13, and the Sanskrit introduction, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> D. C. Bhattacharya, 'Udayana and Śrī Harṣa', *op. cit.*, p. 140.

<sup>9</sup> See the following passages: 1.59, a reference to the *antaḥkaraṇa* as *aṇuparimāṇa*, a Nyāya doctrine; 1.71, a reference to the Buddhists in Sindh sitting in a circle around their *guru*; 1.117, a double entendre, "knowing the *haṃsa* = knowing the soul"; 2.1 a remark on gaining release from the Lord; 2.32, a reference to the Nyāya doctrine that only a *samavāyikāraṇa* imparts its qualities to its product; 2.40, in the description of Damyanti, the phrase, "*sadasatsaṃśayagocarodari*"; 2.42, the use of the terms "*pūrvapakṣatām*" and "*siddhāntadhiyām*"; 2.61, a reference to the doctrine that knowledge is intrinsically valid, "*svata eva satām parārthatā, grahaṇānām yathā yathārthatā*"; 3.18, same as 2.32; 3.36, a reference to the Buddha as possessed of *kṣānti*; 3.37, same as 1.59; 3.39, same as 2.32; 3.63, a reference to Brahma as "*manaso 'gocara*"; 3.78, a reference to Kumārila's doctrine that the invalidity of knowledge is revealed by faults inherent in its causes or by the arising of a contradicting cognition; 3.82, Nala as Brahma reached by *darśana*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *īśvarānugraha* (compare *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, p. 124 Sam); 3.91, a reference to the fact that only non-momentary objects can be the subject of investigation; 3.125, a reference to the Naiyāyika doctrine of creation; 4.3, a paraphrase of the Nyāya definition of causality; 4.18, a reference to the commonly accepted notion that the inference of fire from *bāṣpa*, mist, must be false (compare *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, pp. 78, 213, Sam); 4.80, a reference to the Buddha as the great vanquisher of Kāma; 5.1, a mention of the *dānapāramitā* of the Buddhist tradition; 5.52, a reference to the Upaniṣadic passage in which it is stated that the mind goes to the moon; 5.135, a statement that the doctrine of non-duality purifies the world and invalidates all notions of difference; 7.3, "*Brahmād-*

*vayasyānubhavāt pramodam*"; 8.15, the entire verse in which *mokṣa* is described as "*ānandamayī*" and *saṃsāra* as "*anīrvacanīyamoha*"; 9.71, a mention of the Buddhist *triratna*; 9.121, a reference to the soul as *svayaṃ prakāśa*; 9.147, a reference to the doctrine that one becomes that upon which he meditates at the moment of his death (compare *Bhagavadgītā*, 8.6); 10.62, "*svataḥ prakāśe paramātmabodhe bodhāntaram na sphuraṇārtham arthyam*"; 10.81, a reference to the *Nyāya Śāstra* as divided into two sections, *uddeśa* and *lakṣaṇa*; 10.87, a reference to *śūnyatā*, *sākāratā*, and *viññānavāda*; 11.129, a reference to the Upaniṣads as having the highest person, consciousness, beyond the range of speech as their main purport and denying the validity of the *Nyāya* categories; 13.36, a reference to *advaita* as absolutely unquestionable and beyond the range of the four alternatives, *sat*, *asat*, *sadasat*, *sadasadvilakṣaṇatva*; 14.74, a reference to the *Mīmāṃsaka* debate on the question of whether the gods enjoy the sacrifice attendant thereupon in bodily form or not; 17.38 a reference to the Buddhist inference *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*; 19.45, a reference to the famed example of an *upādhi*, "*śākāhāra*" in the inference, "*sa śyāmo maitratānayatvāt*"; 21.105, the phrase, "*kaḥ svatantram anu nanvanuyogaḥ*" (compare *Mālinivijayavārttika*, pt. 1, vs. 222, p. 22); 21.108, the phrase, "*iśvarehitavijṛmbhita*" (compare again the *Mālinivijayavārttika*, and the other works of Abhinavagupta which throughout describe *bhedaprapaṇca* as "*iśvareccāvijṛmbhita*"), etc. The reader is referred to note 170 of the translation for an interpretation of the whole of the first six *sargas* as an allegory depicting the aspirant's search for union with the soul. In addition, Śrī Harṣa was not alone in combining a talent for dialectical wit and for poetry. Dharma, the famous Kaulika (c. 1050 A.D.) calls himself both "*kavirāj*" and "*vādirāj*" (*Prabhāvakacarita*, *Mahendrasūricarita*, verse 262, p. 148). Śāntisūri was also described as "*kavindra*" and "*vādicakrī*" (*Prabhāvakacarita*, *Vādivetālaśrīśāntisūricarita*, verse 21, p. 133).

<sup>10</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, p. 199, and *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 70–80, 83.

<sup>11</sup> This general principle will be urged against the opponents elsewhere in the sections on *pramā* and *pratyakṣa*. See pp. 138, 223, 266, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 305, 312, 317, 326, 328, 331 Sam. Prior to Śrī Harṣa, Mahimabhaṭṭa had urged the same against Abhinavagupta. See *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 98.

<sup>12</sup> Udayana seems to have a change of heart on p. 96 N.E. of the *Parīśuddhi* where he endorses the third alternative. Śrī Harṣa will refute this along with the related statements in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 232, on pp. 224–229 Sam.

<sup>13</sup> *Ṭikā*, p. 28 N.E.; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 109 N.E.; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 212.

<sup>14</sup> The commentators do not interpret the passage in this manner. *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 250–251 suggests for *ātmāśraya*, *karaṇatve karaṇatvābhyupagama*, regarding the term as an *upalakṣaṇa* for *anyonyāśraya* and *anavasthā*. The difficulty with his explanation is that it does not explain why the Naiyāyika will be forced into admitting the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. There remains the question why an object cannot be a cause of its own knowledge in which case the definition would be valid, and the doctrine of permanence untouched.

Śaṃkara Miśra, p. 135, follows *Vidyāsāgarī* and further denies the possibility that the

Naiyāyika might propose that every object is a cause of its knowledge, for this would not be possible in cases other than perception where an object might be past or future. The Naiyāyika insists that only the existent can be a cause (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 413). For one, Śaṅkara Miśra's interpretation is guilty of the same fault as that of Vidyāsāgara: it fails to explain the reason why the Naiyāyika must accept *kṣaṇikatva*. Secondly there is in fact nothing in the Nyāya doctrine which vitiates an assumption that all objects are causes of knowledge, and which would therefore prevent Śrī Harṣa from taking such an assumption, urging against it *ātmāśraya* and then proving *apasiddhānta*. The Naiyāyikas are not consistent on this point. The *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 204–205; *Parīśuddhi*, pp. 115, 139 N.E.; *Ṭīkā*, pp. 36, 224 N.E. regard not the *liṅga* but *liṅgadarśana* as a cause of inference, in keeping with the theory that a non-existent cannot be a cause. In contrast to this, Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 266 N.E., forcefully states the opposite, “*dhūmasyaiva jñāyamānasya tatkāraṇatvād, anyathā, tatkalānanuvidhānaprasaṅgāt*”. Compare also the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 193, where Udayana specifically alters the *Prasastapādabhāṣya* “*liṅgadarśanāt*” to “*dr̥ṣṭānumitaliṅgāt*”. It would seem that this is the later and more developed of the two doctrines, designed to ward off the difficulty of an inference born of an invalid mark being valid when it accidentally reveals an existent *sādhya* (cf. Śrī Harṣa, p. 315 Sam).

Varadapaṇḍita, p. 275, differs not from *Vidyāsagārī*. Paramānandasūri, p. 7b, is of no use at all; he applies the term *ātmāśraya* to a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine! (“*arthakriyākāritve 'rithakriyākāritvam asti ced, ātmāśrayah*”).

The anonymous commentator, 10a–10b, comes closest to the correct interpretation, “*jñānam janayaddhi sāmānyādīnām kāraṇam. tena jñānaviśeṣitam sat kāraṇapadābhidheyatāyām paryavasyati, na kevalam. tādr̥śāt kāraṇād upajāyamānam jñānam svasmād evopajāyate ity uktam bhavati*”. The reasoning behind this statement is that “*kāraṇatva*” like *sambandha*, or *bheda*, is always *sāpekṣa* or *anyanirūpita* (described by another). Thus *y-kāryanirūpita-x* is a cause of *y* and *y* is a cause of itself. I would prefer the interpretation given in the preface only because it is specific to the definition at hand; the anonymous commentator's argument is a general attack on causality as a whole. It would in fact apply equally to the next step that *x-y-z*—*viśiṣṭavastu* at time<sub>1</sub> must be a cause of *x-y-z*—*viśiṣṭavastu* at time<sub>2</sub>. This is undesirable. Śrī Harṣa does not go so far. He wants this admission with the concomitant fault of *apasiddhānta*. The anonymous commentator would make impossible the causality of all things, and Śrī Harṣa's reply would be meaningless.

<sup>15</sup> Compare pp. 218, 233, 275 Sam.

<sup>16</sup> The *Tārkikarakṣā* gives this as solely Prabhākara's definition and refutes it on p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 23. The *Kiraṇāvalī* passage is well explained by S. Kuppuswami Śāstrī, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Madras: P. Varadāchary & Co., 1932), p. 43, in his treatment of the factors determining that a given quality is a universal.

<sup>18</sup> *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 21; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 200; *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> Śrī Harṣa is not the only one to so refute the Buddhist doctrine of recognition. Abhayadevasūri, *Sanmatitarkatīkā*, p. 116; Hemacandra, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 40 urge similar faults against the notion that recognition is two separate cognitions. It would seem

that Hemacandra takes exception to Prabhācandra's consideration of recognition as memory on the same grounds. He maintains that it must be an altogether different type of knowledge (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 40).

<sup>20</sup> *Brhatī* with *Rjuvimalā*, pp. 238–239; *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 126; *Ślokaṇvṛttika*, *Prātyakṣasūtra*, *śloka*s 229–231; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 22. See also note 136 to the translation.

<sup>21</sup> For Vācaspati Miśra's view see *Ṭīkā*, pp. 230–231 N.E. It is also admitted by the *Nyāyamañjarī*, pt. 2, p. 33. Udayana's improvement on this is in the *Parīśuddhi*, pp. 280–281 N.E. where he outlines the contact as follows:

object——eye——mind——soul——mental traces——past time and place.

The lines of contact represent in order: direct physical contact, direct physical contact, direct physical contact, inherence, and a relation of an attribute to its locus (*viśeṣaṇatā*). Thus, the object is in direct physical contact with the eye which is in direct physical contact with the mind. The mind is in direct physical contact with the soul in which inhere the mental traces. “Pastness”, “*tattā*”, is a qualifier of the mental traces. Unfortunately, Udayana is not consistent in this description. Elsewhere, in the *Kuṣumāñjali*, p. 474 (although curiously enough he offers the above in the same text, p. 440) he suggests that the mental traces themselves serve as the contact, “*saṃskāramātraṃ saṃnikarṣaḥ smaraṇasya*”. The process would be the following:

object——eye——mind——soul——past time and place

where the dotted lines represent in order: direct physical contact, direct physical contact, direct physical contact, and the mental traces acting as a connecting link. Although both passages in the *Kuṣumāñjali* are directly referring to memory, they could apply equally well to the relation *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* as it operates in recognition. Śrī Harṣa will refute this second interpretation on p. 154 Sam after he demolishes the first.

<sup>22</sup> The printed text reads “*viruddhobhayaparakāravaddharmāvalambī*”, an obvious error for “*dharmyavalambī*”.

<sup>23</sup> Although for the purpose of this preface an attempt has been made to avoid any detailed examination of Śrī Harṣa's statements and the variant interpretations of the commentators, the passage at hand is of sufficient importance and complexity to warrant a thorough investigation of its purport. Śrī Harṣa intends to force Udayana into admitting the *vyāpti*, “*yatra yatra niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketarasya grahaṇatve satī sambaddhiviśeṣaṇatayā grahaṇam, tatra tatra svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā vaktavyā*”. The qualifier, “*niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketarasya grahaṇatve satī*”, is to be resolved in the following manner, with “*ka*” in “*pratiyogika*” as “*svārthe kā*”. “*Niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāś cāśrayaś ca yasya pratiyogikasya tadītaratve satī*”. Its purpose is to ward off *vyabhicāra*. The absence of smell in water is perceptible to the nose; however, the locus of that absence is not. Substances are grasped only by the senses of sight and touch. Thus the *pūrvapakṣa* might urge that this is a case of *vyabhicāra*: *svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatavārūpasādhyābhāve 'pi sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatārūpasādhanaṃ tiṣṭhati*. Similarly, the

Naiyāyika admits the perception of the absence of color in wind (*Parīśuddhi*, p. 248 N.E.), but wind is not perceptible to the eye. This would be a second case of *vyabhicāra*. Both of these are eliminated by the modifier, “*niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketarasya grahaṇatve satī*”. *Svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* is to apply only in those instances where *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* is admitted and where the attribute to be grasped is not one which invariably exists on a locus beyond the range of the given sense organ. Applying this to the specific examples in question, the absence of smell in water is an absence which rests on a locus everywhere imperceptible to the nose. The absence of smell exists in all things other than *prthivī*. None of these things can be made known by the sense of smell. The absence of odor is thus not *niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketara* and both the *sādhana* and the *sādhya* are absent. There is no question of *vyabhicāra*. Likewise, the absence of color exists only in loci imperceptible to the eye. By definition the eye grasps only that which has magnitude and *rūpa*. *Vyabhicāra* is averted in the same manner.

It remains now to see how this affects Udayana's *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* in the case of *tattā*. *Tattā* is to be grasped by the eye through the aid of this contact. Now, *tattā* resides on the *saṃskāra*, a locus which is not *niyamena tadindriyāgrāhya* as it is in fact *sarvendriyāgrāhya*. To specify that (x) is not grasped by a sense organ (y) implies that it is grasped by another sense organ (z) by the rule, “*saviśeṣaṇe hi vidhiniśedhau viśeṣaṇam upasaṃkrāmataḥ*”. (compare note to the translation 143 and p. 181). Thus, *tattā* is *niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketara* and its perception must require the additional modification, “*svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā*”.

The final statement that in the doctrine where the absence of sound is perceptible another type of contact, *indriyaviśeṣaṇatā*, is admitted and not *sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* wards off another possibility of *vyabhicāra*, even in the presence of the qualifier, “*niyamena*”, etc. The absence of sound is perceived not only in ether, which is invariably imperceptible to the ear, but also in another sound itself. Anyone who has studied music has had the experience of trying to achieve a resonating note uncontaminated by its corresponding sharp or flat. The absence of sound is therefore not always confined to a locus imperceptible to the ear, and yet it is also not grasped by *svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā* as the ether is never the object of the auditory sense. This would be a case of *vyabhicāra*: *sādhyābhāve saty api sādhanam var-tate*. Śrī Harsa only reminds the opponent that the *sādhana* consists not only of a *viśeṣaṇa*, “*niyamena*”, etc., but also of a *viśeṣya*, “*sambaddhaviśeṣaṇatayā grahaṇam*” which is absent in the present case. Thus, there is *sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāva* and no *vyabhicāra* is to be doubted.

The commentators destroy this passage. Śaṃkara Mīśra, pp. 152–153, begins by taking “*ka*” as a *bahuvrīhi*, and the word “*pratiyogika*” to mean “*abhāva*”. “*Āśrayaka*” he takes as another *bahuvrīhi* directly modifying *pratiyogin*. Thus, the contact, “*svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā*”, applies only to those cases other than absences the counter-positives of which exist on loci never grasped by the sense organs which are to grasp the absence. There is a major difficulty in this interpretation of which Śaṃkara Mīśra himself is aware; unfortunately the means by which he would avoid it would totally destroy Śrī Harṣa's argument. It has been mentioned that the absence of color in wind is admitted to be perceptible to the eye. Now, the *pratiyogin*, color, does not in fact always reside on a locus beyond the range of the visual sense. To the contrary, just the opposite is true. All objects other than atoms which are possessed of color are visible. Thus, this *abhāva* will be “*niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketara*” and yet not grasped by *svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatā*. This is a clear cut case of *vyabhicāra*.

To avoid this Śaṅkara Mīśra claims that by the word “*āśraya*” is meant only that locus at which the existence of the *pratiyogin* in question is suspected and denied, i.e., *vāyu*. Wind is always *cakṣuragrāhya* and so both the *sādhana* and the *sādhya* are absent. This sounds the death-knell to Śrī Harṣa’s proof. It is to be recalled that the demonstration of the necessity of accepting *svagrāhyasambaddhaviśeṣanātā* requires the fact that if it is not admitted in cases other than those excluded by the modifier “*niyamena*”, etc., then the absence of earthness in water atoms would be perceptible to the eye. Śaṅkara Mīśra’s interpretation makes this *āpatti* impossible. The absence of earthness in water is not *niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketara* at all. The locus at which the presence of earthness is suspected and denied, the water atoms, is certainly imperceptible to the visual sense! There is a way out of this untenable situation. It involves the same reasoning employed to show that *tattā* is “*niyamena tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketara*”. Water atoms are not *tadindriyāgrāhya* but *sarvendriyāgrāhya*.

Another weakness of Śaṅkara Mīśra’s interpretation is what then happens with the last remark concerning the absence of sound. The absence of sound, given Śaṅkara Mīśra’s resolution of the compound “*tadindriyāgrāhyāśrayakapratiyogiketara*”, would be excluded by this *viśeṣaṇa*. Any further question of its causing *vyabhicāra* should not arise. In the interpretation I have suggested, *śabdābhāva* is not excluded by the *viśeṣaṇa* and the question and answer would be purposeful as emphasizing the importance of the *viśeṣya*, “*sambaddhaviśeṣanātayā grahaṇam*” in the *hetu*.

Vidyāsāgara, p. 289, and *Citsukhī*, ms. pp. 178–183, give another interpretation of the passage at hand. It is extremely difficult, but entirely incorrect. The reader is referred to those commentaries.

<sup>24</sup> See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 43–46; translation pp. 150 ff. and notes therein for the Prābhākara theory of error, and *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 205, for the Prābhākara statement, “*anubhavakaraṇāsambhavena hi śūktirajātādiṣu smṛtipramoṣaḥ pratītyanārūḍho ’py āśriyate*”. This corresponds exactly to Śrī Harṣa’s remark, p. 161 Sam.

<sup>25</sup> See translation pp. 85 ff. for numerous examples of *pratibandhi*.

<sup>26</sup> There is a question of how to interpret the argument, “*athātyantābhāvaḥ, tadodake ’pi tasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ*”. Does Jayarāśi intend that this is so since *atyantābhāva* cannot be distinguished from *saṃsargābhāva*? Or because of the type of *vikalpa* which the Buddhists propose against the Naiyāyika category of universals – a universal cannot move from one place to the next, and so could never exist in the substratum in question? In either case, the hint is given in the *Tattvopaplavasimha* that if another type of *abhāva* be taken, then the definition will still apply to that which it is meant to exclude. Udayana in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 117, is fully aware of a *pūrvapakṣa* who argues on the basis of an inability to discriminate between reciprocal and relational absences.

<sup>27</sup> This is a superb bit of logic, and is understood only by the anonymous commentator, 17a. Śaṅkara Mīśra, p. 187; Paramānandasūri, 9b; *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 343–344; Varadapaṇḍita p. 373 all offer, “*anuyoginy adhikaraṇe pratiyogyāpattiḥ*”. This is poor. As a matter of fact it will be an *iṣṭāpatti*. The *pratiyogin* does indeed exist on the *anuyogin* by the relation, *anuyogitā*.

<sup>28</sup> For a summary of this Vedānta contention, see the Sanskrit introduction to *Pañcapādikā*, Madras Oriental Series, 155, p. 106, and the *Advaitasiddhi*, pp. 52–55. With Śrī Harṣa's argument on p. 189 should be compared Abhinavagupta's *Mālinivijayavārttika*, śloka 450, p. 43, and śloka 492, p. 46.

<sup>29</sup> It is interesting to note that the passages in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 232, and the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 96 N.E., here refuted seem to represent a later conception of Udayana. The question of how the validity of knowledge is to be determined is also discussed in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 314. Udayana does not there state that the mark is infallible, only that its validity need not be first known in order for it to give rise to the cognition that another knowledge is *pramā*.

<sup>30</sup> See also Abhayadevasūri, *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, p. 13; *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, pp. 167–170. Later Jains follow the Buddhists in their definitions of *pramā*. The Buddhist statement of the validity of both types of cognition may be found in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (with *Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 28). With Śrī Harṣa's resolution of the definition should be compared Dharmottara's statement, “*tato 'rthakriyāsamarthavastupradarśakam samyag-jñānam*”, *op. cit.*, p. 23, and the comment of Ratnakīrti, “*arthakriyāsamarthavastuviśayaviśayatvena*”, *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 105.

<sup>31</sup> For a detailed refutation of any attempt to establish the difference between the sleeping and waking states see *Līlāvātī*, pp. 454 ff., which also contains a support of Udayana's comments on the subject in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 318. A refutation similar to Śrī Harṣa's may be found in the *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 22.

<sup>32</sup> The original reasons for formulating this definition, “*abhipretārthakriyāviśamvāda*” would seem to be slightly different. The definition “*arthakriyāsthiti*” was found by Dharmakīrti himself to be wanting in at least one respect, according to his interpreter, Prajñākaragupta (p. 4). One hears a sentence, has a valid understanding of a given fact, and yet might not act at all. Under the assumption that only that knowledge is valid which leads to purposeful activity, this knowledge derived from a verbal utterance would be invalid. To avoid this, Prajñākaragupta understands the next statement after “*arthakriyāsthiti*”, *avisamvādanam*”, “*śabde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt*” as a modification of the gloss of *avisamvāditva*. It is not that an “activity” as commonly conceived must follow upon cognition, but an “activity” as specifically intended. This activity in the case of utterances which do not give rise to physical motion is the awareness of a given fact. (Compare Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 2 for a similar remark.) Thus, *avisamvāditva* is not excluded from the cognitions in which they result. On p. 5 Prajñākaragupta seems to demonstrate another importance of the qualifier, “*abhipreta*”. Certain individuals suffer from an eye disease which results in their always cognizing white as yellow. Such persons might well have a knowledge, “This is a yellow conch”, and on the basis of that knowledge pick up the conch and do with it as they pleased. The definition “*arthakriyāsthiti*” would be *atīvyāpti*. The knowledge is incorrect, and yet it leads to successful activity. To prevent this *atīvyāpti* is another of the functions of “*abhipreta*”. The person who always sees a conch as yellow intends an activity which is “*pītaśaṅkhānirūpita*”. Such an activity does not in fact exist, for “*pītaśaṅkhā*” is an absolute fiction.

<sup>33</sup> Prajñākaragupta is not unaware of this problem. He seeks to solve it by an assertion that the *arthakriyā* in sleep is not “*sthira*” (p. 4) but “*vicalita*”. This is further clarified on p. 5 with the statement that *arthakriyā* as observed in dream is produced from “*bhāvanā*”. There are several difficulties with such a solution. Not the least is the meaning of the term “*vicalita*”. If “*vicalita*” is nothing more than “*viśaṃvādi*” then one might well urge that the *arthakriyā* a dreamer observes in sleep is not for him *viśaṃvādi*. It does lead to successful activity, pleasure or pain, etc., within the context of that dream. If “*vicalita*” implies “*bhāvanā-mātrajātva*” in violation of the rule, “*sarvaṃ sāmāgrītaḥ saṃbhavati*” (compare preface, p. 28), then the entire definition of *pramā* will be thus: “*bhāvanāmātra-jetararthakriyākāriviśayakajñānam pramā*”. This is subject to any number of faults which Śrī Harṣa elsewhere outlines. For one, it is not possible to establish the existence of this “*itara*” or difference (pp. 80 ff.; 622–660 Sam). Secondly, any knowledge of causality depends upon a prior recognition of a universal or common attribute. This attribute would suffice as the definition of *pramā*, making Dharmakīrti’s statement which Prajñākaragupta hopes to support, in fact, without purpose.

<sup>34</sup> For another refutation of “*prāptiyogyatā*”, the reader is referred to Siddharṣi’s commentary on the *Nyāyavatāra*, p. 37.

<sup>35</sup> For the statement that a definition must exhibit *samavyāpti*, see also Abhinavagupta, *Pratyabhijñāvivṛttivimarsinī*, vol. III, p. 30; *Nayaviveka*, p. 79.

<sup>36</sup> Compare *Pañcapādikā*, p. 79, “*ekasya prthaktve siddhe, 'rthād itarasya prthak-tvasiddhiḥ*”.

<sup>37</sup> For the notion, “*kāryeṇa kāraṇamātram ākṣipyate*”, see translation, p. 78. Compare also *Tattvopaplavasimha*, p. 57, on the comment that *indriyajātva* cannot be known.

<sup>38</sup> *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, p. 482.

<sup>39</sup> See note 25 to translation.

<sup>40</sup> *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 23.

<sup>41</sup> It seems to me that it is possible that the Yogasāṃkhya also originally subscribed to such a view; *Yogabhāṣya*, 1.11, p. 43. Vācaspati Miśra as a Naiyāyika reinterprets the passage and remarks that sleep is not memory, but experience. The *Kusumāñjali*, p. 574, clearly states that *svapna* is *anubhava* and further notes that in some cases it may even be *pramā*.

<sup>42</sup> The *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. 152a, states that the predecessor refuted on p. 306 Sam is the *Tattvopaplavasimhakāra*. There is no such statement in the published *Tattvopaplavasimha*; however, Jayarāsi does name another of his works, now lost, the *Lakṣaṇasāra* (p. 20). There are several factors which mitigate against accepting this author as the one intended by Śrī Harṣa. Not the least of them is the question of date. Tentatively I would identify the definition on p. 312 with that given in the *Prabhākaravijaya*, p. 26, and the *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 31, as a



Prābhākara definition. The *Prabhākaravijaya* as a late text must be drawing upon something earlier, at least as early as Varadarāja who quotes the same definition; however, there is no evidence that its source is much prior to that date. Jayarāṣi, on the other hand, is said to belong to the 8th century (Introduction to the *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, p. x). The second problem is that accepting Jayarāṣi in this case would still not account for the objector cited and refuted on p. 319. The author of this remark clearly accepts the doctrine that *svapna* is *smṛti*, whereas Jayarāṣi accepts nothing at all.

<sup>43</sup> Compare his “*yaduktam mahadādījaganmāyācitrabhittiṃ namāmi tām*”, 1b, with the words of Utpaladeva, “*Nirūpādānaśaṃbharam abhittav eva tanvate jagaccitraṃ namas tasmai kālaślāghyāya śūline*” and the *Śakti Sūtra*, 2, “*svabhittau viśvam unmīlayati*”. Both are cited by Haribhadra Śāstrī in his commentary to Abhinavagupta’s *Bodhapañcadaśikā*. Also, on p. 2a the anonymous commentator refers to the state of release as “*sadāśivā-vastha*”, and on the same page remarks on Śrī Harṣa’s introductory verse in the following manner: “*guṇīkṛtyaśaktikaṃ śivanamaskāram abhidhāya*”, “*guṇīkṛtyasivam śaktinamaskāram āha*”.

## THE INTRODUCTION TO THE *KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYA*: TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

The *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is essentially a philosophical debate set to writing.<sup>1</sup> The *pratijñā* or proposition is stated on p. 130 (Sam), namely that all definitions are illogical, and the bulk of the text to p. 750 is devoted to its proof. The pages preceding 130 thus fall outside the main framework of the text; however, they constitute a necessary introduction to it.<sup>2</sup> There had long raged a controversy between the Naiyāyikas-Mīmāṃsakas-Jains on the one hand and the Buddhist-Vedāntins on the other. The first group maintained that the latter in their refusal to admit the existence of means of valid knowledge, logical fallacies, etc. involved themselves in an impossible situation and were no more than fools – for if proof, the means of proof, what is to be proved and the prover himself do not exist, who does what with what? Their very primary assumptions thus make them ineligible to enter any serious discussion.<sup>3</sup> As Śrī Harṣa will hereafter involve himself in a lengthy debate, he must first meet these objections. He does so by forcefully restating the contentions of the Mādhyamika Buddhist, with the conclusion that what is necessary for discussion is not so much the existence of the *pramāṇas*, etc. as a knowledge of their existence. This is a fact well recognized by the Naiyāyika himself (*Kuṣumāṇjali*, p. 131). Śrī Harṣa's method throughout this section is to reduce his opponent's arguments to absurdity, and force him to admit that the very objections he raises indicate that he holds the opposite position. A detailed comparison of Śrī Harṣa's solution with that of his Buddhist predecessors may be found in the commentaries on his text and their notes.

\* \* \*

Now, disputants maintain the following regulations for debate, "Both parties must admit that the means of valid knowledge, etc., categories which stand proved in so much as they are denied by no one, exist." Others do not agree, for the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. which is to be admitted by the disputants follows from what logical reason? (1) From the fact that discussion, invariably accompanied by the admission of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. cannot be undertaken by two debators who do not admit their

existence? (2) From the fact that these things are the causes of the discussion which is to be undertaken by the disputants? or (3) From the fact that these things are commonly accepted? or (4) From the fact that failure to admit their existence would lead to an improper result in the establishment of truth or determination of victory?

Śrī Harṣa begins his attack with a direct question, why must the disputants admit that the means of valid knowledge, etc., the established categories,<sup>4</sup> exist? The alternatives offered are four. The first is clear – without an admission of their existence debate is impossible as the two invariably occur together. Intended is the relationship of invariable concomitance, *yatra yatra vāgyavahāmaḥ tatra tatra pramāṇ-ādisattābhyupagamaḥ*, and its corollary, *yatra yatra pramāṇ-ādisattābhyupagamābhāvaḥ, tatra tatra vāgyavahārābhāvaḥ*. The second and third alternatives are self-explanatory.<sup>5</sup> The idea of the fourth is that if one does not admit the existence of means of proof and logical fallacies there will be no way to settle who wins in a debate or which viewpoint is correct. Where a fault does not exist, victory results or truth is determined. But if faults never exist anywhere at all, then both parties would win with equal right.

First of all, the first alternative is untenable, for we see lengthy discussions on the part of the Cārvākas, Mādhyamikas and others despite their refusal to admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. Indeed, if such verbal activity did not exist, then your efforts at its refutation would be most unfitting! This refusal to admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge is a new type of silencing charm invoked by you, through the power of which the *Lokāyata Sūtras* have not been written by Bṛhaspati, the Mādhyamika texts have not been taught by the Buddha and a commentary on the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa has not been expounded by Śaṅkarācārya! But should we say, “Let them use combinations of words without the admission of the means of valid knowledge, etc. They will not be capable of proving or refuting anything for just that reason. This is our contention, then?”

No, this is not correct, for you must admit that the fact of being undertaken without the admission of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. is not the determinant of capability to refute or prove; rather the presence of the defining characteristics of incorrect argument, so that the discussion carried out by one school even though it admits the existence of the means of valid knowledge can be said to

be unable to prove or refute by the adherents to another school who also admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. If you cannot demonstrate any fallacies in our words, then even if you repeat a hundred times over, “This discussion has been undertaken by you without admitting the means of valid knowledge, etc.”, it is of no consequence to us. Otherwise, we might equally urge, “This discussion has been undertaken by you upon admitting the means of valid knowledge, etc. and so is not a valid discussion.”

Śrī Harṣa rejects the first alternative by urging *vyabhicāra* – *sattvābhyupagamarūpasādhyābhāve vāgyavahārārūpasādhanaśattvam*. The Mādhyamika does not accept the existence of the Naiyāyika categories and yet he enters into discussion. The opponent then slightly modifies his invariable concomitance. He states that it is not discussion in general which must be accompanied by admission of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, but a particular type of discussion – that which is capable of proving or refuting a desired point. The *vyāpti* becomes: *yatra yatra sādhanabāddhanakṣamatvaviśiṣṭavyavahārah*, *tatra tatra sattvābhyupagamaḥ*, with its corollary, *yatra yatra sattvābhyupagamābhāvaḥ*, *tatra tatra sādhanabāddhanakṣamatvaviśiṣṭavyavahārābhāvaḥ*.

Śrī Harṣa destroys this second *vyāpti* by again demonstrating *vyabhicāra*. Even in the absence of the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* there may be a discussion which is capable of refuting and proving given tenets. This is because one cannot maintain that the failure to admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge leads to inability to prove or refute. Were that the case, in the absence of the admission of that admission (where one accepts that the *pramāṇas* exist) all discussion would be faultless. That this is untenable is shown by the example of a debate between two parties both of whom admit the *pramāṇas* but one of whom is said to be wrong on a given question. Śrī Harṣa further states what is the determinant of unsuccessful argument – the presence of specious reasoning. Given this fact that the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* is irrelevant to an argument’s ability to prove and refute it now becomes possible to have an argument capable of proving, free from fault and which was undertaken without the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas*. The invariable concomitance is thus broken: *sattvābhyupagamarūpasādhyābhāve* ‘*pi* *sādhanabāddhanakṣamatvaviśiṣṭavyavahārārūpasādhanaṃ* *syāt*.

There is only a slight difference between the refutation on p. 26 (Chow.) and that on pp. 29–30 (Chow). The first is a case of *nīścitavyabhicāra* directly illustrated through example. The second is of *śaṅkitavyabhicāra* and requires the additional step of first demonstrating that failure to admit the existence of the *pramāṇas* cannot be the determinant of an argument's invalidity. This leaves open the possibility that a discussion may be effective and yet not accompanied by admission of the existence of the means of valid knowledge.

“But if there were no means of valid knowledge, etc. then how could discussion itself, the locus of the quality in question exist, and how could there be any fixed division of faults, etc., since all assertion and negation depends upon means of valid knowledge?”

Thus far the argument has centered around the problem whether or not discussion is invariably accompanied by the admission of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. Discussion is the qualified and its relationship to the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* the quality under examination. Śrī Harṣa has shown that such a relationship of invariable concomitance cannot be demonstrated. The opponent thus defeated redirects his attention. Up until now both parties have assumed an entity “discussion” and proceeded to examine one of its particular attributes. The *pūrvapakṣa* now objects that all of Śrī Harṣa's criticism is meaningless, for, if he does not accept the existence of the means of valid knowledge, for him there can be no discussion at all, the attributes of which he may then examine. This is not a specific attack on the previous statements of *vyabhicāra*; rather, it is meant as a general criticism, *vyāghāta*, or contradiction. To deny an attribute of a given substratum necessarily implies the existence of that substratum,<sup>6</sup> and yet the opponent conceives that Śrī Harṣa must also deny the existence of the substratum itself. The resulting contradiction, denial and admission of the existence of the same entity, would invalidate all of Śrī Harṣa's previous statements.

The exact reason why failure to admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge entails the impossibility of debate is not made explicit at this point in the text. Intended perhaps is the later statement, “*Prativādyāt-mādyānumānādivyatirekeṇa kathāyām eva pravṛtṭyanupapattī*” (p. 359 Sam). The idea is this. The very existence of debate depends upon the admission of the means of valid knowledge, for one enters into discussion with an opponent who is capable of responding and not with an inanimate object. If there were no means of valid knowledge such as inference by which we

know the opponent has a soul and is capable of reasoning, no one would ever attempt to argue with him. The same notion is expressed in the *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 268, and the *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, p. 74. One might further extend this reasoning to include the subject of debate, applying the previous argument that a debate about an attribute of something requires that we have proof that that something exists.

The second point which the opponent raises is that even if debate were possible without the existence of means of valid knowledge, in such a debate there could never be any proper assignments of faults or merits. This is obvious. The apportioning of faults and merits must be supported by valid knowledge. It is not enough simply to state that the opponent's reasoning is defective; one must have adequate reason for doing so. Unsubstantiated by evidence, the assignment of faults becomes purely arbitrary. More fundamentally, the statement of fault in a speaker's argument also requires first that we understand what the speaker intends. Thus, *śabda* or testimony as a separate *pramāṇa*, or inference, in the case of the Buddhists and Prābhākaras must be admitted before there can be any distribution of faults and merits in the debator's arguments.

The general *réason* given in the text, that all predication and negation requires means of valid knowledge, is to be taken in these senses with both the *pūrvapakṣa* objections – that debate would not exist and the distribution of faults would be impossible.

Not at all. We do not say that debate is to be undertaken having admitted that the means of valid knowledge do not exist, but that debate may be undertaken by individuals who are indifferent to the question whether the means of valid knowledge do exist or whether the means of valid knowledge do not exist, and yet carry on just as you do having admitted their existence. Were this not the case, even this fault adduced by you, having misconstrued our viewpoint to be that the means of valid knowledge do not exist, could not be stated. This fault has been raised in a debate governed by what rules? (1) in a debate begun by two disputants who both admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc.? or (2) by two who do not admit their existence? or (3) where one has admitted their existence and the other their non-existence? It cannot be the first case, since there is no room for such an objection against one who admits the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. In the second case, then you too would be liable to the same fault. Nor can it be the third case, because in the same manner

any other debate would be possible, and because the rules of debate must be in keeping with what both parties admit. Otherwise, some kind of insubstantial fault being adduced in your statement by the other party on the basis of his own contentions, whose would victory be? The effort of bearing the burden of so many regulations would weigh heavily upon the one who admitted the existence of the means of valid knowledge. Therefore, it must be that this fault was adduced by you in a debate undertaken after agreeing to certain conditions, regulations of behavior unconcerned with the acceptance of the existence or non-existence of the means of valid knowledge. That being the case, it certainly would be a fitting objection. For such a one as you, who cannot even understand your own intention, the hope of understanding the meaning of another is far flung indeed.

The *pūrvapakṣa* has argued above that if Śrī Harṣa denied the existence of the *pramāṇas* there could be for him no such thing as debate, and thus any talk of its relationship to the admission of the existence of these categories would be impossible, predication or denial of an attribute entailing the existence of its locus. Śrī Harṣa replies with *niranuyojoyānuyoga* – the contradiction named is not valid as all he contends is that one need not admit the existence of the *pramāṇas* in order to debate, and not that he must admit their non-existence. All that is required is a neutral standpoint on the question of their existence or non-existence and that both parties follow the same set of rules (*Yathā svikṛtya. . . tathāvyavahāribhiḥ*).

Śrī Harṣa here reduces the *pūrvapakṣa*'s position to absurdity, by showing that this indeed must be what the *pūrvapakṣa* also admits, by the very fact that he protests to the contrary. The *pūrvapakṣa* has raised the objection that Śrī Harṣa is involved in a contradiction. Now, this fault is brought up in a debate already under progress. If this debate has been started with the rule that both parties must admit the existence of the *pramāṇas*, the objection, that if they do not exist contradiction ensues, is inapplicable. If it was begun by two parties accepting their non-existence, then the second party, the opponent himself, is also open to contradiction – he does not admit that the *pramāṇas* exist, he debates and yet further states that if the *pramāṇas* do not exist debate is impossible.<sup>7</sup> If the opponent should urge that this debate demands only that he accept the existence of the *pramāṇas* and that Śrī Harṣa accept their non-existence, then what is to prevent all debates from arising out of the same premise?

The *pūrvapakṣa* has now failed in his original contention, that all debates demand both parties admit the existence of the *pramāṇas*. There remains thus only one possibility and that is that the *pūrvapakṣa* has raised his objection in a debate begun by a certain set of rules which have nothing to do with the admission of the existence or the non-existence of the *pramāṇas*. The fault, then, that if the *pramāṇas* do not exist debate is impossible, is still inapplicable. By the *pūrvapakṣa*'s own admission the question of their existence is irrelevant to debate, and no one has necessarily asserted they do not exist. The force of 'ucitam eva' in the text is sarcastic. The *pūrvapakṣa* meaning which the *pūrvapakṣa* himself has failed to grasp is just this – that his very statement of *vyāghāta* when carefully examined implies that the existence of the *pramāṇas* need not be admitted before debate is to proceed, and so defeats his original purpose.

“But it is not to be thought that we have made a wrangler a partner in debate and that in that situation we raise this contradiction; rather, students are informed that such a person is unfit for debate. This is the reason the Bhāṣyakāra has said ‘if asked his purpose he replies’ and not ‘you reply’.”

The *pūrvapakṣa* hopes to avoid all of the above criticism by maintaining that he does not raise this fault of contradiction in a debate against Śrī Harṣa, but merely as a teacher to his own students. He cites the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.1 in its use of the third person as evidence of the fact that the wrangler is not directly addressed in any formal discussion.<sup>8</sup>

This will not help. One must still tell even his students, “This is the fault of the Cārvāka.” And how can this be done, for both in the event of the Cārvāka's entering into debate and not entering into debate, the contradiction is without effect, for it is only in debate that a clincher is to be stated.

Śrī Harṣa's reply is simple; the *pūrvapakṣa* cannot absolve himself from the grave errors mentioned above, because he must still say that the Cārvāka involves himself in contradiction. This contradiction is a *nigrahassthāna* or a logical fallacy which clinches debate, namely *pratijñāvirodha* (*Nyāyasūtra* 5.2.4). The *pūrvapakṣa* assumes that Śrī Harṣa maintains the following: *pramāṇādyasattvam abhyupagamya kathā pravartanīyā, kathātvād, Mādhyamikādikathāvat*. The proposition and the reason are contradictory. If the *pramāṇas* do not exist, there can be no debate, and if there is to be debate, it is not possible to admit that the



*pramāṇas* do not exist. Understood in this manner, contradiction is a technical fault which falls within the scope of formal debate. The alternatives proposed above thus stand, and the discussion of the first suggestion that debate is invariably accompanied by an admission of the existence of the categories is concluded.

Nor is the second suggestion permissible, for this might be possible only if the causality of the means of valid knowledge, etc. with respect to the discussion the debator will undertake were to cease upon failure to admit their existence. But this cannot be true, for were it so there could be no discussion at all on the part of those who do not admit their existence, in the absence of a cause. We have already stated that one cannot deny the very existence of the discourses of the Mādhyamikas and others.

Perhaps you think thus: "Since they are causes of discussion, the means of valid knowledge, etc. exist, and since they exist they are so admitted, since it is seen that what exists is admitted to do so." This is also wrong, for you must prove in a debate begun in accordance with some set of regulations that since they are the causes of the discourses of the debator, the means of valid knowledge, etc., exist, and since they exist they are to be so acknowledged.

Śrī Harṣa here simply repeats the arguments of pp. 34–36 (Chow) that one cannot thus prove by inference that the *pramāṇas* must be admitted to exist prior to debate since all proof is to be offered in a debate already in progress for it to be effective. Such a debate must be possible between two people who do not necessarily admit the existence of the *pramāṇas*, and the *pūrvapakṣa* will have defeated his purpose by tacitly admitting that an admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* is not ancillary to debate. The *pūrvapakṣa* is also involved in the fault of *anyonyāśraya* or reciprocal dependence – to start a debate it is necessary to admit the existence of the *pramāṇas*, but this fact must itself be proved in debate. Thus the existence of debate depends upon proof of the necessity of the *pramāṇas* and that proof depends upon debate. Extending this argument, the opponent is also involved in *cakraka* and *anavasthā*: Debate *A* demands *y*, the necessity of the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* prior to debate. This *y* demands debate *B*, but *B* also requires *y*. If *y* is to be obtained through *A* there is a *cakraka*: *B-y-A-y-B*. If *y* is accomplished by another debate, *C*, there may be a longer *cakraka* or an infinite regress: *B-y-A-y-C-y-B* or *B-y-A-y-C-y-D*. . .<sup>9</sup>

Before a debate, just so much is to be attended to by the debators who desire truth or victory, without which their desired end would not come about. And that end is recognized by both of them to be possible simply through the drawing up of a set of conditions regulating their behavior. Thus, they need do no more than draw up the conditions regulating debate. These conditions are of the following nature:

“The affirmative speaker must speak in accordance with means of valid knowledge and reasoning, and the negative speaker should point out one or another clincher such as the opponent’s contradiction of his thesis which may serve as evidence of his improper grasp of the fundamentals of debate. If he is successful in pointing out such faults, then it is to be said that the first person loses; otherwise, the second. Those in the opposite situation are to be called the victors, and that viewpoint supported by adequate proof is deemed to be true.”

And for just this reason it is not possible to reply as was done in the demand for a proof of the necessity of admitting the existence of the means of valid knowledge, “A cause must also be given for the binding of conditions regulating debate, and this being the case that reason must be stated in a debate already begun”, for this very reason that the regulations of debate are willingly accepted by both parties as constituting the very source of determination of truth desired by the undertaking of discussion.

Nor does it result that all discussions, their topics, and results will carry no convictions since they are based upon rules agreed to at will, unsanctioned by absolute authority, and thus are possibly of imperfect root. For these rules, handed down from generation to generation without beginning and seen to be fruitful in the dealings of this world are possessed of a natural perfection in the form of not even being subject to the doubt that they might result otherwise. Nor is it possible for the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. to be agreed upon by both parties in the same manner, for debate proceeds merely on the strength of a set of rules for behavior. Even upon the admission of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. in the absence of such a set of rules for debate, the end desired by the debator, determination of truth or victory, is not attained.

The discussion of the second alternative is concluded by an elaboration of the statement made on p. 42 (Chow) and earlier on p. 34 (Chow), that debate proceeds according to a given set of rules.<sup>10</sup> We have seen that Śrī

Harṣa aims to reduce the *pūrvapakṣa* to absurdity, forcing him to admit that his own statements are a tacit agreement to this *Siddhāntin* position. On p. 42 it is further demonstrated that this set of conditions cannot involve an admission of the existence or non-existence of the *pramāṇas*, and p. 43 adds that the set of rules is moreover the minimum condition demanded for the successful conclusion of debate, accepted by both parties for just that reason. Involved in this last statement is a simple presumption or *arthāpatti*: both parties willingly admit the regulations of debate, because otherwise their desired end would be impossible (*phalasyānyathānupapattyā*). This fact is essential to Śrī Harṣa's argument. It allows him to refute the objection that just as Śrī Harṣa demanded of his opponent a valid reason for the acceptance of the existence of the *pramāṇas* before debate, so might the opponent demand of him a reason for the necessary acceptance of the set of regulations. This would likewise involve Śrī Harṣa in the same four alternatives as his opponent, with the eventual conclusion that debate must be begun without such a system of rules. The willing admission of the necessity of the rules by *arthāpatti* makes the two cases essentially different. In the case of the regulations for debate both parties are in accord, and by the rule *vipratipannaṃ prati sādhanam arthavad bhavati* no proof is required. The two parties do not agree, however, on the question of the existence of the *pramāṇas* and the question of a valid reason is justified.

Page 47 (Chow) and the passage in the translation beginning "Nor does it result" proposes and refutes a slightly more complex objection. The rules of debate are agreed upon by will alone; there is no absolute authority preceding that will, for no scripture enjoins that just such a set of rules is to be drawn up and followed. *Arthāpatti* makes known only that some set of rules is necessary; beyond that, the choice of rules is left to trial and error or to habit, both non-authoritative.<sup>11</sup> The suspicion thus arises that the particular set of rules outlined in the text and there stated to be the very root of all debate may be incorrect. Debate as based on an incorrect set of regulations, arbitrary sanctions, would then also be without authority.<sup>12</sup> The answer to this question is given that the rules of debate do not require any external proof, for they have been handed down from generation to generation and have always been observed to be effective. This last qualification eliminates the further objection that they have been handed down from one fool to the next, which only strengthens the suspicion that they are useless.<sup>13</sup> There is a general principle behind this statement which is much employed by all Indian philosophers, and that is that doubt is permissible only where irregularities are observed. It is also behind Kumāṛila's famous dictum,

*Tricaturakakṣāsu nādhikā matiḥ*, *Ślokaavārttika*, *Codanāsūtra* 6 and *Vanavāda śloka* 13, and Nāgārjuna's reasoning in the *Vigrahavyāvartini* verse 43.

Lastly, Śrī Harṣa adds that the above process involving *arthāpatti* can only apply to the admission of the set of rules for debate and not to the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas*, for it is only without the former that the desired end is not attained. This is the force of the example of the debate where the existence of the *pramāṇas* is admitted but no set of rules followed. The absence of determination of truth or victory proves that the existence of the *pramāṇas* is not the determinant of either.<sup>14</sup> This concludes the discussion of the second suggestion that the admission of the existence of the categories must precede debate because those categories are its causes.

Nor is it for the third reason, for common conception can either mean notions backed by proof or notions shared by the ignorant and others. It cannot be the first, because without any discussion proof is difficult to describe, and it is for the purpose of discussion itself that a set of regulations is previously sought. Nor is it the second, for in that case you must also subscribe to such notions as that the body is the soul. If you say that the body cannot be the soul as such a thesis is found to be incorrect on later examination, well, then if the means of valid knowledge, etc. will be contradicted on later examination, then they are also not to be admitted. If otherwise, then they are to be admitted. But this is not at all saying that their existence is admitted on the strength of the fact that they are accepted in common parlance.

The refutation of the first alternative for suggestion three is substantially the same as everything that Śrī Harṣa has said before. If the *pūrvapakṣa* maintain that the existence of the *pramāṇas* is to be admitted because people who base their admission of things on valid proof do indeed admit their existence, then it is incumbent upon the opponent to demonstrate that such an admission is in fact well founded. If he does so in debate he is involved either in confessing the opposite of what he sets out to prove (*sveṣṭahāni*) or in reciprocal dependence, circuitous reasoning and infinite regress. If he does not permit debate on the question for just these reasons, then he falls into the fault of *avinigama*; he can never show whether the admission is supported by proof or not.

The second alternative involves the fault technically termed *hetvantara*.

The *pūrvapakṣa* had given one reason to prove that debaters must admit the existence of the *pramāṇas* before they can debate, namely that these things are admitted by everyone around. This is undesirable because ignorant people and others (no doubt by this ‘others’ is meant women) admit many things which a philosopher cannot. The *pūrvapakṣa* then modifies his reason and adds that this admission is to be uncontradicted. He goes thus from the *hetu*, *lokavyavahārasiddhatvāt* to *abādhitālokavyavahārasiddhatvāt*. This second reason is moreover liable to the same objections as the first suggestion posed by Śrī Harṣa in the refutation of this third proposition.

Nor is the fourth alternative tenable, for the very set of rules which is adhered to by you in debate after accepting the valid means of knowledge, etc. is also adhered to by us; indifferent to the acceptance of the existence or the non-existence of the means of valid knowledge. If that set of rules leads to improper results for me, then even for you it must have the same conclusion.

The response to this last of the alternatives posed on p. 21 (Chow) is self-explanatory. It has already been shown that it is only the set of regulations to debate which governs its results, and not the acceptance of the existence of the *pramāṇas*. If that set of rules fails for one, being the same set of rules it must also fail for the other.

“This may all be very true, and yet even by one starting a debate on the basis of a specific set of conditions deemed necessary for its accomplishment, the existence of that debate is to be admitted. For without the admission of its existence it is not possible even to speak of the accomplishment of debate, as accomplishment means creation which is no more than the giving of existence to the non-existent. Binding of the regulation, ‘One should speak in accordance with means of valid knowledge’, including within the regulation itself the causality of the means of valid knowledge is not possible without the admission of the causality; that is to say, the necessary previous existence of the means of valid knowledge. In limiting the conditions of determination of defeat in accordance with the existence of faults, and confining the terming of the truthful in accordance with the existence of such essential components of proof as invariable concomitance, to the objects of these elements of proof, the existence of all these things has been directly admitted. Thus it is nonsense to say that a debate may be begun without admitting the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc.”

Not at all. For if by means of these contradictions you intend to prove your desired end in a debate already begun, then you do not absolve yourself from the previously stated faults. Nor can you avoid these faults by maintaining that these very regulations of debate agreed upon at will themselves amount to the acceptance of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, for what is required there is the knowledge of existence and not existence itself. Now, do you hold that simply because of a knowledge of existence, existence is to be admitted, or because of an uncontradicted knowledge of existence? It cannot be the first, for then one would have to admit the existence of water in a mirage. In the second case, is it because of the absence of a contradicting cognition only at the time of debate and on the part of the two disputants and the arbiter, or because of the absence of contradicting knowledge for all times, and all people? Not the first of these, for it leads to unwarranted conclusions; we see that what is understood even by three people at a given moment is contradicted by those very people or by other people at another time. Nor can something non-existent be admitted to be existent in the form in which it was perceived merely on the strength of the previous cognitions of two or three individuals in the presence of contradicting evidence. Therefore only the second alternative remains – that for which there is no contradiction at any time or place for anyone at all is to be admitted to exist. This being the case, if we admit that a knowledge of the existence of faults, etc. on the part of the two debators and the arbiter, a knowledge which is uncontradicted by them only at the time of debate, is a necessary prerequisite for debate, then what has this to do with our refusal to admit as required for discussion the acceptance of the existence of these things on the strength of a knowledge of their existence uncontradicted for all time, places and people? In general, dealings in this world proceed from no more than a knowledge of a given situation for a certain time and for a few people, and it is just such a knowledge which is ancillary to debate. This is what is meant by the statement that debate is begun upon accepting that existence of the *pramāṇas* which is conducive to worldly activity.

The *pūrvapakṣa* now changes his method of argument. He uses Śrī Harṣa's own techniques in an effort to show that inherent in the *Siddhāntin* statements is the very opposite of what he supposes himself to be saying. This would involve the *Siddhāntin* in a blatant contradiction, Śrī Harṣa's

favoured weapon throughout the opening passages of this text. The *pūrvapakṣa* contends that to admit that certain conditions are necessary to “accomplish” debate is tantamount to admitting that debate exists. *Kriyā*, here rendered as accomplishment, means only the bringing into existence of that which was previously non-existent.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, he says, the statement that one should speak in conformity to the means of valid knowledge, where the term *pramāṇas* is in the instrumental case denoting causality, implies that the *pramāṇas* exist. For the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka and the Jain, causality is defined as necessary existence at a point in time prior to the arising of a given product.<sup>16</sup> The rest of the *pūrvapakṣa* argument is self-explanatory.

Śrī Harṣa’s reply, though not difficult, is of crucial importance in understanding his unique position amongst later Vedāntins and his relationship to his Buddhist predecessors. For the sake of completeness he first proposes two alternatives: either the *pūrvapakṣa* is adducing logical fallacies in a debate in progress in an attempt to prove a point, or he is merely indicating that this is the *Siddhāntin*’s own admission arrived at from the *Siddhāntin* statements and thus requiring no proof. The latter is obviously the case. Śrī Harṣa’s reply to all of this is that his insistence upon the necessity of the conditions he has outlined by no means implies an admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas*. It requires only an admission of knowledge of their existence. This is in fact in perfect accordance with the statement of Udayana, *vyavahāra* is not *tatsādhya* but *tajjñānasādhya*,<sup>17</sup> and verges on the obvious. If one did not know that there is such a thing as a valid proof he would hardly be capable of employing it. Similarly the existence of a fault is not so much the determinant of defeat as the opponent’s and arbiter’s recognition of that fault. A fault missed in debate is as good as not there.<sup>18</sup>

What is distinctive about this reply is only the last sentence – that such a knowledge uncontradicted for a few people over a limited period of time is just what is meant by *vyāvahārikī sattā*. Both Buddhist and Vedānta writers make great use of the concept of ‘*saṃvṛtisattva*’ or ‘*vyāvahārikasattva*’; in fact the very phrase “*vyāvahārikīm sattām ādāya*” used by Śrī Harṣa may well be a quote from a Buddhist text.<sup>19</sup> Without going into the history of this question, it is safe to say that in later texts *saṃvṛtisattva* does come to have the status of a third truth value, somewhere in-between absolute reality and absolute fiction: as such it is vigorously attacked by all non-Buddhists and non-Vedāntins.<sup>20</sup> I believe that Śrī Harṣa in this emphatic statement repudiates the notion that *saṃvṛtisattva* is some sort of provisional reality, and that he is in keeping with Dharmakīrti’s original statement (*Pramāṇ-*

*avārttika*, p. 281) when he says that it is nothing more than a temporarily uncontradicted knowledge of existence. This interpretation subjects Kumārila and the Jain opponents to *niranuyojoyānuyoga*, for they argue on the premise that *saṃvṛti* must be valid, and that through it its object is imbued with some kind of existential reality. I would also suggest that Śrī Harṣa's statement is entirely faithful to the earlier Buddhist texts. In the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, *Prajñāpāramitāpariccheda*, in which *saṃvṛti* is discussed at length, verse 2 (p. 17 ff.) clearly glosses *saṃvṛti* with "*buddhi*". The commentary of Prajñākaramati bears strong affinities to Dharmakīrti's verse. This "*buddhi*" or knowledge is here and elsewhere in the same text explained as "*avidyā*" or wrong knowledge, just as Śrī Harṣa explains it. It is also stated that *saṃvṛtisattva* never implies that an object exists; in fact to call an object existent on the basis of false cognition is absolutely in error.<sup>21</sup> Thus it would seem that the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* also recognizes no third truth value, and interprets *saṃvṛtisattā* or *vyāvahārikasattā* as *sattājñāna*, knowledge of existence. Unfortunately, the position in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is not so clear cut. Elsewhere, *saṃvṛti* is glossed as "*idaṃpratyayatāmātra*" (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and considered as an attribute of the object of wrong knowledge.<sup>22</sup> There is thus room for the development and interpretation of *saṃvṛtisattva* as an existential rather than an epistemological category, with all of the accompanying objections to it. The only points I would like to stress here are (1) that it is not so for Śrī Harṣa and (2) that there is enough evidence from the Buddhist texts from Nāgārjuna to Dharmakīrti to maintain that interpreting *saṃvṛtisattva* as *sattvajñāna* is entirely faithful to the original Buddhist tradition. It is my contention that Śrī Harṣa consistently avoids accepting *saṃvṛtisattva* as a third truth value; perhaps because he recognizes its illogicality, and perhaps because he always confines his arguments to the framework of his opponent's accepted tenets. This is the first evidence of such a position and merits further consideration. It is an untraditional interpretation of Śrī Harṣa, making him somewhat of an iconoclast amongst the later Vedānta tradition, but brings him perhaps closest to the original spirit of his school.<sup>23</sup>

Therefore, the only thing necessary for a debate to begin is the setting of such rules as the following, "He wins of whose speech the arbiter has the knowledge, 'whatever regulation has been made has not been overstepped by him'; of whose words the arbiter has not such knowledge, he is defeated. Where the arbiter has knowledge of the existence of a fault spoken by the debator that debator is admonished



for his fault and the other is not.” Likewise, “They must speak in accordance with these rules” means no more than that the arbiter should understand, “They have spoken in accordance with these rules.”

This is but an elaborate restatement of previous contentions. The last sentence extends the same reasoning to the set of rules itself, the existence of which might be doubted as it is considered the main cause of debate.

Nor is it to be said that in the final analysis one must still admit the existence of these knowledges of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. For in a consideration of their existence one can do no more than resort to a knowledge of that existence. Nor does this entail an infinite regress, for we do not admit that one must indefinitely pursue a series of knowledges, in accordance with the rule, “No more is required than the arising of three or four cognitions.” Nor is it to be said that if the last knowledge is non-existent it will follow that all preceding members of the series are non-existent, and so even he who would debate on the basis of knowledge is not free from difficulty. For let this be; just such is the case; none the less, people enter into debate by mutual consent, having set their rules in accordance with an examination which rests with the search for three or four knowledges and is agreeable for the very fact that it does not go beyond this point. Otherwise, even with the acceptance of the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc. an infinite series of knowledges is difficult to avoid.

This begins the refutation of Udayana’s argument against the Mādhyamika’s concept of *saṃvṛtisattva*, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 283 ff. In brief, Udayana maintains that there can be no debate with the Mādhyamika as he can state no valid reasons to justify his contentions. The Buddhist is allowed to return that he can do so, but that his employment of these necessary aids to debate depends only upon a false knowledge of their existence and so does not imply their reality. This is the position Śrī Harṣa has reached in his argument as well. Udayana now demands of his opponent whether this false knowledge or *saṃvṛti* exists or not. If it exists, he says, then the Mādhyamika will have abandoned his original position that nothing at all exists. If it does not exist, then not even the statement of valid reasons in debate can depend upon it. Udayana allows the Mādhyamika one way out – and that is to say that it is not necessary that this knowledge exist, only that it be known. He repeats the same question with respect to the

second *saṃvṛti* required for the first. Udayana then jumps a step and, to avoid infinite regress or the eventuality that the chain must break and then all the preceding knowledges will be non-existent, concludes that it must therefore be admitted that some knowledge exists of its own accord, and the Mādhyamika is defeated.

Śrī Harṣa's refutation of Udayana in this passage consists in this: (1) his denial of infinite regress; (2) his acceptance of the fact that thereby ensues: *saṃvṛti* may very well not exist since the series must end somewhere, and most importantly (3) his demonstration that the Naiyāyika is in the very same position even if he admits that the *pramāṇas* exist before he enters debate. He is still acting on the strength of a knowledge which may or may not really be. This last assertion requires some explanation. To assert that the *pramāṇas* exist requires that one know that they exist by a knowledge *A*. Should one then ask how is it to be accepted that knowledge *A* itself exists, the only answer is that we know it exists by knowledge *B*. The same question may be asked of knowledge *B* and so on. At the point at which the series is broken to avoid an infinite regress, one cannot insist that the previous cognitions definitely exist. Thus the Naiyāyika himself must argue on the strength of a knowledge which seems to exist on limited investigation, but about which one can never be certain. The Naiyāyika and the *Siddhāntin* are thus in the same position, and the fault adduced by Udayana is ineffectual as it is a fault for him as well. It might be noted that in support of this contention (1) that an infinite series is not required Śrī Harṣa quotes the *Ślokavārttika*, *Codanasūtra* 6, and out of context. Kumārila intended this dictum to refer to the means by which one may know the validity of knowledge and not its existence. The principle remains the same.

All of this objection to *saṃvṛtisattva* and its refutation can also be found in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 287. The verse 107, beginning “*atra sāpi*”, raises the question of *anavasthā*, and further adds that it is undesirable as it would lead to the absence of final release. Just as in the Naiyāyika doctrine release is the absence of the particular qualities of the soul, of which knowledge is only one, so in the Buddhist view it is the cessation of discursive thought. If one always had to prove *saṃvṛti* and the knowledge by which it is known, he would be involved in a process of thinking from now until his death. The conclusion reached in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is essentially the same as Śrī Harṣa's – that *saṃvṛti* may very well not exist but that discussion must be allowed in reliance upon that which is generally accepted if not scrutinized by elaborate investigation.<sup>24</sup> Śrī Harṣa adds only one thing to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* argument and that is this *sāmyāpādāna*

or showing of the same difficulty in the opponent's doctrine as well. It is this which enables him to defeat the *Ātmatattvaviveka* objections.

Nor is it to be said, "In my doctrine it is legitimate not to search after an endless series of knowledges, since debate may succeed through only one knowledge the very nature of which constitutes its existence. But this is not the case in your doctrine, that debate may succeed with knowledge the nature of which is its existence; for then you will have admitted that knowledge exists by its own nature." For we will show in the section on self-awareness that even for him who attempts a refutation of the above faults on the basis of the concept that essential nature is existence, falling into an infinite regress is still difficult to avoid. And just as in your doctrine although all things exist by their very nature it is only the existence of knowledge that leads to debate and not that existence which is the nature of a pot, just so in my doctrine although all things are equally non-existent it is knowledge alone which being non-existent gives rise to debate and nothing else.

Śrī Harṣa has urged that an infinite regress results in the opponent's doctrine as well. The opponent now returns with an attempt to show that it does not, and thereby differentiate his position from the *Siddhāntin*'s. This would allow the objection of infinite regress in Śrī Harṣa's doctrine to serve as an adequate refutation of *saṃvṛtisattva*. The *pūrvapakṣa*'s intention is the following. Śrī Harṣa is arguing from the standpoint of the *Mādhyaṃika* for whom the phenomenal world cannot be said to exist. The *Naiyāyika* as a realist holds just the opposite; that it is the very nature of the visible world to exist. Each entity is a self-contained unit possessed of a defining nature. That very nature is its being. Thus for the *Naiyāyika* it would be necessary to have only one knowledge of the existence of the *pramāṇas*, and this knowledge requires nothing external to itself in order that it exist. All further knowledges of which it is the object are independent of it and do not affect its status of reality. The *Naiyāyika* further argues that this is not at all the case for Śrī Harṣa, in whose doctrine existence of an entity is replaced by a knowledge of its existence. Thus any first knowledge of the *pramāṇas* is not existent in itself and the objection is valid that an infinite regress or non-existence of the first knowledge will ensue.

Śrī Harṣa replies that even to argue that the first knowledge of the *pramāṇas* exists by virtue of its very nature will not avoid the fault of infinite regress. He refers the reader to the text p. 118 (Chow) where this will be proved. The reference to Udayana is *Ātmatattvaviveka*, 308, where he states

that it is not necessary that knowledge be known; its very nature is its existence and that nature does not disappear because of our ignorance. For details of Śrī Harṣa's refutation of this, see below pp. 114 ff.

Śrī Harṣa adds that even in the presence of an infinite regress and the resulting necessity that the chain be broken and there be no knowledge of the existence of *saṃvṛti* no fault ensues. It is not required that *saṃvṛti* exist. Just as for the Naiyāyika of all existents only one is the cause of a given product, so he argues, of all non-existents what is to prevent *saṃvṛti* from being a cause of debate? This assertion remains to be substantiated in what follows, a refutation of the objections raised against the concept that a non-existent may be a cause, and one of the finest passages of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.<sup>25</sup>

“But it is contradictory that a thing should not exist and yet give rise to something else.” No, for why is not the opposite contradictory, that a thing should exist and give rise to something else? It has nowhere been proven between the two of us that only the existent is a cause and not the non-existent. “But if it is always non-existent, then the product would arise at a time other than the given moment.” No, for in your doctrine as well, just as at the first moment of existence of the product, the causal aggregate is non-existent, so at other times when it is equally non-existent why should not the product arise?

The argument opens with the standard objection to the doctrine that the non-existent (*x*) may be a cause of a product (*y*) which is observed to arise at a given moment, (*a*). Now, if (*x*) is equally non-existent at times *d–j* and beyond, and (*b*) onwards what is to determine that the product not arise at any other point in time? All moments are alike in being distinguished by the non-existence of the cause (*x*):

<i>j</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<hr/>							<i>y</i>	<hr/>	

The line represents the moments at which the product would logically arise, but at which it is not observed to do so.

Śrī Harṣa replies with a *pratibandhi*, a type of argument in which a fault is answered by showing a similar fault exists in the opponent's doctrine as well. Even in the Naiyāyika doctrine, at time (*a*) when the product (*y*) arises, the *sāmagrī* is non-existent, as it includes within it *kāryaprāgabhāva* or the absence of the product prior to its arising. This makes time (*a*) equal to all



adventitious and so cannot stand in the relationship of determined and determinant.

This section requires some explanation. We have seen that up to this point the *pūrvapakṣa* has failed to establish any difference between his view and that of the *Siddhāntin*. In both cases the determinant of the product exists for more than one moment and so might equally give rise to the product at a time other than the desired one. The opponent offers a new suggestion in an effort to limit the determining factor to a single moment in time. Although the causal aggregate does exist at points (*j*) through (*d*)

<i>j</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>a</i>
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

---

there is only one instant which can be said to follow immediately upon its existence, and that is (*a*), the point at which the product first comes into being and the *sāmagrī* ceases. If this characteristic, then, ‘immediately following upon the existence of the causal aggregate’ could be considered to be the determinant of the arising of the product, as it is confined to point (*a*) alone there would be no question that the product might arise at another moment in time. The same cannot be said in Śrī Harṣa’s doctrine. The cause is non-existent at all moments. There is no possibility that any moment be characterized by an attribute like ‘following immediately upon the non-existence of the *sāmagrī*,’ as this would imply that at the moment so characterized the *sāmagrī* exists – a violation of the original premise that it does not. The *pūrvapakṣa* has finally succeeded in differentiating the two views. This is clearly indicated by the nature of Śrī Harṣa’s reply. Elsewhere he has urged that the same fault accrues to the Naiyāyika. Here he does not.

Śrī Harṣa instead replies that the characteristic ‘*sattāvyavahitottaratva*’ cannot serve to regulate the moment at which the product arises, for both the product and this attribute exist at the same time and are adventitious. It is generally observed that the relationship of regulator and regulated obtains between two things, one of which exists prior to the other (smoke and fire). Where it does hold between two contemporaneous events (God’s knowledge and God’s will or effort) the two things must be natural and so not require anything external for their existence.<sup>28</sup> This is not the case with the birth of the product and the quality given to determine it, and thus the relationship is impossible.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, it must be admitted that the causal aggregate at another

point in time regulates the appearance of the product in the given moment, as so it is observed to do. And then whatever your reply may be it will hold for us as well.

We have followed the argument through the following clear-cut stages:

(a) Non-existence of the collocation of causes is the determinant of the arisal of the product. This leads to the undesired consequence that the product would appear at points beyond (*j*) and after (*a*):

<i>j</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

---

(b) Prior existence of the *sāmagrī* is the determinant of the arisal of the product. This leads to the undesired appearance of the product between points (*i*) and (*d*) and after (*a*):

<i>j</i>	<i>i</i>	<i>h</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>e</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

---

(c) The quality ‘following immediately upon the existence of the causal aggregate’ is the determinant of the arisal of the product. This confines the appearance of the product to point (*a*) but is impossible for the reasons discussed above.

Śrī Harṣa now concludes by saying that the *pūrvapakṣa* has no recourse but to accept stage (b). This being so, the fault that the product might with equal logic appear at another time is invalid as it exists in both views. The opponent has thus failed to show any inconsistency in the notion that something non-existent may be a cause.

“Even so, what differentiates the time at which the product arises?”

The birth of the product itself, and nothing more. Otherwise, whatever other qualifier is suggested, that must itself belong to a time qualified by a still different attribute and an infinite regress results.

The *pūrvapakṣa* has failed to force the *Siddhāntin* into admitting that a cause must exist on the grounds that otherwise a product might appear when it is in fact not observed to do so. He now attempts the same for slightly different reasons. The Naiyāyika now asks, what is it that makes time (*a*) different from other times, *b*, *d*, *e*, *f*, etc.? His desired answer is the presence of the defining attribute, ‘*sāmagrīśattāvyavahitottaratva*’, which exists only

at (a) and no other point. To admit this quality one must admit the existence of the causal aggregate and the Naiyāyika will have achieved his desired aim.

Śrī Harṣa replies that it is the birth of the product alone which distinguishes (a) from other times. If an entity already qualified by an attribute (x) requires a further attribute to distinguish it from others not so qualified, then one may ask of the Naiyāyika what distinguishes the time qualified by this new attribute (y), *sattāvyavahitottaratva*, from any other time? The Naiyāyika cannot reply *kāryajanma*, or the birth of the product because he has violated his own principle that x-qualified is distinguished from others by (x) itself in assuming the presence of (y). y-x-qualified must then require (z) and so on.

“But if I ask what is the characteristic common to all times at which products appear, then?” No this will not help, as one may still ask the same of the moment possessed of that common characteristic.

The Naiyāyika makes a last attempt to force the *Siddhāntin* into admitting the attribute, *sāmagrīsattāvyavahitottaratva*. If it is not required to differentiate time (a) from others, then perhaps it is necessary to account for the fact that we observe different moments at which products arise, recognize a certain similarity amongst them, and designate them with the same terms. This phenomenon is accountable by the presence of an attribute belonging to all moments at which products arise and absent from those at which they do not. The previous argument has shown us that ‘*kāryajanamādhikaraṇatā*’ or ‘being the locus of the birth of the product’ is just such an attribute. But this is not sufficient. It is regularly observed that general attributes require a ‘*vyāñjaka*’ or manifestor by which they may be recognized. The *vyāñjaka* must likewise be common to all individuals where the general characteristic exists. It is this that the Naiyāyika demands to know, assuming that Śrī Harṣa must answer with *sattāvyavahitottaratva*.<sup>30</sup>

He does not. Even a *vyāñjaka* is a general attribute, as it exists among many similar individuals and is absent from all dissimilar individuals. As a general attribute, then, it too would require a manifestor. If the Naiyāyika allow it to exist without any other general attribute he must admit the same in the case of *kāryajanmādhikaraṇatā*. To reply that the two are different in that one is a general quality and the other its manifestor is no reply at all, for the designations are arbitrary where both share the same nature of existing amongst the same group of things and being absent from the same entities.

This concludes this section of the text in which Śrī Harṣa defies the



objections raised against the doctrine of the non-existent as a cause. Further objections will be raised and refuted on p. 101 ff. (Chow). The intervening passages are an interlude during which Śrī Harṣa displays the full powers of his dialectical wit and further demonstrates that by the Naiyāyika's own admissions, the cause may well be non-existent.

If an entity together with its existence be the cause, then on just that account is the cause non-existent;

If an entity apart from its existence be the cause, then on just that account is the cause non-existent.

For, if causality belong to an entity only in so much as it is qualified by existence, then the presence of an attribute in a locus already qualified by that attribute would result in the attribute's partially residing in itself. And even if the qualified be regarded as different from the qualifier and the qualified, since we invariably observe that an attribute can no more exist in that which it has already qualified than in itself, that very existence could not be present there. If another existence be admitted to reside in the qualified entity, should one consider that entity a cause, including its second existence, then it results that the cause in no way exists; and putting another and another existence into it only leads to an infinite regress. Nor does sticking your neck out and admitting an endless series of different existences free you from trouble. For, if existence is many, even the first universal existence could not be established by you, disregarding as you would be then that principle of unity which renders possible a common cognition and a common designation that an entity exists. In fact, desiring increase you would have lost your principal – a very troublesome situation. Nor is it propitious to admit that it is the very nature of these things that is their existence. For, in consecrating disparate objects into the royal function of producing a common cognition, etc., you will be delivering the death ablation to all universals. Furthermore, if you reply, "Let those things which possess existence through their very nature have no commonality (of perception or designation)", then however could you regard causality, which bears within it that type of existence, as a general relationship?

This is a difficult section. Śrī Harṣa opens with a verse, the gist of which is that whether an entity as qualified by its attribute, the universal "existence" be considered a cause, or simply the entity alone, in either case there is no

justification for the statement that as a cause it must exist. This seems at first paradoxical, and requires the elaborate support which follows. The above is a demonstration of the first half of the verse – that if an entity qualified by existence is a cause, then causes do not exist.<sup>31</sup> The idea is this. An object ( $x$ ) may be said to exist by virtue of the fact that it is the locus of *sattā*, the universal existence. But an object already qualified by that existence (*sattā*<sub>1</sub>) cannot be said to exist by virtue of the same *sattā*<sub>1</sub>. The qualified entity is here considered as nothing more than the qualifier, its locus and their relationship. If existence were to reside in the object already qualified by the same existence then it would be residing in the locus, in itself and in the relationship. The assertion that something resides in itself is an impossibility, technically termed *ātmāśraya*. For the party who regards the qualified as different from the qualifier, the locus and the relationship, Śrī Harṣa makes the second statement. Even in this case it is not permissible to assume that *sattā*<sub>1</sub> which was the qualifier again resides in the qualified. The reason given is that such a situation is never observed. Behind this assertion may be the following logic. It is possible to perceive and state that a blue book is large or a green dress is made of silk, but it is not possible to assert that the blue book is blue and the green dress is green. What is to be predicated (*vidheya*) and that of which it is predicated (*uddeśya*) must always be different.<sup>32</sup> Thus it is not possible to account for the existence of our cause, *sattā*<sub>1</sub> – qualified object, by virtue of *sattā*<sub>1</sub> itself.

The next step is to assume that the qualified object exists on the strength of an existence different from the one which first qualifies it, *sattā*<sub>2</sub>. This the *pūrvapakṣa* does with the expected result. Śrī Harṣa replies that the cause will still in no way exist. How he arrives at this involves a textual problem.<sup>33</sup> The logic is definitely the following: The *pūrvapakṣa* has now arrived at a new qualified object, *sattā*<sub>2</sub> qualified (*sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified  $x$ ). Now, by the same reasoning as before, if this new qualified object including its existence, *sattā*<sub>2</sub>, be considered the cause, then this object certainly does not exist – not by *sattā*<sub>1</sub> nor by *sattā*<sub>2</sub> because of the fact that either would then be residing in itself. The next step is to assume that the cause, *sattā*<sub>2</sub> qualified (*sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified  $x$ ) exists on the basis of *sattā*<sub>3</sub>. Śrī Harṣa quickly dispenses with this possibility as it would lead to an infinite regress. *Sattā*<sub>3</sub> qualified (*sattā*<sub>2</sub> qualified [*sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified  $x$ ]) as a cause would be non-existent without *sattā*<sub>4</sub> and so on. Śrī Harṣa further adds that it is not possible to admit this endless series of existences for the Naiyāyika, as it would involve him in even graver difficulties.<sup>34</sup> The reason for this is the following. The Naiyāyika accepts the category of universals on the basis of

the observation that there are certain things amongst which we perceive common characteristics and for which we use the same designations. He maintains that this phenomenon is accountable only by the assumption of a single attribute which resides in all these individual cases amongst which the similarity is perceived. Now, if the Naiyāyika were to accept an endless series of different existences and allow that we still call them all “existence” and understand them to be the same, then he will have abandoned the principle that such common designation and cognition requires the presence of a single attribute, the universal. Thus he will fail to prove even the first *sattā*, in the absence of which nothing at all would exist, let alone causes!

Śrī Harṣa permits his opponent one more chance to prove that the entity qualified by existence as a cause exists. Why not let it exist on its own accord, without requiring the presence of another existence, *sattā*<sub>2</sub> other than that existence *sattā*<sub>1</sub> which had acted as the qualifier. Thus no infinite regress would result. The very nature of *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x* constitutes its existence. The reply to this is the same as the immediately preceding one. The nature of a stick qualified by existence is not the same as the nature of a pot qualified by existence, for the pot and the stick are totally different. And yet the Naiyāyika himself says of both that as causes they “exist”. This is but another example of his allowing different objects to give rise to common conceptions and designations and destroys his proof of universals.<sup>35</sup>

If to avoid this difficulty, the Naiyāyika denies that we have common perceptions and employ common designations in their primary senses in these cases, then an even greater difficulty results. He has made all knowledge of causality itself impossible. *Sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x* is considered to be a cause, only when taken along with its existence. That existence, moreover, is the very nature of *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x*, which is distinct from the nature of anything else – either another object *x* or an object *y*. Now, to this it is added that *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x* is also known as totally different from say *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x'*. Determination of causality now becomes impossible. Causality is to be ascertained in the same manner as invariable concomitance, by repeated observation, and requires that the observed objects exhibit similarities.<sup>36</sup> If *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x* in its capacity as a cause is totally different from *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified *x'* and moreover is known as such, the following general statement could never be made – *x saty eva y utpadyate; x abhāve y notpadyata eva*, for no individual *x* precedes all *y*. We could only observe that a given stick preceded the appearance of a single pot, and that another individual stick, another particular pot. The relationship has become limited to individual cases. When we wanted to make a third pot

there would be nothing to tell us that (a) our observed stick is the cause of the unborn pot or (b) that a similar stick might do just as well. We would therefore be unable to act, and all worldly operations depending upon causality would fail.<sup>37</sup>

Furthermore, existence, considered as the very nature of an object is nothing more than that very nature, potness, etc. Well, the essential nature of a non-existent is still its essential nature. A non-existent pot is not thereby not a pot; were that so the statement “not a pot” would be impossible, a non-existent being neither a pot nor anything else.

We have arrived at the following admission from the *pūrvapakṣa*: existence is essential to causality, and moreover, that existence is nothing beyond the particular nature which an object possesses. This is tantamount to saying that all that is required for an object to be a cause is that it be imbued with some essential characteristics. Śrī Harṣa now replies that even a non-existent object is possessed of its own particular nature, and so if individual nature be all that is necessary, the non-existent may equally be a cause.

How he makes this last statement has baffled his interpreters.<sup>38</sup> I would suggest that he says here no more than Udayana had said before him, in the *Ātmataṭṭvavivēka*, pp. 58 ff., and the *Parīśuddhi* pp. 720 (O.E.), 341 ff. (N.E.). Udayana there asserts that one can neither predicate nor deny anything of an absolute fiction. Fine, answers Śrī Harṣa, but you are caught in the machinations of your own logic, for then you could never say that a non-existent pot is not a pot. If it is not a pot, then it is nothing at all and the denial, by Udayana’s own insistence, becomes impossible.

There is a hidden twist to Śrī Harṣa’s argument, and that is that the reverse statement, a non-existent pot is a pot, is perfectly permissible. It is only when you deny of this object potness, its essential nature, that it becomes an absolute fiction and the denial or predication of an attribute becomes impossible. The Naiyāyika thus is caught by his own cleverness. Either he must accept the original statement, a non-existent object has an essential nature, or he must deny it. Even if he denies it, however, he has admitted as much for his denial requires that the object in question be other than an absolute fiction.

Or do you maintain that an existent is a cause, irrespective of its existence? Well then, let even the non-existent in the same manner be a cause; for, in both cases existence and non-existence equally remain outside the sphere of the cause.

This constitutes the refutation of the alternative given in the second half of the verse, that an object by itself may serve as a cause and not necessarily qualified by its existence. The *Siddhāntin* replies that this is a virtual admission that what is essential to causality is only the given object and its existence is irrelevant. In that case why not consider the object to be non-existent? The two views are essentially the same; in both, object *x* acts as a cause and its existence or non-existence has nothing to do with that function.

Or perhaps you will say, "It is not that existence is a modifier of the cause; rather, causality itself is existence, for I maintain that causality is nothing more than necessary previous existence." Well, then, let that be causality in my doctrine as well. "But then you will have admitted the existence of the cause and are no better than the man who wanders off at night to avoid paying a toll, only to awaken the next morning at the tollgate." Not at all, for you have not understood my intention. Even in my admitting that existence is non-existent, I have admitted existence. Otherwise, of what would I be predicating the non-existence? And you, do you consider existence as qualified by its own existence to be causality? This cannot be, for just as before you will have to relinquish an existence somewhere or end up in an infinite regress.

Śrī Harṣa has thus far shown that it is not possible for an entity modified by existence to be considered an existent cause, and if just that entity alone be the cause there is likewise no justification for insisting that it exists. The *pūrvapakṣa* attempts now to show by different means that only the existent may be a cause. He asserts that the existence of the cause does not follow from the fact that existence-qualified *x* is a cause, but from the very definition of causality. Causality itself is nothing but a certain type of existence – an existence defined by the condition that it invariably and necessarily precedes a given product. Thus, the *pūrvapakṣa* argues, if *x* is possessed of causality it must be possessed of existence, and if it is not possessed of existence it cannot be possessed of causality. Now, what is possessed of existence exists, and therefore it must be admitted that the cause exists.

Śrī Harṣa agrees to all but the last statement. He replies that in his doctrine as well causality may be defined as existence. There is no problem at all for he has admitted the existence of causes. But, he adds, it does not thereby follow that because the cause is admitted to possess existence that the cause therefore necessarily exists.

This seems at first paradoxical and requires some explanation. That Śrī Harṣa has admitted the existence of causes follows from the discussions on pp. 56 ff. (Chow). Śrī Harṣa there maintained that only a knowledge of the existence of the *pramāṇas* is required for debate, and moreover that this knowledge is liable to contradiction. On p. 59 he has said that only an object made known by a knowledge which is absolutely free from contradiction is to be admitted to exist. From the corollary of this statement we arrive at the opposite conclusion, that an object made known by a contradicted knowledge is to be admitted as non-existent. Thus the existence of the *pramāṇas*, revealed by a contradicted knowledge, is to be admitted as non-existent. Now, to say that existence is non-existent requires that existence be other than an absolute fiction; otherwise, the denial of its existence is impossible. Thus, Śrī Harṣa has admitted the existence of causes by the very fact that he denies the existence of that existence. The second half of the statement is now obvious: nothing can be said to exist on the strength of a non-existent existence.<sup>39</sup>

Śrī Harṣa concludes this argument with a *pratibandhi*, showing that the Naiyāyika also can do no better than to agree that causality is non-existent existence. He applies the reasoning of the verse. If *sattā* is causality, then what is to prove that it must exist? Neither because it is causality as qualified by its own existence nor because it is causality by itself, irrespective of its own existence. If *sattā* is causality only when qualified by its own existence, *sattā*<sub>2</sub>, then the whole qualified entity is still non-existent, and a third existence *sattā*<sub>3</sub> is required. Taking the new qualified compound as causality, the same question is repeated with the final conclusion that somewhere another existence is not admitted, in which case existence as causality does not exist, or an infinite regress results. Likewise, if that existence which is said to be causality be so irrespective of its own existence, then it might as well be non-existent.

There is one possible objection to the introduction of this *pratibandhi*, and that is that it is possible to assert that just as knowledge does not require another knowledge but is self-aware, so the universal “existence” does not require another existence, but is self-existent. Hence the question of an infinite regress does not result. Śrī Harṣa is justified in disregarding this suggestion for the following reasons. If causality were the universal, *sattā*, then as this universal is everywhere one and the same, causality would also be uniform. A stick might cause smoke and pots might cause fire. There would be nothing to restrict causal relationships to their observed limits. Thus the universal *sattā* which exists of its own accord is not to be

considered as causality, but the universal *sattā* as qualified by a particular object. The causality of a stick is not existence in general but its own particular existence (*etaddaṇḍasamavetasattā*). If this existence has *svarūpasattva* then causality itself becomes impossible, as has been shown above. Śrī Harṣa's application of the two alternatives of the verse is thus without objection.

“But should I object, if all things are equally non-existent then how do you account for the regular distribution of causes which is observed, then?” No, for the same question applies where all are equally existent.

The *pūrvapakṣa*, again defeated, offers new reasons for insisting that a cause must exist. If, he says, things are all equally non-existent, then it becomes impossible to account for the fact that certain objects give rise to certain others and no more. A stick will produce a pot but a cow will not. If the cow and the stick are both non-existent, then how can one understand this difference in their behavior?

Śrī Harṣa replies with a *pratibandhi*. If the stick and the cow are both existent, how does the Naiyāyika account for their divergent functions? His intention is that the impossibility exists for both, and what is a valid solution for the Naiyāyika will be valid for the *Siddhāntin* as well. Thus, the very objection is improper.

“But, where they all exist, there is strict adherence to the laws of negative and positive concomitance, either on the part of an individual or something belonging to the same genus. In your view, since everything is always non-existent, there is only negative concomitance and even that is not absolute, for you do not admit that when the cause is non-existent the product must always be non-existent, since in the very non-existence of that eternally non-existent cause the product must sometime be born. And there is no possibility of positive concomitance at all.”

The *pūrvapakṣa* now proceeds to establish a difference between the *Siddhāntin* doctrine and his own, whereby the limitation of causality to specific cases will only be possible if the cause is an existent and not otherwise. His previous objection would then stand. He argues that if you assume all causes exist there is something that will distinguish a cause from what is not a cause. Causes are observed to obey certain laws. *X* is a cause of *y* if and only if the following is true of it: that only in the presence of *x*, *y* arises and always in its absence it does not. Thus a stick is a cause of a pot because it

follows these two rules, and a cow is not a cause of a pot because it does not. Adherence to these rules is sufficient to account for the observed regularity in causes.

The *pūrvapakṣa* further argues that observance of such laws is impossible in the doctrine of Śrī Harṣa where the cause never exists. Positive concomitance, *x saty eva y bhavati* is obviously out of the question as it requires that *x* exist. Negative concomitance will not be invariable. The second law demands that the product never arise when the cause is non-existent. But Śrī Harṣa's cause is always non-existent and the product must arise sometime, otherwise the cause is not a cause at all!

No, for my theory is not different from yours. Even though you say there is no positive concomitance, you in fact admit that there is. For, if positive concomitance is to be qualified by existence the previously stated faults ensue.

This is perhaps the most obscure passage in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. The reasoning is thus: The opponent has admitted that positive and negative concomitance constitute the *cause* for the limited behavior of causes. Now by the logic of the verse, *antarbhāvitāsattva*, this *anvayavyatireka* as a cause cannot be said to exist. On the contrary, there is equal justification for the statement that it does not exist. Thus the opponent must agree that *anvayavyatireka* is a cause and it may not exist. Now, going back to the first premise that causality requires *anvayavyatireka* to account for its limited nature, we arrive at the following three admissions:

- (1) *Anvayavyatireka* is a cause.
- (2) *Anvayavyatireka* may very well be non-existent.
- (3) All causes must exhibit *anvayavyatireka*.

with the conclusion that even this non-existent *anvayavyatireka* still obeys the laws of negative and positive concomitance. Although the text reads only “*anvaya*” the reasoning holds for *vyatireka* as well and should be applied to it as the opponent has voiced objections to both.<sup>40</sup>

This argument is difficult for the *pūrvapakṣa* to defeat. Until he refutes the logic of the verse, *anvaya* which he has accepted as a cause may well be non-existent, and he will have admitted that even the non-existent follows the general rules for causality. If his only reason for asserting that the verse is inconsistent is that a non-existent cannot be a cause because it does not obey these laws, there results *anyonyāśraya* or reciprocal dependence. Only when it is proved that a non-existent cause cannot exhibit negative and



positive concomitance is the verse refuted, and only when the verse is refuted is it possible to assert that positive and negative concomitance as a cause itself must exist and so there is no possibility that non-existent causes have positive and negative concomitance.<sup>41</sup>

By the same logic, the statement, “Then for those who have eaten sweetmeats and for those who have satisfied themselves with imaginary sweetmeats the taste, sustenance, and end products of digestion would be the same”, has about as much power to refute us as an imaginary sweetmeat itself; for, we may reply with the same alternatives, is existence included or not, and because in fact taste, energy and digestive processes are produced by sweetmeats even when they are only imagined.

Śrī Harṣa applies the former reasoning to another example. He allows the opponent to urge that if causes are all non-existent, then there would be no difference whether one ate a candy or whether he dreamt of it. The dreamt-of candy is obviously non-existent and has no effect. By Śrī Harṣa’s own admissions the eaten candy is likewise non-existent. It should then have the same lack of effect.<sup>42</sup>

The answer to this is as follows. This statement is introduced by the opponent as a *bādhaka* or cause of defeat, and to it as a cause applies the reasoning of the verse. If it is a cause as qualified by its own existence then either as a cause it is non-existent or an infinite regress results. If it acts as a cause alone it might as well be non-existent. The logic of the verse thus forces the opponent to admit that this statement both is a cause of refutation and might well be non-existent. With this admission it becomes contradictory to urge that no cause can be non-existent. The statement fails in this very case. The *pūrvapakṣa* assumptions are three:

- (1) This statement is a cause.
- (2) This statement as a cause may be non-existent.
- (3) This statement proves that no cause can be non-existent.

The contradiction between (2) and (3) is obvious. What is required is that the argument of the verse be first destroyed so that assertion (2) be eliminated. It cannot be done by this very statement without involving the debator in the above *anyonyāśraya*. Once the verse is refuted, this statement as a cause exists, and once it is proved that this statement as a cause exists it is no longer contradictory to maintain that no cause may be non-existent and the verse stands refuted.<sup>43</sup>

Śrī Harṣa adds that this is not the only trouble with the opponent's assertion. It is also false, for we do experience taste, energy and secretions of saliva from imaginary foods in dream states. This leads to the next question, for the taste, etc. experienced in a dream is equally imaginary.

"But if these things are not-existent, how can they be products?" No, for if you assert that something is to be considered a product only in combination with its existence, then just as in the case of a cause, the previously stated faults result, and if without its existence, then it will make no difference. Therefore,

Causality for both of us is necessary prior connection. So away with all this talk of existence and non-existence, both outside the question!

"Enough of this obsessive finding of fault in whatever I say. How do you ascertain the causality of a non-existent, for the differentiating factor necessary, previous existence, is not admitted, and non-existence is everywhere the same? This is no objection, for the cause is distinguished by the knowledge, "this invariably exists prior to that."

The opponent now calls for an end to Śrī Harṣa's use of *pratibandhi* and his skilful avoidance of questions.<sup>44</sup> He now directly demands to know how one can determine a cause in the doctrine where all causes are non-existent. He argues that the attribute which distinguishes a cause from what is not a cause, necessary previous existence, is obviously not possible where the cause does not exist, and that all things equally do not exist before all products, making impossible any attribute like "necessary non-existence prior to a given product". The question is substantially the same as that raised on p. 94 (Chow), only now the opponent insists upon an answer instead of a clever display of logistics. That answer is here given. A cause is distinguished from other entities which are not causes by the fact that it alone is the object of a cognition, "this invariably exists prior to that."

"But, it being the object of such a wrong cognition, would this not lead to undesired consequences?" No, for we too determine causality of an object made known by the very same kind of knowledge as you use to determine the existence of that object – a knowledge which rests satisfied with three or four trials during which it is not contradicted. The only difference is that we do not thereby accept the existence of that object since the knowledge may be contradicted on further examination, showing all previous trials to be incorrect. We see that

one man's doctrines although standing many trials are admitted to be false on the strength of the fact that they are later contradicted. Were that not the case, all would adhere to one school.

The opponent now urges an excellent objection to Śrī Harṣa's assertion that what distinguishes a cause is the fact that it is the object of a cognition, "this invariably exists prior to that." It is to be recalled that this cognition must be false for the *Siddhāntin*; *x* is perceived to exist when in fact it does not (cf. pp. 56 ff., Chow). Now, wrong knowledge can arise anywhere; what is to prevent its occurrence for (a), (b), (c), which are not causes? If this cognition is all that distinguishes cause (*x*) from non-causes (a), (b), (c), a terrible difficulty results. The cognition is equally possible with respect to (a), (b), (c), and anything at all might be known as a cause of a desired product. People would thus be unable to act with certainty towards fulfilling their desired aim.

Śrī Harṣa's answer to this objection is equally fine. For the *pūrvapakṣa* what distinguishes the cause (*x*) from (a), (b), (c) is its necessary existence prior to its product. But this existence must be known before we can know that *x* is a cause, and the *pūrvapakṣa* can do no better than to admit that the knowledge by which he determines that *x* does in fact always exist prior to product *y* is uncontradicted only for a given time and place and persons. It is impossible to say or know that that knowledge will never be contradicted by anyone at any time. Now, it is just such a knowledge which Śrī Harṣa employs to determine causality; a knowledge, "*x* invariably exists prior to *y*", which is uncontradicted for a given time, place, and persons. There is thus no essential difference at all in the two methods. The only difference is that the *pūrvapakṣa*, on the basis of this knowledge asserts that the object does actually exist prior to the product, whereas Śrī Harṣa does not. The determination of causality is by the same cognition, and for the same object. It is unreasonable to assert that in one doctrine it leads to undesired results, and in the other it does not.<sup>45</sup>

Śrī Harṣa further adds that his refusal to admit that the object of a cognition exists on the grounds that the cognition may be contradicted at a later time is not at all extraordinary. One denies his opponent's doctrines although he sees their faults only after elaborate investigation. Were this not the case, then everyone would accept everyone else's tenets, and all would belong to the same school, for no doctrine is readily refuted. Witness Śrī Harṣa's own elaborate efforts!

And by this is refuted the objection that if all doctrines are equally

incorrect, why is it that some can stand three or four trials and others cannot?

This in effect destroys the objection of Kumārila raised against the Buddhist in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Nirālambanavāda*, *sloka*s 86–87. Kumārila objects that if all cognitions of the existence of objects are false, why is it that the Buddhist insists on one set of principles and does not follow the tenets of the Sāṃkhya school? Both doctrines are equally conceived on the basis of false cognitions. Śrī Harṣa's reply is that the objection is invalid, as the same must be admitted by Kumārila as well. The knowledge of water in a mirage is immediately contradicted, whereas the doctrine of the opponent requires elaborate investigation. Thus there is a difference in the two cases, although both are equally false.<sup>46</sup>


“But, should I ask, then what is the difference when it is not the object of such a knowledge?” Its being the object of such a knowledge at another time. Otherwise, tell me, how does being the object of such a knowledge at one time prove existence at another time?

“Existence at that time is grasped by a knowledge at another time”. Well, then, we are agreed in admitting that a knowledge at time<sub>1</sub> is necessary for causality at time<sub>2</sub>. This is what is meant by *saṃvṛtisattva*.

The *pūrvapakṣa* poses another valid objection. If, as the *Siddhāntin* holds, the only difference between what is a cause and what is not is that the cause is the object of the knowledge, “this invariably exists prior to that”, then in the absence of that knowledge a cause would not be different from anything else. This will create insurmountable difficulties in the case of a cause which operates in the absence of any human agent. The seed in the mountain hidden from view still produces the sprout. If, because it is not known, it is not a cause at all, then, how could one account for the fact that a sprout is seen to have arisen? Thus, the opponent contends, the knowledge “this exists prior to its product” is insufficient to account for the difference between causes and non-causes, and one must accept that what differentiates one from the other is actual prior existence.

Śrī Harṣa answers that although one does not know that the seed exists at the very moment during which it acts as a cause, one does know this later, probably from an inference of the cause made through knowledge of its product. This later knowledge will be a sufficient differentiator of causes and non-causes. Moreover, he urges, the Naiyāyika, even in admitting necessary

prior existence as the differentiating factor between what are causes and what are not, will be liable to the same difficulty. To be able to say that a cause exists prior to its product requires the knowledge that it does so. Now let us suppose the following situation. A farmer desires a yield of grain. At a given time<sub>1</sub> he knows that the seed exists and he sows it in the ground. He then occupies himself with other matters and forgets all about his seeds. The product will arise long after the time of sowing, say at time<sub>2</sub> on the graph below. What is to prove that the seed did in fact exist during the long interval between time<sub>1</sub> and time<sub>2</sub>?



The line represents that period over which there is no proof of the existence of the seeds. The knowledge of the seed at time<sub>1</sub> is proof of its existence at only that moment.

The Naiyāyika quickly answers, you have understood nothing of the nature of causality. Causality is a general relationship which obtains between all individuals of one class and all individuals of another class. This relationship is grasped over repeated observation in a knowledge the content of which is something like this, “seeds always immediately precede sprouts”. This knowledge although arising at time<sub>x</sub> makes known the existence of any seed right up to the time<sub>2</sub> at which its product arises, and not necessarily at the time of the knowledge itself. This is the very nature of invariable concomitance, that it allows us to infer even future events (rain) from presently observed events (clouds). Thus the existence of the seed from time<sub>1</sub> to time<sub>2</sub> is documented by the general cognition which grasps the causal relationship, and no difficulty arises.

Śrī Harṣa, of course, has understood the nature of causality and the general knowledge by which causality is known. His previous question has only been to force the opponent into a direct admission that a knowledge at any time<sub>x</sub> is all that is required to account for the causality of an object at another time<sub>2</sub>. Their positions are now the same. For Śrī Harṣa as well, although there is no definite cognition at the moment of causal activity, “this seed exists prior to its product”, as the very seed is hidden from view, there will be a later cognition that it immediately preceded its product from an inference with the product as inferential mark.<sup>47</sup>

The passage concludes with the remark that just this knowledge of existence is what is termed *saṃvṛtisattva*. Udayana in the

*Ātmatattvaviveka* thus far stands refuted, with the demonstration that none of the reasons thus far given for the necessity of the existence of a cause is valid, and so there is nothing to prevent that *saṃvṛti* not exist. Thus ends the brief interlude begun on p. 79 (Chow).<sup>48</sup>

And he who asks if *saṃvṛti* exists or not with the intention that, “if it does not exist it cannot serve as a differentiating attribute, and yet it is contrary to your principles to say that it does exist”, is to be answered thus. First of all it is agreed by both parties that knowledge gives rise to activity. It must also be admitted that upon a desire to know its existence as well, if its existence will be possible upon an examination which stops at three or four trials, then, this activity will have been produced by an existent knowledge; if its existence be not so proved, then it was caused by a non-existent knowledge, just as the act of qualifying wrong knowledge by the non-existent object of that knowledge. But one must begin all investigation without first examining the existence or non-existence of knowledge. Otherwise, at the onset, stuck in a mire of opinions, the very undertaking of debate will be impossible. And even you have admitted that a non-existent object is the cause of particularized designation in the case of a knowledge which has a future object and that a non-existent product is the differentiator of causal ability.

This continues the refutation of objections to the doctrine that a non-existent can be a cause, all raised with the intention of eventually forcing the *Siddhāntin* into admitting that at least the acceptance of the existence of knowledge is a necessary prerequisite to debate. This passage may be seen as a refutation of Udayana, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 228. It has been previously stated that the difference between a cause and what is not a cause is the knowledge that the cause always exists prior to the product, and that this knowledge is what is meant by *saṃvṛtisattva*. Udayana in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 228, has objected that if something is non-existent it can never serve as a differentiator of anything else. By a skyflower a book is not made different from a horse. Thus, if *saṃvṛti* is to be considered the differentiating factor between a cause and a non-cause, it must exist. Śrī Harṣa here takes this objection, actually intended in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* to prove the existence of objects of knowledge, and applies it to *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 284, arguments to prove that *saṃvṛti* must exist. It is but one example of a favored practice of Śrī Harṣa: rearranging statements dispersed throughout his opponent’s texts and then defeating them. It is

perfectly valid in that he never misinterprets the original statement, and makes sure that his argument is complete. Although not directly meant by Udayana as a proof of *saṃvṛti*, the argument that a non-existent cannot serve as a differentiating attribute can well be applied here and demands refutation if Śrī Harṣa's position is to be established.

The refutation is accomplished in the following manner. Śrī Harṣa replies that both parties agree that in order to have any activity, verbal, mental, or physical, knowledge is necessary. Now, if on repeated examination it is possible that this knowledge exists, then one can say that that activity was caused by an existent cause. If not, then it must be said that it was caused by a non-existent cause. But, Śrī Harṣa adds, and this is the crux of his argument, at the time one undertakes the activity in question (here, debate) he must not worry whether this knowledge exists. Otherwise he will involve himself in a long investigation and never quite make it to his intended topic.<sup>49</sup> He further states that even the Naiyāyika admits that a non-existent acts as a qualifier. One perceives silver in a conch shell and designates his perception, "knowledge of silver in a conch shell". The non-existent silver in the conch shell here serves to distinguish this knowledge from other knowledges. Likewise one speaks of a "knowledge of future rain" where rain is non-existent, and of a cause of an unborn object. All three are cases of a non-existent serving as a qualifier.

In essence Śrī Harṣa's argument amounts to this. One cannot urge that the admission of the existence of knowledge is required prior to debate on the grounds that:

- (1) Debate must be preceded by a knowledge of its causes.
- (2) The only thing that distinguishes a cause from what is not a cause is the presence of the knowledge, "*x* invariably exists prior to *y*".
- (3) Only an existent can serve as a distinguishing attribute.

The reasons are two. If proof of the existence of knowledge were required prior to debate, then one could never begin any debate at all. Debate *A* would be required to prove that knowledge must be admitted to exist prior to debate so that debate *B* might begin. Likewise debate *A* could not start without the same proof. If this is accomplished by debate *B*, then *anyonyāśraya* or reciprocal dependence would result – *B–A–B*. Introducing debates, *C*, *D*, leads to *cakraka* and *anavasthā* (cf. p. 78). The second is that the Naiyāyika himself violates premise (3) above, in the examples explained earlier.

Nor is to be said, “But in the one case there is existence at another time, and in the other there is no existence at any time at all, and thus the two cases are essentially different”, for in both cases at the time the particularized designation is made, all are equally non-existent. Their simply existing at a time when they are not needed resembles the behavior of the watch guards who awaken in the house only after it has already been burglarized!

The *pūrvapakṣa* takes exception to our last statement, that he too violates premise (3) and admits that the non-existent serves as a differentiating attribute. He says that in all the examples which the *Siddhāntin* has cited the objects do exist at sometime. The *Siddhāntin*’s knowledge which is meant to distinguish a cause never exists, and thus the two cases are different. Śrī Harṣa’s reply is self-explanatory – the fact that they exist at another time is irrelevant. They still do not exist when they act as qualifiers, and so premise (3) is violated in the admission that the non-existent acts as a distinguishing attribute.

“But still, since they do exist at another time, pots, etc. are distinct from other objects both in their inherent natures and in the qualities they possess; and, being distinct they are taken up by knowledge, in accordance with its very nature, as its own qualifiers. But this is not possible of an object which is absolutely non-existent, because such an object is not admitted to be limited by any inherent nature or by any qualities. To what would knowledge be described as related by its very nature?”

No, we have already said how the non-existent has that same inherent nature; that it has a given limited nature, since it is only that very object possessed of certain differentiating attributes which does not exist. If this is not admitted undesired conclusions result. And the answer has been given with the object of wrong knowledge. Enough of verbosity.

The *pūrvapakṣa* now rephrases the objection first stated on 110 (Chow). Existence of a qualifier is not necessary for the reason that if at the moment the locus is to be stated as so qualified the attribute does not exist such a designation would fail; it is required for a far more fundamental reason. Pots, etc. since they exist at some time can be said to be possessed of a specific nature which is common to all members of the group and yet sets them apart from other communities of objects. It is obvious that if object *x*



is to differentiate a knowledge  $y$  of  $x$ , from a knowledge  $y_2$  of  $z$ , then  $x$  must be different from  $z$ . Given this difference, knowledge by its very nature will accept object  $x$  as its own differentiating quality.<sup>50</sup> If  $x$  were always non-existent and so non-differentiated from all other objects either by reason of its inherent nature or external attributes, then how could one describe a knowledge as of  $x$  and not  $z$ ?

Śrī Harṣa rightly replies that the very question is out of place here as it implies what has been previously refuted; that the non-existent is nothing at all (Chow, p. 89 ff.). He repeats this conclusion, that the non-existent is of definite nature and reminds of the impossibility in denying this. Finally, he reminds the Naiyāyika that at least one of the three examples he had urged earlier (p. 108) is of an absolutely non-existent serving as a qualifier. Silver in a conch shell nowhere exists, and yet we refer to its cognition not only as a knowledge of silver but more specifically as a knowledge of silver in a conch shell.<sup>51</sup>

With this is concluded the first part of the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. It is perhaps the most systematic presentation of the Mādhyamika system available to us and successfully answers the objections of the *sadvādins*. Śrī Harṣa is now qualified to enter debate. Before he does so, however, as an aside he sets forth the Vedāntin view giving the proof for the existence of knowledge. It is to be kept in mind that this in no way affects the arguments to this point. The existence of nothing at all is necessary to debate – not even of knowledge.

Others, finding it uncomfortable to accept the unreality of knowledge and unwilling rashly to assert that everything in the world is non-existent, think thus: Knowledge is self-aware. It stands proved of its own accord. Indeed, when knowledge arises, for no one who seeks to know it is there the doubt, “Do I know or not?”, or the wrong cognition, “I do not know”, or the valid cognition, “I do not know.” The sum of these absences, of incorrect knowledge and valid knowledge of non-existence, leads to that without which it exists not; that knowledge has been known by valid means. Otherwise, one would expect for the person who desires to know and meets no impediment, a knowledge of the absence of that which he seeks to know; such a knowledge invariably accompanying the absence of proof of his desired object. And so the very nature of this knowledge is established for all people through a process of self-awareness.

With this begins what may be considered the classic Vedānta proof for

the existence of knowledge, or the soul.<sup>52</sup> It is an inference, involving a relationship of invariable concomitance of the following description, “*yatra jijñāsitasyātattvajñānavyatirekapramābhāvaḥ, tatra tatra pramitatvam; yatra yatra pramitatvābhāvaḥ, tatra tatrātattvajñānavyatirekapramābhāvaḥ*”. The idea is thus. When one seeks to know a given object and nothing, such as a sudden occurrence which might distract his attention, arises to prevent knowledge from appearing,<sup>53</sup> there occurs either one of the three – doubt, false cognition of the absence of that object, valid cognition of the absence of that object, or in their combined absence, valid cognition of the existence of that object. Applying this to the specific case of knowledge, Śrī Harṣa states no more than what is universally accepted. When knowledge arises, no one doubts, “Have I knowledge or not?” Nor does anyone ever assume that he does not know, validly or falsely. This leaves the second alternative. He knows correctly that he has knowledge. Śrī Harṣa adds that this valid perception can only come about if knowledge is self-aware and requires no other knowledge for the demonstration of its own existence. This is an *arthāpatti*, *jñānasya pramitatvānyathānupapattyā tasya svaprakāśatvaṃ siddhyate*. It is this second *pramāṇa* that the Naiyāyika will go on to contest.

A comment might be made about Śrī Harṣa’s methods here. At first reading it would appear that Śrī Harṣa is introducing the inference as an independent proof for the fact that knowledge is validly known, and the *arthāpatti* as an independent proof for the fact that it is self-aware. In reality he does nothing of the kind. He merely paraphrases what the Naiyāyika himself accepts to show him that by his own admissions it follows that knowledge is self-aware (cf. p. 181–183 Chow). This is an important point, and should be kept in mind throughout the reading of this section. Failure to understand this method has led the commentators to criticize Śrī Harṣa unjustifiably for the introduction of these proofs. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 86, and *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 114 (Chow), suggest that just as Śrī Harṣa asks of his opponent the proof of the existence of knowledge of a given object, and its knowledge, etc., so may one here ask of Śrī Harṣa, “If it is known from *arthāpatti* that knowledge is self-aware, well, what is the proof of the existence of that knowledge?” Śrī Harṣa must reply with a knowledge other than that resultant cognition of the *arthāpatti*, for to assert at this point that knowledge is self-aware would involve *anyonyāśraya*. As soon as the existence of the cognition resulting from *arthāpatti* is proved, it can be said that knowledge is self-aware; but only when it is established that knowledge is self-aware can the existence of that cognition be proved. Śrī Harṣa himself

is thus involved in an infinite regress and could never prove by inference that knowledge is known and by *arthāpatti* that it is self-aware. *Vidyāsāgarī* further states that to assume that knowledge is self-aware is incompatible with the fact that it must also be the object of these proofs. It is contradictory to assert that one thing is never the object of another knowledge and then to maintain that it is so.

Neither of these objections is valid. The first would never occur, for Śrī Harṣa does no more than merely to restate the Naiyāyika's contentions. Now, the Naiyāyika does not believe that knowledge must always be known (cf. *Ātmataṭtvaviveka*, p. 308, *Parīśuddhi*, p. 201, O.E.; 118 N.E.). He vehemently denies that knowledge must be experienced and so an infinite series results. The very question, thus, of how that knowledge is known and its knowledge is known could never be posed by a Naiyāyika.

The second is similarly to be discarded. The contradiction rests only with him who requires these proofs. Śrī Harṣa himself never questions *svataḥ prakāśatva*. To him it is an obvious truth requiring no further demonstration. It is only the Naiyāyika who falls into a contradictory situation. By the inference and *arthāpatti* here given, both faultless according to Naiyāyika principles, he must admit that knowledge is self-aware and not the object of any other knowledge. At the same time he must admit that it is made known by these very proofs. It is the Naiyāyika, then, who admits that knowledge is both the object of another knowledge and not the object of another knowledge. Śrī Harṣa is free from fault.

Bearing this in mind, let us continue with the Naiyāyika objections to the *arthāpatti*. Knowledge is known, but why must the only means of its knowledge be self-awareness?

“But knowledge is invariably followed by a second knowledge of which it is the object, and so there is no doubt, etc.” No, this is no solution, for where you do not admit being known by another knowledge, in the case of the second knowledge, a desire to know of it arising, it would be difficult to avoid the appearance of doubt, beginning with a doubt of that second knowledge's existing in the soul and extending all the way to the object of the first cognition. For, when one doubts the very existence of knowledge one must also doubt its object. This will still be the case even if one admits that knowledge always permits of three or four successive acts of awareness.

The Naiyāyika, accepting the conclusion of the inference, urges that the *arthāpatti* is invalid as there exists in fact an *anyathopapatti* or another

means by which knowledge may be known. The knowledge, “this is a pot”, arises, having the pot as its object. Immediately thereafter a second knowledge, “I know this is a pot”, arises, having as its object the first knowledge of the pot. This serves as proof for the existence of the first knowledge and accounts for the fact that we neither doubt whether or not we know nor mistakenly assume we do not know. It is thus not required that knowledge be its own proof.

Śrī Harṣa begins an attack on the Naiyāyika which will eventually destroy the *Ātmataṭṭvaviveka* and *Pariśuddhi* statements cited above. The Naiyāyika has admitted that the first knowledge of an object is invariably known by a second cognition. Fine, he says, but what happens when one asks for proof of the existence of this second knowledge? In the absence of a third knowledge of which the second knowledge is the object, one would doubt the very existence of that knowledge, “Do I have knowledge of the pot, or do I not?”<sup>54</sup> This would lead in turn to a doubt of the existence of the first knowledge, for its proof is now suspected to be absent, and finally to a doubt of the existence of the object of the first cognition, for the same reason. Śrī Harṣa adds that even if the Naiyāyika in an effort to remove this doubt should assert that the second knowledge is known by a third and the third by a fourth but no more, for then an infinite regress would result, then the same fault ensues. In the absence of a fifth knowledge serving as proof for the existence of the fourth, that fourth knowledge would be subject to doubt. Likewise, with the suspicion of the non-existence of its proof, the third knowledge would be in doubt and so on down to the object of the first cognition. Unspoken is the conclusion that for anything at all to be established in the Naiyāyika doctrine, an infinite series of knowledges cannot be avoided.

But where knowledge is self-aware, because the relationship of object to object-bearer does not exist, the faults inherent in such a relationship are without opportunity. In the opposite case, knowledge itself could never be known. For if knowledge is to be known by another knowledge, an infinite regress results.

The natural conclusion of the above arguments is here made explicit. If to break the chain of knowledges at three or four members leads to doubt of the existence of all that precedes, then the chain must be continued indefinitely. This is still no solution, for then it would be impossible to establish definitely the existence of knowledge at any given moment in a person’s lifetime. Without proof of the existence of knowledge, one could

never prove the existence of its object, and all worldly activity would cease. Thus Śrī Harṣa justifies his assertion that to accept the conclusion of the inference, that knowledge is known, one must also accept the conclusion of the *arthāpatti*, that it is self-aware. Śrī Harṣa adds that such an acceptance is not only necessary, but it also avoids another series of faults. Where one knowledge is the object of another knowledge, the two must somehow be related. This relationship is not easily defined, and on examination proves to be fraught with serious inconsistencies.<sup>55</sup> To assume that knowledge is self-aware eliminates these inconsistencies. The assumption is thus not only necessary in view of the aforementioned difficulties but it is also preferable in view of the difficulties that will be described later.

Nor should you say, "But we do not admit that knowledge must be known, for activity with respect to its object is engendered by its very nature which constitutes its existence." For, if you can adduce no proof of existence as its very nature, why must it have that existence as its nature, through which existence activity is to come about? Who would say that such a knowledge is existent? Why would it not in fact be non-existent?

The Naiyāyika, for the moment, delirious in his efforts to avoid an infinite regress, glosses over the substance of Śrī Harṣa's reply. He now urges that an indefinite series of cognitions is not to be admitted, nor does it necessarily result. It is not always the case that one seeks to know whether or not knowledge exists. Such a knowledge of knowledge is inessential. The purpose of knowledge is successful activity. It is in itself a means and not an end. The Naiyāyika asserts that this end is served the moment knowledge *A* of a given object arises from its own collocation of causes. It is not required that knowledge *A* be known by knowledge *B* and knowledge *B* by another knowledge *C*, etc. As soon as knowledge *A* appears, we move towards its object and fulfil our desires. The very nature of knowledge *A* is its existence, and by that very nature the purpose of knowledge is established. It is thus immaterial whether we know that knowledge or not. There is nothing that demands the existence of further cognitions, and so no infinite regress results.

Śrī Harṣa replies briefly and essentially that all of this argument is of no avail. The Naiyāyika has not understood the intentions of the previous replies. It is not that knowledges *B*, *C*, and so on are of themselves necessary to activity. Granted knowledge *A* alone is sufficient, but without knowledges *B*, *C*, etc. it is impossible to assert that such a knowledge *A* itself

exists. Even this doubt of the existence of knowledge *A* would make activity impossible. Furthermore, in the total absence of proof for the existence of knowledge *A* that knowledge would in fact be non-existent (see below). No one acts in the absence of knowledge.

This constitutes an effective refutation of the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 308. The Buddhist asks of Udayana, "But if you did not know that knowledge, how could you say that it has arisen?" Udayana answers, "Do not say that it has arisen. But because you do not say so does not mean that what has in fact arisen thereby ceases, and so activity based on that knowledge is difficult to deny." Udayana is guilty here of a fallacy in reasoning, technically known as "*vākchala*" and defined in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.12. What the Buddhist means when he asks, "How could you say it exists", is not what would serve as the cause of the actual utterance, "It exists", utterance requiring prior knowledge, but, "Would it not then be non-existent?" Śrī Harṣa makes this clear. The phrase "*asaty eva na kutah*" implies that what is in question is not the statement, "Knowledge exists", but the very existence of that knowledge. Thus the Naiyāyika is still guilty of infinite regress. Without knowledge *B*, *C*, etc. the existence of any knowledge *A* which is to lead to successful activity remains highly suspect.<sup>56</sup>

"It may be that no means of valid cognition is employed for a knowledge in its particular form because we have attained our desired aim when that knowledge is known to exist in a general sense. But then even in the absence of a proof of its particular existence, upon the desire to know of it, the existence of activity or something else does indeed later serve as its proof." No, for should we ask how its existence is proved, then either an infinite regress results, or in the absence of knowledge of the last member, the absence of knowledge of all that went before. And so it is difficult to avoid this series of ills, which extends right to the failure to establish the object of knowledge. This is what is meant by the statement, "For whom knowledge is not self-aware no cognition of an object can succeed." For, by one who speaks in accordance with valid cognitions, when he says that a pot exists, a means by which this existence is validly known must be cited. If without furnishing any means of valid knowledge, he merely admits that existence, then why could not the opposite be just as true? Thus, the existence of a means of valid cognition must be shown for the existence of the pot. Furthermore, the existence of that means of valid knowledge likewise cannot be admitted without the existence of a

means of its valid knowledge by one who acts in accordance with valid means of knowledge, for the absence of the existence of all means of valid knowledge is in fact concomitant with the absence of the existence of their objects. Otherwise, the existence of a seventh taste, etc., would have to be admitted. Thus, clearly, the difficulty of an infinite series cannot be avoided for one who does not admit knowledge to be self-aware. Indeed, if the opponent could convince us of the existence of a means of valid knowledge without any proof, then let him convince us as well of the existence of a pot in the very same manner – all of this effort to state proofs for the existence of a pot would then be most unnecessary!

This is one of the more difficult and misunderstood passages of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.<sup>57</sup> Śrī Harṣa has just urged against Udayana that without any knowledge of the existence of knowledge *A* by which activity is to be engendered, it is meaningless to assert that such a knowledge actually does exist. Inherent in this statement is what is made explicit only later, on p. 131 (Chow), that moreover, the absence of the proof of the existence of a given object is sufficient evidence for its non-existence.<sup>58</sup> This is in effect a refutation of the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 328, p. 448, where Udayana contends that *prameya* is not *pramāṇavyāpta* and hence that the absence of proof does not imply the non-existence of an object. The text gives only a hint of the logic behind Śrī Harṣa's refutation: if the absence of proof were not sufficient evidence for the non-existence of an object, the Naiyāyika would be forced to admit the existence of a seventh taste, etc. From this, I have assumed the following process of reasoning: The Naiyāyika is involved in determining what exists and what does not exist, and in further categorizing the former into certain limited divisions. Should one ask why he accepts only those categories described in the texts of his school, and not others, i.e. only six types of taste and not seven, or nine types of substances instead of ten, he cannot by his own admission reply "*pramāṇābhāvāt*", as such a fact is impossible to determine (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 328). If he should reply, "*vyāpakānupalabdheḥ*" or because of the absence of knowledge of that which pervades the object in question (the reply he does in fact give in the *Kusumāñjali* p. 328), he is still no better off. It is possible to ask whence comes this *vyāpakānupalabdhi*. Does it result from (a) the absence of its cause (*upalabdhi-kāraṇābhāvāt*)? or (b) the absence of its object (*viśaya-bhāvāt*)? The second case is impossible as it involves *ātmāśraya*. Udayana would then be saying, "*saptamarasādir nāsti, saptamara-*

*sāderevābhāvāt*". The *hetu* and the *sādhya* are identical. Thus, he must agree to the first, *upalabdhikaraṇābhāvāt*. He has now contradicted himself. At the onset he asserted that the absence of a cause of knowledge is not the determinant of the absence of an object. In its place he has substituted another means which when examined turns out to be nothing but the same – absence of the cause for the knowledge of that object's existence. One can also easily refute Udayana's *vyāpakānupalabdhi* by asking of it the same questions Udayana asks of *pramāṇābhāva*. Does this mean absence of knowledge for a few people at a given time and place, or for all people at all times? By his own admission (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 328) the second is not possible to determine, and the first is not infallible. The result of this second refutation is that if Udayana does not admit that the absence of proof is evidence of the non-existence of an object, then for the same reasons he will never be able to prove the absence of anything at all; *vyāpakānupalabdhi* is considered the *sādhana* of *abhāva*.

All of this is behind Śrī Harṣa's deceptively simple statement, "*asaty eva na kutaḥ?*", in the preceding passage. Although it is not made explicit until the end of the present passage, it is essential to an understanding of the opponent's reply at the opening of our section. This reply is in essence the statements of Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 201 O.E.; 118, N.E., a commentary on the *Ṭīkā*, p. 27K, p. 40 N.E. In the *Ṭīkā* the statement is made that not all knowledges need to be known, for in that case one would spend his entire life in trying to perceive a single object. An objector is allowed to intervene in the *Parīśuddhi*. He finds the assertion that some knowledges are not known, a meaningless one. If they are not known, then how could one speak of them at all? If they are known well enough to be the subject of speech, then what does it mean to say they are unknown? Udayana replies that the *pūrvapakṣa* objection is invalid. One certainly does have some general notion of these knowledges, since they form the subject of the present inquiry. We infer from the very existence of that inquiry into whether these knowledges are known or not, that in some general way they are known to exist. They are not known only in their particular nature as "a knowledge of a pot" or "a knowledge of a cloth". This is a summary of the *Parīśuddhi* statements. Śrī Harṣa simply fills them into the given context of our text. When cognition *A* arises, although we are not immediately aware that we know of its existence, the very fact that we later desire to know whether or not we have such a knowledge proves that that knowledge was in fact perceived in a general sense. *Jijñāsā*, like *vicāra* in the *Parīśuddhi*, acts as an inferential mark of this general knowledge, for desire to know a given



object demands that it has been previously experienced. Thus, and this is the crux of the Naiyāyika's argument, it is wrong to assert that in the absence of proof for the existence of knowledge *A* that knowledge would in fact be non-existent. Knowledge *A* is generally known to exist by inference with *jijñāsā* as the mark. It is therefore fully possible that activity proceed from this knowledge. Should there later arise a desire to know knowledge *A* in its particular form, the existence of a specific activity or of memory will serve as the means to know it. One can make an inference of the type, "I had knowledge of a pot, because I now remember it" (*ahaṃ ghaṭajñānavān āsam, ghaṭasmarāṇavattvāt*). The essence of this *pūrvapakṣa* argument is thus that Śrī Harṣa cannot urge that activity cannot proceed from knowledge *A* which is unknown and therefore non-existent. This is *niranuyoḍyānuḍyoga*. Knowledge *A* is generally known to exist, and the *Siddhāntin* objection is invalid.

Śrī Harṣa's refutation of Udayana is equally complex. It is assumed that a given statement or activity is preceded by a knowledge *A*. Of that knowledge *A* it is known only that it exists, and not that it is a knowledge of a pot or anything else. This existence, according to the opponent, cannot be denied and is sufficient to account for worldly behavior. Śrī Harṣa replies that all of this may sound very plausible, but in effect it is useless. Let us apply it to a concrete situation, a debate in which the Naiyāyika argues with the Vedāntin that the phenomenal world exists. Knowledge *A*, generally known, may very well enable him to state, "The pot exists", but this statement alone is not adequate to the situation at hand. The opponent may then ask, what is the proof of the existence of the pot? The Naiyāyika must answer with some proof, perhaps perception (knowledge *A*). This requires a *specific* knowledge of knowledge *A*, albeit itself only generally known. The opponent may again ask, what is the proof that this proof actually exists? The Naiyāyika must cite another proof, and the question repeats itself ad infinitum. It is not possible for the Naiyāyika to admit the existence of anything without adequate proof, nor for him to convince Śrī Harṣa of his doctrines without sufficient evidence. Could one win over his opponents with mere statement of fact, no debate would ever be necessary. The Naiyāyika could just say "objects exist", and the question would be settled.<sup>59</sup>

The gist of Śrī Harṣa's reply here is thus that the general knowledge of knowledge *A* by means of which Udayana would account for activity is not enough. What is required in a worldly activity such as debate is the awareness of knowledge *A* as a particular knowledge ("perception of a pot",

above), and the proof of that, namely *vyavahārasattā*, etc. would remain to be demonstrated. This entire argument is stated in brief on p. 128 (Chow), with the question, “*tasyāpi sattvaṃ katham?*”, How can you account for the existence of that proof of the cognition in its particular form? It is only elaborated upon on p. 130 where the same question is rephrased, “*pramāṇasattāpi tatpramāṇasattām*”, the second, *tatpramāṇasattā* being the same *vyavahārasattā*.

The infinite regress now stands, and Śrī Harṣa cites Dharmakīrti's words that if knowledge is not self-aware, cognition of objects becomes impossible.<sup>60</sup> In review, he has refuted Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 308, having pointed out the fault of *vākchala* and explained the Buddhist intention, through a refutation of the *Kusumāñjali*, pp. 328, 448. This left us with the conclusion that for anything to be established in the Naiyāyika doctrine an infinite regress must result. The *Parīśuddhi* improvement upon the *Ātmatattvaviveka* argument was then introduced. This is refuted by showing that still an infinite regress cannot be avoided, for it is on the basis of particular cognitions and not general cognitions that the existence of objects must be established. The whole is a skilful refutation of these three passages of Udayana's works, here deftly combined into a single continuous argument.

Or perhaps you maintain, “An endless series of knowledge and its knowledge, one following immediately upon the other is not admitted. Rather, it is accepted that at some time, by some means some knowledge is known, and in this way all knowledge is established by valid means.” This is not correct, for this might be so only if such a cognition beyond the knowledge, “this is a pot”, “I know the pot”, heavy with the weight of hundreds of objects, into which the entire chain has entered as its object, were observed to arise for us.

The Naiyāyika, left with an unavoidable infinite series of knowledge, seeks another solution to his problem. It has been shown in the concrete example given in the comments to the immediately preceding passage that the necessity of knowing all these knowledges in a given period of time would make all activity impossible. The opponent now offers that all these knowledges need not be so known; one need not immediately follow upon the next whereby an individual would never be able to prove the existence of a given object, and would moreover exhaust his life in contemplating that object. Knowledge *A* arises, and perhaps thereafter knowledge *B* having knowledge *A* as its object. At some later time, it is conjectured, knowledge *B*

will be grasped by a knowledge *C*, and *C* by *D* and so on. It is thus assumed that all knowledges of the chain will sometime be proved. The existence of the infinite series is thus admitted. It does not present any difficulty as it no longer prevents activity, nor does it lead to the undesired conclusion that the existence of knowledge could never be documented. Underlying this Naiyāyika reply is the thought that the existence of an infinite series does not in itself constitute a fault. All Indian philosophers admit some infinite series; *saṃsāra* itself is nothing but an endless cycle. An infinite series is only an impossibility where it is required that all members be known or arise in a finite period of time. This the Naiyāyika here avoids by saying that the knowledges are in fact only known over an endless period.

Śrī Harṣa replies to Udayana as Udayana had replied to Kumārila in the *Kuṣumāṇjali*, p. 448, “*yady asti, tarhy asti, na cen, naiva*”. The admission of such a process as that outlined above would still entail that at some time a knowledge having all the previous knowledges and their objects as its own object arise. Only if such a knowledge *X* is experienced in valid cognition, can one say that it exists, if not, then the assumption of its existence is no solution. No one in fact has such a knowledge, and thus it is without justification for the Naiyāyika to assert that all knowledges are in fact known at some time.<sup>61</sup>

Even if one could assume the existence of such a cognition for one who is of different birth than we are, then still there is no proof of the assertion that that knowledge, of which other knowledges including their objects form the object, must itself be known by some other knowledge; absence of final release would also ensue. For, the series cannot be grasped by a cognition which also grasps itself. In that case it would have been admitted that knowledge is self-aware. And for the same reason, that one is the object of the other is also refuted, for should one grasp the other and all of its objects, it would also be grasping itself. Nor do you have any means of validly knowing that its existence will be grasped by another person and not its non-existence. For that purpose another chain for the existence of means of valid knowledge would result.

Śrī Harṣa has argued above that it is not possible to assume that all knowledges are known at one time or another, for the existence of the resulting cognition is beyond our ken. The opponent is now permitted to suggest that such a knowledge  $X_1$  of knowledge *D* and all of its objects (knowledges *C*, *B*, *A*, and their objects) may not arise for us, but what is to

prevent the assumption that it occurs for yogis who are omniscient? An infinite regress, answers Śrī Harṣa, and absence of proof of the assumption that such a chain of knowledges does exist for yogis. Śrī Harṣa himself further explains these two points. Supposing the existence of knowledge  $X_1$  for a certain yogi, it must also be assumed that this knowledge  $X_1$  is documented by that yogi in a knowledge  $X_2$  which constitutes proof of the existence of knowledge  $X_1$ . Nothing can be admitted without such evidence. This knowledge  $X_2$  would also require some proof of its own existence, knowledge  $X_3$ , and so on ad infinitum. To assume such an infinite series of knowledges on the part of this yogi is not only without proof, but would lead to the undesired conclusion that the yogi could never achieve final release, always having knowledge  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots X_n$ .

It is not possible to avoid this infinite series by assuming that knowledge  $X_1$  grasps all members of our series,  $A, B, C, D, \dots$ , and also constitutes proof of its own existence. This would be admitting that knowledge must be self-aware. Nor is it possible to assume that knowledge  $X_1$  grasps  $X_2$  and  $X_2$  in turn grasps  $X_1$ .  $X_1$  is also an object of  $X_2$  and in making known  $X_2$  and its objects would again be making known itself.

A last attempt to avoid this infinite series and absence of final release might be to assume that the first yogi's knowledge  $X_1$  is grasped by  $Y_1$  of a second yogi. But proof must be given for the existence of this  $Y_1$  as well. Another infinite series results.

The Naiyāyika is thus caught in a hopeless entanglement of unjustifiable infinite knowledges. The original statement that no knowledge can be established if it is to be known by another knowledge stands valid.<sup>62</sup>

Nor does such an infinite regress similarly result in searching for the collocation of causes of a pot, their collocation of causes and so on. The two cases are essentially different. That a pot has an unbroken series of causes is validly demonstrated by presumption: "If the causes of a pot and their series of causes were somewhere broken, then the pot would be eternal." But were this the case with knowledge, then if it made known itself, one would be admitting it is self-aware, and if not, then there would be an infinite series; or, if it were unknown, then with the absence of proof for the last member, there could be no proof of all that precedes. Thus, this difficulty cannot be avoided. In addition, the faults inherent in the relationship of object to knowledge which we will later mention would also result.

The Naiyāyika here takes exception to the above statements that there is

no proof for the assumption of either an infinite series of knowledges on the part of one yogi, or that a second yogi grasps  $X_1$  and a third,  $Y_1$  and so on. In some cases, he offers, infinite series can be demonstrated without any difficulty. It must be admitted that any object ( $x$ ) to be transitory must arise from a given set of causes.<sup>63</sup> Now, if these causes were eternal then their product should always appear. It must thus be further accepted that the causes of ( $x$ ) have their own causes. The same reasoning applies to this second set of causes, and so on. To account for the fact that products appear only at certain moments an infinite series of causes is admitted (*Kāryasya kādācitkatvānyathānupapattyaṁvichinnā sāmagrī siddhyate*). The opponent suggests that the same *pramāṇa*, *arthāpatti*, be permitted to prove the existence of an infinite series for yogis.

Śrī Harṣa rejects the possibility of *arthāpatti* in the case of knowledge for the following reasons. If the opponent contends that without all knowledge being known in an infinite series its very existence could never be established (*jñānasya siddhyanyathānupapattyaṁ sarvaṁ jñānam jñāyate*) a series of faults results. The product of this *arthāpatti* is also a knowledge  $R$  which has as its object the fact that all knowledge is known. The question now arises, what is the proof of this very resultant cognition? If one asserts that as it is also knowledge it falls within the purview of the original statement, "all knowledge is known", this is in effect saying that  $R$  constitutes its own proof, and the opponent will have accepted the *Siddhāntin* doctrine of *svaprakāśatā*. If it be said that the existence of cognition  $R$  is known by another knowledge  $R_2$  the question can again be applied and an infinite regress results. As before, cutting the chain at any point leads to the absence of proof for all the prior members. There is thus for the Naiyāyika no possibility of even proving that an *arthāpatti* exists, let alone justifying his infinite series through that *arthāpatti*, as he did the existence of an infinite series of causes.<sup>64</sup> In closing, Śrī Harṣa repeats that were knowledge to be known by another knowledge in this fashion, the faults inherent in the relationship of knowledge to its object would result (see note 56).<sup>65</sup>

Nor on account of all these faults is it to be assumed that knowledge does not exist; for that which is established by itself for all people cannot be denied. Furthermore, on admitting that knowledge is self-aware it will be shown that all these faults are removed. Since only its very nature as knowledge can be established by itself, there is no possibility of any qualities insentient in nature being included within it. For this very reason it is not an object of speech which proceeds from a

reference to qualities. It is only secondarily called eternal because it is not limited by time, and said to be all-pervading as it is not limited by space. The designation of it as the essence of all things and as non-duality follows from the fact that it is devoid of any limiting attributes. And there is no contradiction of the doctrine of non-duality because an absence is admitted to be no more than its substratum, just as the Buddhists and Prābhākaras admit in the case of a positive locus, and the Naiyāyikas in the case of an absence as the locus. Nor is there any fault if the counterpositive of these absences is nowhere established, just as in the case of the negation of an object of wrong cognition.

Having demonstrated the impossibilities of the doctrine that knowledge is known by another knowledge, Śrī Harṣa takes the opportunity to reassert the contentions of the inference made on pp. 118–119 that knowledge is known. He anticipates the objection of a Mādhyamika that since knowledge is besieged by this host of faults then it too must be non-existent. The answer to this objection is given that it is difficult to deny knowledge which stands proved for all (cf. the inference, no one doubts or denies that he knows). Moreover, all of the above-named faults are eliminated by accepting the conclusion of the *arthāpatti* that knowledge is not the object of any other knowledge but is known by itself. This is further explained by the very next statement: the faults incumbent upon the relationship of knowledge to known have no place in the doctrine of *svaprakāśatā*. All that is self-aware and thus proved of knowledge is the very essence of that knowledge. Any external quality such as “*meyatva*” or “*mānatva*” remains unproved. Establishment by another knowledge we have seen leads only to infinite regress. What is self-valid is knowledge alone, and thus the doubt can never arise that belonging to this knowledge are the qualities of “being known” or “serving as the proof for another”, and so on whence the above trouble results.<sup>66</sup>

This statement that no attributes of knowledge can be proved leads naturally to the next remark, that knowledge so conceived can never be the object of speech. Speech requires certain attributes to which words may refer; universals, qualities, activities, and so on. Knowledge as self-established can have none of these and is thus beyond the range of ordinary expression. When we say of it that it is all-pervading we mean only that it is not diminished by space. To say of it that it is eternal means only that it is not limited by time. The assertion that it is of the essence of all things implies only that it is possessed of no characteristic as a pot is of potness which dis-

tinguishes it from other objects not so characterized.<sup>67</sup> All designations of which it is the object thus revolve around absences. It is not to be suspected that this implies an admission of the reality of “*abhāva*” over and above the existence of knowledge. Such an admission would be a violation of the *Siddhāntin* contention that knowledge alone exists. The absence of the conditions here named is considered to be no more than the presence of their substratum, knowledge. To the Buddhists and Prābhākaras the assertion that an absence is nothing apart from its locus requires no comment as they admit the same, and to the Naiyāyika it should also not seem extraordinary as he admits that an absence residing on another absence is nothing more than the first absence.<sup>68</sup> Thus, “*abhāva*” need not be additional to knowledge and the doctrine of non-duality is preserved. That these absences do not require the existence of their counterpositives has been earlier explained (see pp. 101–102 and notes).

And this very knowledge is revealed by scripture serving as a valid means to know it, in conformity with the general sense of its sentences and by very much the same process as that by which any object is made known through reference to something foreign to its essential nature. Thus, even in the absence of the relationship of denotated to denotator, in the presence of an albeit invalid cognition of that relationship, by the opponent’s own admissions it is said that scripture constitutes a valid proof of knowledge.

In actuality, consciousness is self-proved.

Having shown that knowledge, in fact self-proved and devoid of attributes, cannot be the object of speech, Śrī Harṣa now asserts that by the Naiyāyika’s own admissions *śruti* must also be considered as a valid proof of its existence. This is a difficult assertion, and requires much explanation. All words, even of the scriptures, it is true, depend upon some attribute to which they refer; however, the Naiyāyika himself admits that an object can be made known by reference to something totally external to it which is in fact absent at the time of reference (an *upalakṣaṇa*). A concrete example may be of use. Suppose two people are walking in a village and one asks, “Which is Devadatta’s house?” The other replies, “The one with the crows.” This is the standard explanation of an “*upalakṣaṇa*”. At the time this statement is uttered there is actually no crow on the roof of Devadatta’s house. The listener has previously seen a crow on the roof of a house and understands by context that the word “crow” must be taken to mean something which is associated with the bird it normally denotes, upturned

grass or some such (*uṭṭṛṇāḍī*) (cf. Śaṅkara Miśra, p. 149). He then realizes that Devadatta's house is the one with the torn thatch. This process permits that an attribute previously known as associated with a given object, though in fact absent, makes known that object as different from other objects.

Śrī Harṣa maintains that for him who admits this, scripture must also be admitted to constitute a valid proof for the existence of knowledge as the Vedāntin conceives it. Prior to correct understanding of its nature, knowledge or Brahma is similarly thought to be associated with attributes – *jagatkaraṇatva*, *satyatva*, *anantatva*, etc. The sentences of the scripture require only this much. Just as an *upalakṣaṇa*, though not really present on the locus it makes known, still yields valid knowledge of that locus, what is to prevent that these attributes, though not present in knowledge likewise result in a valid cognition of which it is the object?<sup>69</sup> The reply that the two cases are different because these attributes are never present in Brahma whereas the crow was once on Devadatta's house, has been refuted by the argument of p. 114 (Chow) and the argument that Śrī Harṣa has employed throughout the first section of the introduction. For one, their presence when they are not needed is useless, and for two the assertion that the crow existed on the house means no more than that it was perceived to exist there. Well, *satyatva*, etc. have been perceived to exist in knowledge and the two positions are the same. By the Naiyāyika's own admissions, thus, *śruti* is to be considered as a means of proof for eternal, non-dual, self-aware knowledge.

The second sentence is no more than a restatement of the above. There is only one additional word in this sentence, and it has caused the commentators great difficulties, "*avidyādaśāyām*".<sup>70</sup> I would interpret it thus. The Naiyāyika may still object that even the use of an *upalakṣaṇa* requires that words have some relationship to that which they denote. By "a crow" must be implied "up-turned grass" and nothing else. It must therefore be admitted that these two concepts have a certain relationship to each other which differentiates them from others not so related. Similarly, by "*satyatva*" must be implied the very essence of knowledge. But it has been denied that any quality including "*abhidhānābhidheyabhāva*" can exist for this knowledge. It cannot thus be said that according to the Naiyāyika doctrine scripture would be a valid proof of that knowledge. The Naiyāyika requires this relationship which Śrī Harṣa has made impossible. "*Avidyādaśāyām*" answers this objection. Even the Naiyāyika must admit that what is essential to speech is not so much the existence of a relationship between the word "pot" and the object which it denotes, but a knowledge of



that relationship (*Kuṣumāñjali*, 131).<sup>71</sup> For Śrī Harṣa as well such a knowledge of that relationship is perfectly permissible, with the qualification that the knowledge is contradicted at some later date by some individual, and so need not imply the existence of its object. It has been repeatedly shown that the Naiyāyika himself can do no better than to admit the same. Thus in accordance with the admissions of the *pūrvapakṣa* it is said that *śruti* is a valid authority for self-proved knowledge.

This “*parābhyupagamarītyā*” is highly significant. Śrī Harṣa himself closes with the statement that knowledge is its own authority and requires no further demonstration. Compare the remark in the *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, 10.62, “*svataḥ prakāśe parātmabodhe bodhāntaram na sphuraṇārtham arthyam*”. Like the inference and the *arthāpatti* on pp. 117–118 (Chow), then, scripture here is meant only as a *pramāṇa* for the opponent. The faults of contradiction that follow from knowledge being self-aware and the object of another knowledge, the object of speech and not the object of speech, as before result for the Naiyāyika alone.

“But, self-awareness of knowledge is impossible, as the relationship between an activity and the object of that activity is not possible in the absence of difference. This is because activity is the product of its object, and the object the cause of that activity. Nor can one thing be produced by itself, for the relationship between what is caused and the cause itself is but a particular relationship of priority and posterity in time. Now, one thing cannot be both prior and posterior, for the phrase, ‘prior to *x*’ means no more than that time which is not delineated by the existence of object *x*. If it be admitted that the same object then exists, that one time would be both delineated by the existence of that object and not delineated by the existence of that object; an obvious contradiction.”

We have followed Śrī Harṣa thus far: Knowledge is known and can only be known if it is self-aware. To require that it be known by another leads to an infinite regress. Nor, on the basis of these faults, is it to be admitted that knowledge does not exist, for knowledge is proved for all and its self-validity absolves it of the blame accruing to externally valid knowledge. The Mādhyamika and the Naiyāyika who were unable to refute the *arthāpatti* with an *anyathopapatti*, turn now to attack the very doctrine of self-awareness. They assert that the concept of knowledge as self-aware is in fact an impossibility. If knowledge knows itself, then it must be both the activity of knowing and the object of that activity. This is not admissible. An activity

and its object cannot be the same, as the object serves as the activity's cause. A cause and a product must be different. The cause is defined as that which invariably exists prior to its product, and one thing can obviously not be prior to itself.<sup>72</sup>

Not at all, for it is not admitted that an activity must always be the product of its object. Such can never be the case with a knowledge the object of which is future. The designation of an object as an activity producing factor is made on the basis of the fact that objects sometimes do give rise to their activities. The use of the term 'object' is observed on the basis of a definition such as "being the object of the function of the instrumental cause", or "being the locus of the fruits of an activity which inheres in something else", even when there is no question of giving rise to activity.

Srī Harṣa answers this standard attack on self-awareness by first dismissing the notion that one thing cannot be both activity and object as the two stand in the relationship of cause and caused. He asserts that it is not always the case that the object gives rise to its activity. In fact, such a situation is impossible to imagine in the case of a knowledge of a future object. This object does not exist, but it is the Naiyāyika's own contention that only the existent can serve as a cause. The designation of a *karma* as a causal agent thus does not require that all *karma* are causes, only that some *karma* are so. The term *karma* is in fact applied to things which are not causes of activity but which possess another attribute, "*parasamavetakriyāśālitva*" or "*karaṇavyāpāraviśayatva*", either of which is considered to be the defining attribute of that which serves as an object of activity.<sup>73</sup> Thus, on the basis of the fact that activity is the product of its object, it is not possible to refute the doctrine of self-awareness.

Furthermore, what is this "being an object" which is contradictory for one thing with respect to itself? "Being the locus of the fruits of an activity which inheres in something else?" No, for this applies to the ablative case as well. "Then the ablative must also be an object." Never, for just like the usage, "The leaf falls from the tree" one would have the usage, "The leaf falls the tree." "Case relations are determined by the wish of the speaker, and so in the absence of a desire to express ourselves in this manner we do not have this usage." No, for in the presence of a desire to express oneself thus one would have this usage if the ablative were in fact also an object. "But if

it is the general tradition of the grammarians that the objectness of the ablative is not intended to be expressed, then?" Well, then in the absence of any use of it as an object, by your admitting that it is still an object on the strength of your own definition, room has been made for such definitions as, "All things are objects." And do tell me with your superior wit, how was it known even in the absence of any usage of the ablative as an object, that it still possesses the objectness which you describe!

Śrī Harṣa here turns to a tactic which he describes at the end of the fourth *pariccheda*, p. 752 (Sam). When no other method of refutation occurs to the *vaitaṇḍika*, he is to take any word from his opponent's statement and show its logical inconsistencies. This he now does, having successfully destroyed the *pūrvapakṣa* objection by showing that by the *pūrvapakṣa*'s own admission *kriyākarmabhāva* does not necessarily imply causality. He chooses the word "*karma*" and subjects it to careful scrutiny. The first definition examined is that of Vācaspati Miśra in the *Ṭīkā* p. 367 K: "An object is that which is the locus of the fruits of an activity which inheres in something else". The idea is this. In the sentence, "*Caitro grāmaṃ gacchatī*", the word "*grāmaṃ*" appears in the objective case. The activity of going inheres in *Caitra*, the subject. Its result, *prāpti* or *paradeśasamyoga*, belongs to both *Caitra* and the village. Of the two, only the village is the object, as the results inhering in *Caitra* belong to an activity which also inheres in him, and thus the definition is inapplicable.

Śrī Harṣa urges against this definition that it is over-extended as it applies to the ablative case as well. In the sentence, "The leaf falls from the tree", the result of falling, *viyoga* or separation, is in fact an attribute of the tree, and a result of an activity which inheres elsewhere, in the leaf. For a definition to be valid it must exist in all individual cases which are to be defined and in none that are not. This is a case of *ativyāpti*; the definition falls outside the desired cases.<sup>74</sup>

The opponent to avoid the fault of *ativyāpti* suggests that the ablative is not in fact an "*alakṣya*" but a "*lakṣya*". It too is an object which is to be covered by the said definition.<sup>75</sup> Śrī Harṣa returns that if the ablative is an object, why is it that it is not so used? He urges here that the relationship of invariable concomitance, "*yatra yatra pratibandhakābhāve sati nimittam varitate tatra tatra vyavahāro bhavatyeva*", is thus destroyed. The relationship itself is a result of the Naiyāyika view that a definition is a *kevalavyatirekī hetu* by means of which a given term is applied to an object.<sup>76</sup>

The *pūrvapakṣa* returns that the invariable concomitance is not in fact destroyed. Not only does the *sādhya* not exist, but the *hetu* is also absent. *Vivakṣābhāva* is an impediment which prevents the usage in question, and it is present. Thus the qualifier of the mark, “*pratibandhakābhāve satī*”, fails, and both the *sādhya* and *hetu* are absent.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that one cannot say that there is no desire to express the ablative in this manner on the part of anyone in the world, at any time. In fact the logical assumption is the opposite. If the ablative were really an object, then someone sometime might very well wish to use it in the objective case!

The *pūrvapakṣa*, recognizing that it is not legitimate to assume that no one will want to employ the ablative as an object, slightly alters his statement. He assumes another hindrance to prevent this usage: it is established in the general tradition of grammarians that the ablative is not to be expressed in the objective case.

To this in turn Śrī Harṣa replies that the opponent might then just as well say that all things are objects, and account for the fact that some things are not so employed by the same assumption of a grammatical tradition which forbids that usage. There is nothing gained by an attempt to narrow down this definition when it still results in a undesired extension requiring this assumption. He concludes with the first of many insults to come.<sup>77</sup>

“Let such a thing different from the ablative be an object.” No, even in that case in such sentences as, “The river overflows”, the verb “overflows” the result of which is reaching the other bank would then be transitive. Substituting for “other than the ablative” the phrase, “which destroys the activity” leads to the same fault; moreover, it is impossible in the case of the verb “*vrddh*” meaning to be destroyed, and the verb in the sentence, “He abandons the tree”, would then be intransitive.

The *pūrvapakṣa* now suggests a slight qualification of the same definition. An object is that which, being other than the ablative, is the locus of the results of an activity which inheres in something else. Śrī Harṣa urges that this definition is still over-extended to the verb “*varddhate*” or overflow where the bank of the river is the locus of the results of that activity of overflowing which inheres in the water molecules. It would thus be an object, which is not the case observed.

The next suggestion of the opponent is thus, “The object is that which is the locus of the results of an activity which inheres in something else where

that activity is destroyed by its own results.” This would avoid over-extension in the very first case urged. The activity of falling is not destroyed by *vrkṣaviyoga* but by *bhūmisamyoga*, which is unrelated to the tree. Śrī Harṣa returns that the same fault will still remain in the sentence, “*Nadī varddhate*”, as the flow of the river is in fact destroyed by contact with the opposite bank. The bank is still covered by this new definition of *karma*. In addition, he points out that there will be *avyāpti*, or that the definition will not cover all that is to be defined. In the case of the word “*vrddh*” meaning destruction, the definition fails as destruction has no other destruction.<sup>78</sup> Similarly in the case of the sentence, “He abandons the tree”, the definition is inapplicable as the tree is not the locus of those results, *paradeśasamyoga*, which end the act of abandoning.

It will also not include the sentence, “I know myself” as there is no possibility there of “something else”. “Even in that case there can be ‘something else’ by a difference in adventitious qualities, since only the soul as artificially limited by the qualities, ‘doer’, ‘knower’, etc. is considered to be the object of knowledge.” Let this be somehow or another, but still when he who knows the truth sees his pure soul free from these qualities the verb could not have the soul as its object. And what explanation can you offer in the case where the object itself is considered the doer, as in the sentence, “The rice cooks all by itself”? Furthermore, he who regards God as all-knowing does not admit that His eternal knowledge can be destroyed by its results. For him this definition would fail here.

Śrī Harṣa continues with three more examples of *avyāpti*. The first constitutes a refutation of the statement of Vācaspati Miśra in the *Ṭīkā*, pp. 368, 370, 394 and 501 K, and Kumārila in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Śūnyavāda*, *Śloka*s 68–69. The definition requires that the object be the locus of the results of an activity which inheres *somewhere else*. Now, consider the statement, “I know myself”. The self appears in the objective case but it cannot be said to be the locus of the result of an activity inhering in something else. The activity in question is knowledge and that inheres in the soul. Vācaspati Miśra sought to avoid this difficulty by asserting that the soul is an object of knowledge only when it is qualified by certain accidental attributes such as “*kartr̥iva*”, “*bhoktr̥iva*”, etc. The attributes themselves form the actual object of the cognition, and the definition is unblemished as they are indeed the locus of the results of an activity which inheres elsewhere, in the soul. Against this Śrī Harṣa replies that yogis also know

the soul but as unqualified by those attributes. The definition thus fails for the object of the knowledge of such individuals.<sup>79</sup>

The second case is self-explanatory. In the construction, “the rice cooks by itself”, the rice is both locus of activity and of results. As above the definition is inapplicable because of the absence of the qualifier, “*para*”.

The last example is a result of the absence of the newly introduced particular, “where those results destroy the activity”. For the Naiyāyika God’s knowledge is eternal, and there is thus no question that it be destroyed by anything at all.

Therefore, this *karma* is nothing more than a term coined by the grammarians to establish proper speech, like the terms, *nadī*, *vrddhi*, etc. Enough of searching for the one definition which will fit all cases!

This is Śrī Harṣa’s final conclusion to the objection against the self-awareness of knowledge on the basis of the fact that one thing cannot be both activity and object of that activity. The impossibility of defining this *karma* shows that it is nothing at all. It is merely a term coined by the grammarians to make formulation of rules of grammar less cumbersome, and not any physical reality with which activity would be contradictory in one object.<sup>80</sup> Self-awareness thus stands proved, and it remains for the opponent to adduce yet other reasons for its impossibility.

“But if they are not different, the very relationship of object to object-bearer would be impossible. ‘Bearing an object’ means no more than ‘being connected with an object’ and connection cannot exist without difference. It is always observed that a cognition of connection is impossible where there is no cognition that the two objects so connected are different.”

Not at all, for the relation connecting object to object-bearer is not different from the very nature of the two terms so related. Were it so, in the end its connection must be admitted to be of the nature of its locus, out of fear of an infinite regress. This being the case, just as it must finally be admitted that the cognition of the connection itself is possible without a difference between the two connected terms and that connection, as a connection which is the very nature of its locus defies the limits of other connections, so this connection, the relationship of object to object-bearer will fulfil itself without any difference between the two connected terms, and its knowledge will be possible without a knowledge of their difference. What is contradictory in this?

This begins the second standard objection to the doctrine of self-awareness. It is not possible for knowledge to know itself as that would imply that knowledge is its own object. That knowledge is its own object further implies that it is related to itself by the relationship *viṣayaviṣayibhāva* or object to object-bearer. The opponent urges that all relations or connections demand that the two objects which are to be so connected be different. For one thing to be connected with itself is contradictory and is never observed.<sup>81</sup>

Śrī Harṣa destroys this objection by beginning with a violation of general observation which even the Naiyāyika admits. It is generally accepted that a pot and a table are connected by *saṃyoga*, a quality which is different from both of these terms in which it inheres. Similarly "potness" resides in the pot by *samavāya* which is neither of the two terms it connects. Thus the general observation is that not only are the two entities to be connected different, but also the connection between them is different from either of the two terms. Now, let us consider this very relationship of *viṣayaviṣayibhāva* which is under dispute. Contrary to the above general expectation it must be admitted that this relationship is in fact not different from the two terms which it relates.<sup>82</sup> This results from the following reasoning. If this relationship were different from the terms it connects,  $x$  and  $y$ , then one would have to assume another relationship  $R_2$  which connects the first relationship with both  $x$  and  $y$ . Similarly, if this  $R_2$  is different from  $R_1$  and its locus,  $x$  or  $y$ , another relationship  $R_3$  is required to connect  $R_1$  or  $x$  with  $R_2$ , and so on. An infinite regress results and it must therefore be admitted that at some point  $R_x$  is not different from its locus and thus does not demand another connection with that locus. The Naiyāyika must (and in fact he does) admit that it is the very nature of some relationships that they are not different from the terms they connect.<sup>83</sup>

Śrī Harṣa now applies this to the defense of his own doctrine of self-awareness. If the Naiyāyika thus ignores one difference which is generally observed to occur in all relationships, the difference between the terms and a given connection, then why cannot the *Siddhāntin* do the same and ignore the other difference generally admitted, that between the two terms themselves? The essence of his argument is that contradiction can only be urged on the basis of the fact that such a situation is never known to occur. If in the one case, logic demands that the perceived be abandoned and no contradiction results, it must do the same in the other and with the same lack of fault. For the Naiyāyika to deny the second case, he must also deny the first; for in both cases the impossibility of an admitted fact demands our abandonment of a general rule.

Nor is it to be said that if the relationship of object to object-bearer in the case of self-awareness be even slightly different from the type of object-object-bearer relationship observed in the case of a pot and its knowledge then one must be proved contradictory. For there certainly is contradiction of the pot and its knowledge, which are made known by wrong cognition, and valid proof of self-awareness which in fact exists. There is thus no fault if the two are dissimilar.

Śrī Harṣa here assumes an objection to the above insistence that the proponent of self-awareness in denying the difference between the two terms of the relationship is doing nothing more than what the Naiyāyika himself does in certain cases. He suggests that the two cases are in fact radically different. It is possible to defy general observation and postulate that some relationships are not different from their loci. Such relationships are known as “*svarūpasambandha*” and form by themselves a class different from “*saṃyoga*” and “*samavāya*”. It is thus possible to explain their divergent behavior on the basis of an essential difference in nature. This is not the case with the relationship of *viśayaviśayibhāva*. The proponent of self-awareness assumes that this one relationship is in some cases accompanied by a difference between the two terms it connects, and in other cases not. These two assumptions are contradictory, for they demand the presence of two mutually opposed attributes in the same locus. Either one must be false, or the relationship *viśayaviśayibhāva* must be many, by the *nyāya*, “*ayam eva bhedo bhedahetur vā yad viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ*.”<sup>84</sup>

Śrī Harṣa summarily dismisses this suggested objection with *iṣṭāpatti*. He willingly concedes that the relationship in the case of a pot and its knowledge is false and that only self-aware knowledge exists.<sup>85</sup>

Or it is not to be thought that self-awareness implies that one thing is related to itself by the relationship which obtains between an activity and its object, or an object and an object-bearer. Rather, just as for you other things are said to be existent because they are connected with the universal, “existence”, but this universal “existence” is itself existent and thus there results no fault that existence must reside in itself, just so knowledge is its own knowledge. Or an analogy may be made from *bahuvrīhi* compounds of the type *tadguṇasaṃvijñāna*. The syntactically predominant element, which is exocentric, is denoted by the word in *bahuvrīhi* formation; but it is so denoted only along with a secondary element. In the same way, a knowledge may be supposed to give rise to a cognition of its own object but only along with a



cognition of itself, despite the fact that it is not its own object, properly speaking. This is the doctrine of the Prābhākaras where knowledge having its own object is self-aware, and not of the doctrine where Brahma is self-aware, for in that doctrine there is no object. There the similarity is only this much: just as a *bahuvrīhi* compound results in activity with respect to “*kuṭa*”, etc. which are not its objects, so knowledge results in activity with respect to itself which is not its object, in the state of ignorance.

Having shown that there is no fault, even in the Buddhist theory of self-awareness where knowledge is its own object, Śrī Harṣa proceeds to set forth other explanations of this doctrine, first a general one and then that of the Prābhākara and finally of himself. The first rationalization of the fact that knowledge is self-aware he takes from the Naiyāyika tenets. The Naiyāyika maintains that except for the universal “existence” (and the category *samavāya* which is irrelevant here) all objects derive their existence from their relationship to the universal “existence”. It is not possible to assert that the universal *sattā* similarly exists, for to do so it would have to be the locus of the universal *sattā*, and it is impossible for an entity to reside in itself. If it be said that *sattā*<sub>1</sub> exists by reason of a *sattā*<sub>2</sub> different from itself, the same question is asked of *sattā*<sub>2</sub> and an infinite regress develops. It is thus admitted that the universal “existence” exists of its own accord, and does not require anything external to itself to exist: existence is its very nature. Śrī Harṣa says the same thing of knowledge, and for the same reason, avoidance of an infinite regress. Knowledge is its own knowledge. It does not demand anything external to it for its own proof. There can be nothing in these statements to which the Naiyāyika may take exception; they are but a re-application of his own doctrines.

The Prābhākaras hold that in every cognition of an object (*x*), both the knower and knowledge are revealed, although neither is the object of that cognition.<sup>86</sup> To justify this to non-believers, Śrī Harṣa cites an example familiar from grammar. There is a type of *bahuvrīhi* compound known as *tadguṇasaṃvijñāna*, e.g. *lambakarna*. As in the case of all *bahuvrīhis* this word denotes something which is not the meaning of either of its component parts, in this example, “goat”. But it is the special nature of this particular subclass of compounds that they also give rise to a cognition of that which is not their primary object. *Lambakarna* means a goat, but it also means “long-eared”. It thus gives rise to knowledge not only of that which is its object, but also of that which is not. For the Prābhākara, knowledge is like a

*tadguṇasaṃvijñānabahuvrīhi*; it makes known its given object ( $x$ ) and itself, which is not its object. Śrī Harṣa actually cites as an example of this type of compound, “*kuṭādi*” from Pāṇini 1.2.1. The *Sūtra* reads “*Gāṅkuṭā-dibhyaḥ*”. Its predominant denotation is the class of words beginning with “*kuṭa*”, but it also indicates its own first member.

Śrī Harṣa notes the one difference between this conception of self-awareness and his own. For Prābhākara knowledge can never be without some object ( $x$ ). It is thus only revealed when in combination with that object. For Śrī Harṣa only the opposite is a reality. The relationship of object to knowledge cannot be defined, and only the very essence of knowledge is self-revealed. His knowledge like that of the Prābhākara is forced upon the Naiyāyika with the same illustration. The similarity extends in his case only to the fact that what is not an object is made known, not to the fact that it is made known along with its own object.

There is only one qualification which Śrī Harṣa himself makes to this brief sketch of self-awareness in his own doctrine, and that is that the above applies in a state of ignorance. The commentators agree (Varadapaṇḍita, p. 126, *Śāṃkarī*, p. 177 Chow, *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 121) that this is to avoid the objection that in reality with respect to Brahma no activity is to be admitted. Activity presupposes difference. In fact, the very statement that knowledge gives rise to knowledge of itself implies as much. The resultant cognition as a product of the first must be different from it. Śrī Harṣa wishes by this qualification to show that such a difference, and indeed the very process he details is not to be taken as a final truth. For a certain stage on the path to enlightenment, such an explanation is conceived to explain the nature of the summum bonum, and defend it against the attacks of those opposed to his doctrine. Beyond this stepping stone is a higher moment at which no difference is even falsely cognized. This is the final stage, and there no such statement that knowledge gives rise to its own knowledge could be made.

In this way, wherever a difference from what is elsewhere observed, will result finally in the doctrine of self-awareness, it will always be a presumption offered as proof of self-awareness that forces us to accept that difference. Just as the observed, “the knower is one thing and the known another”, is to be abandoned as otherwise the knowledge “I” would be impossible, just so the observed, “knowledge is one thing and the known another”, is to be abandoned as otherwise the cognition “I know” would be impossible. Presumption is stronger than anything else and crushes a hundred arguments with the observed as their only

strength. This is what is meant by the statement, “Things never before observed but supported by proof are to be admitted – even in great number.”

Having explained his own conception of self-awareness, and illustrated it by example, Śrī Harṣa now raises and refutes an objection similar to that raised earlier on p. 170 (Chow). The opponent urges that the assumption that knowledge reveals what is not in fact its object is contrary to that which is generally observed. The knowledge, “this is a pot”, is valid only for the pot, its object. Were it valid for something other than this one object, then it might be valid for all things in the world (*aviśayatvāviśeṣāt*), and everyone would be omniscient with a single perception.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies with a principle which the Naiyāyika himself fully endorses. *Arthāpatti* has been given as a proof for self-awareness (pp. 117–118 Chow). Now, the impossibility otherwise of an accepted fact forces us to admit a situation sometimes contrary to what is expected on the basis of general experience.<sup>87</sup> It has been shown that Vācaspati Miśra’s attempts to prove that the soul as knower and known is different by reason of adventitious qualities fail in the case of the yogi’s self-knowledge. It must be admitted that the knower and known, although elsewhere observed to be different, are here the same. Failure to admit this fact leaves the cognition “I” unexplained. Similarly, Śrī Harṣa argues, it must be admitted that knowledge and the known, elsewhere observed to be different can also be the same; without this admission, the cognition “I know” becomes impossible. That both assumptions are contrary to general conceptions is of no consequence. They are proved by *arthāpatti*, and as Kumārila asserts in the *Ślokavārttika* and Śrī Harṣa here quotes, that for which there is proof is to be admitted even if it is nowhere else observed.

If the impossibility of otherwise accounting for an established fact is used as valid proof, it will crush all difference from what is observed. Presumption alone is stronger than all else.

You must say how that fact might otherwise occur, or abandon hence your stubborn clinging to the observed; For the two can no more stand together than darkness and the sun!

In this way, self-awareness of knowledge should be easy for you to accept, through the grace of these discussions, all equipped with the marks of valid argument which you admit. For us, knowledge which is its own valid testimony, is admitted on the strength of that knowledge alone.

This concludes the demonstration of self-awareness begun on pp. 117–118 (Chow). The argument has taken the following course. An inference and *arthāpatti* were first cited for proof of the fact that (1) knowledge is known and (2) it can only be known if it is self-aware. In support of the *arthāpatti*, all doubt that it can be known by another knowledge has been removed through refutations of Udayana's arguments in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Kusumāñjali* and *Parīśuddhi*. Finally, all objections to the doctrine of self-awareness, whether it be as the Buddhists, the Prābhākaras or the Vedāntins understand it, have been removed. In addition, it was shown that *śruti* must also be recognized as proof of the existence of such a knowledge. The Naiyāyika now on the basis of these three proofs, inference, presumption, and testimony, must admit that knowledge is self-aware. For Śrī Harṣa who contests it not, it remains as it should be – self-proven.

This being the case, there is only one difference between the Buddhists and the Brahmvādins, and that is that the former maintain that absolutely everything defies exposition. Thus the blessed one has said in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (2, 173, p. 48; 10.167, p. 118) "When things are examined with discrimination, their nature cannot be known, and so it is taught, 'all things are indescribable, and without essential substance'." The Brahmvādins, on the other hand, maintain that other than knowledge all things are neither existent nor non-existent. For, they cannot be existent, as they are caught in the faults which will be detailed in what follows. Nor can they be non-existent, as then all activity of both the common man and the learned would fail.

In the first two sections of this introduction, Śrī Harṣa has set forth two different viewpoints; that of the Mādhyamika, and that of the Vedāntin. He now clarifies their difference, in a passage which is to be read in combination with what follows (pp. 193 Chow). The first section of the introduction concluded that prior to debate existence, even of knowledge, need not be admitted. One undertakes debate unconcerned with existence or non-existence, and on the basis of certain cognitions, themselves uncontradicted only for a limited period of time. The second section opened with the assertion that knowledge is self-proved and cannot be denied. This is not to imply that its existence must be admitted prior to debate; to the contrary. There is absolutely no contradiction between these first two parts of Śrī Harṣa's introduction. He fully endorses the Mādhyamika contentions of the first section, but just does not extend them to their logical end – that knowledge itself is also only revealed by false knowledge and stands contradicted as

much as anything else. Knowledge is self-proved and the contradictions can be eliminated. Thus the second half of the introduction.

It is only this point which distinguishes Śrī Harṣa from his Mādhyamika Buddhist predecessors. The reverence he shows Buddhism in the *Naiṣ-adhīyacarita* (21, 88–91) is perhaps nowhere in greater evidence than here, where he does it the honor of accepting its arguments with this one reservation.

The assertion that all but knowledge is “*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*” is not to be understood as an avowal of a third truth value. *Anirvacanīyatva* is only the result of the opponent’s contentions (see pp. 193 ff. Chow). What is known and contradicted cannot be said to exist, and yet what does not exist cannot be a cause. The latter half of this contention has in fact been refuted in the discussion on the existent as a cause. It is thus in part a concession to the *sadvādin*. The statements on p. 31 (Chow) that one cannot say the *pramāṇas*, etc. do not exist and then enter into debate and speak as if they do, is not to be confused as Śrī Harṣa’s own assertion that the world neither exists nor does not exist. The contradiction rests in *saying* both that *x* is and is not; there is nothing amiss if one does not *say* it is not, although that is in reality the truth.

This passage and those that follow it to p. 199 (Chow) constitute an invaluable interlude during which Śrī Harṣa will clarify his own intentions and the procedures of the main debate which will occupy the majority of his efforts. He does this again by demolishing the objections his opponents raise.

And the statement, “Let those who cannot define the objects of this world pay reverence to their teachers from whom they may learn proper terminology and usage”, would be a telling criticism if those against whom it is urged did not say that this inability to define was not inherent in the very nature of that which is revealed to knowledge, but said instead that it was a fault of the speaker. Let a man who considers himself well-versed in the dictionaries try to define these things. He will not be able to do so because of the faults inherent in what is to be said.

Śrī Harṣa first dismisses a sarcastic objection to the statement that everything in the world is indefinable and defies exposition (cf. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* quoted above). If it is not possible for you to define a given object, perhaps you had better find yourself a decent teacher and start studying the dictionaries! The objection appears as a quote in the text. Paramānandasūri attributes it to Udayana (5a); the closest parallel that I could find

is *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 220. Similar objections are voiced by Kumāṛila (*Ślokaṁvārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra śloka* 117, p. 128) and Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭaśaṭī*, p. 11.

The reply is given that such a criticism would only be valid if the speaker could not define a given object through the fault of his own ignorance. This is not the case. No one, not even the most learned man, can define anything at all, because of the faults inherent in what must be said, i.e. in all definitions. This is in fact Śrī Harṣa's main proposition: no definition can stand logical scrutiny (cf. p. 130 Sam).<sup>88</sup>

Nor is it to be said, "But these faults nullify themselves and thus would they not be futile rejoinders?" For, ability to be defined is in fact contradicted by those faults which themselves are incapable of definition, and those faults, incapable of definition are moreover employed by you in debate. Where is the contradiction for us? Furthermore, you could not even define what is meant by "being a futile rejoinder" and apply it to these faults!

The opponent returns with the objection that if things cannot be defined because of the faults inherent in all definitions, then these faults must also be incapable of being defined and possessed of like faults. They then would not only destroy the definitions they are meant to destroy, but themselves as well! A statement which contradicts itself is known in Nyāya terminology as a "*jāti*" or futile rejoinder (*Nyāyasūtra* 5.1.1 ff.).

The answer is given that for Śrī Harṣa there is absolutely no contradiction; in fact, contradiction rests with the Naiyāyika alone. It is to be remembered that all the faults which Śrī Harṣa urges against his opponent are taken from the last chapters of the *Nyāyasūtras*. He never adds anything to these which the Naiyāyika himself has formulated and which he himself employs. If on the basis of Śrī Harṣa's arguments it must be admitted that these faults are indefinable, and if the Naiyāyika asserts that faults which are indefinable are futile rejoinders, then he has placed himself in a most troublesome position. He admits that such faults are capable of destroying an argument, for so he employs them, and yet now he says they are useless as they also destroy themselves. It is his contradiction, not Śrī Harṣa's.

Śrī Harṣa adds that indefinability being inherent in all things, it is not possible to assert that these faults are "futile rejoinders". What is a futile rejoinder, anyway? The question can never be answered!

“But, he who maintains indefinability on the strength of the fact that he sees faults in both asserting existence and asserting non-existence, does he have doubt of existence or non-existence, or does he admit that things fall outside both categories, the existent and the non-existent? In the first case, either one or the other, existence or non-existence must be true, and all the faults presented in one alternative must be invalid. It must further be admitted that those are the faults in the case of existence. For, if existence is to be admitted, then how could those faults applying to it be valid? If everything is non-existent, then how could the faults for the other alternative exist? The second suggestion is not possible because it is contradictory. When two things are mutually opposing, there is no third possibility.”

An objection is now raised, along the lines of the *Ślokavārttika*, *Vanavāda*, śloka 79, p. 633, and the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 372.<sup>89</sup> The *pūrvapakṣa* asks what it means to assert that a given object is neither (x) nor (y), existent nor non-existent. From common experience failure to assert that an object is (x) or (y) can be a result of doubt, or the definite knowledge that it is neither of the two but a third, (z). If it is a result of doubt, then it must be admitted that the object is in fact either (x) or (y). The occasion for this doubt, here, observation of faults in both cases, is to be removed.

Applying this to the specific case in question, the opponent urges that where  $x$  = existent and  $y$  = non-existent the object must in fact be (x) and the faults given if it were so must be invalid. The reason why the object cannot be (y) is obvious. If it be asserted that nothing in the world exists, then it is not possible to prove things do not exist, the faults resulting on the opposite assumption being equally insubstantial. Thus if Śrī Harṣa intends by the statement “One can say neither that things exist, nor that they do not exist” to say that he is in doubt, then he must admit their existence.

If the second alternative, the fact that it is neither (x) nor (y) but (z), be intended, this is also not possible. Where (x) and (y) are mutually contradictory, the very statement “not x” means (y) and “not y” means (x). A denial of both (x) and (y) is impossible by the law of the excluded middle.

All of this is the objection of one who has not understood his adversary’s intentions. For how is he, who maintains that nothing can be defined as existent or non-existent, to be criticized as if he had asserted the existence of this very indefinability? Indefinability is included within the word “all” which refers to anything and everything in the phenomenal world. It is only in accordance with what the opponent ad-

mits that this results: definability being refuted, indefinability remains, for it is he who claims that of a negation and its counterpositive the denial of the one is the assertion of the other. And so, it is only in accordance with our opponent's conceptions that this is said, "Everything turns out to be indefinable." In reality, we avoid categorizing the phenomenal world as existent or non-existent; placing our all on self-established consciousness, the real Brahma alone, we rest in peace, our purpose accomplished. But those who undertake debate by means of a set of proofs and refutations which they themselves design, and hope thereby to establish the truth, to them we say, "These arguments of yours are not correct, for they are contradicted by the very principles which you admit." And for this reason, all objections to the faults which we adduce are without occasion, for we do no more than to point out that your principles are contradicted by your own admissions.

In Śrī Harṣa's reply to the above objection is the essence of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* and I believe, the secret to its brilliance. The opponent has made the following assumption, "According to you, indefinability exists for all objects", and has then proceeded to question, "What is this indefinability, and what in fact does it mean to say that an object is indefinable?" Śrī Harṣa replies with the utmost simplicity. That very first assumption from which the opponent has begun is incorrect. Śrī Harṣa does not maintain that indefinability exists. "Indefinability" is merely the logical outcome of his opponents' doctrines. All that Śrī Harṣa ever does is to demonstrate that the *sadvādin's* conceptions of the world are self-contradictory. Thus, the world cannot be said to exist as nothing is admitted to exist on the basis of a cognition later contradicted (cf. p. 56 Chow). This is an indisputable principle of the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Jains. The world can also not be said to be non-existent, as then no discussion or anything else for that matter would be possible. This is also by the opponent's own admission; it is in fact the very logic he urges against the Mādhyamika and Vedāntin (cf. p. 31 Chow, translation and note 3). Thus it is the opponent's contention that the world cannot be defined as existent or non-existent. Now, that which cannot be defined is indefinable, also according to the Nyāya principle that negation of (x) gives non-x, or (y) and no third possibility.

Śrī Harṣa thus has done nothing more than to indicate to the Naiyāyika just where his own doctrine leads him. It is the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka or



Jain (after denouncing the *Syādvāda*) who is to be asked, “Well, now, everything has indefinability. What does that mean?” The true Vedāntin is free from all such involvement. He neither attempts to prove that the world exists nor that it does not exist, whence the faults of *ativyāpti*, etc., in definition might result or the contradictions inherent in nihilism. And he does not attempt to prove that it is indefinable. *Anirvacanīyatva* is only the result of his opponent’s failure to define the world as existent.<sup>90</sup>

This leaves no room, as Śrī Harṣa himself asserts, for the opponent to urge against him that any of the faults he adduces against the Naiyāyika is invalid. All Śrī Harṣa ever states is what the Naiyāyika himself designed and respects. Thus, as long as Śrī Harṣa follows the method here outlined for himself, the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* should be irrefutable. It is my contention that he probably does follow this procedure (see preface). This is a question to be kept in mind as further arguments are read; its final answer must come from extensive research into the doctrines of his opponents.

Nor is the mere statement of this fact a cause for reproach, for it has been shown that debate can be undertaken merely on the admission, “Debate is to be carried out by those who are oblivious to the question of the existence or non-existence of the statements made therein.” If it be said, “Debate cannot be carried out if one does not admit its existence”, then, it is also not possible to admit its existence without employing some means of valid knowledge, for that would lead to undesired conclusions. And so debate would also have to be debated, and the very start of any debate would be impossible.

Śrī Harṣa has clarified his own manner of debating. He does no more than to tell the opponent he has contradicted himself. The opponent now returns with an objection similar to his earlier objections (p. 53 Chow). If Śrī Harṣa says that he “states” these facts, then he must be admitting the existence of his own statements, if nothing more. The doctrine of non-duality is contradicted, and the assertion that the admission of existence is not necessary becomes meaningless.

Śrī Harṣa answers this objection just as he did above (Chow p. 112). To demand that admission of the existence of debate (the collection of statements the two parties make) is necessary prior to all debate will make any debate impossible. By debate *A* it will have to be proved that debate must be admitted to exist before debate *B* can begin. But *A* is also a debate, and for it to begin the same fact must be proved by another debate *C*, and so on. The *pūrvapakṣa* will be involved in an infinite regress, and no debate could ever get started.

Nor is it to be said that the existence of debate need not now be investigated as each debate has been proved by endless previous proofs. For, if debate has been previously proved, then since it is determined by its object, that which is to be debated, that topic of debate would also have been previously established and there would be no starting of debate again. Or is it that a particular topic of debate has not been previously established and so it is permissible to open discussion for the purpose of establishing that topic? Well, then, the particular debate which has that as its object has also not been previously established, and all of this argument of yours is as worthless as chewing on dried grass!

The opponent seeks to avoid the infinite regress much as Śrī Harṣa himself did on p. 47 (Chow) in the case of accepting the rules of debate. The existence of debate need not be proved at present. Just as it was not necessary to examine anew the rules for debate as their effectiveness had already been established by endless prior generations, so it is not necessary to examine the existence of debate as that has also been accepted by our long distant predecessors and passed down through time immemorial.

Śrī Harṣa replies that the two cases are essentially different. Debate, like knowledge, is a “*saviṣayakapadārtha*”. It is known and defined by its object, and can never be experienced without that object. If the existence of a particular debate having an object ( $x$ ) were previously known, then that object ( $x$ ) would also have been previously known as the two are inseparable. The purpose of now undertaking this debate has already been fulfilled; one debates only to ascertain object ( $x$ ). If it is already known, any further investigation would only be a waste of energy. Thus by the *pūrvapakṣa* attempt to prove that debate may be undertaken as there is no infinite regress, the very opposite results.

To avoid this difficulty the opponent further suggests that what has been established in prior times is that debate in general exists, and not that a particular debate  $A$  having object ( $x$ ) exists, whereby it would follow that ( $x$ ) is also known. This object remains unknown and present investigation is thus fruitful.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that the *pūrvapakṣa* statements are somewhat confused. On p. 195 (Chow), it was urged that the very assertion of certain facts in a debate implied the admission of the existence of that collection of statements known as debate. The opponent now suggests that all that is necessary is the admission of the existence of some collection of statements,

some debate undertaken at some time or another. This is no better than his assertion on p. 114 (Chow) and the reply is essentially the same. What has the existence of some group of statements at some time to do with the present situation? If people in the Fiji Islands do not discuss the existence of the world, how could the non-existence of their debates ever prevent the occurrence of the present debate between Śrī Harṣa and his opponent? That some debate in general is previously known is thus no solution to the *pūrvapakṣa* objection on p. 195 (Chow), and it remains that the existence of this or that particular debate be investigated, with the result of an infinite series and the impossibility of ever undertaking any debate.

And if you contradict an objection of ours which is phrased in accordance with your own admissions, you will only be contradicting your own statements. If you should attack something we say by employing one of our “refuting principles” still we are the victors, for you will be establishing our own view that “refuting principles” are the means to destroy accepted tenets, and that which is to be accepted is to be destroyed. Therefore, in a debate where you are to prove a given point and we are to refute you, the only way for you to win is actually to prove that point. In this manner it is established that the phenomenal world of difference is indefinable and that Brahma alone, without a second is absolutely real.

Śrī Harṣa here elaborates his earlier statement (p. 195 Chow) that the Naiyāyika in a debate with Śrī Harṣa who does no more than to show with the Naiyāyika tenets that those tenets are contradictory, must not ever find fault with Śrī Harṣa’s refutations. To deny what Śrī Harṣa urges against him would be to deny his own previous admissions. To subject Śrī Harṣa’s replies to the same scrutiny to which his own tenets are subjected by Śrī Harṣa, by asking of him the meaning of various words in a statement and then refuting any definition given, will also only give Śrī Harṣa victory. Those replies are the Naiyāyika’s own contentions. To destroy them by powerful logical examination is to admit that such attempts at proving the existence of the world are doomed to failure and lead only to contradiction. This is Śrī Harṣa’s very design. The Naiyāyika will have saved him the trouble of demolishing the Naiyāyika admissions by himself. Thus, the only way for the Naiyāyika to win is to prove what he sets out to prove. These are the rules of the game. Śrī Harṣa adds that in a debate of this general description it is thus shown that the world of difference is false, and Brahma, free from duality, is real. This concludes our brief interlude, and the final

assertion that difference is impossible and non-difference true, serves as the focus of the next and third main section of the introduction to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, which is a defense of the doctrine of non-duality.

“But what is the proof that it is without a second?” The very question is not possible for one who does not admit non-duality. For, if that proof which you demand for non-duality has never been known, then how could the question even arise? This is not a proof in general which is requested by you; but one defined by a specific object, and that request could only be possible if such a proof were known to you. A question is a type of verbal activity and all activity is limited to the object of the knowledge which gives rise to that activity. Otherwise, there being no other cause for limiting the objects of activities, there would be total chaos among the objects of all behavior!

This third section is opened with a direct question to the last statement made above: what proof is there that Brahma is non-dual and difference is false? All cognitions in fact tell us the opposite – that difference cannot be denied. Śrī Harṣa permits his opponent to open his objection with this fatal question, and then proceeds immediately to destroy it. To ask, which is a form of speaking, requires knowledge of that which is asked. This is simple enough, and admitted by the Naiyāyika (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 131). Knowledge supplies all activity with its object. We first know that a pot exists and that it will serve our end and then we move to take it and not a book or anything else. Without knowledge we might act towards anything at all or towards nothing at all, the reason, *jñānaviśayatvābhāva*, existing everywhere.<sup>91</sup> Thus the opponent’s question as a form of activity must imply knowledge.

Now, the opponent asks not what is the means of rightly knowing the time or anything else, but of rightly knowing non-duality. Knowledge is always *viśayanirūpya* or described by its object.<sup>92</sup> To ask for such a proof then implies that the opponent has knowledge of that specific proof of non-duality. It is obvious that if he knows a valid proof for non-duality, then he must in fact admit its existence. This is in essence Śrī Harṣa’s reply: the very question implies the opposite of what its propounder would desire.

If you say that non-duality, the object of your question, has been known, is this knowledge of yours valid or invalid knowledge? In the first case, whatever was the instrumental cause of that knowledge, that is the proof of non-duality, and it is thus known to you as well. Your question is useless. Nor is it to be said that even though it is known that

there exists some means of valid knowledge for non-duality, the question is of a specific means of valid knowledge, since on the knowledge that there exists some proof for it, non-duality is established, and your question of a particular proof is as useless as looking for a crow's teeth! Furthermore, knowledge of a proof in general implies a proof in particular and thus makes known the particular as well. What is the use of the question? For, wherever you do not perceive any faults amongst the accepted number of means of valid knowledge, the general will fulfil itself in that particular; and if you perceive faults amongst all of these, then the general must lead to another particular means of valid knowledge and rest therein. And if your question is which one means valid knowledge from a particular group, then not every individual can be named and so even if we do not answer it is not to our detriment. If you mean the second, then would not this question of yours, given that you believe the knowledge of non-duality to be invalid, "What is the means of valid knowledge in the case of this invalid knowledge?" be contradictory? Or perhaps you would say, "In my doctrine it is invalid, but in your doctrine it is valid, and I am asking the cause for that valid cognition, the means of valid knowledge?" This is still not possible. For, it is not necessarily the case that I must say that the cause for the knowledge of non-duality which you have is in fact a means of valid knowledge. Just because I admit non-duality, must therefore the cause of your knowledge of non-duality be a means of valid knowledge? Just because someone seeing fog and thinking it to be smoke infers from that fog that there is fire on a mountain where fire does happen to exist, does that mean that the cause of his inference, namely a mistaken knowledge of smoke in which fog is the real object, must be admitted to be a cause of valid knowledge?

The conclusion to the preceding passage, that the question implies the existence of a proof and that the opponent does in fact accept non-duality, involves actually one more step in reasoning. This step is here detailed. That the opponent asks, shows he has knowledge of such a proof. That this knowledge cannot be invalid and must be valid, in which event the opponent would be accepting non-duality, is only here demonstrated.

The passage opens with a *vikalpa*. There are two alternatives. The opponent's knowledge may be valid or invalid. If it is valid, then he knows that a proof exists, and that for which valid proof exists is admitted. The conclu-

sion of the preceding passage is established, and the question itself becomes meaningless as the opponent would now be asking for something which he already knows. Śrī Harṣa allows his opponent a few opportunities to justify himself. The opponent suggests that he knows that there is some proof for non-duality, but he does not specifically know what that proof is, whether perception, inference, scripture, etc. The question is thus meaningful as an inquiry into the specific proof for non-duality. To this Śrī Harṣa replies with the general rule, “*nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyam*”. The fact that there is some proof is not possible without there being one specific type. Thus, the knowledge of a proof in general leads to knowledge of a proof in particular. This will be either one from amongst those accepted by the opponent, or in the case that none of these will do, something other than the presently acknowledged *pramāṇas*. Having failed in his second suggestion, the opponent offers a third. He knows that the proof of non-duality is either inference or perception, etc., what he does not know is of one given group which individual it is. This is his question. To this Śrī Harṣa replies that the individuals are infinite in number and no one can know or name them all. The question thus demands no answer.

The second alternative remains, that the opponent's knowledge of non-duality is invalid. The question is now contradictory: “What is the cause for this invalid knowledge, which cause moreover leads only to valid knowledge?” Nor is it possible to remove this contradiction by the assumption that the cognition of non-duality is considered to be valid by Śrī Harṣa, for there is nothing to prevent a wrong means from giving rise to right knowledge in limited cases, and thus the question of that cause as a right means is still unjustified.<sup>93</sup> There is of course one other possibility, which Śrī Harṣa does not mention and refute, and that is that the *pūrvapakṣa* is asking for the cause not of his own knowledge which is invalid but of Śrī Harṣa's knowledge which Śrī Harṣa himself says is valid. This is also no solution. If the opponent admits that Śrī Harṣa's knowledge of non-duality is in fact valid knowledge, then he has admitted that non-duality is true. If he merely says so for the sake of his question, and believes that even Śrī Harṣa's cognition is invalid, then he will still be asking for a means of valid knowledge which gives rise to false knowledge, a contradiction in terms. Thus, the question of the opponent can be only that he admits a valid cognition of non-duality, and inevitably involves him in the admission of the doctrine he wishes to destroy.<sup>94</sup>

Let this question be, in some way or another. We reply that scripture is the means of valid knowledge for non-duality. It is recorded in the

scriptures, “There is only the one, without a second, there is no multiplicity here whatsoever” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 4.4.19), etc. And that scripture is valid for existing objects will be demonstrated in the *Īśvarābhisamdhī*. Even if scriptural passages referring to existing objects are considered as primarily denoting something else, still, they make known that other object only along with that which is known through the associations of their particular words and is uncontradicted. The inherent validity of knowledge is removed by contradiction alone.

Śrī Harṣa allows the opponent’s unfortunate question to rest and begins his direct reply. Scripture is the source of knowledge of non-duality. In deference to the Mīmāṃsaka who holds that scripture is only valid with respect to “*kārya*”, that which is to be accomplished, and not with respect to objects already established, he makes two remarks. One, that this doctrine will be disproved in the *Īśvarābhisamdhī*, his own now lost work, and two, that even if one considers the passages on existing objects to be primarily related to “*kārya*”, one still cannot deny their validity for that meaning which is directly perceived from their sentences, when such a meaning is uncontradicted.<sup>95</sup> It now remains to show that non-duality is in fact free from objection.

“But, the scriptures enjoining non-duality cannot be valid in their obvious sense, for they are contradicted by perception. Thus some other significance for them is to be imagined.” No, for that perception which you conceive as contradictory to non-duality arises limited with respect to its own object, the difference, say, between a pot and a cloth. There is no perception accepted by both of us which grasps the difference of all individual objects, past, present and future. I would believe your omniscience on the strength of such a knowledge thus arising if you could know just what is in my mind! And if perceptions, etc. are of limited objects, then the scripture propounding non-duality, operating elsewhere, could not be contradicted, since a valid cognition contradicts wrong knowledge only with respect to its own object and no more. Otherwise, the scriptural passage enjoining non-violence to all animals would be nullified by the injunction to immolate the beast for the Agniṣomiya sacrifice.

With this begins the refutation of all objections to the doctrine of non-duality. The opponent begins with the most obvious criticism: non-duality is

contradicted every moment of our lives by the perceptions we have in which difference is made known. Śrī Harṣa replies with an examination of the nature of these ordinary cognitions. All perception is limited to a given set of objects. Thus, the cognition, “the pot is different from the cloth”, can be proof only of a particular difference, in Nyāya terminology known as “*ghaṭ-ānuyogikapāṭapratīyogikabheda*”. Now assuming that scripture cannot act where it is contradicted, it could still make known the non-duality of all things untouched by this cognition. It is not possible to assert that a given authority nullifies that which is not its own object. Were that the case, Śrī Harṣa illustrates, the scripture enjoining non-violence to all animals but considered to refer only to those which are not needed for sacrifice, might be nullified by the injunctions to immolate sacrificial beasts, the latter acting outside their designated sphere. The particular sacrifice here cited is part of the Darśapūrṇamāsa ritual.<sup>96</sup>

This being the case, when the scripture is uncontested in making known the non-duality of that very contradicting perception and the knowledge which is to be contradicted, and proves their identity, how could that same perception nullify itself? And, how is the scripture making known the oneness of all things not to be a valid proof for the oneness of that very cognition with its own objects, the pot, the cloth and their difference, for it is not contradicted in this respect? That knowledge is not its own object, nor is the difference between itself and the pot, cloth, etc., its object. The knowledge arises in the following form, “the pot and the cloth are different”, and not “I am different from the pot and the cloth”, or “they are different from me”. Self-awareness is a witness only to the very essence of knowledge and not to the difference knowledge has from everything dissimilar to it as well. Otherwise, with all those things thrown into the womb of self-awareness, why would not non-duality come out? Nor is it to be said that when knowledge makes known its own nature and the nature of its object, difference, which is nothing more than those individual natures, has thereby also been revealed; for, in that case, in the erroneous cognition, “this is silver” in the revelation of the natures, “thisness” and “silverness”, their difference would also have been revealed. And if it be argued that essential nature alone is not difference, but only in combination with some particular quality, well, then, the same would be true of knowledge, and that very knowledge cannot be its revealer, for this would require some form of contact, impossible before that



knowledge. "If in revealing its own qualities it requires no contact?" No, for then this would also have to hold true for the qualities, "experience", "memory", "validity", etc.

Given the fact that one authority can nullify another only where their objects are identical, Śrī Harṣa now proceeds with his demonstration that an ordinary perception, "the pot is different from the cloth", can never serve to refute the knowledge, "all is non-different", resulting from the scriptures and unlimited in its object. The simplest refutation is first given. Knowledge *A*, "*ghaṭapaṭau bhinnau*", tells us nothing of its own relationship to the knowledge "*sarvam abhinnaṃ*" which it is to contradict. Now, what is to prevent the scripture, uncontradicted in this sphere from making known that the very cognition *A* is non-different from the scriptural knowledge? When this is realized it becomes nonsensical to say that knowledge *A* nullifies scripture = knowledge *A*. The very assertion of the opponent that perception *A* nullifies scripture reduces to the statement that it nullifies itself and is contradictory!

For those who prefer more lengthy expositions, Śrī Harṣa continues with the following. Scripture is also uncontradicted in making known the non-difference of cognition *A* and the objects of that cognition, the pot, the cloth and their difference. It is not possible to contend that cognition *A* also makes known its own difference from its objects; this is contrary to experience. The cognition *A* arises in the form, "the pot and the cloth are different", without giving any further information about anything else. Moreover, for the Naiyāyika such a contention would involve acceptance of the doctrine that knowledge reveals itself.

Śrī Harṣa next anticipates and refutes an objection raised by the two *bhedavādins* who admit both that knowledge is self-aware and that difference is the very nature of an object, the Jains and the Prābhākaras. Knowledge as cognizant of its own essence should be cognizant of its difference from other objects. Śrī Harṣa refutes the Jains with a statement taken from their own texts: Even so, knowledge, self-aware, is admitted to be oblivious to its distinction from anything else.<sup>97</sup> The Prābhākara remains, for to him knowledge as aware of its own nature and the nature of its objects could very well be aware of their difference as well;<sup>98</sup> he does not assert the contrary. To this Śrī Harṣa replies that such an admission is not tenable for the Prābhākara as it would destroy another of his cherished tenets. It is to be recalled that error in the doctrine of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā is nothing more than ignorance of difference.<sup>99</sup> Now, if knowledge in making known its

own nature and the nature of its objects, also made known their difference, this whole theory of error would fail. The erroneous cognition, “this is silver”, makes known both “thisness” and “silverness”. If the difference between the two were nothing more than this, that difference being perceived, there would be no opportunity for an absence of the same perception, which Prābhākara maintains is the very life-blood of such a cognition. If to avoid this undesired result, the Prābhākara asserts that it is not just essential nature which constitutes difference, but that nature qualified by some attribute, say conch shellness,<sup>100</sup> and that that attribute must also be grasped for difference to be perceived, then the same must be true in the case of knowledge. Some attribute of knowledge must be grasped before its difference from its own objects can be known. This is not possible, as such a perception would require some contact between the sense organ and its object, the quality of knowledge in question, prior to the rise of the knowledge of that quality. It is obvious that this one knowledge as the locus of the contact cannot exist prior to itself. Finally, if the Prābhākara assume that knowledge may grasp its own quality without such prior contact, again his theory of error fails. The theory requires not only that the difference between “thisness” and “silverness” not be grasped, but also the difference between “memory” and “experience”. This would be impossible if all knowledge as self-aware also revealed its own qualities. We have thus arrived at the conclusion that scripture makes known the non-difference of knowledge *A* from its own objects.

In this way, how could this knowledge, being revealed by scripture as identical with the pot and with the cloth, be a valid proof of the difference of itself from itself? Thus, the contradicting cognition loses its probative value for the difference of the pot from the cloth, and scripture, rendered invincible by the impossibility otherwise of the fact that this and that are identical, a fact revealed by its natural authority which is unhindered by any contradiction in this or that case, when it now reveals that these two (the pot and the cloth) are also identical cannot be contradicted. And so, scripture, nowhere denied access, makes known the non-difference of all things. Nor is the opposite to be suspected, on the strength of the fact that a valid cognition of difference would otherwise not be possible; for the very validity of such a cognition is placed in doubt by the scriptures enjoining non-duality, and an invalid cognition may indeed otherwise occur, like the cognition of two moons.

This is but a natural conclusion to the above passage. With the fact that scripture makes known that knowledge *A* is not different from its own objects, the pot and the cloth, it now follows that that knowledge *A* cannot serve as a valid proof for the difference of these two objects. Such an assertion amounts only to this, “knowledge *A* is different from knowledge *A*”, an obvious impossibility. Scripture, now completely uncontradicted, can make known that the objects themselves are identical. It can do so not only on its own unchallenged authority, but is also supported in this task by an *arthāpatti*.<sup>101</sup> Without the identity of (*x*) and (*y*) their identity to knowledge *A* is impossible. (If  $A = x$  and  $A = y$  is true, then  $x = y$  must also be true.) Śrī Harṣa concludes by saying that such an *arthāpatti* is not to be doubted in the opposite case. It cannot be argued that the pot and the cloth must be different, as otherwise a valid cognition of their difference would be impossible. *Arthāpatti* comes to the aid of scripture, the validity of which has been fully established by the above demonstration of the absence of any conflicting cognition. The validity of the perception of difference is nowhere proved; in fact, it is subject to strong doubt by the presence of the contradicting scriptures. A wrong cognition cannot serve in the *arthāpatti*, for error can occur even in the absence of its object. Thus, it is proved that scripture is a valid authority for non-duality, uncontested by perception.

That the scripture enjoins that it is one and further adds the particle “only” in the statement “It is one only” makes known that it is absolutely one and that the validity of the perceptions grasping the difference between a pot and a cloth, for example, is not to be justified by a doctrine of difference and non-difference.

Śrī Harṣa, having dispensed with the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka, now rejects the Jain who might contest the above demonstration of the fact that perception of difference is invalid as contradicted by scripture. The Jain sees no such contradiction. He maintains that all things are both different and non-different from each other. Śrī Harṣa asserts that the particle “*eva*” in the scriptural statement explicitly denies such a possibility. The whole process of reasoning thus far detailed is to be repeated against the Jain substituting “*bhedābheda*” for “*bheda*” and the Jain doctrine is refuted.<sup>102</sup>

“How can all this be, for cognition does not stop and then start again?” No, for all that is being said is that our cognitions, mounting the stairway of such an investigation, gradually proceed with the object of

examining the validity of the cognition of non-duality with respect to various objects, the cognition of non-duality itself making known the non-duality of all things at once the very moment it arises.

An objection is now raised to the very process of argument thus far outlined. Śrī Harṣa has detailed how scripture acts first with respect to one non-difference, that between the cognition of the difference between the pot and the cloth, and its own objects, and then proceeds to make known the non-duality of the pot and the cloth and so on. It is a general rule of Indian philosophers that knowledge cannot so function. Its very arising is its activity and in the next moment it is destroyed (cf. *Ślokaṇṛtta*, *Pratyakṣasūtra śloka*s 55–56, p. 113). Thus, to say that one knowledge of the non-duality of all things first acts here and then acts elsewhere is not in conformity with that which is accepted to be true about knowledge in general.

The answer is given that the opponent has not in fact understood Śrī Harṣa's intention. It is not that a single knowledge derived from the scriptures on non-duality proceeds thus in a gradual process. It acts at once. It is only that we examine its validity by means of many cognitions in the gradual steps outlined above. The opponent is thus guilty of *niranūjojyānūyoga*. No one has said that a single knowledge acts, stops and then resumes its function.<sup>103</sup>

“But just because by that perceptual knowledge which reveals the difference between the pot and the cloth, its own difference from the pot and cloth, its own objects, is not made known, still, how can scripture be valid for non-duality? For, that scripture will indeed be contradicted there by another knowledge which makes known the difference of the first cognition from the pot and cloth.”

Not at all. For scripture, for the moment disregarding the objects of the first cognition, serves as valid proof of the non-duality of the objects of the second cognition and that second cognition itself, by means of which the difference between the knowledge of the difference of the cloth and the pot and its objects was made known. Gaining thus a foothold, scripture reveals the identity of the second cognition with *all its* own objects – the pot, the cloth, their difference, and the first knowledge itself. And so it eventually ends up in showing the non-duality of all these things.

The opponent, defeated in his first attempt to rebut Śrī Harṣa's arguments, returns with another effort to show that scripture is indeed

contradicted by perception. It is to be recalled that Śrī Harṣa had demonstrated that once knowledge *A* is known as non-different from its own objects, it can no longer serve as valid proof of the difference between those two objects. *Śruti*, thus uncontradicted, steps in and reveals their identity. It is this crucial step to which the opponent now takes exception. Although knowledge *A* itself does not make known its own difference from its own objects, what is to prevent a second knowledge *B* from so doing? Scripture would then be contradicted and could not prove knowledge *A* to be identical with its own objects, and knowledge *A* could then serve as proof for the difference between those two objects and strongly contest the validity of a cognition of their identity based on scriptural passages.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that the same process of reasoning applied to knowledge *A* must be applied to this new knowledge *B*. Scripture, neglecting for the moment knowledge *A* and its objects, makes known the identity of knowledge *B* and the objects of knowledge *B*:

knowledge *B* = knowledge *A*  
                   = *x*, *y* (objects of *A*)  
                   = *x*. *ybheda*

To assert now that knowledge *B* reveals the difference between knowledge *A* and its objects, (*x*) and (*y*), is just as contradictory as it was to assert that *A* reveals the difference between (*x*) and (*y*) above. Knowledge *A* is thus shown to be identical with (*x*) and with (*y*) and is no longer a valid proof of their difference. *Śruti* steps in and shows that (*x*) and (*y*) are the same.

This being the case, wherever breakage in the successive chain of contradicting cognitions is admitted, for fear of never being able to know another object, and for fear of infinite regress, the scripture of non-duality places its foot right there on that very knowledge and revealing the whole chain of knowledges and objects as non-dual, cannot be refuted with respect to any single object by any means of knowledge.

Therefore,

When the successive chain of contradicting cognitions, exhausted by its long march, rests, the battle is won by the scriptures of non-duality, bringing up the rear.

Nor is it admissible to assume that where the chain of cognitions of one knower ceases, the cognition of another individual will serve as a valid means to know that difference. For you still must give some means by

which you know that these things will be experienced as different by that person. You cannot leave that to another person as well! Nor is proof to be reasonably assumed, for such an assumption is prevented by the definitive knowledge which arises from scripture, and because an infinite regress would still result.

Śrī Harṣa summarizes his former arguments, extending his reasoning to show that no matter how many cognitions of the difference between a given knowledge and its objects the *pūrvapakṣa* might admit, at one point he must break the chain to avoid an infinite series, and wherever the chain is broken, *śruti* will step in.<sup>104</sup>

In response to this the opponent suggests that an infinite series need not result, nor need the authority of the scriptures. Where the chain is broken and cognition  $X_x$  of cognizer  $X$  is not known by the same individual as different from its objects, another cognition  $Y_1$  of a cognizer  $Y$  will appear. Thus scripture cannot prove that  $X_x$  is non-different from its objects as it will be contradicted by this  $Y_1$ .

Śrī Harṣa's answer is brief. What justification is there to say that  $Y_1$  reveals the difference of  $X_x$  from its own objects and not just the opposite? The *pūrvapakṣa* must offer some proof for this, which he cannot do.<sup>105</sup> The suggestion is then anticipated and refuted that although one cannot name a specific proof, one can reasonably surmise that there might be one and so scripture is still of dubious validity. Such an assumption Śrī Harṣa states could only be an unreasonable one, for scriptures tell us without question that the difference between  $X_x$  and its objects is indeed false. The opponent's reasoning involves *anyonyāśraya: śruter apramāṭve siddhe tādr-śabhedapramāṇasambhavaḥ; bhedapramāṇasambhava ca sati śruter apramāṭvaṃ syāt*. Finally, even the admission of such a cognition  $Y_1$  would not rescue the opponent from this fault of infinite regress. If cognition  $Y_1$  is not known as different from its own objects, *śruti* will have there gained an opening. In making known the identity of  $Y_1$  and its objects, it will make  $Y_1$  unable to act as proof of the difference of  $X_x$  from its own objects, reveal them as non-dual and proceed right down the line until it has shown the non-duality of everything in the series. The assumption of a  $Y_2$  and so forth ad infinitum or a  $Z_1$  on the part of a third cognizer will lead to further infinite series. It is to be noted that the logic here employed has been met with earlier in the section on self-awareness (138 Chow, 51 Sam).

Or perhaps you would say, "When the scriptural statement of non-duality is contradicted by a chain of knowledges proceeding to a

certain point, then, by the same reasoning, the contradiction of the scripture will be understood to apply to that knowledge which stands at the end and is not itself the object of any other knowledge. For the last cognition of the series obeys the same laws as all of those by which scripture was contradicted.”

This is not true. Do you demonstrate contradiction of the scriptures of non-duality in the last cognition, having observed a certain pervading and a certain pervaded property amongst a number of knowledges, just on the strength of a cognition which grasps invariable concomitance? or on the strength of a knowledge, of which the last knowledge is the object, which makes known an inferential mark existing in the locus of the quality to be proved, and which is accompanied by invariable concomitance? It cannot be the first. For if knowledge of invariable concomitance is admitted to be a contradicting cognition in a specific case, independent of anything else, then that knowledge of invariable concomitance must also be a knowledge of a particular and all talk of inference would vanish. If you intend an inference, then that inference does not proceed, including itself as the locus of the quality to be proved. Thus given a foothold, the scripture of non-duality would have access to all members of the chain, and our previous utterances repeat themselves.

Faced again with an infinite regress, the opponent discards his cognition  $Y_1$  of a second individual and replaces it with a knowledge of difference obtained on the basis of the observation that all members of the series exhibit a certain similarity. Cognition  $A$  has been perceived to be different from its objects by a cognition  $B$ ; cognition  $B$  in turn has been known to be different from its objects by cognition  $C$ . The chain stops here, but cognition  $C$  can also be known to be different from its objects on the basis of a recognized common quality. All are cognitions of the difference between some knowledge and its objects.  $C$ , then, like  $A$  and  $B$  should also be different from its own objects.

Śrī Harṣa seeks clarification for this sketchy proposal. Does the opponent mean to say that he has observed two qualities, perhaps, “*sva-viṣayapratīyogikabhedaṇuyogitva*” and “*jñānānuyogikaviṣayapratīyogikabhedollekhitva*”, which are *vyāpaka* and *vyāpya* respectively and that the general cognition of their existing in the same locus (i.e., the cognition of their *vyāpti*) serves to refute the scripture which makes known that  $C$  is non-different from its objects? If so, he is in serious difficulty. It

has been shown that for one knowledge to serve as a contradiction of another, the two must have identical objects (cf. p. 81 Sam). Now, if the knowledge of the invariable concomitance, “*yatra yatra jñānānuyogika-  
viśayapratīyogikabhedaollekhitvam, tatra tatra svaviśayapratī-  
yogikabhedaṇuyogitvam*”, is to be a contradicting cognition of the knowledge, “*C-anuyogika-C-  
viśayapratīyogikābheda*”, then it must have as its object “*C-anuyogika-C-  
viśayapratīyogikābheda*”. Now, let us look again at the invariable concomitance. This very difference is the *sādhya dharma* or the quality to be proved, and *C* is the *pakṣa* or locus in which it is desired to be proved. Thus, to assert that the knowledge of invariable concomitance has as its object “*C-anuyogika-C-  
viśayapratīyogikābheda*” is to assert that it makes known “*pakṣaṇiṣṭhasādhyaśattva*” or the existence of the quality to be proved at that very locus in which its proof is desired. Such an assertion makes all inference impossible under the Naiyāyika doctrines. The Naiyāyikas assume that the purpose of inference is just such a knowledge. It is easy to see that if it is otherwise obtained, by the cognition which grasps invariable concomitance, then inference becomes unnecessary.

The second possible meaning which Śrī Harṣa allows his opponent’s statement avoids this undesired consequence but leads to another. If the opponent maintains that an actual inference is here implied, then the resultant cognition will be specific to “*C-anuyogika-C-  
viśayapratīyogikābheda*”. Unlike the knowledge of invariable concomitance it is not a general knowledge, but one confined to the presence of the *sādhya* in a given locus. Thus the cognition tells us nothing of its own relationship to its own objects. *Advaitaśruti* steps in here and the process is repeated.


Or perhaps you maintain that the inference, “All knowledges under consideration are different from their own objects, because they are knowledge, like the knowledge of the difference between the pot and the cloth”, making itself the locus of the quality to be proved can in fact establish its own difference from its own objects. This is still of no avail, for even in this case, scripture making known the non-difference of the object from its knowledge will deprive the inference of its opportunity. Let an inferential mark be cited even for proving their reciprocal difference. Scripture uncontradicted with respect to one cognition and the objects of another cognition, running to make known one cognition as non-different from the objects of another cognition, and that other cognition as non-different from the objects of the first, will still end up in the non-duality of all things.



The *pūrvapakṣa* now urges that the inference by which we know that cognition *C*, the last cognition of the chain, is different from its own objects need not be limited to *C* alone, whence *advaitaśruti* steps in and shows all to be identical. There is nothing to prevent that inference from being formulated in such a manner as to prove all knowledges different from their own objects.<sup>106</sup>

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that such an inference still does not reveal the difference of these objects from their knowledges. Scripture is thus uncontradicted in this area and will prove the opposite: all objects are non-different from their knowledges. That the knowledges cannot be different from their objects now follows by *arthāpatti*; if (*x*) is different from (*y*), then (*y*) must also be different from (*x*). The opponent's newly suggested inference is thus impossible, as it is *bādhitaviṣaya*. It might be noted that it is not possible for the opponent to use the same reasoning to justify his own inference that all knowledge differs from its own objects. The opponent cannot urge that if the objects were not different from knowledge, then knowledge could not be different from its objects. The reason for this is that the last statement, that knowledges are in fact different from their objects, is yet to be proved. The inference is of suspected validity, as it is contradicted by scripture. Scripture in revealing all objects as non-different from their knowledges is uncontradicted and so of proven validity. And it is only with respect to a proven fact that *arthāpatti* may operate.

Śrī Harṣa adds that even to formulate an inference where both the objects are proved as different from their knowledges and those knowledges are proved as different from their objects will not hamper the activity of *advaitaśruti*. The difference of knowledge *A* from the objects of a knowledge *B* is still not covered by such an inference. In making known the non-difference of these things, the scriptures on non-duality prove that all things are non-dual. The process is illustrated in the diagram below:



which gives the following equivalents:

$$(1) \quad K_a = V_b = V_c$$

$$K_a = K_b, \quad V_a = V_b$$

$$K_b = V_a = V_c$$

$$(2) \quad K_b = V_a = V_c$$

$$K_b = K_c, \quad V_b = V_c$$

$$K_c = V_b = V_c$$

and finally,

$$K_a = K_b = K_c = V_a = V_b = V_c$$

Nor can it be inferred, “All knowledges are different from the objects of all other knowledges”, lest a knowledge be different from itself, the object of another knowledge. Nor does inserting the qualification, “other than itself” help, for this qualification is unproved for the proponent of non-duality who believes that all things are non-different. For the same reason it is to be known that there is no occasion for the reply, “The scriptures of non-duality are contradicted by another scripture, ‘all is different’, which is self-valid and without contradiction”. If this is to prove the difference of anything from anything else, then it only proves what we already admit, as we recognize the difference of the true from the false. If it proves that everything is different from everything else, then things would even be different from themselves, and the qualification “other than one’s self” is not a valid delimitor for the one who admits non-duality.

Śrī Harṣa continues the previous argument which has steadily progressed from an inference, “Knowledge *C* is different from its objects” to an inference “All knowledges are different from their own objects and all objects from their own knowledges.” Against this it has been urged that *śruti* can still reveal all knowledges as identical to the objects of other knowledges. The opponent now attempts to avoid this possibility. He suggests an inference, “All knowledges are different from the objects of all other knowledges, and all objects are different from all knowledges”. Śrī Harṣa replies that such an inference is inadmissible, for it is perfectly possible that a knowledge *A* be the object of another knowledge *B*. The inference would then be proving that knowledge *A* is different from knowledge *A*. Nor is it possible to qualify the proposition, “All knowledges are different from all objects other than themselves”, for the qualifier “other than themselves” is unproved for the Vedāntin.

The same reasoning is now applied to the suggestion that there exists another scripture making known the difference of all things.<sup>107</sup> Śrī Harṣa asserts that if the scripture means that everything is different from

everything else, then things would be different from themselves. If the opponent adds the qualification, “other than themselves”, this is unproved for the Vedāntin. Finally, he says, if it means that anything is different from anything else, this is already established, for the Vedāntin admits the difference of the true from the false. I can make no sense out of this last remark and suspect it to be an insertion in the main body of the text.<sup>108</sup>

In this way,

If all be made the subject of a proof, there result omniscience and the absence of a mark, etc.; If something be excluded, then open is the door for the scriptures on non-duality!

Śrī Harṣa now summarizes in this verse further faults which would result in an inference such as the opponent above suggests, an inference in which all things are to be proved as possessed of a given attribute. If everything were to form the *pakṣa*, then there could be no *hetu*, as the *hetu* must exist in the *pakṣa* and nothing can reside in itself. There could also be no example. It is required that the proposed *sādhya* be known to exist in the *drṣṭānta*, but if everything is the *pakṣa*, then everything is doubted to have this quality and nothing is proven to be its locus.<sup>109</sup> In addition, the *pakṣa* must be known, and so all things would be known by the person who formulates such an inference; he would have to be omniscient.

And for a like reason,

The otherwise impossibility of the first difference in the chain cannot serve to contradict the scriptures on non-duality in the end; for it too demands a knowledge of itself.

Śrī Harṣa here turns to *arthāpatti*, and says that *arthāpatti* cannot contradict the scriptures on non-duality. The *arthāpatti* might be of the following description: “*ghaṭapaṭabhedānyathānupapattiyādvaitaśrutirapramā*”. This has in essence been refuted on p. 85 (Sam); however, for the sake of completeness perhaps, it is here introduced and subjected to the very faults to which *anumāna* was subjected earlier on p. 92 (Sam). An *arthāpatti* leads to its final conclusion only when the fact that (x) cannot exist without (y) is definitely known.<sup>110</sup> Now, the knowledge by which this *arthāpatti* is known has as its object *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, *tadbheda*, *tasya anyathānupapannatā*. It does not make known its own difference from its own object for the reasons stated on p. 81 (Sam).<sup>111</sup> The *advaitaśruti* steps in here and makes known the fact that this *anupapattijñāna* is non-different

from *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, etc. This being the case, as before, it cannot serve as valid proof of their difference. To suggest a second *arthāpatti* to prove this *anyathānupapattijñāna* as different from its own objects only repeats the same problems. To suggest that one *arthāpatti* makes known that everything is different from everything else would make it liable to the same faults adduced for a scripture of this nature; one thing would then be different from itself.

Nor can one suspect an obstacle to one's understanding of relationship on the grounds that such an understanding follows in positive and negative concomitance the presence and absence of that which is firmly rooted in our minds. For,

Even with respect to that which is absolutely non-existent, words give rise to knowledge, and where contradiction is not present, they give rise to valid knowledge, unshaken in its natural authority.

Even he who admits the non-grasping of an absence of relationship, accepts for what is uncontradicted that the non-grasping of a non-existent absence of relationship is followed by a knowledge of relationship.

This is perhaps the most unaccessible passage of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, and the commentaries are of little help.<sup>112</sup> I would suggest the following. It has been shown that *śruti* cannot be considered invalid because it is contradicted by another means of valid knowledge. It is now offered that it has the second kind of invalidity mentioned in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Codanāsūtra* 54, p. 46, "*ajñāna*". It cannot generate any cognition at all. It is observed that a statement may fail to produce knowledge when it violates what we firmly believe to be true. An example from the Indian context may be of use. In South India, sandal wood trees are favorite habitats of cobras. In the dark when the branches sway in the wind, it is not possible to convince anyone who sees them that there are no cobras hanging down from the boughs. The utterance, "There are no snakes", is not even heard; no connections between the words are recognized.<sup>113</sup>

The opponent is suggesting much the same in the case of the scriptural statement, "Everything is identical". It cannot generate any knowledge of relationship, i.e. of sentence meaning, because such an awareness of the relationship of words in a meaningful whole is invariably accompanied by

the presence of what we firmly believe to be true as the expressed object of those words. Where the words in a sentence would indicate that which is contradictory to our firmest convictions, they can thus produce no notion of any relationship between the things which they denote; the sentence fails to generate any knowledge. Intended is a relationship of invariable concomitance, “*yatra yatrānvayapratipattiḥ, tatra tatra saṃskārārūḍhadr̥ḍhasya pratipādyatayā sattvam; yatra yatra saṃskārārūḍhadr̥ḍhasya pratipādyatayā sattvaṃ nāsti, tatra tatrānvayapratipattir nāsti*”. This comes from the resolution of the compound, p. 96 (Sam), “*saṃskārārūḍhadr̥ḍhānyavavyatirekānvayavyatirekānvayapratipattiḥ*” as “*yaḥ saṃskārārūḍhaś ca dr̥ḍhaś ca tasya yav anvayavyatirekau tābhyām anvayavyatirekau yasyāḥ sānvayapratipattiḥ*”. Now, the statement “Everything is one” violates one of man’s oldest established convictions, the notion of differences. It can thus produce no knowledge at all.

Śrī Harṣa replies to this objection with the first half of a verse from the *Ślokavārttika* (Codanāsūtra 6, p. 35). It is not true that a group of words only gives rise to a knowledge of the relationship obtaining between the objects they denote only when they are in conformity with that which we believe to be true. In fact, the very opposite is observed: even with respect to non-existent objects words generate cognitions. How much more so in the case of that which is uncontradicted, where they give rise to a valid cognition which cannot be disputed! Thus the very suspicion that the words of the scriptures, already shown to be uncontradicted, cannot give rise to knowledge is totally unfounded.<sup>114</sup>

In the second verse, Śrī Harṣa removes the possible objection of a Prābhākara to the statement that even with respect to non-existent objects sentences yield knowledges of relationships. The Prābhākara maintains that an untrue statement does not give rise to any cognition of the relationship obtaining between the objects which it denotes. To do so would be to admit a false knowledge of relationship which would be contradictory to the general Prābhākara assumption that all knowledge is valid, with the exclusion of memory.<sup>115</sup> Śrī Harṣa replies that it makes no difference what happens in error. Scripture has been shown to be valid, and even the Prābhākara admits that where there is no contradiction a statement gives rise to a knowledge of relationship. *Śruti* thus cannot be suspected of *ajñānarūpāpramāṇya*.

This is the idea of the second half of the second verse; what is actually there stated, that the absence of a perception of a non-existent absence of relationship is followed by a knowledge of relationship, demands some

explanation. If in the case of error, the Prābhākara admits that non-grasping of the absence of relationship leads to activity, then he ought to admit the same in valid knowledge, “*pravṛtṭyaviśeṣāt*”, with the one qualification that this absence of relationship is not really there. Now, if the Prābhākara does not also admit that this failure to grasp an absence of relationship in the case of valid knowledge must be accompanied by some knowledge of relationship as well, then he would have no case in which relationship is actually known. This being so, the very concept of “an absence of relationship” which forms the basis of his theory of error would be impossible. Negation demands that its counterpositive be elsewhere proved.

In closing it might be mentioned that the placement of this passage immediately following the refutations of all contradictions of *śruti* is further evidence of the logic governing this text. The present argument would be meaningless without the former proof.

And the scripture of non-duality cannot be contradicted by the hypothesis that it is unfitting, for scripture is not based on false assumption and so has greater force than hypothesis so construed.

Where the very root of the hypothesis of its being unfitting is not cut by something as the hypothesis proceeds,  
There is the kingdom of “unfittingness”; not here, where the opposite obtains.

The opponent, thus defeated, now suggests that it is not that our firm convictions of the existence of difference prevent the very arising of knowledge from the statements of the scriptures; rather, that it is wholly improper for such firmly rooted notions to be denied. It is a common percept of truth-seekers that explanations are to be sought for things which are observed, and that these explanations must satisfactorily account for phenomena as perceived and not deny their very existence. This is Kumāṛila in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra* 133, p. 131, “*Siddhānugamamātram hi kartum yuktaṁ parīkṣakair, na sarvalokasiddhasya lakṣaṇena nivartanam*”. *Advaitaśruti* is invalidated by the fact that it violates this principle in destroying one of our most ancient notions, the notion of the difference of all things. In so doing it is ‘*ayukta*’ in Kumāṛila’s words or ‘*anucita*’, unfitting. To urge thus against an argument that it is unsuitable involves the use of a special *tarka* or hypothesis technically known as ‘*anaucityatarka*’. Here it might be of the form, “*yady advaitaśrutiḥ pramāṇaṁ syāt tarhi sarvalokasiddhasya nivarttanād anucitaṁ eva syāt*”.

Against this Śrī Harṣa replies that “*anaucityatarka*” cannot here be applied. *Tarka* depends upon an assumption which is known to be false at the very moment that it is made. This is the meaning of the phrase, “*āropitamūla*”.<sup>116</sup> Consider the *tarka*, “*yady agnir na syāt, tarhi dhūmo na syāt*”. The speaker knows that the first assertion, “*yady agnir na syāt*”, is contrary to the truth. Similarly, in the present *tarka*, to the opponent, the scripture on non-duality is not a means of valid knowledge and the assertion, “If it were a means of valid knowledge”, is contrary to that which he believes to be true. Scripture on the other hand involves no such false assumption. For the Mīmāṃsaka there is no question that *śruti* can be false at it is “*apauruṣeya*” and invalidity can result only from human error. Similarly for the Naiyāyika to admit that God’s knowledge which is behind all scriptural utterances is false would be to contradict his previous assumption that the cognitions of the omniscient Lord are always correct.<sup>117</sup> For the Jain, its truth has been shown by all the preceding demonstration of absence of contradiction. There is thus no possibility that any scriptural statement involves, even in part, a false conjecture. It is for this reason that scripture has greater force than the present *tarka* urged against it. The one is free from defect and the other, admittedly based on undoubted error.

Śrī Harṣa in his second verse supplies another reason why in fact no *tarka* can be effective in this particular case. The relationship of *bādhyabādhakabhāva* demands that first the cognition which is to be contradicted arise, and then a second, contradicting cognition follow.<sup>118</sup> Thus first it must be known from the scriptures that everything is non-different. Now, this very knowledge of the identity of all things which the opponent desires to be contradicted by *tarka* destroys the very root of that *tarka* and prevents its arising. *Tarka* depends upon invariable concomitance,<sup>119</sup> which itself depends upon a knowledge of the difference between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. The *sādhya* must be unproved and of greater or equal extension; the *hetu* must be proved and of equal or lesser extension. It is not possible that the two be one. Thus, the necessary knowledge derived from scripture destroys invariable concomitance which is at the root of *tarka* and precludes its appearance. There is no question of refutation of the scriptures from something which cannot even be said to exist!<sup>120</sup>

“But, in furnishing examples, whenever you say that the difference of this from that has not been grasped, and so their non-difference is made known by the scriptures of non-duality, and with this as an opening the non-duality of all things results, at that very moment the

difference of this and that is indeed grasped by me, and so either in mentioning specific examples or in not mentioning specific examples a retort such as yours is in no way possible.”

Not at all. For when I say, “The difference between the last cognition and the cognition arising from the scriptures, etc. has not been grasped by you”, that difference, which you are to know by a valid means of knowledge, cannot be known to you by perception, as the last cognition does not then exist. And if you should prove it by some inferential mark or some impossibility which failure to admit it entails, then that mark is unproved for the proponent of non-duality, and that impossibility which results without it is not different from what is to be proved. And so how could there arise a valid cognition from a faulty means of knowledge?

The *pūrvapakṣa*, having failed in his attempts to establish that the scriptures on non-duality are contradicted by perception, inference, presumption or hypothesis, now seeks to show that Śrī Harṣa’s own demonstration of their validity is fraught with contradiction. He turns from independent argument to a type of *pratibandhi* urging that his adversary is guilty of the same fault of which he accuses others. The very statement made from pp. 82 Sam onward, he says, namely that the difference of an entity (*x*) from (*y*) and (*z*) has not been grasped, makes known in fact the opposite. It is a matter of common sense that to use one word to denote (*x*) and other words to denote (*y*) and (*z*) in a single sentence would be impossible if (*x*), (*y*) and (*z*) were the same. Thus Śrī Harṣa is guilty of self-contradiction. His main contention is that (*x*) is not different from (*y*) and (*z*), but his very demonstration of this fact proves its opposite. He is now trapped. He must either admit both difference and non-difference which is illogical, or difference alone, its denial leading only to its proof.

Śrī Harṣa skilfully avoids both these undesirable consequences. The opponent has urged that when the statement, “The difference of (*x*) from (*y*) and (*z*) has not been grasped”, is made, that difference is in fact experienced. The question is now raised, by what means is it experienced? It cannot be by perception, for perception grasps only the immediately present and would require the existence of the locus of that difference.<sup>121</sup> Now, (*x*), it is to be remembered, is nothing but the last cognition of the series earlier construed. This knowledge endures only for a few seconds and is not present when the opponent asserts that he knows its difference from either the knowledge arising from scripture or from its own objects. If the opponent intends that this



difference be grasped by inference, “*x-y bhinnau bhinnapadavācyatvāt*” or by *arthāpatti*, “*bhinnapadavācyatvānyathānupapattyā x-y bhinnau*”, which would indeed seem to be the case, then the faults mentioned on p. 97 (Sam) in the refutation of *tarka* would result. For the *advaitavādin* all things are non-different. This *hetu* is thus *sādhyaśiṣṭa* or *asiddha* and invalid.<sup>122</sup> Similarly the *arthāpatti* is *sādhyaśiṣṭa*. Whence, then, comes this experience of the difference of (x) from (y) and (z) when it is stated that that difference is not known?

Nor is it to be said, “That difference is known by me, and there is no question of the mark being unproved in my case”, for then your words would be useless as the only purpose of speech is to inform another. And if you remain silent then you do not absolve yourself from the fault of failure to reply.

Nor is it to be said, “The difference is validly experienced by me and my opponent is simply awakened to this fact by my words”, for your opponent has no faith in what you say. The words of one person who is out to win act on another who is also out to win only by awakening in him a desire to know a given object and thereby leading to his own proof of that object. And this cannot be done in the case of the person who maintains the non-duality of all things, for it has already been said that the inferential mark remains unestablished for him. Nor is it to be said, “Your assertion of non-difference is improper as it is on the basis of a scripture which is of suspected validity, if only on account of the doubt my words engender.” For, the very occasion for doubt is destroyed by one who maintains the non-duality of all things, and because of the absence of difference sees such faults as the mark’s being equivalent to the quality which is to be proved, etc., in every case.

The opponent replies that his cognition of the difference of (x) from (y) and (z) comes in fact from inference and that there is no fault of *asiddhi*. He admits the difference between all things, and so there is no question that the *hetu* and *sādhya* may be non-different. Thus it is perfectly permissible for him to infer this difference himself and then to urge that the resultant cognition contradicts Śrī Harṣa’s statement that no such difference has been experienced.

Śrī Harṣa takes exception to this suggestion, less because it has any inherent flaw in its logic, and more because it is totally irrelevant to the situation at hand. The two are engaged in a debate. The opponent has urged against Śrī Harṣa that his earlier statements are untrue; difference is known.

Now, it is incumbent upon him to prove this point to his adversary. There is no place for “*svārthānumāna*” in debate. Moreover, that the opponent addresses Śrī Harṣa with these words is an admission of the fact that he wishes to force him to the same conclusion. The only function of speech is to make something known to another person. (Compare the *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 107, “*śabdaprayogaḥ prāyeṇa parārtham upayujyate*”, In general words are spoken for the sake of another”). This being the case, the mark must be meant for Śrī Harṣa and it remains *asiddha*. Śrī Harṣa further adds that if to avoid this fault the opponent makes his own inference and then remains quiet, he will only be guilty of another fault, “*apratibhā*” or ignorance of the proper reply (*Nyāyasūtra* 5.2.18). The opponent is thus caught in a dilemma; if he replies, his mark is *asiddha*, and if he remains silent, he is defeated by this clincher.

The opponent seeks a way out of this situation. He suggests that his words are not purposeless, nor is his mark meant for his adversary’s use whence it would be unproved. The opponent himself infers the difference of (x) from (y) and (z) and then simply tells Śrī Harṣa that he has done so. His words are necessary to communicate this information, and are not meant as a *parārthānumāna*.

Śrī Harṣa replies with a paraphrase of Udayana’s comments on how the statements of the essential components of inference function in debate.<sup>123</sup> It is Udayana’s contention that the utterance of one speaker cannot immediately convince their hearer of the veracity of their object as “*āptavacana*” or valid testimony might do, for the hearer naturally doubts his opponent’s authority. Any mention of an inferential mark simply gives rise to *jijñāsā* or a desire to know on the part of the person who hears it. Stimulated by this desire, the hearer proceeds to formulate an inference for himself and thereby arrives at the opponent’s desired conclusion. Now, by the same logic, the Naiyāyika in the present debate cannot rest with simply telling Śrī Harṣa, “I have grasped the difference of (x) from (y) and (z).” Śrī Harṣa no more believes him than Udayana’s hypothetical listener his own opponent. These words must likewise serve to awaken a desire to know and through that desire lead to the formulation of an inference independently by Śrī Harṣa himself. This is the point at which the entire structure collapses. Inference is not possible for one who does not recognize the difference between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. The *hetu* is still “*anyatarāśiddha*”, and the Naiyāyika statement that he grasps the difference of (x) from (y) and (z) is made meaningless by his own conception of how such a statement must function in debate.

Only one possibility remains to the Naiyāyika, and this is to show that *śruti* has the third type of invalidity, *saṁśaya*. It leads to doubt.<sup>124</sup> If his words, “The difference of (x) from (y) and (z) has been grasped by me”, can never convince Śrī Harṣa that they are true and thus that *śruti* is contradicted, perhaps they can give rise to the doubt that they may in fact be true and *śruti* thus may be false. To this Śrī Harṣa replies that once one knows everything as non-different, and is aware of the fact that there can thus be no *arthāpatti*, *tarka* or inference valid against *śruti*, he could not possibly even suspect that *śruti* might be false. What else could contradict it?<sup>125</sup>

Therefore,

There is no defeat in the frolics of battle for the stalwart hero who takes Brahma as his weapon and cares for naught else.


This is summarized in the present verse, with a play on the word “*Brahmāstra*”. Śrī Harṣa takes the divine weapon of the epic literature and slightly alters its sense. For him it becomes “*Brahmaivāstram*”. The very nature of the ultimate truth defies all arguments against it. Non-duality precludes the possibility of *tarka*, *anumāna*, and *arthāpatti*, and destroys the validity of the perception of difference. It is indeed invincible, in the hands of a logician of Śrī Harṣa’s might.<sup>126</sup>

Moreover, one knows only generally that another person is thinking something or other or is desirous of speaking something or other. But the object of that individual’s thought or the object of his desire for expression is not specifically known in the absence of any determinant. The difference of the last cognition in the chain from this object cannot possibly be validly known by you, since the other individual might very well be contemplating that same last cognition itself. Nothing can be different from itself. In this way gaining a foothold there, how can the scriptures on non-duality resulting in the non-difference of all things possibly be contradicted? Thus,

When something is known but vaguely and not at all in specifics,  
How could you stop the march of the scriptures of non-duality?

In concluding his defense of non-duality, Śrī Harṣa applies his arguments of p. 93 (Sam) to the present *pūrvapakṣa* objection of p. 98 (Sam). The *pūrvapakṣa*, it is to be recalled, failing to demonstrate that scripture has either *mithyātvarūpāprāmānya* or *añānarūpāprāmānya*, turned

his attention to destroying Śrī Harṣa's refutation of the validity of perception of difference. He maintained that at the very moment Śrī Harṣa says that the difference of the last member of the chain from something else is not grasped, it in fact is. Śrī Harṣa has thus far refuted this argument by showing that no *pramāṇa* can make known this difference. He now adds another reason why such a difference cannot be validly known; not by fault of the cause of that knowledge, but by the very nature of its object. We know only generally that another individual is contemplating something or wishes to say something. This can be inferred from his facial expressions and his bodily movements. We have no way of knowing exactly what it is he wishes to say or is thinking.<sup>127</sup> Thus it is in no way possible to know the difference of the last cognition from the object of that individual's knowledge. That very last cognition may in fact be what our friend is contemplating!<sup>128</sup> Any cognition of difference in this case would have to be invalid, as one thing cannot be different from itself. *Advaitaśruti* now steps in and makes known the non-difference of the last cognition of our series from the object of this other person's thought. The same situation results as before (p. 92 Sam):



and everything is now identical.

“But if you do not admit difference, why is not your use of different words in different meanings contradictory?”

And why should it be contradictory? We will explain this anon. Moreover, this contradiction which is to be proved by you must also result from some reason, and we have already said that where the reason and what it leads to are the same, nothing can be proved.

Thus,

When the proponent of non-duality, even taking recourse to multiplicity, speaks, his mind, how could any contradiction fall to him from any sort of reason, when difference is not proved?

As a last resort the opponent rephrases his earlier objection of p. 98 (Sam). If it is not possible to demonstrate that Śrī Harṣa's very statements give rise to a knowledge of the difference he would deny, perhaps it can be

urged that the contradiction inherent in such assertions will suffice as their refutation. It has been shown that behind the *pūrvapakṣa* objection lies the common observation that speech, employing different words to denote different objects, demands difference. To deny that difference and yet engage in discussion would be contradictory. It would involve the following two opposing assumptions:

- (1) *Bhedo nāsti*
- (2) *Bhedo 'sti, tadvinā niyatavāgyavahārasyaivāsambhavāt.*

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that first of all the admission of premise (2) is in fact not essential. Just as the formulation of regulations for debate requires not so much the existence of the *pramāṇas*, etc. as a knowledge of their existence (cf. p. 56 Chow), so the use of given words to express only certain objects and not others demands not the existence of difference but a knowledge of difference. This will be shown on p. 118 (Sam). Finally he urges against the introduction of *vyāghāta* the very same arguments he employed against *tarka*, *anumāna* and *arthāpatti*. This contradiction must be demonstrated in debate and justified by adequate reasons. It is still incumbent upon the opponent to prove contention (2) and to prove that the admission of both (1) and (2) would be contradictory. For one who does not accept that the *hetu* (*niyatavāgyavahārasyāsambhavāt*, or *vidhinikṣepayoḥ parasparaviruddhatvāt*) is different from that which it is to prove (*bheda* and *vyāghāta*) such a demonstration would be impossible. Mere statement of the existence of these reasons according to Udayana himself is useless in debate. All words there act as *parārthānumāna*. Thus the opponent is still guilty of *anyatarāśiddhi*.

This concludes the defense of *advaita* begun on page 76 (Sam). In brief review, it has proceeded in the following manner. The opponent is permitted first to urge against the doctrine of non-duality that it is contradicted by perception (p. 81 Sam). The validity of the perception of difference is then refuted (pp. 82–90 Sam), and the possibility of either inference or presumption as an aid to perception in its refutation of non-duality is denied (pp. 90–95 Sam). With this temporarily rests the defense of *advaita* against perception. P. 96 (Sam) introduces the second type of invalidity, viz. that scripture may fail to give rise to any knowledge at all. This is refuted on pp. 96 and 97 (Sam) and p. 98 (Sam) returns to the question of Śrī Harṣa's attack on the validity of perception. The objections of the opponent are destroyed on pp. 98–102 (Sam) and the suspicion of the third type of invalidity, doubt, is removed. The whole is a detailed refutation of all argu-

ments against *advaita*, and contains nothing in it unacceptable to the opponent. It corresponds to step one of the process of applying “*khaṇḍanayuktis*,” it is a general refutation of the statement of the *pūrvapakṣa*, that non-duality is contradicted by difference. With this completed, Śrī Harṣa now moves into step two, a detailed analysis of one term involved in this statement, namely *bheda* or difference.

The following also requires investigation. That very perception which, grasping the difference of a pot from a cloth, etc., is adduced as a contradiction to the scriptures on non-duality, what exactly does it prove? More specifically, that difference which is grasped by perception, is it (a) the very nature of an object? or (b) reciprocal absence? or (c) distinctiveness in quality? or (d) something else?

Śrī Harṣa opens this first investigation of difference with a direct question.<sup>129</sup> Perception of difference is said to be contradictory to the scriptural assertion of non-difference. Now, what exactly is this “difference”? The alternatives here given cover all the explanations advanced by the *sadvādins*. Difference may be the very nature of an object in question (Prābhākaras, Jains and Naiyāyikas); it may be reciprocal absence or *anyonyābhāva* (the Naiyāyikas); it may be distinctiveness in quality, or *vaidharmya* (the Naiyāyikas) or finally it may be another attribute, *prthaktva* or individuality as accepted by the Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas.<sup>130</sup>

If it is the first, that difference is the very nature of an object, then that very nature of the pot and cloth which is their difference from each other cannot be so without including the one within the other. For, being difference it must of necessity be “from something else”. If this is not admitted, then to say “essential nature is difference” is to do no more than to coin a particular term of no individual significance. And when this much as the nature of the cloth is grasped by perception, namely, “the difference of the cloth from the pot”, then the pot has been included within the nature of the cloth and the very opposite results: the identity of the cloth and the pot has been grasped by the perception which was to have revealed their difference!

Śrī Harṣa begins his refutation of the concept that difference is the very nature of a given object with a unique improvement upon his predecessors’ arguments. The standard Vedānta refutation of difference as essential nature had consisted in the following: Difference is always described by a counterpositive, that from which an object is said to differ. Now, it is a

violation of common sense to assert that the very nature of an object exists only in dependence upon something else. By definition, essential nature should be unique to an object and oblivious to external factors. Moreover, that which exists only in the presence of another is itself nothing more than a mental fiction.<sup>131</sup>

Śrī Harṣa sets out with all of this in mind, but adds the arguments of the present passage, in his brilliant and typical manner demonstrating that the very means by which the opponent would prove difference, on examination proves only its absence. The Prābhākaras, Jains and Naiyāyikas alike urge that “difference is essential nature”. For this statement to be meaningful, such an “essential nature” must itself behave as difference does. Otherwise, the *pūrvapakṣa* might just as well say that “difference is a tree”, coining for difference a synonym which has no independent significance of its own. Such is in fact the practice of the grammarians, as Śrī Harṣa himself has earlier pointed out (“*Nadī*”, “*Vṛddhi*”, p. 61 Sam). Now, difference is always known in combination with a counterpositive. Like absence it is impossible to conceive of difference without its being specifically designated as “the difference of (x) from (y)”.<sup>132</sup> Thus, if any difference is to be the very nature of an object, that difference cannot simply be “difference” but must be “difference from (y)”. This “*y-pratīyogikabheda*” includes within itself (y). To assert that the whole of it is the very nature of (x) is to assert that (y) is also the nature of (x), or that (y) and (x) are identical. The perception of the difference of a cloth from a pot, making known “*ghaṭapratīyogikabheda*” as the essential nature of the cloth, would therefore also be making known that the pot is the real nature of the cloth or that the cloth is in essence a pot. The *pūrvapakṣa*’s own *pramāṇa* now serves as a perfect illustration of the *Siddhāntin* doctrine that all things are non-different.<sup>133</sup>

“But just as this perception has been explained as revealing non-difference, so cast your eyes upon it as revealing difference as well. For, if it revealed non-difference, then the cognition should have the form, ‘this is a pot’ or ‘this is a cloth’, and not, ‘the cloth is different from the pot’.” No. This objection would only be possible if in asserting that non-difference is established by valid means of knowledge we also denied that the existence of difference is falsely perceived.

Therefore,

No cognition not revealing non-difference is capable of revealing difference.

This being so, it must be valid for the first and not the second, as then it would destroy that very thing it requires to exist.

The opponent here voices his first objection to Śrī Harṣa's demonstration that where difference is the essential nature of an object, perception of that difference proves only identity. He urges that this is contrary to what is in fact commonly observed. A cognition of non-difference is of the form, "this is (x)" or "this is (y)", but the present knowledge in question appears as "(x) is different from (y)". Their content cannot be the same in the presence of such a major difference in form.

Śrī Harṣa's reply is somewhat difficult, and once again lost to his later interpreters.<sup>134</sup> He answers the *pūrvapakṣa* objection with *niranu-yojyānuyoga*. He does not assert that there is absolutely no difference in form or content between a knowledge *A*, "(x) is (y)", and a knowledge *B*, "(x) is different from (y)". Knowledge *B* does, it is true, make known the difference of the cloth from the pot; however, *it can only be an invalid knowledge of their difference*, when difference from the pot is conceived to be the very nature of the cloth. On examination, it must be admitted that such a knowledge can be valid for non-difference alone. Thus the previous argument amounts to only this: by the opponent's own conception of difference it results that only non-difference is validly perceived and that difference is invalidly perceived.<sup>135</sup>

The last statement that knowledge *B* must be valid for identity and invalid for difference is further explained by the verse. It has been shown that if the difference of (x) from (y) is the very nature of (x), then (y) must also be the nature of (x), for difference is inseparable from its own counterpositive. Thus inherent in the *pūrvapakṣa* explanation of the difference of (x) from (y) is their very identity. Now, any cognition which reveals their difference must for these reasons also reveal their non-difference. If it makes known that the nature of (x) is "*y-pratīyogikabheda*" then it also makes known that (y) is the nature of (x). If this cognition were considered as valid proof of the difference of (x) from (y), and hence as a denial of their non-difference, then it would only nullify itself. In order that the difference of (x) from (y) be the essential nature of (x), (y) must be non-different from (x). To deny that non-difference is to deny that "*y-pratīyogikabheda*" is the essential nature of (x). This is a denial of difference as it has been explained by the Naiyāyika, Prābhākara and Jain. Thus, the cognition, "(x) is different from (y)", cannot be a valid proof of their difference. It does directly make known "*x-anuyogika-y-pratīyogikabheda*" but must there be invalid. Its validity lies in the opposite direction – that shown by logical examination, "*x-anuyogika-y-pratīyogikābheda*". For a single cognition to be both valid and invalid with respect to different objects represents no contradiction to any of the *sadvādin*s.<sup>136</sup>



Or perhaps it is thought, “‘Difference’ alone is the very nature of the cloth. ‘From a pot’ only means that it is described by something else, the pot, its counterpositive.” This is also not admissible, for difference without any counterpositive is beyond the range of all means of valid knowledge. Those means invariably act only with respect to difference as combined with its counterpositive. And what does it mean to say that the essential nature of a cloth, which must be independent of everything else, is its difference from another object only when described by that other object as a counterpositive? Something that is blue by reason of its very nature is not blue only when it is described by yellow.

The opponent again attempts to avoid the difficulty that where difference is essential nature, (x) and (y) must be alike. It is to be recalled that this results when “*y-pratīyogikabheda*” in its entirety is considered to be the nature of (x). The *pūrvapakṣa* now suggests that “*bheda*” alone is the nature of (x) and that it is only described by (y) which remains external to (x). This is in fact closer to the actual contention of all the *svarūpabhedavādins*; the former assumption that “*y-pratīyogikabheda*” is the nature of (x) is more a result of its following impossibilities.

To say that “difference” alone is the essential nature of any object is not possible, for difference undistinguished by a counterpositive is never perceived (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 446), and thus cannot be said to exist. (Cf. p. 115 of the translation.) Moreover, the very assertion that difference is essential nature and yet requires a counterpositive for its own existence is a contradiction in terms. That which is the very nature of any object is so independently of everything else. Utilizing Śrī Harṣa’s own example, that which is blue of its own accord is not so only because it is in juxtaposition with yellow, green, etc. Thus it is meaningless to state that difference is the essential nature of (x) and yet that it requires the presence of (y) which remains outside that (x). If it requires the presence of a counterpositive, difference could never be the essential nature of its locus. The former alternative, that “*y-pratīyogikabheda*” is the nature of (x), thus remains, and with it the unavoidable consequence that (x) and (y) must be non-different.

And in the statement which has been made, “The essential nature of a cloth being defined by a pot as counterpositive is its difference”, is this “being a counterpositive with respect to the cloth” the very nature of the pot or another quality of some sort? If the first, then the whole thing, “being a counterpositive with respect to the cloth”, being the

nature of a pot would include within the essence of the pot the cloth itself. How could it not result in non-duality? If it be said here as well that “being a counterpositive” alone is the nature of the pot, and that its dependence on the cloth, expressed by the words, “with respect to the cloth”, is something else, this is also not feasible. For, “being a counterpositive” alone, independent of everything else, is not the object of any means of valid knowledge. The same faults are to be applied to “being a counterpositive with respect to the pot” when it is asked whether that quality is the essential nature of the cloth or something else.

Having rejected the possibility that “*bheda*” alone can be the essential nature of the cloth while “*ghaṭa*” as its *pratiyogin* remains external to the cloth, Śrī Harṣa now applies his first arguments to the statement that the pot is the counterpositive of the difference under examination. “*Paṭam prati pratiyogitva*” is said to belong to the pot. Like difference, this may be considered the very nature of the pot or it may be considered to be a quality different from the pot but having the pot as its locus. In the first case, just as “*y-nirūpitabheda*” as the nature of (x) implied that (y) and (x) are identical, so, if the whole thing, “*paṭanirūpitapratyogitva*”, is to be the very nature of the pot, then the pot and the cloth must be identical. If, as the opponent later suggested with *bheda*, only “*pratiyogitva*” is the nature of the pot and “*paṭanirūpitatva*” remains outside that nature, the same faults ensue. There is no proof for the existence of any such thing as “being a counterpositive”. An object (x) is always perceived as a counterpositive *to* something. Thus “*pratiyogitva*” in abstraction is a fiction and it is not possible to assert that such a non-entity constitutes the essential nature of anything at all. Śrī Harṣa adds that the same arguments are to be applied where the difference is phrased, “*paṭād ghaṭo bhidyate*”, and *paṭa* is the *pratiyogin*. If the quality, “being a counterpositive with respect to the pot”, is the very nature of the cloth, then the two must be identical, as the pot is part of this quality which is the essence of the cloth. Again, to place “*ghaṭam prati*” outside and consider only “*pratiyogitva*” as the nature of the cloth is impossible, as this “*pratiyogitva*” undefined with respect to a given object does not exist.<sup>137</sup> Only the second alternative, then, that “*paṭam prati pratiyogitva*” is an attribute of the pot, now remains.

Nor is it the second, for into the quality, “being a counterpositive with respect to the cloth”, enters the cloth as well, and the cloth would thus

be non-different from that attribute. And when the cloth becomes an attribute of the pot, then the pot must also become an attribute of the cloth, by the same process of reasoning. There is no other recourse for the pot when the cloth's being a counterpositive is described by the pot as its counterpositive. And so both would be the residing attribute and the residence of that attribute. No means of valid knowledge has as its object the cloth as the locus of the pot and at the very same time the pot as the locus of that same cloth. Furthermore, in the absence of any connection between the attribute and its locus, there would result undesired consequences; in an endless number of connections, infinite regress. If at the onset or in the end their connection be admitted to be the very nature of one of the terms, then since the other term must also be included within it, non-difference still results. Such is the case with all attributes. Therefore, perception as a valid means of knowing difference as the essential nature of something is actually a valid proof only of non-difference.

The second alternative is here destroyed. If "*paṭam prati pratiyogitva*" is said to be an attribute of the pot, then this attribute must include within itself the cloth as "*pratiyogitva*" alone is an absolute fiction. To assert now that the whole "*paṭam prati pratiyogitva*" is an attribute of the pot is to assert that the cloth itself is an attribute of the pot. Moreover, for the difference of (x) from (y) to exist, it must also be true that (y) is different from (x). The same reasoning here applies. "*Ghaṭam prati pratiyogitva*" which is to be an attribute of the cloth must include within it *ghaṭa*, and the pot is an attribute of the cloth. It has now been asserted that pot  $P_1$  resides in cloth  $C_1$  and that cloth  $C_1$  also resides in pot  $P_1$ . Both the cloth and the pot are attribute and locus at once. This is untenable. One thing cannot be the substratum and the attribute of the same thing at one time.

Śrī Harṣa adds that non-duality also results from the very nature of the relationship between any attribute and its locus. It is obvious that for (y) to be an attribute of (x) the two must be somehow related. Otherwise, all things might well be attributes of all other things, *asambaddhāviśeṣāt*. Now, if (x) and (y) are connected by  $R_1$  and that  $R_1$  is different from either (x) or (y), we have seen before (translation pp. 131–132 and note 83) that  $R_1$  will require another connection,  $R_2$ , allowing us to speak of  $R_1$  as the connection of (x) to (y). The question repeats with respect to  $R_2$  if  $R_2$  is different from  $R_1$  and its locus, either (x) or (y). It must therefore be admitted that some connection,  $R_n$ , is not different from its locus

It is simplest to do so with the very first connection of the series, the connection of the attribute (*y*) and its locus (*x*). This gives us the following equivalence:  $R_1 = x\text{-}svabhāva$ . Now, like difference or “*pratiyogitva*” the term *R* or *sambandha* is also described by an outside referent. A connection is always of one object to another. Applying this to the present case, *y-pratiyogikasambandha* is the very nature of (*x*). As before this is an admission that (*y*) itself is the very nature of (*x*) or that the two are identical. It is to be remembered that (*x*) is the cloth, and (*y*) its attribute, “being a counterpositive with respect to the pot”. This attribute (*y*) includes within itself the pot. If it is identical with its locus, the cloth, then the pot is also identical with the cloth and thus the second alternative that “*ghaṭam prati pratiyogitva*” is only an attribute of the cloth cannot avoid the consequence that the two objects in question must be identical.

Śrī Harṣa himself concludes that these faults will result whatever the attribute (*y*) may be. Thus that “*anyonyābhāva*” or “*vaidharmya*” or “*pr-thaktva*” constitutes difference is in effect herein refuted. Any such attribute must be identical with its locus, and must also include within it the counterpositive of the desired difference.<sup>138</sup>

The statement of page 104 (Sam) thus stands. Perception of duality where that duality is the very nature of the two objects in question can only be valid proof of their identity. This has been demonstrated not only by showing that “*paṭapratīyogikabheda*” must then be considered the very nature of the pot, but also by detailing that whether this “*y-prati pratiyogitva*” be an attribute of (*x*) or the very nature of (*x*), non-duality cannot be avoided.

“But, when the pot, etc., are viewed without regard to anything else, then they are perceived as ‘a pot’, etc. When, on the other hand, they are described by a cloth, etc., then they are perceived as the difference from that cloth.” No, for a cognition, “a pot”, etc. is different from a cognition of difference, and such a cognition of difference cannot be of another form merely on the strength of its own object, the pot, etc. Nor is to be said that their difference results since in addition, the cloth, etc., is therein revealed. For the cognition of difference is still different from a cognition which has as its object both the pot and cloth. No one understands that the cognitions, “there is a pot and a cloth” and “the cloth is different from the pot” are of one meaning. Why is this? Because such a confusion of cognitions is prevented by the employment of the nominative and ablative cases which cannot be

interchanged. Thus no one perceives, “the cloth is different from the pot”, when it is to be known, “there is a cloth and a pot”. Therefore, the description of the very nature of a pot could never require a perception of a cloth.

The opponent still refuses to abandon his effort to prove that difference may be the essential nature of an object. He attempts again to avoid that “*y-pratīyogikabheda*” in its entirety will be the very nature of (*x*). He had earlier argued (p. 105 Sam) that “difference” alone is the nature of (*x*) and that “*y-pratīyogitva*” remains outside. To this it was replied that it is not possible to say that “*bheda*” is the *svarūpa* of (*x*) when that “*bheda*” cannot exist without the presence of (*y*). Essential nature implies the very opposite – it exists without requirement of any external factor. The *pūrvapakṣa* here only slightly modifies his prior contention. “*Bheda*” as the essential nature of (*x*) *exists* without (*y*); however, it cannot be experienced without a knowledge of that (*y*) as its counterpositive.<sup>139</sup> Although it has been shown that such a statement is in fact meaningless, for without proof nothing can be said to exist, and so “*bheda*” alone must be a product of the *pūrvapakṣa*’s imagination, Śrī Harṣa allows the statement to remain and continues with a further demonstration of its illogicality.

The cognition of an object, (*x*), is different from the cognition of the difference of any other object (*y*) from that (*x*) as a counterpositive. Now this disparity in cognitions should be accountable on the basis of a difference in their objects. Where “*bheda*” is no more than “*ghaṭasvarūpa*” no such diversity in object would be possible. Both the knowledge, “this is a pot”, and the knowledge, “the cloth is different from the pot”, have as their object the very nature of the pot. It is also not possible to assume that the second cognition differs from the first because it also has the cloth as its object. This would still fail to explain its dissimilarity from a knowledge, “there is a pot and a cloth”, where both the pot and the cloth are revealed. No one would ever deny that these cognitions differ. In one, “*ghaṭas ca paṭas ca tiṣṭhataḥ*”, the word “pot” is in the nominative case, and in the other, “*ghaṭāt paṭo bhinnah*”, it is in the ablative case. These two cases denote entirely different meanings; they can never be used interchangeably with the same intention.<sup>140</sup> Thus, the difficulty with the *pūrvapakṣa*’s present suggestion is that it so far fails to explain the lack of identity between the cognitions, “(*x*) exists” or “(*x*) and (*y*) exist” and “(*y*) is different from (*x*)”. Difference cannot therefore be the essential nature of (*x*), even if it be assumed that it is known only when its counterpositive is also known.

Again, when a cognition (*a*) is the cause of another cognition (*b*), the object of the product cognition (*b*) is not cognized in the form “this is from that”, where “that” represents the object of the causal cognition. Let there not be a cognition of an object of determinate knowledge as “from the object of indeterminate knowledge”, or a cognition of similarity as “from that which is remembered”. Therefore, the cognition, “the cloth is different from the pot”, to which all people bear witness, cannot be explained by the mere dependence of one cognition upon another. The undesired consequences that we have mentioned above would ensue.

Śrī Harṣa here suggests and then denies one more possible explanation of the difference between the simple cognition of the existence of the pot and the cloth and the cognition of their difference. Any knowledge of difference depends upon a prior cognition of the *pratiyogin* which is then remembered. It may be for this reason that the *pratiyogin* appears in the ablative case, and not the nominative case, and thus the form of the one cognition differs from that of the other. In this manner it would be possible to account for the disparity in the content of these knowledges, not on the basis of diversity in object, but on the basis of diversity in cause.

The difficulty with such a suggestion is that it involves undesired conclusions. If necessary prior cognition of (*x*) as the cause of the cognition that (*y*) is different from (*x*) determines that (*x*) must appear in that resultant cognition of difference in the ablative case, then it must do so elsewhere as well. All Indian philosophers accept “*savikalpika*” or determinate cognition in addition to “*nirvikalpika*” or indeterminate cognition. They also admit that *nirvikalpikajñāna* serves as the cause of *savikalpikajñāna*. One would thus expect that the knowledge of a pot would have the form “*ghaṭatvād ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*” and not the form “*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*”. The prior perception of “*ghaṭatva*” in *nirvikalpikajñāna* is indeed the cause of the final determination, “this is a pot”. Likewise, perception of similarity depends upon remembrance of that to which a given object is to be known as similar. The perception “Caitra is like Maitra”, “*Caitro Maitreṇa sadṛśaḥ*” would have to be “*Caitro Maitrāt sadṛśaḥ*”. Such a knowledge with the object of comparison in the ablative case is nowhere observed.

This concludes the refutation of the first alternative, p. 103 (Sam), that difference is essential nature. Śrī Harṣa has shown that this concept is untenable for two major reasons. Where “*y-pratiyogikabheda*” is *x-svarūpa*, (*y*) and (*x*) must be identical. Where “*bheda*” alone is *x-svarūpa*, it will be

impossible to account for the difference between the cognition, “there is an (x) and a (y)” and the cognition, “(y) is different from (x)”. The discussion now turns to the second alternative, difference is reciprocal absence.<sup>141</sup>

And for the same reason, the assertion, “Perception which makes known difference as reciprocal absence is contradictory to the scriptures on non-duality” is refuted. That difference, even as reciprocal absence must be a difference from something or other, and so it will include that something or other within the very nature of its locus by the reasoning stated above.

The first criticism of *anyonyābhāva* is merely an *atideśa*. By the arguments detailed in the refutation of *svarūpabheda*, *anyonyābhāva* will also result only in the non-difference of (x) and (y). *Anyonyābhāva* as *bheda* must still be “*kasmāḍ api bheda*” or described by some *pratiyogin*. It must also be an attribute of that (x) which is to differ from (y). As before, this leads to the assertion “*y-nirūpitānyonyābhāva*” is an attribute of (x), or (y) is an attribute of (x) (cf. p. 107 Sam). Similarly, “*x-nirūpitānyonyābhāva*” must be a quality of (y), and the impossibility of both (x) and (y) being substratum and attribute ensues. Finally, this “*y-nirūpitānyonyābhāva*” must be connected with (x). That connection is assumed to be a *svarūpasambandha*.<sup>142</sup> Now, “*y-nirūpitānyonyābhāvanirūpitasambandha*” is thus (x)-*svarūpa*. It is easy to see that (y) is also included within (x). The two are thus identical (cf. p. 107 Sam).

Furthermore, the identity of the pot and the cloth and such other things must be considered the counterpositive of reciprocal absence. If this identity is nowhere admitted, then reciprocal absence as qualified by that identity or as externally limited by that identity cannot be made known by any valid means. For, nothing qualified by a rabbit’s horn or externally limited by a rabbit’s horn can be the object of a means of valid cognition. And why not? Because any valid cognition of such a qualified entity or such an entity the essence of which is delimited by such an external limiter would have to reveal as well its qualifier or external limiter; and with respect to that absolutely non-existent object its validity could never be established. Nor is it to be said, “This absence, being admitted to have the pot as its counterpositive and the cloth as its locus, does not bear the fault of an absolutely non-existent counterpositive.” For in that case, what would be the difference between a relational absence and a reciprocal absence? As you

understand the relational absence of a cloth to exist in a pot by saying, “The absence of the pot is connected to the cloth”, you will not similarly justify the reciprocal absence in a cloth by saying, “The absence of the pot is of the very nature of the cloth.” Therefore, the difference between relational and reciprocal absence is to be accounted for by including “relationship” and “identity” within the sphere of the counterpositive. This being the case, it is difficult to avoid the fact that the counterpositive will be non-existent.

Śrī Harṣa opens his specific attack on *anyonyābhāva* with an examination of its counterpositive. He begins actually with a conclusion: the counterpositive of such an absence must be “*tādātmya*” or identity of the two objects in question. For the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka that *tādātmya* is nowhere established. Thus the *pratiyogin* of this absence is an absolute fiction and there can be no valid cognition of the absence as limited by its counterpositive, whether the counterpositive act as a *viśeṣaṇa* (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 462) or an *upalakṣaṇa*. Any cognition of a qualified object must also take the qualifier as its object by the general rule, “*saviśeṣaṇe hi vidhiniṣedhau viśeṣaṇam upasaṃkrāmataḥ*”.<sup>143</sup> It is contradictory to assert that an absolute fiction is the object of valid knowledge, for then its existence would be proved and it would not be an absolute fiction at all!

In support of this conclusion, that the counterpositive of *anyonyābhāva* must be the identity of (*x*) and (*y*), the definition of Śrīdhara in the *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 557) and of Kumārila in the *Ślokavārttika* (*Abhāvādhikaraṇa*, p. 473) is paraphrased and refuted. Both of these authors hold that “*ghaṭe patābhāva*” and “*paṭe ghaṭābhāva*” are reciprocal absences. The *pratiyogin*, *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, are established by valid means of knowledge and there is no question of a non-existent counterpositive. To this Śrī Harṣa replies that the acceptance of such a definition will entail other difficulties. If this absence is “*ghaṭānuyogikapāṭapratiyogika*”, then what will distinguish it from a *saṃsargābhāva* of the same description? The difference between these two absences cannot be in their relationship to their loci. Neither the Naiyāyika nor the Kumārila Mīmāṃsaka admits as do the Jains, Buddhists and Prābhākaras that an absence is the very nature of its locus. All absences are attributes of their substrata. Thus *saṃsargābhāva* and *tādātmyābhāva* (*anyonyābhāva*) will be non-distinguishable, a violation of the accepted principles of the Naiyāyika and Bhaṭṭa, and an admission which will involve serious impossibilities in the definition of “*anubhūtitva*”, as Śrī Harṣa will later point out (pp. 136–208 Sam).



He thus returns to his original statement, that the only way in which *samsargābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva* can be made different is by considering in the first case that *samsarga* is the *pratiyogin*, and in the second that *tādātmya* is the *pratiyogin*. This *tādātmya* of a pot and a cloth is unproved for the opponent and the fault of *atyantāsaṁpratiyogitva* stands. This passage in effect also constitutes a refutation of Udayana's earliest definition of reciprocal absence in the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p. 26.<sup>144</sup> Udayana sought to differentiate *tādātmya*- and *samsargābhāva* by assuming that in the first case (*x*) is denied of (*y*) in the relationship of "*tādātmya*". Elsewhere, in the case of *samsargābhāva*, (*x*) is denied of (*y*) in some other relationship, *saṁyoga*, *samavāya*, etc. Now, this "*tādātmya*" as a relationship is still of (*x*) to (*y*). As such it remains unestablished. Moreover, to deny (*x*) of (*y*) in the relationship *R* is in essence to deny that relationship itself.<sup>145</sup> Thus, *tādātmya* would still be the counterpositive of reciprocal absence, and the absence would remain undocumented by valid cognition.

Nor is it to be said, "This alone is to be considered as the nature of reciprocal absence and no more: 'There is no clothness in the pot and no potness in the cloth'." For in that case, then, there is admitted no such quality in potness and clothness which can be denied in each of the two, and so their identity results. When any means of valid knowledge denies potness in the cloth and clothness in the pot, it thus makes known both as devoid of both potness and clothness. The possibility of either different qualities or of difference by nature being eliminated, taking what as its counterpositive and what as its locus could the reciprocal absence of a pot and a cloth step onto the path of valid knowledge?

Having shown that the counterpositive of reciprocal absence must be "*tādātmya*" which is unestablished, Śrī Harṣa is now faced with another objector who like the later Naiyāyikas (*Līlāvatī*, p. 576) does indeed consider that *tādātmya* is the *pratiyogin* of this absence, not in the meaning of "the identity of the pot and the cloth", but in the meaning "the very nature of the pot" or "the very nature of the cloth". The *abhāva* is actually two separate absences, the absence of the nature of a pot in cloth and the absence of the nature of a cloth in a pot. In both cases the *pratiyogin* is established.

Śrī Harṣa slightly but legitimately varies this interpretation. It has already been shown that one cannot consider difference as the very nature of the

two objects in question, as that results only in their identity. That “*ghaṭasvarūpa*” is different from “*paṭasvarūpa*” is thus as yet unproved. In fact, the purpose of the present discussion is to show that a pot is different in nature from a cloth, by reason of possessing the absence of something which belongs to the cloth alone. By the *nyāya*, “*nāsiddhenāsiddham sādhyate*”, it is not possible to assume first that the nature of a pot and the nature of a cloth are different and then by denying these natures of the two objects to prove that very difference. For this reason, Śrī Harṣa allows his opponent to assume as “*tādātmya*” not essential nature, unknown to be different, but the attributes, “*ghaṭatva*” and “*paṭatva*”, defined as existing only in *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* respectively, and thus not subject to the above criticism.

But the respite is short-lived. The identity of “*ghaṭatva*” and “*paṭatva*” is herein demonstrated. The opponent asserts that *ghaṭatva* is denied in the cloth and *paṭatva* is denied in the pot. This constitutes the difference of the pot from the cloth. Now there is no such quality, “*ghaṭatvatva*”, which is admitted to exist in *ghaṭatva* and which can be denied in *paṭatva*. Similarly there is no such thing as “*paṭatvatva*” which resides in *paṭatva* and can be denied in *ghaṭatva*. Where such a denial alone constitutes the difference between two objects, in the absence of that denial *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* must be identical. Now, when it is known that there is no *paṭatva* in a pot it would also be known that there is no *ghaṭatva* in that pot, for *paṭatva* = *ghaṭatva*. Likewise, denying *ghaṭatva* of a cloth will also deny of it *paṭatva*. Both the cloth and the pot, then, lack both *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*. A negation of *ghaṭatva* in a cloth or *paṭatva* in a pot is now impossible. It destroys its own *pratiyogin*, for if *ghaṭatva* is denied of *ghaṭa* as well, where else could it possibly exist? The negation proves itself as *atyantam asatpratiyogī*. By analogous reasoning, what would be the *anuyogin* of such a negation? The cloth cannot be said to be different from the pot by reason of its very nature, as has been adequately demonstrated in the discussion from pp. 103–109 (Sam). It can now also not be different by reason of its possession of a particular attribute, that attribute being denied of it as well. Thus, the perception of difference as *anyonyābhāva* like the perception of difference as essential nature defeats its own purpose. If it is valid, it destroys both its own *pratiyogin* and its own *anuyogin*, the very elements it requires to exist. In the manner just detailed, it must therefore be valid for their non-difference alone. The conclusion reached in this passage is thus the same as before, and one might repeat here the verse of p. 104 (Sam).<sup>146</sup>

And for the same reason, perception making known difference as par-

ticularity in quality cannot be contradictory to the scriptures on non-duality. For if it be admitted that in this particular quality in question, potness, clothness, etc., resides another particular quality, there will result either an infinite regress, or the necessary cessation of the series of particular qualities. And how is the fault of lack of proof to be avoided? If in this particular quality another particular quality is not admitted, then the two qualities in question will be the same, and how could they then result in the difference of their own substrata? Moreover, those two qualities which are considered as difference, do they enter a substratum which is different from the pot, etc., or a substratum which is non-different? Other than these two mutually opposing alternatives no third possibility can occur. In the first case, that difference by means of which the substrata of the particular qualities under discussion are considered different is subject to the same question, and an infinite regress results. "But, let there be an endless number of differences." No, for if they all attach themselves to their locus in gradual succession, it would not be possible for them to be so connected with that object, which is only of limited duration. "If all of these differences grab onto an object as soon as it is born?" Then, what will there be to decide which difference attaches itself to that very object as qualified by which other difference? In the absence of any regulating difference amongst them, what would there be to quell their quarrel? Moreover, when the function of each difference earlier admitted is accomplished by the differences later accepted, this chain running ahead and falling apart from behind, like a person who forgets everything he learns, would have no firm basis.

This is true of all such cases,

The three faults of anyone who agrees to an infinite regress, namely, loss of the preceding members, lack of any regulating feature and absence of proof would indeed be without any cure!


Śrī Harṣa proceeds to refute the third alternative, that difference is the possession of a particular quality, in an ingenious reapplication of the principles he had employed against *anyonyābhāva*. If the difference between the cloth and the pot is nothing but "*paṭatva*" and "*ghaṭatva*" and not the absence of these attributes whence results *atyantam asaṭpratīyogī*, still major difficulties ensue.<sup>147</sup> Firstly, if it be admitted that *paṭatva* and *ghaṭatva* are also possessed of such qualities whence one may account for their difference, then either an infinite series of *vaidharmayas* results, or the

breakage of the chain at any point which will lead to the identity of all prior members. In addition, it will be impossible to avoid a second type of infinite series for which there can never be any proof. Śrī Harṣa leaves his refutation of this first possibility here; the question of *vaidharmyaviśrānti* or *anavasthā* has in fact been refuted above in the statement that the Naiyāyika does not admit any such quality in *paṭatva* and *ghaṭatva* (*Ghaṭatve paṭatve ca na kaś cit tādṛśādharmo 'bhyupagamyate*, p. 112 Sam).<sup>148</sup> *Ananubhava*, the second fault here mentioned will be detailed with the second alternative, that *paṭatva* and *ghaṭatva* have no other particular quality. Whether *vaidharmyas* are endless or one, the problem still arises, will *paṭatva* or *ghaṭatva* enter a locus different from the desired *pratiyogin* or not.

Passing on to the second possibility, if no distinguishing attribute resides in *paṭatva* and *ghaṭatva*, as before, since that attribute alone is considered as constituting difference, *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* must be identical. It is not difficult to see that they then cannot result in the difference between their loci. If it be said that, “*paṭatvaviśiṣṭaṃ ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭād bhidyate paṭatvāt*”, then since that same *paṭatva* also exists in *ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭa* (*ghaṭatva* = *paṭatva*), the following must also be admitted: “*ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭaṃ ghaṭatvaviśiṣṭād bhidyate, paṭatvāt*”. This is an impossibility, as one thing cannot be different from itself.

The other basic difficulty with any theory of difference as particularity in quality results whether *vaidharmya* has another *vaidharmya* or not. *Paṭatva* is the difference of the cloth from the pot. Now, does this *paṭatva* attach itself to an object, ‘*paṭa*’ which is already different from the pot or to an object which is not different from the pot? By the Naiyāyika’s own admission these are the only two possibilities.<sup>149</sup> In the first case, the opponent will have admitted that *paṭatva* resides in a locus different from a pot by a difference  $D_1$ . The same question is repeated. Does this difference  $D_1$  reside in a cloth different from a pot or not? If the answer is still yes, then to avoid *āt-māśraya* the cloth must now be said to differ from the pot on the strength of the presence of another difference,  $D_2$ . Again the question is asked and an endless series of differences must be admitted. Such a series is *niṣpramāṇika*, it can never be proved. It cannot be demonstrated by *arthāpatti*, for example, “*ghaṭapaṭabhedānyathānupapattiyā*”, as it is beset with the following faults. If this endless series of differences, all, it is to be remembered, “*paṭ-ānuyogikaghaṭapratyogikabhedāḥ*”, attaches itself to the cloth, member by member in gradual procession, then it will never completely be able to do so. The cloth exists for a finite period of time. In a given period,  $D_1$  through  $D_{10}$  might be able to become connected with their locus, but  $D_{10}$  through  $D_n$

would remain unattached. If it be admitted that all these differences attach themselves to their locus at once, as soon as the cloth is born,<sup>150</sup> then another impossibility results. Now assumed is the situation diagrammed below.



As soon as the square representing the substratum appears, all the different *bhedas* gather round it to locate themselves therein. But, all of these differences are the same and it is admitted that they must reside on an object already different from the *pratiyogin*. Well, what is to say which differences will go first? There is no determinant that demands that the circled *X* start off the process and the one next to it then plunge into circled *X viśiṣṭavastu*, the one below it into *X-X viśiṣṭavastu* and so forth. As children in a dentist's office, these innumerable differences would stand around and quarrel, "You go first!"<sup>151</sup>

In a more serious vein is the next objection. In either case, where the differences attach themselves to the locus at once or where they attach themselves over a given period of time, such a chain of differences can never exist. The purpose of  $D_1$  is to establish that the cloth is different from the pot. This is also the purpose of  $D_2, D_3, \dots D_n$ . Once  $D_2$  is admitted  $D_1$  becomes unnecessary, its object being accomplished by  $D_2$ . Similarly, once  $D_3$  is admitted,  $D_2$  will drop out. The opponent is thus caught in a dilemma. For  $D_1$  to exist he must admit  $D_2$ , but that very  $D_2$  destroys  $D_1$ . For  $D_2$  to exist he must admit  $D_3$  thereby losing  $D_2$ . At any given moment, the *pūrvapakṣa* will never be able to establish the existence of any difference in a given locus. That which he hopes would permit the difference to reside on an object in fact does the opposite.

All of this is summarized in the verse, with a play on the word "*tridoṣ-atā*". The three faults here are: *prāglopa* or the loss of  $D_1, D_2$ , etc., *avinigama* or lack of determination of which is to enter at which point, and, as following from the first two faults, *niṣpramāṇikatā* or lack of proof for the existence of such a chain. They are as incurable as the famous three faults of Indian medicine, the disturbance of the three vital humors of the body.<sup>182</sup>

Śrī Harṣa closes with the remark that the same reasoning is to be applied

to any similar infinite series, which in fact he later does on pp. 182 and 233 (Sam). It thus remains that it is not possible to account for the fact that *paṭatva* enters a locus already different from its *pratiyogin* by the presence of  $D_1$ ,  $D_2$ , etc.

And if you claim that at some point difference is no more than essential nature, ruled out from one another [of a pair], then these two things the essential nature of which is so construed would be without any nature at all! And if you should say that essential nature in general is not excluded from each, but particular essential nature, well, then, by the exclusion of all particular essential nature there would remain just some general nature and so both would be one. Otherwise, you must say what you mean by this 'particular nature' if not just particular nature as a whole. If you should say, "I do not admit any such 'essential nature' which is common to all things; rather, the word 'essential nature' having many meanings is applied to many individuals of distinct character." Then, for this very reason gone is the hope of ever proving 'cowness', etc. Nor can the proper usage of the term 'essential nature' ever be ascertained with respect to each individual. And if essential nature were difference, then whenever a particular object as the locus of any quality is seen, its nature being definitely known, there would never be any doubt anywhere at all.

This will conclude the discussion of the possibility that *vaidharmya* as *bheda* enters into a locus already different from the *pratiyogin*. Thus far it has been shown that any such assumption will result in an infinite series which can never be proved. It is now suggested that  $D_1$  or *paṭatva* for that matter enters into the cloth which is different from the pot but not by virtue of another difference,  $D_2$ ,  $D_3$ , etc., whence an infinite regress would ensue. Śrī Harṣa's arguments here are but further refutations of the doctrine of *svarūpabheda*. The present passage is so conceived that it starts out with an obvious impossibility, forces the opponent to express explicitly his intentions and concludes with a sharp criticism of those intentions. In so doing, it destroys all other possible meanings that the opponent and indeed the reader might conceive.

The difference of the cloth from the pot is now said to be *essential nature*, absent from the one and the other. What the opponent actually means by this statement is only made clear on p. 116 (Sam). The pot has a given nature which the cloth does not, and the cloth has a given nature which the pot does not. These two natures, that of the cloth and that of the pot, absent

from the pot and the cloth respectively, constitute the difference between the two objects in question.

Śrī Harṣa suggests that the statement, “*svarūpam anyonyaṃ vyāvartamānam*” or “essential nature absent from the one and the other”, does not in fact convey any such idea. “*Svarūpa*” is a general term denoting any essential nature at all. What the opponent has thus in effect said is that essential nature is absent from a pot and essential nature is absent from a cloth. It is not difficult to see that if neither the pot nor the cloth has any inherent substance then they are both absolute fictions. “*Svabhāva*” or inherent nature is what distinguishes a sky-lotus from a real lotus. The sky-lotus is nothing at all, whereas the real lotus has a particular nature – a particular shape, feel, behavior, etc.

Śrī Harṣa allows his opponent an attempt to make his statement more specific. The opponent suggests that by the term “*svarūpa*” he means not essential nature in general but “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” or particular essential nature, potness, clothness, etc. Once again Śrī Harṣa urges that this will not solve his problems. The term “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” will still imply a group of things; all inherent natures which are particular and which distinguish one object from another. Just as the word “*gauḥ*” implies “*gotvaviśiṣṭa*” or anything qualified by the generality “cowness”, so will the word “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” designate anything qualified by the general attribute, “*svarūpaviśeṣatva*”. And, just as the negation “*atra gaur nāsti*” implies the absence of all cows, so will the *pūrvapakṣa* statement, “*paṭe svarūpaviśeṣo nāsti; ghaṭe svarūpaviśeṣo nāsti*”, denote in these two objects the absence of all particular natures which might be capable of distinguishing the pot and the cloth from each other. Thus the *pūrvapakṣa* has really said that neither the pot nor the cloth has any specific nature enabling them to be distinct from objects not so formed. It follows that they must therefore be identical.<sup>153</sup>

The opponent is finally permitted to state exactly what he wishes. It is not that “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” means “*svarūpaviśeṣamātra*”<sup>154</sup> or an entire group of things subsumed under the heading ‘particular natures’ and possessed of a common attribute, “*svarūpaviśeṣaṇatva*” or “being a particular nature”. There exists no such generality like “cowness” in cows which would permit that the term be applied to a class of entities, and which would allow a number of different individuals to be so grouped. The term “particular nature” is specific to one thing alone every time it is used. When it is said that a pot does not have a particular nature it is meant only that it does not have clothness. Here “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” denotes only that nature specific to a

cloth. When it is said that a cloth does not have a particular nature it is meant only that it does not have “potness”. In this case “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” denotes only that nature specific to a pot. There is thus no possibility that a statement of the absence of “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” in a certain object implies that that object is totally devoid of any distinguishing character.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that if the *pūrvapakṣa* thinks he has avoided the undesired conclusion that the pot and the cloth will be non-different, he is mistaken. Such an explanation of the term “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” cannot be allowed. It has been repeatedly noted that the Naiyāyika admits the existence of universals on the basis of the fact that there are certain objects which we designate by the same term and recognize to be of the same type. This phenomenon the Naiyāyika seeks to explain by assuming that all such individuals are possessed of one characteristic which he calls a universal or generality.<sup>155</sup> But now what has he here admitted? The *pūrvapakṣa* has just admitted to a usage, “*ghaṭasvarūpa*” “*paṭasvarūpa*”, etc., and further added that the same term denotes an entirely different object each time it is employed. This is a violation of his *vyāpti*, *yatra yatrānugatavyavahāraḥ, tatra tatra jātiḥ*. It is a case of *vyabhicāra*; *jātirūpasādhyābhāve* ‘py, *anugatavyavahārarūpasādhanaśattvam*. For this reason, and the immediately following one, it cannot be admitted that the word “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” denotes only the nature of a pot or the nature of a cloth, and the argument that it must therefore denote a class of things, all particular natures, the absence of which implies identity, stands valid.

The second reason is thus. If the term “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” denoted an individual which has no universal or general attribute it would be impossible to learn the proper usage of this term. This follows from the Naiyāyika account of how speech is acquired. A child hears a command, “Bring a cow”, and watches a third party obey. At another time he hears someone order, “Bring a horse.” Again he watches the result and knows that the word “cow” denotes the first object brought, and the word, “horse”, the second. He now can apply these words to any cow or any horse he sees, that is to anything possessed of the universals “*gotva*” and “*aśvatva*”. If the words “cow” or “horse” denoted only the particular animals the child first saw his elder bring, then every time he wished to apply the word to an object before him he would have to learn anew that such words also denote similar members of the given species. The individuals of any group are endless, and thus so would be the learning process. Moreover, there are cases when no one else is present to teach us usage and yet words are correctly employed. Thus, the usage of the term “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” if it denoted a different in-



dividual each time it was employed, could never be properly learnt.

In closing, Śrī Harṣa adds that it also cannot be said that essential nature constitutes difference for another reason. No doubt would ever be possible. One doubts an attribute of a locus definitely known. If when one saw an object, for example a pot, and its essential nature being known knew it as different from all other objects, how could he then still doubt that it might be a man? As shown earlier (see note 54) definitive knowledge must be admitted to be contradictory to doubt.

Thus *vaidharmya* as *bheda* cannot enter into a locus different from the *pratiyogin* of that difference by another *vaidharmya* or by its very own nature. The second alternative remains. It enters into the cloth, undifferentiated from the pot.

And if difference enters into a locus which is not different from its counterpositive, then even any one single thing which is perceived, a pot, etc., would by such a difference be multiple. And in the absence of 'one', multiplicity too would be impossible. By this very same reasoning is also refuted the assertion that difference does not enter into a locus which is different or into one which is not different, but into a locus which is oblivious to both.

The refutation of the second alternative is brief. If the cloth, (*x*) is not different from the pot (*y*) and yet it is said that a difference entering into (*x*) later makes that object different from (*y*), then (*y*) would also be different from itself. The situation is thus:

$$(1) \quad x = y$$

$$(2) \quad x \neq y.$$

*D*

But by the *pūrvapakṣa*'s own admission that very (*x*) into which *D* enters in step (2) equals (*y*) and so, by substitution,

$$(3) \quad y \neq y.$$

*D*

The pot is thus now different from itself and cannot be said to be a single unitary object as difference implies duality.<sup>156</sup> The same reasoning is to be applied to all objects in the world, and the concept of non-difference or unity disappears. The difficulty with this for any *bhedavādin* Udayana himself realized and verbalized in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 107 – “*sarvatraikatvocchedaprasaṅgāt. Tathā cānekatvam api na syāt*”. All

With the same logic Śrī Harṣa refutes the Jain who might here be tempted to interject that he does not admit that difference and non-difference are mutually contradictory, and that he is therefore not faced with the *vikalpa*, does difference enter into a locus different from the *pratiyogin* or non-different from the *pratiyogin*.<sup>157</sup> Difference, in fact, enters into an object which need not be different from the counterpositive of that difference nor non-different from that counterpositive, but might be oblivious to both. Thus neither difference nor non-difference is the determinant of step (2) outlined above. Śrī Harṣa's reasoning here might very well be thus. As long as *x-anuyogika-y-pratiyogikabheda* is not admitted to be the determinant of this difference dividing (*x*) and (*y*), unity will still disappear. Just as the difference *D* enters into (*x*) in step (2) above so might it enter into (*y*), *y-pratiyogikabhedābhāvāviśeṣāt*. It is not permissible for the *pūrvapakṣa* to assert that this will not be so, for *y-pratiyogikābheda* does in fact exist in (*y*) and is absent from (*x*), and thus the two cases are essentially different. This would be tantamount to admitting that *y-pratiyogikābheda* is in fact the determinant of *y-pratiyogikābheda*. Such a possibility is implicitly denied by the Jains,<sup>158</sup> and involves *ātmāśraya*; *y-pratiyogikābhede sati*, *y-pratiyogikābhedaḥ siddhyate*.<sup>159</sup> This concludes the refutation of the third alternative, p. 103 (Sam), that difference is particularity in quality.

And for this reason as well is refuted the concept that difference is not essential nature, reciprocal absence, or particularity in quality, but is another attribute named 'individuality'. For one could still not jump over the aforementioned dilemma: does it enter into a locus which is already different from the counterpositive or not? Furthermore, if out of fear that it might not be different from its own locus, it is assumed that that very difference enters therein, then it would be residing in itself. If some other difference enters therein, then the same question repeats and an infinite series results. If somewhere the identity of a difference and its locus is admitted, then with that as an opening the non-duality of all things results.

The fourth alternative, that *bheda* is a special attribute known as “*pr-thaktva*” is refuted in the same manner as before. Śrī Harṣa only adds here that another unacceptable infinite series must result. This *anavasthā* is

applicable to alternatives two and three as well. For *prthaktva* to reside in a locus ( $x$ ) it must be different from that locus. Nothing resides in itself. If *prthaktva* is different from its locus by that very *prthaktva*, then *svaviśiṣṭe svam vartate* which it has already been shown is an impossibility (cf. text p. 29 Sam and translation, p. 95). Thus it must be admitted that *prthaktva*<sub>1</sub> resides in a locus different from *prthaktva*<sub>1</sub> by reason of *prthaktva*<sub>2</sub>. The same question is asked of *prthaktva*<sub>2</sub>, is it different from its locus or not. An infinite regress results. Such an infinite regress cannot be admitted as it is *niṣ-pramāṇika* as was the infinite series described on p. 113 (Sam). *Prthaktva*<sub>2</sub> is *prthaktva*<sub>1</sub>-*anuyogikāśrayapratyogikabheda*. *Prthaktva*<sub>3</sub> is *prthaktva*<sub>2</sub>-*anuyogikāśrayapratyogikabheda*, and *prthaktva*<sub>4</sub> is *prthaktva*<sub>3</sub>-*anuyogikāśrayapratyogikabheda*, etc. Like *abhāva*, *bheda* differs only by a difference in its *pratyogin*. These are thus all the same. They cannot attach to their locus in succession, as the locus is of limited duration. As before, however, if they all attach at once then there will be *avinigama*. Although it might be argued that each does serve a different purpose and so no *prāglopa* results (*prthaktva*<sub>2</sub> makes *prthaktva*<sub>1</sub> different from its locus, and *prthaktva*<sub>3</sub> makes *prthaktva*<sub>2</sub> different from its locus, etc.) still the presence of *avinigama* would vitiate the infinite series.

If it be admitted that the chain somewhere stops and so all the different *prthaktvas* could attach themselves to their locus in succession, then where the chain stops, that *prthaktva* <sub>$x$</sub>  cannot be different from its locus. It thus cannot exist at that locus and account for the difference of *prthaktva* <sub>$x-1$</sub>  from the locus. *Prthaktva* <sub>$x-1$</sub>  is now identical to its substratum and cannot be said to reside there. In its absence *prthaktva* <sub>$x-2$</sub>  is equal to the locus, cannot exist there and account for the difference of *prthaktva* <sub>$x-3$</sub>  from that locus and so on, down to the original *prthaktva*<sub>1</sub>, the difference of the cloth from the pot. In the absence of this quality the pot and the cloth are identical.

Thus, no matter how difference be conceived, it is fraught with logical inconsistencies. In fact, on examination all notions of difference end up in demonstrating just the opposite. There is now no question that a perception of such a non-entity might contradict the scriptures on non-duality.

In this way the contradiction of the scriptures on non-duality by perception is denied.

Even in your doctrine, inference, etc., cannot destroy the texts.

In this army of the scriptures on non-duality, well warding off the foes, A series of presumptions comes only to our aid.

“But, how is it that the scriptures on non-duality making known their meaning in dependence on the difference between letters, words, case endings and their meanings are not refuted by these very cognitions of difference upon which they depend? For the servant is always of lesser strength than the master who furnishes the sustenance.” Not at all. We do not assert that difference does not exist at all. What then? We do not accept that its existence is proved by valid means. We do accept that it is made known by an invalid cognition, and that is all that is required for the relationship of causality.

Śrī Harṣa concludes his defense of the doctrine of non-duality with two verses. Perception cannot refute the scriptures as it is invalid and its object illogical. Even the opponent admits that other means of knowledge, inference, presumption, etc., are of lesser standing as subject to human weaknesses.<sup>160</sup> Furthermore, *arthāpatti*, it has been shown, does not contradict the doctrine of non-duality, but in fact comes to its aid (cf. p. 85 Sam).

The objection of p. 98 (Sam) is now repeated and finally destroyed.<sup>161</sup> It is to be recalled how in his refutation of the perception of difference (p. 104 Sam), Śrī Harṣa urged against his opponent that perception of difference if valid would destroy its own “*upajīvyā*”, the non-difference which it requires to exist. It must thus be invalid. The earlier objection is now rephrased to urge against Śrī Harṣa the same fault. It would not be possible to speak or write a sentence, were all words, letters, and case inflections the same. Thus, scripture depends upon their difference and to deny all difference in this world would be to destroy its own “*upajīvyā*”. By Śrī Harṣa’s own admission, difference must be valid.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that such an objection is ill-conceived. Śrī Harṣa admits the existence of difference, but only an existence which is known by a wrong knowledge (cf. p. 93 Chow, where he says the same of the existence of all causes). What Śrī Harṣa denies is that the existence of difference can be known by valid means. He adds in closing the result achieved by the sum of the arguments in the first section of the introduction. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that the only thing required for the causality of (x) is a knowledge of the existence of (x), uncontradicted for a limited period of time, people and places. Nothing can be said to exist on the basis of such a cognition which is later contradicted, and an object the existence of which is itself non-existent cannot rightly be said to exist (cf. translation pp. 96–97). Thus, the knowledge of the existence of a difference between words, letters

and their meanings is sufficient for speaking and writing, and the *pūrvapakṣa* is guilty of *niranuyoḥyānuyoga*. No one denies the necessity of this knowledge which permits both debate and scriptural utterances to proceed, and on the question of its existence the opponent and the *Siddhāntin* are in the same position.<sup>162</sup>

By this is refuted the objection, “Your doctrine is contradicted by that which is to be eliminated by the particle ‘only’ in the statement ‘one only’ and by ‘a second’ in the assertion ‘one without a second’ and by ‘multiplicity’ in the statement ‘there is no multiplicity’. None of these utterances would be possible without the concept of plurality.”

Earlier, on p. 54 (Sam) (translation pp. 123 ff.), Śrī Harṣa had dismissed the objection that if designations of Brahma revolve around negations, then they must imply the existence of the counterpositives of those negations, and thus the doctrine of non-duality is contradicted. The reasoning of the immediately preceding passage is now applied to this same objection.

To say something is not many, or has no second, requires no more than a knowledge of the many-ness or duality denied. If that knowledge is false, there is no fault. *Vyavahāra* is still *tajjñānasādhya* and not *tatsādhya* (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 131). This and the passage above constitute one argument of Śrī Harṣa against “*upajīvyabādhā*”. The existence of *bheda* is not required, but a knowledge of that existence. Such a knowledge is admitted.

And by the scriptures which have non-duality as their purport is made known non-duality which is validly cognized. Now, a valid cognition cannot be contradicted by an invalid cognition. Let us not have the valid cognition of a conch shell contradicted by the invalid cognition of silver in that shell. But where the cognition “fire lacks warmth” depends upon the cognition of its warmth and so that knowledge of the absence of warmth is contradicted by another knowledge of warmth, this contradiction is possible because both are revealed in invalid cognition.

“But, then let an absence of warmth which is validly known be proved there and so it too will not be contradicted.” Never. For if what is proved is an absence of warmth similar to that perceived in water and of the same nature as coldness, then it can only be known by invalid knowledge. If you do not admit that the absence of warmth takes this form then you will only be considering it as “non-duality” under a different name. And so, since there must be admitted with respect to this

“absence of warmth”, the difference between knowledge, the known, etc., all the arguments which catch the visible world in their teeth cannot be prevented from stepping in. Moreover, it has already been shown that even the possibility that non-duality is not validly known disappears since there is no opportunity for any real contradiction of it, all contradiction depending upon duality.

Śrī Harṣa continues with his refutation of the concept that *śruti* is invalid as it destroys the difference upon which it depends. The present passage, like the above, is for the most part a reinterpretation of Vācaspati Miśra’s argument in the *Bhāmatī*, pp. 6–7.<sup>163</sup> The essence of the *pūrvapakṣa* argument is that the knowledge of *bheda* as *upaśīvyā* must be stronger than the scriptures of non-duality. Thus scripture is the contradicted and not the contradicting cognition. Śrī Harṣa replies that the relationship of contradicted to contradicting cannot hold where the cognition to be contradicted is valid, and the contradicting cognition is invalid. It has already been shown that perception makes known only a limited object and can be proved to be invalid. Thus the very objection that scripture destroys the *bhedajñāna* which it requires for its own existence and thus must be incorrect cannot arise. To admit that a contradicting cognition may be invalid and the contradicted cognition valid would turn the whole world upside down. No one would have the invalid perception of silver contradict the valid cognition of a conch shell.<sup>164</sup>

Śrī Harṣa adds that where the opponent admits “*upaśīvyabādha*” as in the case of the inference, “*agnir anuṣṇo, dravyatvāj, jalavat*”, or “Fire lacks warmth, because it is a substance, like water”, both the cognition of warmth and the cognition of the absence of warmth are invalid. No case in which the contradicting cognition is invalid and the contradicted is valid can be cited.

To this the *pūrvapakṣa* immediately objects. What if one were to say that the very absence of warmth proved in this inference is in fact validly cognized? By Śrī Harṣa’s own admission then the inference would have to be valid and the common perception that fire is warm would be untrue. Behind this curious rejoinder is that the *pūrvapakṣa* still does not admit that *advaita* is validly cognized; thus, if you call one non-existent ‘*pramāṇasiddha*’ then why not call another? It is Śrī Harṣa now who turns the world upside down by taking a fiction, maintaining that it is validly proved and asserting that nothing whatsoever can contradict the cognition of which it is the object.

Śrī Harṣa’s reply is brief. He reminds the opponent that non-duality has indeed been validly cognized. If the absence of warmth which is proved in

the inference is what we normally understand by such a phrase, coldness as perceived in water, then its cognition is beset with the faults of the relationship of knower to known (cf. pp. 46, 52 Sam), and the cognition as shown before must be false. If by “*anuṣṇatā*” the *pūrvapakṣa* means something which is self-valid and devoid of difference, then he has admitted *advaita* by another name. Moreover, Śrī Harṣa adds, it has been stated (p. 97 Sam) that no inference, presumption or reasoning can be valid against the *advaitavādin*. There is thus not even the doubt that *advaita* may be non-existent and its cognition is without contradiction from any source. For these reasons, then, the *pūrvapakṣa* objection, let *anuṣṇatā* also be proved by valid means, is without any sense. One cannot demonstrate the validity of the cognition of any such object. Valid is self-proved non-dual knowledge alone. The above assertion that an invalid cognition never contradicts a valid cognition now stands as a refutation of the argument that *śruti* in abolishing difference would run into the difficulty of *upajīvyabādha*, or contradiction by that upon which it depends.

“But what is gained by asserting that non-duality is known by valid means when we say that because it is contradicted by that upon which it depends scripture cannot give rise to any valid knowledge at all!” No, for non-duality being validly proved could only be contradicted by difference which is also validly perceived, not by difference which is made known by wrong cognition. Therefore, scripture which depends upon difference revealed in error and such an erroneous cognition cannot be contradicted by that upon which it depends.

The opponent continues his criticism of non-duality on the grounds that it destroys *bheda*, its *upajīvyā*. Śrī Harṣa has argued that the cognition of non-duality is valid and so cannot be contradicted by any cognition of difference which has already been shown to be invalid. The opponent now urges that all this reasoning is useless. Scripture does not in fact give rise to any valid cognition at all. The observation that in so doing it would destroy its own *upajīvyā* prevents valid knowledge from ever arising. This is the actual objection of the *Bhāmatī pūrvapakṣa*, *Bhāmatī* p. 6.

Śrī Harṣa replies with a reassertion that scripture depends only upon a knowledge of difference and that such a knowledge must be false for all the reasons discussed in section three of this introduction. Non-duality as true could only be contradicted by a true cognition of difference. There can be no contradiction from the false knowledge of difference upon which scripture depends. Thus it is not possible to assert that because it is contradicted by

the knowledge of difference which it demands, *advaitaśruti* cannot give rise to knowledge. The essence of this reply is that the *pūrvapakṣa* reasoning involves a *cakraka*: *śrutijanyajñānābhāve saty eva bhedaññānam pramā; bhedaññānapramāve sati, tadvirodhāc, chruter jñānam notpattum alam*.<sup>165</sup>

Even though the knowledge of non-duality born of scripture is known to us incorrectly, still the existence of its object, non-duality, is validly cognized and contradiction of it must come from that which is opposed to such an object. No such opposing force exists.

Finally the objection that *śrutijanyajñāna* is itself only a concept of ignorance and so cannot serve as valid proof of anything is refuted. Both objection and reply require some explanation. The existence of *śrutijanyajñāna* cannot be validly perceived. It is a knowledge which arises from a given set of causes, the scriptures, and has a particular object, non-duality. Thus it too is beset by the difficulties inherent in the relationship of “*mānameyabhāva*” and by the difficulties inherent in the relationship of causality which will be outlined in the fourth *pariccheda*, pp. 659 ff. (Sam.) Nothing can ever arise from causes, nor can knowledge ever take an object. Śrī Harṣa has already remarked on the illogicality of the concept that a knowledge may arise from the scriptures in his demonstration of *śruti* as a *pramāṇa* for *svataḥ prakāśatva*, p. 55 Sam, where he added the qualification that the process he outlines applies only in the state of ignorance.

It is not difficult to see that an opponent might well here object. If the only thing which can be validly known to exist is knowledge as eternal, self-proved and unassociated with any object, and thus the cognition of non-duality produced and taking an object cannot be so proved, then is it not contradictory to assert that non-duality is validly known on the strength of such a cognition, itself admittedly impossible?

Śrī Harṣa replies in the negative. Although the existence of this knowledge as arising from the scripture and taking non-duality as its object cannot be proved, the object it is thought to take still stands uncontradicted. It can only be contradicted by difference similarly validly known; however, the invalidity of all such cognitions has been repeatedly demonstrated. Thus, although the concept of a knowledge *A* having as its object a given (*x*) and arising from a particular set of causes is contradictory, such a contradiction does not affect the object of that knowledge. Such a knowledge *A* is perceived to exist, and to be devoid of any knowledge contradicting it in content. That the existence of this knowledge is later shown to be non-existent makes no difference. The Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka and Jains all



likewise admit proof of the existence of an object ( $x$ ) on the basis of such a knowledge. For the opponent himself, knowledge fails as proof only when its object is contradicted, and here no such contradiction exists. Thus, *advaita* can be proved by scripture, uncontested as it is by any other means of knowledge.

Therefore,

Entering into the protective graces of validly known non-duality, Scripture fears not from contradiction for a single moment, not even if the contradiction come from that on which scripture relies.

Scripture itself tells us this, "There is fear only from a second" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 1/4/2). And this non-duality is in fact Brahma itself, becoming one with the purport of the passage, "All of this is Brahma" (*Muṇḍaka*, 2/2/11). And it is made known as identical with knowledge and joy by the text, "Brahma is knowledge and joy" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 3/9/28). Similarly, the cognition which is produced by the scriptures also enters into identity with the knowledge that is non-duality.

Śrī Harṣa here summarizes in verse the conclusions of his arguments defending *advaita*. Scripture with non-duality as its protector has nothing to fear, for it has been shown that non-duality itself acts as the prime weapon against all objections (cf. p. 101 Sam). Non-duality destroys perception, inference, presumption and reasoning. This, he says, the scriptures themselves tell us, there is fear only where there is duality.

Finally to avoid any misconception that non-duality validly proved is admitted apart from Brahma or the self-aware knowledge demonstrated in section two of this introduction, Śrī Harṣa cites the scriptural passages propounding their oneness. He adds that even the knowledge produced by the scriptures also disappears into this one eternal truth. Nothing remains external to that truth which might contest the denial of multiplicity.

But, how is it possible that it arise from the scriptures? That objection would apply, if it were validly known to arise from the scriptures. But an invalidly conceived arisal is not in contradiction with its non-arisal validly known. And for this reason scripture makes known that all is one.

The opponent returns to contest the last statement, that the knowledge arising from the scriptures merges into Brahma along with its object, non-duality. On p. 121 (Sam) the objection had been raised that the very concept

of a knowledge as being produced from scriptures and having non-duality as its object is inconsistent with logical principles. The *Siddhāntin* had accepted as much in his reply. How, then, is it now said that the knowledge of *advaita* arising from the texts is shown to be one with Brahma and so non-duality is not destroyed? Is it not contradictory that a knowledge which is produced from causes be one with that which is eternal, and that a knowledge which is non-existent be one with that which is real?

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that yes, he does assert that a knowledge arising from scriptures and taking an object cannot be, but what is impossible about such a knowledge is only its '*janyatā*' or "being produced by causes".<sup>166</sup> This is what is grasped in invalid cognition. In fact, that knowledge as Brahma is always present, eternal, self-aware, without an object, and validly proved. There is thus no contradiction in saying that the cognition arising from the texts is identical with the highest truth. Our perception only of its causal relationship to the scriptures and its relationship to its own object is false and cannot contradict a valid assertion that in fact such a knowledge never does arise but is nothing more than the eternal self-shining soul. As in the previous case where *avidyāvidyamānabheda* could not contradict *pramāṇasiddhādvaita*, so here the invalid cognition of "*janyatā*" cannot contradict the valid cognition of "*ajanyatā*". *Śrutijanyajñāna* thus can well be Brahma and non-duality remains unblemished.

And if it be said that, "If oneness means absence of difference, or the numeral one, or identity with knowledge, or if oneness be some other attribute synonymous with 'non-difference', and if the possession of this oneness is made known, then because non-duality would thereby be contradicted, such oneness cannot be substantiated." To this we reply, then, let the knowledge of that attribute, not standing the logical squeeze, disappear along with the attribute, 'arising from the scriptures'. But that which was validly known as the substratum of that attribute, non-duality, let that alone remain, validly cognized, known without contradiction. For, when a real conch shell is cognized as silver, in the presence of contradiction when silverness is denied, the very substratum does not for that fault disappear.

Śrī Harṣa here proposes and dismisses an objection to the last assertion of the immediately preceding passage, that the oneness of all these things, non-duality, Brahma, *jñāna*, *śrutijanyabodha*, etc., is made known by the scriptures. Now, one might ask what is meant by this "oneness". Is it the number one which as a quality resides in a locus by inference? Is it the

absence of difference, or perhaps, 'being of the nature of knowledge'? In all of these cases, no such thing can be made known by the texts. For, if *jñāna*, Brahma, or whatever it is termed, be possessed of this attribute, then duality results. Admitted is not only the one real as the locus of such an attribute, but 'oneness', the attribute itself.

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that just as the illogical '*janyatva*' is contradicted when the identity of the knowledge arising from the scriptures with Brahma is made known, just so then if this quality 'oneness' cannot survive logical examination, it too will be contradicted and its knowledge shown to be false by the scriptures of non-duality. Nor is it to be suspected that nihilism results. The substratum, Brahma or self-proved knowledge remains uncontradicted. That there is nothing extraordinary in such an assertion is shown by the example, acceptable to all *sadvādins*. When silverness wrongly perceived in a conch shell is denied, the conch shell itself, the supposed locus of that silverness does not thereby disappear.

Thus, scriptures on non-duality make known everywhere that cognitions of difference are false. In combination with other Upaniṣadic passages they propound that all is one, knowledge, self-proved. If there be anything at all contradictory in the process, then that contradiction is to be removed by eliminating its cause. Knowledge remains untouched, uncontested, and validly perceived.

And this cognition of non-duality is not to be removed by the wise men, adducing even a hundred reasons. Thus the scripture itself declares, "This knowledge is not to be removed by reasoning" (*Kāthaka*, 2/9).

Therefore:

Those rich in knowledge, turn your wit to the refutation of this, if you would cast a wishing jewel already in your hand into the ocean depths!

And this knowledge of non-duality has immediate and undoubted results as well. As it is said, "Even a little of this truth saves from great fear" (*Gītā* 2.40).

Therefore:

The mental traces of non-duality are obtained by men by the grace of God;

They save from great misfortunes, for those two or three in whom they are born.

As part of his final conclusion to part three of his introduction, Śrī Harṣa gives the above verses, in praise of the doctrine of non-duality which he has just defended. Throughout this section, it has been shown that the knowledge of non-duality cannot be contradicted by reasoning. The first verse adds that one should not even attempt to do so, for *advaita* is like a wishing jewel, granting all desires.<sup>167</sup>

This is further clarified in the prose prelude to the second verse. Revered literature tells us that the knowledge of non-duality has visible and immediate gains, the final release from *saṃsāra* through the destruction of ignorance. Śrī Harṣa here quotes from the *Gītā*, interpreting the passage not as a Śaṅkaravedāntin, but as Abhinavagupta had interpreted it. The followers of Śaṅkara understand that the word “*dharma*” refers to the immediately preceding “*yoga*”, or proper performance of one’s own particular duties in life, and not to “*Sāṃkhyābuddhi*” or “*advaitajñāna*”. Abhinavagupta alone contends that the two are one, non-dual *saṃvit* (cf. *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, pp. 95–96; p. 99; and pp. 141–143, “*Loka eṣā dvayī gatih prasiddhā- Sāṃkhyānām jñānam pradhānam yoginām ca karmeti. Mayā tu saikaiva niṣṭhoktā. Jñānākriyāmayatvāt saṃvittattvasya*”). The verse further states that *advaita* is also to be considered precious as a propensity for the doctrine of the Vedānta is a rare gift of the Lord. For those few, then, in whom the knowledge of non-duality arises, it is of unsurpassed value.<sup>168</sup>

And thus,

Non-duality which has been superficially extracted as the meaning of the scriptures denying multiplicity, becomes itself pure consciousness and wondrously does it recede from all intricate examination.

Thus, even you, absorbed in the play of your ignorance, must believe in this doctrine of non-duality, presented to you by means of these arguments, equipped with the defining characteristics of valid reasoning which you yourself have proposed. And thereupon, with this belief in the *Upaniṣads*, desiring to know your soul, gradually withdrawing your mind from the objects of sense, you yourself will directly perceive that highest real for which self-awareness is the only witness and which exceeds the sweetest honey. And I have told in the chapter entitled, “Praise of the Highest Person” in the *Naiṣadacarita* of how the mind, devoid of its wandering tendency, sinking into the nectar of the soul effortlessly finds its joy. Enough said here.

Śrī Harṣa now brings to a close the third section of his introduction, the defense of *advaita*. His final statement in verse is reminiscent of his earlier remarks on the proof of knowledge as self-aware (cf. pp. 55, 67, 72 Sam). Although it has been said for the opponent's sake that scripture constitutes a valid means to know non-duality and that the validity of the scriptures can be demonstrated by careful examination, in fact, non-duality is nothing more than self-valid consciousness, requiring no external proof and beyond the range of the discursive thought marking all inquiry.<sup>169</sup> For him who recognizes this fact, the proofs herein outlined have no place. As before, by means of the arguments here given, employing only those means the opponent himself has outlined as constituting legitimate reasoning, it is the opponent who is forced to accept the doctrine of non-duality. And starting from this belief, he too can come to know his own soul with the immeasurable joy that such self-realization brings.<sup>170</sup> For Śrī Harṣa, then, non-duality is self-evident; for the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka and Jain it is demonstrated by the very principles they all admit. Thus Śrī Harṣa closes in keeping with his earlier method of proving to his adversary that his adversary's own tenets can only lead to a conclusion opposite to his intentions.

And the use of refuting principles even in proving one's desired aim is not banned by any law like the law of the kings.

Thus why cannot you employ them at will, even on the path of your very own doctrines?

Thus our refuting principles assert their authority at will in every single school of philosophy. The purpose of the listing of various doctrinal standpoints which follows, is to introduce these very refuting principles which cannot be destroyed except by asserting, "All of this arrangement of things in the world is the will of the Lord". Thus, if one believes either in the emptiness of all things or in the indefinability of all things, then these principles apply everywhere without any limitation. If one accepts a doctrine in which the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc., is admitted, even then, the principles to refute definitions are to be applied to the refutation of particular definitions, and the principles of refuting that which is to be defined are to be applied to the refutation of the objects of those definitions, the particular means of valid knowledge, etc. Nor in refuting a particular definition given by the *Sūtras*, etc., does one fall into the fault of contradicting one's own doctrine, for it is an interpretation of the *Sūtras* which is refuted. Nor is

it to be said, “But even when you refute a specific definition, a particular proof of a particular object or a particular explanation of a given *Sūtra*, then you too must provide an alternative definition, an alternative means of valid knowledge and an alternative interpretation.” For I employ these refutations in the form of debate known as ‘wrangling’ and there is thus no occasion for the criticism that I must then turn around and establish my own doctrine.

In this elaborate introduction, Śrī Harṣa has begun with a necessary refutation of the objection of the *sadvādins*, that one who does not admit the existence of the means of valid knowledge, etc., cannot enter into debate. He has proceeded to demolish the theory of *satkāraṇavāda*, or that only the existent can be a cause, concluding like the *Mādhyamika* that nothing, not even the existence of knowledge must be admitted as a prerequisite for debate. This would have been sufficient to allow the main debate to begin; however, to ward off any suspicion of his own doctrinal preferences, Śrī Harṣa as an aside then set out to establish his own doctrine of self-valid knowledge, clearly differentiating himself from his Buddhist predecessors, and, in an interlude, also briefly describing the terms of his debate. This brought us to the third section of the introduction, just concluded, a defense of the doctrine of non-duality with its subsection refuting the concept of difference. What remains now is but a justification of the means by which sections two and three have been constructed. Throughout, Śrī Harṣa has established his own doctrines of self-awareness and non-difference by sharply criticizing his opponent’s tenets, and allowing that refutation to serve as his own means of proof. It is thus with a perfect sense of order that Śrī Harṣa here passes on to some brief comments on the nature and use of his ‘refuting principles’.

The present verse sanctifies the employment of refutation to prove one’s own contentions. There is no unbreakable law, like the law of a king which states that refuting principles can never be employed as proof.<sup>171</sup> Thus, refuting principles can apply anywhere at all, and Śrī Harṣa adds that the very purpose of the great debate to which the present constitutes but an introduction is to introduce readers to the different types of *khaṇḍanayuktis* which cannot be destroyed. The interesting comment is here made that the only possible reply against a *khaṇḍanayukti* is, “All of this is the will of the Lord and cannot be denied even if it be logically inconsistent.” Paramānanda Sūri (7a) supplies, “*Īśvarābhisamdhitaiva viśvavyavasthā, na khaṇḍanāvakāśaḥ*”. Perhaps we have here a clue to the significance of the

title of Śrī Harṣa's now lost *Īśvarābhisamdhī* which seems to have served as a complementary volume to the present one.<sup>172</sup>

Śrī Harṣa proceeds to detail the limits of *khaṇḍanayuktis*. For the Mādhyamika and the Vedāntin they can be used to refute anything and everything as both deny the logicality of all things in the phenomenal world. For the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka and Jain their usage is slightly constricted. The *sadvādin*s are to employ *khaṇḍanayuktis* only to refute particular definitions or particular objects. There is another major difference between the two groups. The *sadvādin*, having applied a *khaṇḍanayukti*, must then return with another acceptable definition. The Mādhyamika or Vedāntin as a *vaitaṇḍika* is required to do no more than demolish his opponent's position. Both, however, can and must employ *khaṇḍanayuktis*.

This being the case, the employment of a refuting principle, even by one who for the moment argues in accordance with his opponent's tenets is not precluded. For the opponent may reply as would a member of his own school who holds a slightly different opinion. And because it is perfectly possible for a member of one school to ask his own follower a question, in order to find out if he has correct understanding of a given point, like the grammarians who ask how a given form is obtained.

Śrī Harṣa here removes the doubt that the last statement made above may be incorrect. The Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka and Jain, it is true, should be able to employ refuting principles against their opponents, but not the Mādhyamika or the Vedāntin who argue as *vaitaṇḍikas*. What exactly are these refuting principles? They are nothing more than the urging of contradiction, *vyabhicāra*, etc. Now, these are the sole providence of the Naiyāyika who has formulated them and the Jain and Mīmāṃsaka who have agreed to their existence. The *vaitaṇḍika* admits nothing at all. How can he then even refute his own opponent?

To this Śrī Harṣa replies that the *vaitaṇḍika* refutes his opponent by using his opponent's own principles, an assertion often repeated in this introduction. There is no contradiction that one individual admitting a general set of principles, (x), can be contradicted by another who also admits the same set of principles. In fact, all schools are subdivided into different factions on specific questions. Literature is replete with the arguments of one Naiyāyika against another, or one Buddhist against another Buddhist.<sup>173</sup> Śrī Harṣa himself cites an example of the practice of one member of a given school attacking another member of the same school

from the tradition of grammar. One individual may well ask another in order to test his knowledge, “How do you arrive at the following form?” No matter what the other answers, even if it be correct, the first party might then suggest, “If this is accepted, then in another case a fault results.” If the second party remains silent, his ignorance is revealed. If he quickly replies, his understanding is apparent. Thus, although both belong to the same school, their discussion is not thereby impossible.<sup>174</sup> The opponent’s objection here is now invalid. Even without his own set of principles, the *vaitaṇḍika* is qualified to employ refuting arguments taken from the opponent’s doctrine.

And by one who wishes to establish the truth of the matter, these refuting principles must be eliminated. Otherwise, he will be unable to determine where the truth lies. And thus, even in a discussion undertaken to ascertain the truth, the employment of refuting principles is without question. There is no such thing as a discussion merely for victory; such a thing exists only as a name. In fact it consists of two wrangling debates. Otherwise, why not make another type of debate out of two such debates designed for victory? I have gone over all of this in “The Examination of the Category of Debate for Victory”. And even if you were to call this type of discussion by the name, “debate for victory”, still, if you offer in fact a faulty argument as a valid proof, your opponent who perceives its faults must somehow be silenced by employing some kind of refuting principle. And so it is not that refuting principles are without occasion in a “debate for victory” either.

This final passage to the introduction presents a slight difficulty. Śrī Harṣa had earlier stated that *khaṇḍanayuktis* can be used by all philosophers, the *sadvādins*, and the *asadvādins*. Having justified this statement in the immediately preceding passage, he now proceeds to demonstrate that they can also be employed in all types of debate. The Naiyāyika conceives of three types of discussion; *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, defined in the *Nyāyasūtras* 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. The first is considered to be a discussion undertaken only for the purpose of determining the truth. Śrī Harṣa begins by stating that *khaṇḍanayuktis* are perfectly applicable in such a discussion. If one person should deny the validity of something the other party states, in order to get at the truth it is incumbent upon the first party to remove the faults his opponent adduces for his original proof. It is obvious that if debate were concluded every time a fault was mentioned, the second party, who has the first opportunity to criticize, would always win.



Determination of truth would be arbitrary, depending on how the question was first posed. Thus, *khaṇḍanayuktis* must be employed by the first party to justify his own contentions.

The difficulty arises with the second type of debate, *jalpa*. Śrī Harṣa first states that there is no such thing as *jalpa* apart from *vāda* and *vitāṇḍā*. This possibility has already been refuted, according to Śaṅkara Mīśra, in the *Īśvarābhisaṃdhi*.<sup>175</sup> Śrī Harṣa's reasoning is not here detailed beyond the cryptic statement that if one considers *jalpa*, in fact two separate *vitāṇḍās*, as a third type of debate, then he must also consider two *jalpas* as a fourth type of debate. To do so would involve *apasiddhānta* for the opponents, in the acceptance of another category not sanctioned by the texts. A glance at Udayana's description of *jalpa* in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 627 N.E., helps us to supply the missing reasoning.

In the *Parīśuddhi* an objection is raised that *jalpa* is no different from *vitāṇḍā*. The debate opens with a party *A* setting forth a proof, perhaps a Naiyāyika urging, "*ātmā nityaḥ pratyabhijñānyathānupapattyā*". The second party, here a Buddhist, then offers an objection, perhaps, *asiddha*; "*kṣaṇikajñānasantānasattvāt pratyabhijñānyathotpadyate*". If this objection of the second party is valid, then *A* is defeated. If not, *B* fails and *A* wins. The debate, a *vitāṇḍā* ( $V_1$ ), is concluded. Thereupon follows a second debate,  $V_2$ . The second party, the Buddhist urges perhaps, "*sarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ sattvāt*". The Naiyāyika now must object, "*pratyakṣaviruddha*", etc. If his objection succeeds the Buddhist is defeated; if not, he is defeated. This closes the second *vitāṇḍā*. In each debate one individual sets forth his views and the other devotes his efforts to refuting those views. The objector here imagines that *jalpa* is thus but two separate debates:

*Vitāṇḍā<sub>1</sub>*

- |                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. <i>A: Svapakṣasādhana</i>      | 1. <i>B: A-pakṣadūṣaṇa</i>             |
| 2. <i>A: Svapakṣadūṣaṇoddhāra</i> | 2. <i>B: Punar A-pakṣadūṣaṇa, etc.</i> |

*Vitāṇḍā<sub>2</sub>*

- |                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. <i>B: Svapakṣasādhana</i>      | 1. <i>A: B-pakṣadūṣaṇa</i>             |
| 2. <i>B: Svapakṣadūṣaṇoddhāra</i> | 2. <i>A: Punar B-pakṣadūṣaṇa, etc.</i> |

To all of this Udayana replies that it is not sufficient in *jalpa* for party *B* merely to refute party *A*. He must also at the same time set forth his own views. The order of argument as Udayana conceives it is thus:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. <i>A: Svapakṣasādhana</i>  | 1. <i>B: A-pakṣadūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>svapakṣasādhana</i>                               |
| 2. <i>A: Svapakṣadūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra; B-</i><br><i>pakṣadūṣaṇa</i> | 2. <i>B: Svapakṣadūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra; Punar A-</i><br><i>pakṣadūṣaṇa, etc.</i> |

The essence of Udayana's argument, then, is that it is not legitimate to split the sequence herein detailed. *B* cannot complete the refutation of *A* and then later begin to prove his own point, whence it might be argued that the whole consists of two *vitāṇḍās*. Rather, *B* must undertake the refutation of *A* and at the same time must embark upon a proof of his own desired tenets.

It is not difficult to see that Udayana's reasoning in this passage involves *anyonyāśraya*. Once it is established that a *jalpa* is different from two *vitāṇḍās*, it is permissible to insist upon the format Udayana outlines; and once that format is followed, it is possible to maintain that *jalpa* is not only two *vitāṇḍās*. Should Udayana arbitrarily urge that his given sequence must be followed, then his own insistence is the only determinant of this peculiar division in form. Śrī Harṣa might similarly urge that two *jalpas* must be considered a separate debate of name *X*. The form of such a debate would be the following:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <i>A: Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>sādhana;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>sādhana.</i>   | 1. <i>B: A-pakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>A-pakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>sādhana;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>sādhana;</i>  |
| 2. <i>A: Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>B-pakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>B-pakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇa.</i> | 2. <i>B: Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>Punar A-pakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>Punar A-pakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇa,</i><br><i>etc.</i> |

The purpose of such a debate might be to test an individual's ability to prove two points at once. As Udayana argued before him, Śrī Harṣa too might well insist that it is not permissible to split this sequence into two parts and make two *jalpas*:

*Jalpa*<sub>1</sub>

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. <i>A: Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>sādhana</i>  | 1. <i>B: A-pakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>sādhana.</i>                       |
| 2. <i>A: Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>B-pakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇa.</i> | 2. <i>B: Svapakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>A-pakṣa<sub>1</sub>dūṣaṇa; etc.</i> |

*Jalpa*<sub>2</sub>

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. <i>A: Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>sādhana</i>  | 2. <i>B: A-pakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇa;</i><br><i>Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>sādhana.</i>                       |
| 2. <i>A: Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>B-pakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇa.</i> | 2. <i>B: Svapakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇo-</i><br><i>ddhāra;</i><br><i>A-pakṣa<sub>2</sub>dūṣaṇa, etc.</i> |

Śrī Harṣa does no more here than Udayana had done in his demonstration that *jalpa* must be different from *viṭaṇḍā*. He draws up a scheme that will distinguish his debate *X* from two *jalpas*, starting with the preconception that they must be different. In both cases there is no reason for that primary assumption and thus for the insistence upon accepting the combined sequences. If Udayana allows the first, and maintains that *jalpa* is different from two *viṭaṇḍās*, then he must also allow the second and maintain that *X* is different from two *jalpas*. This will be a violation of his own tenets; he accepts only the three types of debate defined by the *Nyāyasūtras*.<sup>176</sup>

This I would assume to be sufficient refutation of the category “*jalpa*”. Śrī Harṣa adds that even if one admitted “*jalpa*” as a distinct species of argument, *khaṇḍanayuktis* must still be employed there. The purpose of *jalpa* is victory. Now, should party *A* urge an inferential mark which is at fault and party *B* quickly recognize that fault, in order to win *A* must somehow deny his own error. *Khaṇḍanayuktis*, by trapping *B* in his own words would be an excellent means of doing so. Thus, *khaṇḍanayuktis* are universally applicable, and we are now prepared for the main text of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, itself an answer to the next obvious question, “what are these refuting principles?” (p. 130 Sam), and a brilliant display of dialectical acumen.

So concludes one of the most perfectly organized passages in all of Sanskrit philosophical literature, the introduction to the main body of Śrī Harṣa’s masterpiece. For details of some of the following arguments, the reader is referred to the general preface to this book.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The earlier writers of the *Sūtra* commentaries maintain their strong links with the tradition of oral debate in India in long passages of proof and rebuttal which seem to be nothing more than recorded dialogue; however, they were confined in the overall organization of their texts by the very nature of a commentary. Prior to Śrī Harṣa, Abhinavagupta set the precedent for consciously modeling his work as a single oral debate, governed by a single proposition which he aimed to prove. See *Īśvarapratyabhijñānīmarsinī* with *Bhāskari*, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> For this section as an introduction with this intention cf. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Such objections are voiced throughout the history of Indian philosophy. A few references are here given. *Nyāyavārttika*, pp. 187 ff. K; *Ṭīkā*, pp. 359–360 K; Aniruddha, p. 5; *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 283; *Ślokavārttika*, *Nirālambanavāda*, *śloka* 129 quoted by Rāmānuja in the *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, p. 102; and *śloka* 130 ff.; *Āptamīmāṃsā*, verse 26; *Āptaparīkṣā*, p. 109; *Aṣṭaśatī*, p. 11; *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 98; *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 268; *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, pp. 74, 75, 76, 79, 94, 108; *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 45; *Nyāyavātāra*, p. 53 line 19; *Pramāṇanayatatvālokālaṅkāra*, 6.45, p. 37; *Vigrahavyāvartini*, p. 282, *śloka* 17, 18; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 249, line 16.

<sup>4</sup> The means of valid knowledge are referred to in the text, p. 19 (Chow), as “*sarvatantrasiddhānta*”. The definition of “*sarvatantrasiddhānta*” is given in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.28; *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 104 K, and Jayantabhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyakalikā*, p. 9, as that which is not contradicted by any party. The importance of acknowledging that some things stand proved simply by virtue of the fact that no one denies them is made clear by Vācaspati Miśra in the *Ṭīkā*, p. 57 N.E., and *Bhāmati*, p. 43 on 1.1.1, and by Udayana in the *Parīśuddhi*, p. 136 N.E. That which is *sarvatantrasiddhānta* is required as the very substratum upon which further argument proceeds. Given the pot, an attribute of it, whether it is a collocation of atoms or a unique whole, may be discussed. Similarly, given the *pramāṇas*, etc. an attribute of them, namely their existential status is explored by Śrī Harṣa and his opponents. The appearance of the word *sarvatantrasiddhānta* thus prevents *āśrayāsiddhi* in any attempt to prove the acceptance of their existence.

<sup>5</sup> The second alternative has presented some difficulty to the commentators. Of them only Paramānanda Sūri, 2a, takes it as I have done in my translation; namely that the *pramāṇas* must be said to exist as they are the causes of debate. The other commentators, *Citsukhi* (Chow, p. 23), *Śāṅkarī* (Chow, p. 23), *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 14, Varadapaṇḍita, p. 15, and the anonymous commentator, 2a, all take the second alternative to mean that admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* is required before debate as that admission is the cause of debate. This gives the same *vyāpti* as stated in the text for the first alternative: *yatra yatra*

*vāgyavahāraṣ, tatra tatra pramāṇādisattvābhyupagamah* and *yatra yatra pramāṇādisattvābhyupagamābhāvas, tatra tatra vāgyavahārābhāvaḥ*. That this interpretation is untenable is shown by the following reasons. (a) It is unsupported by the construction of the text. In both the second and third alternatives no word has been provided in the genitive case to accompany the ablative. In the third alternative there is no doubt that *pramāṇādīnām* is to be supplied from the first part of the sentence (cf. the refutation of this suggestion on p. 51 Chow, where it is clear that the *pramāṇas* themselves are *lokasiddha* and not the admission of their existence). By similarity in construction one would naturally expect the same in the second alternative. Where *pramāṇādi* is not to be taken, in the first and fourth alternatives, this is clearly indicated by the introduction of the word “*tadanabhyupagamah*”. (b) It is not consistent with the refutation of this alternative given on Chow, p. 41. Śrī Harṣa there does not repudiate the notion that the admission of the existence of the *pramāṇas* is a cause of debate, which he should do if that were what his opponent were proposing. Instead, he states that the causality of the means of valid knowledge is untouched by the question of their existence, and hence admission of existence need not follow from the fact that they are causal agents in debate. The opponent then returns with a challenge to this last statement. There is nowhere any mention made of admission of existence as a cause of debate. Finally, to interpret the second alternative in the manner of these commentators requires splitting of the reply into two different *pūrvapakṣas* (cf. Varadapaṇḍita; p. 27). That this must be done is nowhere obvious from the text. In fact, it does violence to the natural continuity of the arguments.

<sup>6</sup> For the notion that denial of an attribute necessarily entails existence of the substratum see *Parīśuddhi*, p. 720 ff. (O.E.), 341 ff. (N.E.), and *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 58 ff.

<sup>7</sup> This is an example of the *nyāya* that where a fault accrues to both neither is to be reproached, *Śloka-vārttika*, *Sūnyavāda*, *śloka* 252.

<sup>8</sup> The only difficulty in this passage is the use of the word “*upādhi*”. I have translated it as debate in accordance with the *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 39 (Chow), and the Anon. Com., 2b. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 25, understands it as “*prativādi*” perhaps taking “*upādhi*” as *mūlakāraṇa*. The sense of the passage better supports the first interpretation. The following explanations were offered by T. S. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī for the employment of the word *upādhi* in the meaning of debate. “*Śrotrabuddhau svapratipāditam artham prasaṅjayati yathā japākusumaṃ svarūpam*” and “*yatra vāgyavahāre vyāghāta upādhiyate sa upādhiḥ*”.

<sup>9</sup> Most of the commentators prefer the fault of *anyonyāśraya* to *sveṣṭahāni* which I have emphasized (cf. *Śāṃkarī*, p. 42 Chow; *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 32). I believe that *sveṣṭahāni* is more in keeping with Śrī Harṣa’s original intention which seems to be to reduce the opponent’s position to absurdity. He never directly mentions any other fault beyond the fact that the opponent is speaking in circles and objects to just what his objection shows he must be admitting. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 29, also notes that the *hetu* is *asiddha* and remarks that Śrī Harṣa does not mention it as it is so obvious. A more likely explanation is that he is simply saving it for the logical tour de force beginning on p. 68 (Chow). It is an example of Śrī Harṣa’s perfection in organizing his work. To introduce this here would only interrupt the continuity. The debate over the existence or non-existence of a cause is far more effective as a separate unit.

Śrī Harṣa is throughout aware of his work as a unique whole, and gives particular attention to smooth transitions. The very repetition of reasoning to be supplied by the reader moreover strengthens textual unity.

<sup>10</sup> For a similar statement and like description of the rules of debate cf. *Vādanyāya*, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> For the use of the term “*upajñā*” by Śrī Harṣa compare *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, 3.64 and 17.90; *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 13 and *Moharājaparājaya*, p. 62, “*anāptopajñam nirmūlyam vacanam*”. Also, see *Kusumāñjali*, p. 294, for the notion that behavior is not a valid source of authority without scripture to support it, and p. 457 for the view that a product allows us only to infer a cause in general and not a particular cause.

<sup>12</sup> The term “*viplava*” is here translated as “*niṣpramāṇika*”. Along with the similar “*upaplava*” it is often used by Udayana in the *Kusumāñjali*. On p. 300, 299, it does have the meaning “*niṣpramāṇika*”. On pp. 554, 750, it seems to mean something closer to chaos or destruction. *Citsukhī*, p. 48 (Chow) and ms 24, takes *viplava* as *niṣpramāṇika*; *Śāṅkarī*, p. 48 (Chow), as chaos, and Varadapaṇḍita, p. 34, as *vilaya* or *asiddhi*. The last is echoed by the modern commentary *Śāradā*, p. 47. I have followed *Citsukhī* as the simplest and most direct interpretation. Varadapaṇḍita is the least correct for discussion could proceed with any set of rules; the failure would only be in its effectiveness. Śaṅkara Miśra is strained and could be argued against. Even with an arbitrary set of rules the *vādin* and *pratīvādin* might be distinct; their arguments being faulty, however, the discussion would be a waste of time. Vācaspati in the *Bhāmātī*, p. 6, also employs the word to mean ‘*apramā*’.

<sup>13</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, p. 249, raises this objection. For *anāditva* as justification for authority see Jayantabhaṭṭa’s *Āgamaviḍambana*, p. 94.

<sup>14</sup> The additional phrase “*kathāpravṛttiṃ vinā*” appears in italics in the Chowkambha text and *Śāṅkarī*. It is absent from the new Hindi edition, p. 9, and from *Śāradā*, p. 19. The later contains a reliable text as the editor has examined the manuscripts. I have eliminated it in the translation as unnecessary.

<sup>15</sup> See *Syādvādaratnākara*, vol. II, p. 418, where “*abhūtvā bhāvitva*” is given as Udayana’s definition of *kāryatva*, and the same p. 415 for Vyomaśiva’s definition similarly involving *sat-tā*.

<sup>16</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, p. 203, 1.1.19; p. 150; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 443 (O.E.), *Aṣṭasahasrī*, pp. 24, 192; *Brhatī*, p. 54; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 220.

<sup>17</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, p. 131.

<sup>18</sup> *Vādanyāya*, pp. 69–71.

<sup>19</sup> The same statement with very little change appears in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 249, verse 109; *Vīgrahavyāvartinī*, p. 284.

<sup>20</sup> *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 283–284; *Śloka-vārttika*, *Nirāmbanavāda*, pp. 163, 193; *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, p. 33; *Āptamīmāṃsā*, p. 22.

<sup>21</sup> *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 186, quoting from the *Śālistambasūtra*; pp. 176, 182, 211, 229, 233.

<sup>22</sup> *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, pp. 174, 247.

<sup>23</sup> The only Indian interpreter who follows this interpretation of Śrī Harṣa is Nageśa in the *Laghumañjuśā*, quoted in the Sanskrit introduction to the *Pañcapādikā*, Madras Oriental Series. The editor takes exception to Nageśa's understanding of Śrī Harṣa. The whole is an excellent although traditional review of the question. For further support of this contention see below, notes 27, 134, 161, 162, 163.

<sup>24</sup> The commentator, Prajñākaramati, interprets this passage differently, taking *anya* to mean another person. This is nonsense and further makes the statement “*paracitta*” superfluous. He has failed to realize that *anavasthā* does result in *mokṣābhāva*.

<sup>25</sup> That the non-existent can be a cause is discussed in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 186. It is refuted in the *Aṣṭasatī* by Akalaṅka. Śrī Harṣa's arguments here show striking resemblances to those of Akalaṅka. Akalaṅka, through a series of *pratibandhi* arguments finally forces the Buddhist to admit that, “*yathāśattvāviśeṣe 'pi niyamah saṃbhavati, tathā sattvāviśeṣe 'pi*”. Śrī Harṣa merely interchanges the “*yathā*”, “*tathā*”. The technique is identical. The question of influence is to be explored. Refutations of Nyāya doctrines abound in the Jain texts. In fact, the *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra and the *Syādvādaratnākara* of Vāddevasūri are devoted in the main to refuting Nyāya tenet. The latter is an open and detailed attack on Udayana. In addition, one might compare Yaśāscandra's remarks on Vāddevasūri in the *Mudritakumudacandraprakaraṇa*, “*Maharṣiḥ devādya Śrīdevasūreḥ prāmaṇikamanoharīṇīm vāṇīm ākarṇya viśīrṇaḥ Kaṇḍāksapādabhaṇitau pakṣapātaḥ; udvignaṃ Udyotakaroktav antaḥkaraṇam; arucigocaratām acarad Vācaspatimatir; dagdham ivābhāty Udayanavaidagdhyaṃ*” (p. 49) and Merutuṅga's depiction of Vāddevasūri as “*Khaṇḍanatarakapraviṇa*”, *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, *Siddharājādīprabandha*, p. 66. There is at least one Jain commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* preserved; that of Paramānanda Sūri in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Poona. Manuscripts of other commentaries to this text have been preserved in the main in the Jain Bhandars of Rajasthan, Udayana also shows some similarities to Akalaṅka. The section in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* refuting “*svataḥprakāśata*” is to be compared to *Siddhiviniścaya* 1.1.4, p. 26, and the *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, pp. 33 ff.

In addition, Śrī Harṣa's employment of these arguments provides another point of distinction from his predecessors. Śaṅkarācārya explicitly denies the “*asatkāraṇavāda*” (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.27; pp. 464–466). This is indicative of a fundamental difference in method between the two. Śaṅkarācārya, in his task of explaining the *sūtras* on creation, does accept a type of *pariṇāmavāda*, which, he further qualifies, is possible only through “*avidyākalpitena ca nāmarūpalakṣaṇena rūpabhedena vyākṛtāvvyākṛtātmakatvena tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīyena*” (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, pp. 401 on 2.1.27; see also p. 304 on

2.1.9; p. 394 on 2.1.22; pp. 380–382 on 2.1.14; p. 401 on 2.2.2; pp. 419–420 on 2.1.22; p. 448 on 2.2.17, etc.). Thus Śaṅkarācārya not only repudiates the notion that the non-existent can be a cause, but also endorses for the *vyāvahārika* level a doctrine of creation, which he recognizes as untenable in the modification of the process as in part due to the inexplicable workings of *avidyā*. Śrī Harṣa, unhampered by any necessity of explaining the diverse Upanishadic passages, categorically denies the validity of all attempts to account for the phenomenal world. One might expect him to level against Śaṅkara the same objection as he levelled against Dharmakīrti (preface pp. 37–38). If by the phrase “*avidyāpratyupasthāpitanāmārūpa*” is acknowledged the fact that one cannot logically explain these things, then of what necessity is their supposition? The same end, namely the proof of Brahma as the one reality, self-established, can be better accomplished simply through the use of destructive arguments. The answer to this question is obvious for the traditional Vedāntin. The *Sūtras* in denying *asatkāraṇavāda* do seem to propound a theory of *pariṇāmavāda*. They must be explained. Śrī Harṣa in keeping to the Mādhyamika Buddhist’s methods of denying the validity of his opponent’s assertions is the far more consistent of the two (see note 103).

<sup>26</sup> The commentaries make clear that the text should read *sāmagrī-asattvam* (Chow p. 700) and not *sattvam*. This is actually Śāradā’s reading, p. 28. Udayana’s refutation of *asatkāraṇavāda* can be seen in *Kusumāñjali*, pp. 52 ff.

<sup>27</sup> None of the commentators understands this passage, and while it is not within the scope of this work to discuss their errors and idiosyncracies of interpretation, a few illustrations of just how far wrong they can be might be useful as a warning against reading texts with the explanations of later philosophers. *Citsukhī* urges (Chow 70–71) that the product will arise at points following (a) and Śaṅkara Miśra that the whole argument is incorrect. Their failure is largely due to anachronism. Both maintain that the *sāmagrī* exists at only one moment in time, the moment immediately preceding (a). This assumption is possible by postulating (1) that over and above the collocation of visible causes is an invisible cause which is momentary or (2) that there exists an invisible impediment which is removed only at the point in time immediately prior to (a). Both of these are impossible for the Naiyāyika as he would then be admitting that although something is presented to cognition as non-momentary it is in fact not actually so. This will vitiate all the arguments Udayana employs against the Buddhist in the first part of the *Ātmatattvaviveka* and against the Cārvāka and Buddhist in the opening sections of the *Kusumāñjali*. In addition it will involve him in *apasiddhānta*, the admission of his opponent’s doctrine that all causes are momentary (cf. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 52).

I believe that Śaṅkara Miśra has in mind the definition of the *sāmagrī* given by Vardhamāna Prakāśa on p. 190 of the *Prakāśa* to the *Parīśuddhi* of Udayana. Śaṅkara Miśra himself quotes this definition on p. 74 of our text. Vardhamāna holds that the *sāmagrī* itself is a single point in time at which all causes, including the *prāgabdhāva* of the product, are present. Thus it is not possible to urge that the *sāmagrī* exists at another point in time, for time is one and uniform, and this would result in the fault of *ātmāśraya* (cf. *Kusumāñjali*, p. 119; for *kāla* as one and not residing in any other *kāla*). That this definition is unacceptable here is clear from the following reasons. Firstly, the definition as it stands with Vardhamāna’s assertion that by so defining the *sāmagrī* one cannot say of it that it is momentary or non-momentary is itself a violation of Nyāya tenets (*Kusumāñjali*: *viruddhāyoraṅ prakāraṅtarasthiti*, p. 372, and *Ṭīkā*, p. 552 K). An object must either be x



or non-*x*. Vardhamāna's *sāmagrī* is neither. If this be allowed then the Naiyāyika must drop his vehement objections to the traditional Vedānta concept of *sadasadvilakṣaṇatva*. Secondly, there is good reason to believe that the definition was first formulated by Vardhamāna, possibly in an effort to refute these objections of Śrī Harṣa. It finds no place amongst the other definitions of *sāmagrī* which Śrī Harṣa attacks in the *Khaṇḍana*, p. 252 (Sam), and is directly attributed to Vardhamāna by the Bhūṣāmaṇikāra, ms. p. 81a. Finally and most importantly, the conclusive proof that it cannot be taken here is the very same reason why Śaṅkara Miśra asserts that the *sāmagrī* cannot be said to exist at more than one point in time – because it is time, it can no more be said to exist at the moment immediately prior to the arising of the product. And this is the Naiyāyika statement in the text (Chow p. 70).

It remains now to see how Śaṅkara Miśra misconstrues this passage and refutes Śrī Harṣa and how the *Bhūṣāmaṇi* comes to his rescue for equally wrong reasons. The whole chaotic jumble exemplifies the confusion that grew up around the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, and the hair-splitting attempts at refutation and defense all based upon misinterpretation of the author's original intention.

Śaṅkara Miśra argues that there is a major difference between the Naiyāyika view and that of the *Siddhāntin*. The *Siddhāntin* cause non-exists at all points in time, whereas the Naiyāyika cause exists only at point (*d*) in our diagram in the text. Thus Śrī Harṣa's argument is simply wrong, but Śaṅkara Miśra adds, his intention is that the product is also non-existent. This attempt to support Śrī Harṣa after invalidating his original statement and attributing to him an altogether different conception has given rise to what I would consider the most unpardonable misinterpretation of Śrī Harṣa on the part of the Bhūṣāmaṇikāra; a misinterpretation which not only does violence to this passage but also to the very method of argument exemplified by Śrī Harṣa and defined in the *Nyāyasūtras* as *vitaṇḍākathā*.

The Bhūṣāmaṇikāra replies, true the *Siddhāntin* cannot urge that both views are the same, but all he means is that both cause and product are non-existent from the standpoint of absolute reality. Thus just what the Naiyāyika calls existent the *Siddhāntin* calls non-existent and what holds for one holds for the other. Moreover, he argues, the *Siddhāntin* recognizing that the object in question has no absolute existence (and hence is *asat*) still admits a provisional existence which is sufficient to account for such processes as causality. And so the two parties are talking about the same thing and the difference between them is imaginary.

This is absolutely untenable for many reasons. For one, it is not what Śrī Harṣa says, and for another it destroys the arguments as they appear in the text and substitutes for them an altogether different interpretation which can be dismissed without too great difficulty. Śrī Harṣa employs the word *asat*. He never once indicates that we must supply, "from the standpoint of absolute reality", nor does he endorse a third truth value. There are two reasons why he does not do so. The first is obvious. The Naiyāyika does not accept any such division of existence into different degrees of reality and this would involve the *Siddhāntin* in either *asiddhi* or a long proof to demonstrate the validity of this division. It would also violate the rules he has set for himself in undertaking debate. The reader is referred to pp. 194 ff. (Chow) where Śrī Harṣa clearly states that his only aim is to show that his opponent's doctrines do not stand logical scrutiny. In the same passage he explicitly and unmistakably also states just how this is to be accomplished. The *Siddhāntin* must show that the

conceptual scheme of reality which his opponent proposes is contradicted by the very same principles which he, the opponent, admits. Thus we must understand by *asat* just what the Naiyāyika would – the locus of the absence of the universal, “*sattā*”. That this is just what Śrī Harṣa desires it to mean is clear in the refutation of *satkāraṇavāda*. The *kāraṇa* is *asat* as the universal *sattā* does not reside in it. Vidyāsāgara, p. 60, is not free from this type of misinterpretation, nor is Varadapaṇḍita, p. 54.

In conclusion it might be added that all the Naiyāyika need urge against the *Siddhāntin* if he really meant that what the Naiyāyika calls *sat* he calls *asat* and so there is no difference between them is, what is his justification for doing so? To argue by arbitrarily renaming an entity is not to argue at all. One might call it a tree but it still has the same properties and nothing is thereby gained. Thus sadly, Śaṅkara Mīśra for reasons other than those he might have originally intended has succeeded in destroying the brilliance of Śrī Harṣa’s arguments. Taken in this fashion they are indeed little better than nonsense.

<sup>28</sup> That God’s will and effort are regulated by his knowledge which supplies them with an object is explained in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 499. For both as *naisargika* or natural, cf. *Āgamaviḍaṃbana*, p. 90. There is a variant reading in the text for *samasamayavāt* (Chow p. 73). Both Varadapaṇḍita, p. 54, and the anonymous commentator, 3b, give *aprthaksamayavāt*. It does not alter the meaning.

<sup>29</sup> Śaṅkara Mīśra again misunderstands this passage, because he interprets *avyavahitottaratva* in accordance with its later Nyāya explanation as “*svādhikaraṇakṣaṇadhvaṃsādhikaraṇakṣaṇadhvaṃsādhikaraṇatve sati svādhikaraṇakṣaṇadhvaṃsādhikaraṇatva (Gadhādhari)*”. There are several objections to this interpretation. The first is that it probably post-dates Śrī Harṣa. The second is that it would accomplish nothing for the opponent as the new determinant would still exist at points (i) through (a). Śaṅkara Mīśra himself is aware of this and so adds that there is something in the *sāmagrī* which exists only at point (d), the moment immediately prior to the arising of the product. This is untenable for the reasons mentioned in note 27. Finally, this very conception of *avyavahitottaratva* which permits it to exist from moments (i) to (a) violates common sense. Consider any object which endures over a given period of time, 1 2 3 4 5 6 /, the line representing the moment at which it is destroyed. Now what does it mean to say, “that point in time which follows immediately upon the existence of our object”? If at point 2 the same object exists as did at point 1, then point 2 represents not the first point after its existence, but simply another point of its existence; existence is one and uniform. Point 2 may be considered as the point immediately following upon the existence of “object qualified by existence at time point 1” but the Naiyāyika must not admit that this object differs at points 1, 2, 3, 4, as that would be tantamount to admitting that all things are momentary. Thus points 2, 3, 4, 5, are not *vastusattāvyavahitottarakṣaṇāḥ* but *vastusattākṣaṇāḥ*. The sense of the argument must thus be as I have outlined it in the comments to the translation. The opponent urges this quality as it is confined to one point.

<sup>30</sup> Although no commentator interprets the passage thus, such an interpretation is required to justify the existence of the Naiyāyika question. The previous argument has established that the attribute, *kāryajanmādhikaraṇatā*, can serve to distinguish moments at which products appear from moments at which they do not. This requires that it be common to all such times

and absent from unlike times. It thus fulfils the same purpose as a common attribute, and the very question betrays only the ignorance of the questioner. When it is realized that as a universal or a general condition (*upādhi*) it would require a manifestor, the question becomes meaningful. This interpretation was provided by T. S. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī. The commentators are aware of a difficulty in distinguishing the previous question from this one (cf. *Citsukhī*, p. 78 Chow); however, they provide no satisfactory explanation.

<sup>31</sup> The interpretation and the translation given here require one slight alteration in the printed text. *Antarbhūtasattvam* should read *antarbhāvitāsattve*; the change from “e” to the dot indicating *anusvāra* is a highly possible error in manuscript reading. The commentaries support the reading of the printed text; however, they interpret it as if it were in the locative or genitive case.

<sup>32</sup> Śrī Harṣa will make great use of this principle later on. See p. 194 Sam.

<sup>33</sup> *Tām aniveśya* in the text (p. 83 Chow) is either in error for “*tām viniveśya*” or “*tām niveśya*”, or the antecedent of “*tām*” must be taken not as the more natural “*anyām*” but as “*prathamām*”, with the idea that the denial of the first *sattā* implies the acceptance of the second. The anonymous commentator 4a does gloss “*tām*” with “*prathamām*”, perhaps with this in mind. The reading of both the Bhandarkar Institute manuscript and the transcript from L. D. Institute is too garbled to be able to tell his exact intention. *Citsukhī*, p. 83 (Chow), reads “*aviniveśya*”. In any case it must be taken to mean, “if you include the second existence”, for this is the only way to understand the argument. To read it as “*tām aniveśya*”, if you exclude the second existence”, the reasoning simply becomes incorrect. This would introduce the alternative given in the second half of the verse. Now, considering of *sattā*<sub>2</sub>-qualified (*sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified-*x*) only the part in parentheses as a cause, it is not possible to assert categorically that this cause is non-existent. In fact the very purpose of assuming a *sattā*<sub>2</sub> was to show that this qualified entity does exist. All that one can say in this case is that it is not necessary that *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified-*x* as a cause exist, since it has been admitted that its existence is irrelevant to causal function. This is the actual reply given to the second alternative by Śrī Harṣa himself, text p. 91 (Chow), and is the only answer possible. Thus, aside from the fact that to read “*tām aniveśya*” as “*dvitīyām aniveśya*” is out of place in a criticism of the first half of the verse, the reply which would be incorrect proves that it could not have been intended. Finally, reading “*tām viniveśya*” allows for a smooth and natural transition to the next sentence. It might be noted that all commentaries are incorrect on this point.

<sup>34</sup> At least some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas did admit to an endless series of existence, cf. *Vaiśeṣika Darśana*, ed. Jainmuni Jambuvijayaji, p. 4, in the commentary on *sūtra* 7. Śrī Harṣa in general does not use a fictitious *pūrvapakṣa*; sources have been found for a number of his opponent’s statements, and further research should uncover still more.

<sup>35</sup> There is another way to read this passage; cf. *Citsukhī*, p. 86 (Chow), *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 58, *Śāṅkarī*, p. 88 (Chow), and Varadapaṇḍita, p. 59. All contend that after Śrī Harṣa criticizes the Naiyāyika by saying that the first universal, *sattā*, could not be proved, the Naiyāyika agrees – let it not be proved, and goes on to say that even without *sattā*, entities

can exist on their own accord. Thus they assume that *x* itself is *svatūpasat* and not *sattā*<sub>1</sub> qualified-*x*, as I have done in the translation notes. The difficulty with their interpretation is that it involves the opponent in a major fault, *apasiddhānta* or violation of his own tenets, for the Naiyāyika does admit *sattā* as a universal. This fault would conclude the debate with the defeat of the Naiyāyika and further argument would be out of place. *Vidyāsāgarī* recognizes this, and suggest that the *pūrvapakṣa* changes to Prabhākara. The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas do not admit the universal *sattā* (cf. *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 94–98). There is no need to do so if the passage is interpreted as I have done. It would further require switching again, as pp. 89–90 are to be interpreted in accordance with the statements of Udayana. The *Bhūṣāmaṇi* seems to waver, sometimes following *Śāṅkarī* and sometimes tending toward my interpretation (cf. p. 84 Chow).

For the word “*padaprasarikā*”, p. 84 (Chow), cf. *Āgamaviḍambana*, p. 60. I am told by Dr. V.W. Paranjpe of the Deccan College that the expression, meaning “recklessness” is retained in modern Marathi.

<sup>36</sup> It is a favorite doctrine of Śrī Harṣa that negative and positive concomitance can only exist between universals. See text pp. 187, 676, 176, 209, 304, 305, 310, 312 (Sam).

<sup>37</sup> I have taken “*anugati*” to mean community in designation and cognition; the commentators all take it more generally as “similarity”. In their interpretation, the Naiyāyika here replies, “So what if this type of existence is limited to individuals?” This is imperfect for the following reasons. (1) The question has already been answered – it results in the impossibility of proving the existence of universals. (2) To further assume as the commentators do that the remark moreover implies an assent to the absence of universals involves the Naiyāyika in *apasiddhānta* and the debate would end here. In the interpretation I have given the argument is allowed to proceed in gradual and logical steps. As before, the opponent now seeks to absolve himself from the faults the *Siddhāntin* has urged. He suggests that yes, individuals are different, but so are our perceptions of them. This does resolve the immediately preceding problem. The relationship, *yatra yatrānugatavyavahārādi tatra tatra jātiḥ*, is unharmed as in this case the absence of both is admitted. A new fault results, however, and that is that causality itself becomes impossible without this common perception.

<sup>38</sup> The commentators offer many different explanations for this passage, none of which is free from fault. A brief resume of some of their suggestions is given here. *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 61–62, and Varadapaṇḍita, p. 60, interpret “*asat*” as “*abhāva*” and argue that the absent pot is still a pot since all denial demands a counterpositive (*pratīyogin*). For one, “*asat*” cannot mean “*abhāva*” as Udayana clearly admits that an absence is a cause (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 108) and there would be no use for any of the arguments in this section of the text. Moreover, the usual definition of “*bhāva*” as “*vidhimukhatvena pratīyamāṇatva*” (*Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p. 2, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 542; *Ṭīkā*, p. 32 K, p. 43 N.E.; *Vārttika*, p. 9 K, p. 12 N.E.) applies equally to Śrī Harṣa’s “*asat*”. It cannot thus be taken as “*abhāva*”.

*Citsukhī*, p. 90 (Chow), suggests that unless you admit a non-existent pot is a pot, it will be impossible to use the words in the same grammatical cases. The simplest refutation of this is that it violates the reading in the text; the phrase “*ghaṭādir na*” becomes superfluous. There are other reasons for its rejection. *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* need not imply identity (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 179).

The anonymous commentator, 4a offers still another interpretation, not altogether impossible. It presupposes a course of argument something like the following: The Naiyāyika objects to Śrī Harṣa's statement that a non-existent pot is a pot, or a non-existent object has its own nature, on the grounds that it is contradictory. The very word "non-existent" means "without essential nature". Thus the statement is equivalent to the following, "That which has no nature has a nature", an obvious contradiction. To all of this Śrī Harṣa replies, to whom belongs this contradiction? Let us take a look at what you have said, "The non-existent has no nature at all". This is an equally impossible statement, for by your own admission the very word "non-existent" means "having no nature". Thus your statement reduces to this, "that which has no nature has no nature". This statement is impossible as predication requires that the predicated and that of which it is predicted be different. Putting this back into the text, "*na hy asan ghaṭādir na ghaṭādiḥ*" would imply, "for the statement a non-existent pot does not indicate that the object in question is not a pot at all, for in that case you could never say 'a non-existent pot is not a pot', the same being said by the very word '*asat*'." The anonymous commentator emphasizes that the fault here is that such a statement would be repetitious. There is a more fundamental difficulty with it, and this brings us back to Udayana. If the object is *asat* and so *niḥsvārūpa*, whence to predicate of it a *svārūpa* becomes contradictory, then for the very same reason the denial of a *svārūpa* becomes impossible – because it is then an absolute fiction and denial or predication demands the opposite of the locus. In urging this contradiction in the case of denial, Śrī Harṣa would be guilty of "*matānujñā*" or accepting the *pūrvapakṣa*'s assertion of the same fault in his own doctrine. This is the reason why the interpretation of the anonymous commentator is weak; it allows the fault of contradiction to stand and the further statement on p. 116 (Chow) to the effect that it has been proven that the non-existent has its own nature would be impossible. The interpretation given with the translation makes Śrī Harṣa the victor, for the fault then exists only on the side of his opponent. It also makes possible the further use of this argument on p. 116.

<sup>39</sup> For a similar assertion that nothing can be said to exist on the basis of an existence which itself is non-existent, see *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 272; *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, p. 113b; *Aṣṭaśatī*, p. 24, *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 399. I have not been able to locate a parallel in any non-Jain source.

For the expression in the text, p. 92 (Chow), "*ghaṭṭakutūyām prabhātam*" cf. *Kusumāñjali*, p. 423.

<sup>40</sup> For the requirement of *anvayavyatireka* in causality, cf. *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, pp. 79, 129; *Ātmattavivēka*, p. 292; *Nyāyakalikā*, p. 10; *Ṭikā*, p. 373 K. Aniruddha takes exception to the requirement (*Pañjikā*, p. 11), although he accepts it earlier on page 9. His objection seems to be that God's knowledge is a cause and yet is eternal; thus, it cannot serve in a *vyatireka* statement. Udayana follows Aniruddha in the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 203. For the same reason, he de-emphasizes the importance of *anvayavyatireka* in these limited cases, while not denying that they remain elsewhere an important determinant of causality.

<sup>41</sup> No commentator gives this interpretation; what has led me to it, however, is the impossibility of the suggestions they do offer. The following is just a sample: *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 66, suggests that when the *pūrvapakṣa* denies *anvaya* he admits its existence, as it is not possible

to deny something that has never been perceived. This is absolutely incorrect. The *anvaya* admitted in the opponent's own doctrine could well serve as the *pratiyogin* for negation. If he means that denial requires the existence of the counterpositive at the very place at which it is denied (i.e. existence of *anvaya* in *asatkāraṇa*), then *Vidyāsāgarī* has made impossible all negation. We deny silverness of a conch shell. If to do so required that the *pratiyogin* exist at that locus, then the negation would be impossible, for silverness never exists in a conch. Furthermore, no Naiyāyika would admit such a thing cf. Aniruddha, p. 44, on *Vārttika*, p. 336 ff. K; *Ṭīkā*, p. 87 K, p. 161 N.E.; and Udayana, *Kiraṇāvalī* pp. 221 ff.; Paramānanda Sūri (3b), *Śāṃkarī* and *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 96 (Chow), offer the same solution, and Varadapaṇḍita, p. 65, something akin to it.

*Citsukhī*, p. 96 (Chow), repeats the logic of p. 92 (Chow) with the idea that Śrī Harṣa accepts the existence of the causes, albeit a non-existent existence. This existence might well serve in the function of causality and would be all that is required for *anvayavyatireka*. The trouble with all of this is that it is not what the text says; to read it into the text requires that "*anvaya*" be interpreted as "*sattā*" (cf. *Citsukhī*'s gloss, *niyatapūrvasattārūpasyanvayasya*) which is not what it means. *Niyatapūrvasattva* is *kāraṇatā* not *anvaya*; *anvaya* is only one determinant of *kāraṇatā*. Secondly, it requires that the instrumental case refer to the first person, but it is the opponent's statement immediately above that "there is no *anvaya*". Thirdly, it splits the two sentences in the reply, for which there is no justification (i.e. no "*ca*" or similar word). They would now mean, "for even though I deny existence, I accept it as well; (and you can do no better than to admit a non-existent existence) because if existence includes within it existence, then the previously stated faults result". The sentence fragment in parentheses would have to be supplied. Perhaps the severest criticism for *Citsukhī*'s interpretation, however, is that it is completely out of phase with what is to follow in the text. The same question is asked and answered on p. 102 (Chow). The *pūrvapakṣa* statement on the preceding page indicates that the reply given earlier was not a reply at all, but just a clever display of wit. *Citsukhī*'s interpretation is an actual answer, and would thus make the *pūrvapakṣa* objection incomprehensible. Finally, it is not the answer which Śrī Harṣa does actually give. Śrī Harṣa on p. 102 tells us that what determines (x) is a cause of (y) and not (a), (b), or (c) is that (x) is the object of a cognition, "(x) invariably exists prior to (y)", and (a), (b), (c), are not the objects of any such knowledge. If we accept *Citsukhī*'s explanation for the section here, the question on p. 101 becomes unjustified, and we are in difficulty in explaining why Śrī Harṣa allows not only the same question but also gives two different answers! This is an example of what I would call the second greatest source of errors in the commentaries, failure to look at the text as a unified whole, organized so that one argument leads naturally to another.

<sup>42</sup> The commentaries attribute this objection to Kumārila (*Citsukhī*, p. 97, Chow). I have not been able to locate its exact source. According to D. C. Bhattacharya, 'More Light on Sanskrit Literature in Bengal', *I.H.Q.* Vol. XXII (1946), p. 131, although it is quoted in the *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 131, as a verse of Kumārila's it is not to be found in that author's works.

<sup>43</sup> The commentators have another explanation. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 67, *Śāṃkarī*, p. 97 (Chow), Varadapaṇḍita, p. 68, maintain that this is not a valid *tarka* as it must prove the very opposite of the premise it starts with (i.e., just as the *tarka*, *yady agnir na syāt, tarhi dhūmo na syāt, dhūmas tiṣṭhati yasmāt tasmād agninā bhavitavyam*), this *tarka* should also

give the result, *yadi kāraṇam asat syāt tarhi bhojane 'bhojane 'pi ko 'pi viśeṣo na syāt; viśeṣas tiṣṭhati yasmāt tasmāt satā kāraṇena bhavitavyam*). This they urge is impossible as the verse, “*antarbhāvitāsattvam*”, etc. has proved that the cause must be non-existent. The *tarka* is thus “*bādhitaviśaya*”. There is one major flaw in this reasoning, and that is that the verse has done nothing of the sort. It has merely shown that by the Naiyāyika’s own admissions there is no reason to insist that a cause must exist. It may well be non-existent without any problem. In fact Śrī Harṣa never tries to prove the non-existence of the phenomenal world, for the very reasons adduced by his opponents (cf. references in note 3). Such a proof is impossible. In this he resembles his predecessor, Nāgārjuna (*Mādhyamikaśāstra*, pp. 52, 214–215; and *Vigrahavyāvartini*, p. 293 vs. 94).

<sup>44</sup> Compare pp. 69, 72, 91, 96, 98 (Chow).

<sup>45</sup> All commentaries, with the exception perhaps of the anonymous commentator, 4b, miss the point of the argument. [*Śāmkarī*, p. 102 (Chow). Varadapaṇḍita, p. 70, *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 70]. They have the *pūrvapakṣa* ask, “what if such a false knowledge should arise as in the well-known case of the donkey standing outside the potter’s house which people all think invariably precedes the appearance of pots? The donkey would then be considered a cause.” The reply is given that where a contradicting cognition immediately arises that is not a cause, and where it does not, the opposite is true. The trouble with this interpretation is that the text nowhere gives such a reply; moreover, it destroys the force of the “*yādṛśyā, tādrśyā*”. A better explanation might be that since such a wrong knowledge is possible in the case of things which are not causes, the statement made by the *Siddhāntin* should be qualified – the knowledge must be *pramā*. For the knowledge “*x* exists” to be valid the *Siddhāntin* would have to admit the Naiyāyika’s contentions that only existents serve as causes. This is similar to what I have stated in the translation; however, I prefer the interpretation there given as it makes a better objection of the Naiyāyika statement. Śrī Harṣa is actually admitting causality on the basis of a wrong knowledge. For an argument somewhat similar to Śrī Harṣa’s, see *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* with *Bhāskarī*, p. 117.

<sup>46</sup> *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 73, gives another explanation which is perfectly possible; the only thing against it is that it is a *pratibandhi* of the type Śrī Harṣa explicitly avoids in this section and is slightly out of order here, belonging more properly to the preceding sections as a *bādhaka* of *asataḥ kāraṇatva*. He takes *asattva* to mean non-existent rather than false. The *pūrvapakṣa* would be asking, “well, if all are equally non-existent, then how is it that one is subject to contradiction immediately and the other is not?” The answer is, of course, if all are existent the same question may be asked. The interpretation in the translation is substantially that of Varadapaṇḍita, p. 72; *Citsukhī*, p. 105 (Chow); *Śāmkarī*, p. 105 (Chow); Paramānanda Sūri 4a; anonymous commentator, 4b.

<sup>47</sup> There is only one difficulty in interpreting this passage, and that is the referent of the pronoun “*tādrśā*”. Only the anonymous commentator, 4b, gives “*sad iti buddhiviśayatayā*”. The others all say “*idam asmān niyataprākṣat*”. There is a fundamental difference between these two. *Niyatapraākṣat* because of the presence of the word “*niyata*” is a statement of invariable concomitance. It is a generalized cognition and makes known the existence of the cause right up to the time the product arises. It is permissible to gloss the first *tādrśā* with

“*idam asmān niyataprāksat*”, but not the second (in the compound *anyadātanatādrśabuddhiviśayatayā*, pp. 106–107 Chow). In that case, the question Śrī Harṣa is asking would be meaningless. This is the reason why I have changed examples in my explanation. If one refers Śrī Harṣa’s question to the seed in the mountain, then, the knowledge gained from inference from the product will be of the type “*idam asmān niyataprāksat*” and will make known the existence of the seed at Time<sub>1</sub> through Time<sub>2</sub> on our graph. Thus the query, “how can you know the existence of that seed at time<sub>2</sub> by a knowledge at time<sub>1</sub>”, is very weak. It is tantamount to asking how can you know a pot by a knowledge of a pot. Moreover, were this intended one would expect in the reply an “*eva*” after *grhyate*, or better yet the phrase, “*grhītam eva*”, but not simply “*grhyate*” as the text reads. To take “*tādrśa*” here as “*sad*” is completely natural in this second case, for one proves “*x*” by a knowledge of which “*x*” is the object.

<sup>48</sup> With all of Śrī Harṣa’s arguments might be compared the brief comments of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 183, which are meant as a proof of the fact that a non-existent can serve as a cause, the same laws applying to both. This is indeed Śrī Harṣa’s line of argument, but the two are far apart in sophistication and detail.

<sup>49</sup> For the term “*matikardama*” in the text, p. 112 Chow, cf. *Kusumāñjali*, p. 536.

<sup>50</sup> The Naiyāyika, specifically Udayana, regards that it is the very nature of knowledge to take on its object as its distinguishing attribute. This very nature is moreover the relationship of object to cognition. See *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 224. Śrī Harṣa will refute this notion in the fourth *pariccheda*.

<sup>51</sup> For the object of wrong knowledge as an absolute fiction, see Aniruddha, p. 44; *Ṭīkā*, p. 87 K, p. 161 N.E.

<sup>52</sup> See *Bhāmātī*, p. 475, on 2.2.28 for a prior source, with the one difference that the *Bhāmātī* assumes this to be a proof of the “*sākṣin*” which it differentiates from ordinary object cognition. This is an important distinction. Śrī Harṣa, like the Buddhist and Abhinavagupta, regards *viśayajñāna* as *svataḥsiddha* and “*saviśayatva*” as *mithyā*. For both Śaṅkara and Vācaspati Miśra (2.2.28 and 2.3.7, p. 511) *viśayajñāna* is itself *jaḍa* and *sākṣibhāṣya*. Probably for this reason, the editor of the Chowkambha edition with *Citsukhī*, etc. suggests that Śrī Harṣa here turns from the Mādhyamika standpoint to the Vijñānavāda doctrine; however, to my knowledge the inference here given is not to be found in any Vijñānavāda work. Varadapaṇḍita on p. 79 is more correct in his assertion that this is a purely Vedānta argument.

The Yogācāra argument as set forth in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, pp. 187 ff., is strikingly similar to Udayana’s objections in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 284, earlier refuted; *saṃvṛti* must exist for anything else to depend upon it. For Dharmakīrti, that knowledge must be self-aware follows from an entirely different set of premises. He begins his demonstration with the question, “What allows us to say that an object, ‘*a*’ is known?” If it were only that this object and its knowledge possess some similarity, then two similar stones would also know each other. If the object and the knowledge are of one form, the nature of the object, then both



would be unaware. Thus it must be said that the object of a cognition has “*anubhavarūpatā*”. Now, if the object of a cognition is nothing but knowledge, then, to know any object is to know knowledge itself (cf. Manorathanandin, “*na hy arthākarajñānavedanam antareṇārthavedanam*”, *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 229). Knowledge cannot be known by another knowledge as this would lead to an infinite series (*Pramāṇavārttika*, verse 441). It must thus be self-aware (*Pramāṇavārttika*, pp. 227 ff.).

Abhinavagupta in the *Vivṛti* and *Vimarśinī* has a proof of *svasamvedana* still different from that of Dharmakīrti. He states that knowledge must be known as no one questions it (*Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarśinī*, pp. 70 ff.) and that it must be self-aware in order to explain the difference between the self and others (*Vivṛti*, Vol. 1, p. 102). The first statement is similar to Śrī Harṣa's present assertion. The second is distinctive. On p. 103 of the *Vivṛti*, Abhinavagupta also quotes Dharmakīrti's arguments. A comparative study is awaited.

<sup>53</sup> The presence of this “*avighnitajijñāsitasya*”, p. 122 (Chow), wards off the possibility of *vyabhicāra* in the inference. It might be urged that the absence of doubt and cognition of non-existence valid or invalid of a given object need not imply that that object has been validly known to exist. There is one other possibility – total ignorance. This would be a case of *vyabhicāra*; *pramitatvarūpasādhyābhāve 'py atattvajñānavyatirekapramābhāvarūpasādhanaśattvam*. *Atattvajñāna* includes both doubt and false cognition of non-existence. This is avoided by inserting the qualifying phrase, “*avighnitajijñāsitasya*”, as ignorance could only result either where there was no desire to know, or where some external factor intervened to prevent the arising of knowledge.

Śaṅkara Miśra here urges an objection against the use of the word “*jijñāsitasya*” (p. 120 Chow). His argument is that in the Vedāntin doctrine where all knowledge is proof of its own existence, a desire to know of it can never arise. One desires to know only in the absence of definitive knowledge. The Vedāntin knowledge is by its very nature already cognized: thus, in the absence of an absence of knowledge *jijñāsā* would never appear. There are two things to be said against this objection. The first is that there is nothing in Śrī Harṣa's statement to indicate that *jijñāsā* must exist at the same moment as knowledge. One can easily imagine a situation in which at a time *A* an observer sees an object. At time *C* far removed from time *A* he is asked by another, “Did you see the pot?”, wonders and recollects that he has seen the pot. Recollection of his perception is possible only because of his prior knowledge of that perception. This is illustrated below where *A* is the moment “*ghaṭajñāna*” arises, *C* is the moment of the question, *D* the moment *jijñāsā* arises and *E* the moment of remembrance.

A      B      C      D      E  
·      ·      ·      ·      ·

At time *D* when *jijñāsā* arises there is no more knowledge of the pot. That knowledge has been destroyed at moment *C*. Śaṅkara Miśra's supposed objection vanishes.

The second point is that Śrī Harṣa is urging this inference only for his opponent's use (cf. pp. 152, 181, 183 Chow). The Naiyāyika does not admit that knowledge is self-aware. Thus for him *jijñāsā* might well arise even at time *B*. Finally it is also accepted by the Naiyāyika that “*jñāte 'pi jijñāsā bhavati*”. This is expressed in the *Cintāmaṇi*, *pakṣatāpaprakaraṇa*. I am indebted to T. S. Śrinivāsa Śāstrī for this reference.

<sup>54</sup> This doubt is so conceived, “*ātmadharmika*”, to avoid any objection that whether knowledge is known or not cannot be doubted. One doubts an attribute of a substratum which is clearly experienced. To doubt whether knowledge is known or not would be to doubt the existence of the quality “*jñātatva*” on the locus “*jñāna*”. Knowledge, then, as the locus of the quality in question would have to be known. That we thus definitely know that knowledge is known and still continue to doubt the same is an impossibility. In that case no doubt would ever cease, as it would have been admitted that even in the presence of definitive cognition doubt arises and thus the two are not incompatible. Definite knowledge must be inconsistent with doubt (cf. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 3; *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 27 ff.; *Ṭīkā*, p. 235 N.E. where *saṃśaya* is termed “*anavadhāraṇa*”, the very contrary of definitive cognition, and *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 91). By rephrasing this doubt so that the soul is the locus, and knowledge the quality doubted, Śrī Harṣa avoids all the above difficulty. The soul is definitely known from inference, and there is no contradiction as the existence of the quality remains suspect. Cf. *Śaṃkarī*, p. 123 (Chow), *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 123 (Chow), and *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 84–85.

<sup>55</sup> For an account of the impossibilities of *viśayaviśayibhāva* see the fourth *pariccheda*, pp. 608–623 (Sam). Only Varadapaṇḍita, p. 88, is correct in stating that these faults will be later enumerated by Śrī Harṣa himself. The *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 126 (Chow), quotes the *Śiṣyahitaiṣinī* of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya. The manuscript of this commentary is still extant in the Jain Bhandar of Jaisalmer; however, it is not available to the public for examination or reproduction. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya here suggests that the relationship of knower to known is impossible in the case of knowledge, for if knowledge were known, it would be insentient like a pot. Such an interpretation is simply wrong. The text states that the general faults inherent in such a relationship would also result in the case of knowledge. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya’s faults are specific to knowledge alone. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 86, in its turn offers something else. The process of imagining what was in Śrī Harṣa’s mind is in fact endless – one might equally apply the reasoning of Abhinavagupta in the *Tantrāloka*, vol. 1, p. 97. What saves us from all this effort and proves Varadapaṇḍita right is that the exact same phrase, “*mānameyabhāvadoṣa*”, appears on p. 141 (Chow) where it is clearly stated that these faults will be later detailed. Commenting on this statement, though not making any connection with our passage, Śaṃkara Miśra, p. 141 (Chow), says that this refers to the discussion in the first *pariccheda*, p. 294 (Sam). I would much prefer the reference to the fourth *pariccheda*, given at the beginning of this note. The verses cited by Śaṃkara Miśra are not a refutation of the relationship of knowledge to its object, but of any proof of the existence of that object from a knowledge in which it is revealed. The relationship between object and knowledge is not in fact touched upon until the last chapter of our text.

<sup>56</sup> With this argument that there is no proof of the existence of that which is unknown, cf. *Sanmatitarkaṭīkā*, p. 11.

<sup>57</sup> Of the commentators, it is only Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 90 ff., who rightly understands even the *pūrvapakṣa* intentions, and furthermore is correct in referring the objection to the *Parīśuddhi*. He does not, unfortunately, understand Śrī Harṣa’s refutation of Udayana, as he takes pp. 130–131 (Chow) to be a different argument from that on pp. 128–129 (Chow). This is missing the point. Knowledge can be known to exist without specific proof of it; there

is no infinite regress here. The *anavasthā* can only be understood in combination with the statements on pp. 130–131 (Chow), that it is a specific knowledge of knowledge which is required for debate, and that its proof, *vyavahārasattā*, or *smaraṇa* requires further proof.

Paramānanda Sūri (4a) is entirely wrong. He states, “*yat sat tat prameyam iti vyāptijñānena vedyatvaviddhau*”. This is in fact just the opposite of what the Naiyāyika is attempting to prove. Moreover, it has just been said that the existence of that knowledge is in question. The *hetu* in such an inference is *asiddha*!

The anonymous commentator (5a) only glosses a few words. He does this correctly; however, it is not possible to determine how he interprets the passage as a whole.

*Śāṃkarī*, p. 128 (Chow), *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 128 (Chow), and *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 89, interpret *sāmānyataḥ* as a knowledge of the form “*jñānavānn aham asmi*”. This is impossible. Knowledge is always *viśayanirūpya* and such a cognition could never occur. Cf. *Pariśuddhi*, O.E. p. 521; *Kuṣumāñjali*, p. 392; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 216; *Ślokovārttika*, *Sūnyavāda*, *śloka* 115; Keśava Miśra, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 38. “*Sāmānyato vites tathātvasiddhau*” must therefore be accomplished by an inference as explained in the *Pariśuddhi* itself and the translation notes here.

<sup>58</sup> For the notion that that for which there is no proof must be non-existent, see *Āptaparīkṣā*, p. 97; *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, p. 122; *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 471; *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, p. 11. Udayana himself admits as much in the *Pariśuddhi*, p. 333 N.E., and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 199.

<sup>59</sup> Compare *Vigrahavyāvartinī*, p. 286, verses 31–33; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, pp. 60, 250, for similar arguments.

<sup>60</sup> The statement “*apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyate*” is attributed to Dharmakīrti in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, pp. 499, 705; by Varadapaṇḍita, p. 92, and Śaṃkara Miśra, p. 129 (Chow). It is widely quoted, *Bhāmatī*, p. 474; *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 3; *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivrtivimarśinī*, vol. 1, p. 103; *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, p. 29. For a paraphrase of it see *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 193. The original meaning of the statement has been discussed in note 52. Jñānaśrīmitra (p. 478) identifies it as belonging to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

<sup>61</sup> The commentaries, with the exception of Varadapaṇḍita, p. 95, and *Citsukhī*, p. 132 (Chow), do not understand this passage. *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 92–94, suggests that all are perceived by *sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*. There are three major faults in this interpretation. The first is that there is good reason to believe that the early Naiyāyikas did not admit the possibility of any such means of perception. Both Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana maintain that the method of grasping invariable concomitance is nothing extraordinary; simply *tarkasahitabhūyodarśana* (*Tīkā*, pp. 167 K, 310 N.E.; *Pariśuddhi*, p. 333 N.E.; *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 197 ff.; *Āmatattvaviveka*, p. 404). Udayana, moreover, categorically denies its possibility in such passages as *Kuṣumāñjali*, p. 262 and p. 472. The first of these asserts that it is not possible to perceive a universal without specific perception of the individual in which it resides. Thus, there could be no question of knowing an individual which is not an object of perception on the basis of a universal elsewhere perceived. Proof that this universal resides in the unknown individual is lacking. Page 472 is a discussion on how knowledge can be known. It is there asserted by way of example that *vahnitva* is grasped only where the individual is

grasped, i.e., in the case of the *dr̥ṣṭānta*. There is no question that the *sādhyavyakti* has been perceived at the same time. The *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 218, similarly denies that all individuals can be known on the perception of one through a contact like *sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*. Of the early writers it is only the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 111 who seems not to reject outright its possibility. It is my suspicion that the Naiyāyikas took over this concept from the Jains. For Śrī Harṣa's refutation of *sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti* see p. 345 (Sam). The *śloka* there quoted is in fact a Jain *śloka*, *Ācārāṅgasūtra* 1.3.4.1. It is cited by Vācaspati Miśra in the *Ṭikā*, p. 37 K., p. 46 N.E.; *Syādvādamāñjarī*, p. 4; *Prapañcasāraṭīkā*, p. 64; *Āgamaviḍambana*, p. 34; *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, p. 58. The question is an interesting one for future study.

The second difficulty with *Vidyāsāgarī*'s interpretation is that it does not solve the *pūrvapakṣa*'s difficulties at all. The problem is with an infinite number of specific knowledges of knowledge. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti* would give only general knowledge and is thus useless in the present situation. In fact it would only be a rephrasing of the previously refuted idea. It is not possible to assert that all knowledges can be known at one time through a contact such as *sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti* as "knowledge of a pot" or "knowledge of an activity". The Naiyāyika does not admit any such universal. Furthermore, a difference in *prakāras* for each member of the series must be admitted. Without this if one cognition "*ghaṭajñānavānn aham*", could establish the existence of an infinite number of individual knowledges, the single knowledge used to prove the existence of one universal in all other cases might equally point to an endless group of individuals. This destroys any hope of the Naiyāyika's proving generalities. The above discussion refutes the objection of Śaṃkara Miśra, p. 132 (Chow). Finally, under *Vidyāsāgarī*'s interpretation Śrī Harṣa's reply would be totally meaningless. The knowledge arising from *sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti* would be simply "*jñāna*" and would not have hundreds of objects!

The anonymous commentator (5a–5b) suggests that all of these knowledges are known by inference (cf. Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 94–95). He cites an inference of the following description, "*sarvaṃ jñānaṃ pramīyate jñānatvād abhīmatavat*". This is not in fact a valid inference, as *Vidyāsāgarī* hints, p. 92. The *pakṣatāvaccchedaka* and the *hetutāvaccchedaka* are one. When the relationship, *sāmānadhikaraṇya*, or existing at the same locus, is grasped in the perception of invariable concomitance, it is known that *jñānatva* and *pramīyamānatva* exist together. Nothing remains to be proved by the inference. In the case of a valid inference, *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*, the *hetutāvaccchedaka*, *dhūmatva*, is different from the *pakṣatāvaccchedaka*, *parvatatva*. Thus, although the relationship between *vahnitva* and *dhūmatva* is known when invariable concomitance is seen, the relationship between *vahnitva* and *parvatatva* remains to be proved. This would appear to be a late Nyāya notion (cf. note 74). The Jains fully endorse the validity of an inference where the *hetutāvaccchedaka* and the *pakṣatāvaccchedaka* are one. The main fault of this interpretation is the same as in the case of *Vidyāsāgarī*'s; it makes Śrī Harṣa's reply useless. Again, the result of this inference could not be described as having a chain of objects.

<sup>62</sup> Śaṃkara Miśra, p. 135 (Chow), quotes Vardhamāna (*Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*, p. 473) to the effect that an infinite regress does not result in the case of a yogi as yogic knowledge is admitted to be self-aware. Thus, he argues, all of Śrī Harṣa's criticism is invalid. This is another anachronism. There is no indication that such a conception existed prior to Vardhamāna; indeed one suspects it of being a result of an attempt to avoid the faults Śrī Harṣa here so well states. In addition, the very notion that a yogi's knowledge can be self-

aware is subject to criticism. Knowledge of a yogi is still knowledge. To allow it this special property only in the case of a yogi is not tenable, its essential nature remaining the same regardless of the substratum in which it inheres (cf. *Kusumāñjali*, p. 461 ff.). Finally, this is an inadmissible assertion for Śaṅkara Miśra who throughout has urged against Śrī Harṣa the same *anavasthā* as Śrī Harṣa urges against the Naiyāyika (cf. p. 131 Chow). If Śaṅkara Miśra can avoid this infinite regress by the assumption of a knowledge on the part of a yogi that requires no further proof, why could not the *Siddhāntin* do the same? This is typical of the poor quality of Śaṅkara Miśra's objections to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.

<sup>63</sup> Compare *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 270, rephrased by Śrī Harṣa, p. 335 (Sam), and *Kusumāñjali*, pp. 51 ff.

<sup>64</sup> *Citsukhī*, p. 138 (Chow), and the anonymous commentator, 5b, suggest that there would be an infinite series of knowledges of the causes of a pot, and not of the causes themselves as I have interpreted the passage to mean. Their explanation is not consistent with Śrī Harṣa's reply. An infinite regress is a fault where all members of the endless series must be known or must appear at one time. Such is not the case with the infinite number of causes. All one need to know when he wishes to make a pot is the immediate causes of that pot, the stick, etc. and not the causes of those causes. Moreover, Śrī Harṣa has said that the infinite series of knowledge which the opponent proposes is unproved. The opponent would be expected to reply with a series which is proved. On p. 139 (Chow) it is clearly stated that the infinite causes of a pot make up one such series.

It is possible to justify their interpretation in only one way. It must be assumed that Śrī Harṣa is now the protagonist in a debate attempting to demonstrate that a pot is preceded by an infinite number of causes. The opponent admits to only the first group of visible causes, and no more. It would be incumbent upon Śrī Harṣa to prove each and every other cause, with an infinite number of proofs. Thus, the *pūrvapakṣa* is urging against Śrī Harṣa the same fault Śrī Harṣa had urged against him, pp. 129–131 (Chow). In both cases an infinite number of proofs must be presented in a limited time. This entire hypothesis is very far-fetched. Śrī Harṣa is a *vitāṇḍika*; putting him as the protagonist of a debate does violence to his nature. Moreover, as Varadapaṇḍita adds, p. 96, urging a *pratibandhi* against Śrī Harṣa can nowhere be valid. In fact, Śrī Harṣa accepts the conclusion that nothing can be proved about the visible world! For these reasons, I would prefer the interpretation of the translation which is substantially that of Śaṅkara Miśra, p. 132 (Chow), and Varadapaṇḍita, p. 97.

<sup>65</sup> With all of this should be compared Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 3, section 12. The two arguments are strikingly similar. Hemacandra likewise urges against the *paratoveḍyavādin* that an infinite regress results (Śrī Harṣa, p. 125, Chow). He rejects the possibility of an *arthāpatti* as *arthāpatti* like an inferential mark must itself be known before it can prove anything else. Its knowledge and the knowledge of that knowledge will lead to another infinite regress. (I have shown the same with the resultant cognition; both are possible.) He further adds that assuming the *arthāpatti* is known by another *arthāpatti* leads to *anyonyāśraya* (Śrī Harṣa, p. 136 Chow, is slightly more clever. It also leads to *svaprakāśatā*. Compare also *Kusumāñjali*, p. 463). *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, pp. 142 ff. provides a possible source for Hemacandra; that either may have served as a model for Śrī Harṣa is at this stage only conjecture. The similarities remain intriguing. It might be added

that the fault of an *anavasthā* for the *paravedyapakṣa* is urged by Abhinavagupta as well, in the *Mālinivijayavārttika*, śloka 56, p. 7, and 676, p. 64.

<sup>66</sup> Only Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 99–100 is correct in saying that the word “*vakṣyamāna*” refers to the statement immediately following, and that by “*dharma*” is to be understood *meyatva* and *mānatva*. *Citsukhī*, p. 143 (Chow), *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 94, and the anonymous commentator, 5b, all offer something else and suggest that the statement is in reply to an unspoken objection that the admission of qualities such as *sukha*, *sattā*, etc., would destroy the doctrine of non-duality. Such an interpretation destroys the natural continuity of this passage; moreover, it would leave the word *vakṣyamāna* totally unexplained as the subject is not elsewhere resumed. There is a beautiful flow in the interpretation of *dharma* as *meyatva*. It is stated that all faults are removed, how they are removed, and to what this removal leads: that designations must be based upon absences. It is then further remarked that an absence is not other than its locus and the doctrine of non-duality remains unharmed. The whole sentence beginning “*jaḍānām*” functions much like a “pillow word” in Japanese literature; it serves as the pivotal point for what precedes and follows it.

<sup>67</sup> One of the finest and most detailed demonstrations of these absences is to be found in the opening passages of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*.

<sup>68</sup> For the Buddhists on *abhāva* see *Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 201; for Prabhākara see *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 282 ff.

<sup>69</sup> This follows essentially the interpretations of *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 101, and *Śaṃkarī*, p. 148 (Chow).

<sup>70</sup> Compare Śaṃkara Miśra, p. 149 (Chow), and *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, p. 150 (Chow), who assert that Śrī Harṣa admits a “*kālpanikavācyaṁvācakahāva*”. We have seen that such an interpretation is to be avoided. It is contrary to all statements in the text itself and is liable to criticism by the opponent. See pp. 85–87 of this translation and note 23, etc. All the commentators base their interpretation on the famous passage in the *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 99. For Śaṃkara’s use of a similar phrase cf. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 117, on 1.1.11 and for the same author’s vehement insistence that one must not rely upon an assumption of “*kālpanikatva*” in order to explain his arguments, see 1.3.14, p. 225, and 2.3.40, p. 547.

<sup>71</sup> Compare the comments on Humpty Dumpty’s speech in *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 69.

<sup>72</sup> For such an objection to *svataḥprakāśatā* see *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 188; *Yogadarśana*, *Tattvavaiśārādī*, p. 435; *Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 51; *Ślokaṁvārttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, śloka 75, p. 117; *Abhidharmakośa*, *Sphuṭhārthavyākhyā*, p. 78; *Praśastapāda*, *Vyomavatī*, p. 529; *Nyāyakañikā*, p. 267.

<sup>73</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, p. 475; *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 397; *Parisuddhi*, p. 182, O.E.; *Ṭīkā*, p. 367 K; *Vārttika*, p. 196 K. The first of these belongs to Udayana, and the second, to Vācaspati Miśra.

<sup>74</sup> It is worth noting at this point that Śaṅkara Mīśra criticizes Śrī Harṣa's arguments in these passages (p. 159 Chow). He urges that these attributes are not meant as definitions, but as general characteristics to account for the use of certain designations (*śabdapravṛttinimitta*). The adducement of the fault of *ativyāpti*, applicable to definitions, is thus invalid.

This is absolutely untenable. Udayana himself clearly calls these terms "*lakṣaṇa*" (*Parīśuddhi*, pp. 182 ff. O.E., 115 ff. N.E.). Moreover, he seems to assert in the *Kusumāñjali* that only the *pravṛttinimitta* can serve as a *lakṣaṇa* (*Kusumāñjali*, p. 383). From the existence of his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Lakṣaṇamālā* we infer that Udayana also accepted as a valid definition anything coeval with the *pravṛttinimitta*.

Vācaspati Mīśra in the *Ṭīkā* likewise regards all the attributes there given as definitions (page 44 N.E.). As a matter of fact, p. 368 K is an attempt to ward off *avyāpti*. The *Vārttika*, pp. 196–197 K, similarly makes no distinction between *pravṛttinimitta* and *lakṣaṇa*.

The later Naiyāyikas vehemently deny this possibility – that the *pravṛttinimitta* and the *lakṣaṇa* can be one, for the *pravṛttinimitta* is the *pakṣatāvaccchedaka*, and the *lakṣaṇa* is the *hetutāvaccchedaka*. It is an interesting topic for further study. Perhaps Śrī Harṣa's criticism of the old Nyāya doctrine in which the *pravṛttinimitta* served as definition (p. 246 Sam) stimulated later writers to insist upon their difference.

<sup>75</sup> Compare *Parīśuddhi*, p. 195 O.E., P. 116 N.E., and *Kusumāñjali*, p. 476, for the statement that there is no contradiction if one thing be both a *karma*, *karaṇa*, etc. as long as the appropriate definitions apply to it.

<sup>76</sup> *Ṭīkā*, p. 186 N.E.; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 383; *Tārikarakṣā*, p. 75.

<sup>77</sup> For the derogatory "*lokottaraprajñā*" compare *Kusumāñjali*, p. 100.

<sup>78</sup> There are some problems with this statement. "*Varddh*", "*chedane*", should give the form "*varddhī*" and not "*vrddhī*" as here recorded. I am told by T.S. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī that the Bhānujadikṣita commentary to the *Amarakośa* does allow the use of this word in the *Bhvādi* class (*Amarakośa*, p. 159). According to the editor of the Chow edition the sentence does not appear in all manuscripts. It is possibly a later addition. The assertion of *avyāpti* twice does in fact seem unnecessary. Śrī Harṣa employs this verb in the *Naiṣadhyācarita* 13.2.6.

<sup>79</sup> That a yogi knows the soul as free from all adventitious qualities is stated in the *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 466. Udayana does not use this definition of *karma*; he offers "*karaṇavyāpāraviṣayaiva*" (see references note 73). It is interesting to note that the *Kusumāñjali Prakāśa*, p. 462, rejects this definition of Vācaspati Mīśra for the same reasons as Śrī Harṣa here does. In the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 313, however, Udayana does agree to Vācaspati Mīśra's assertion that the soul is the object of knowledge only when limited by adventitious attributes.

<sup>80</sup> The statements following this are definitely a later addition as the editor of the Chow text notes (pp. 166–167). They are a direct contradiction to Śrī Harṣa's earlier statements on p. 154 (Chow). The Hindi edition, p. 39, drops them; surprisingly, *Śārada* does not. One also suspects that something is missing from the original text. It is curious that Śrī Harṣa cites both Vācaspati Mīśra's and Udayana's definitions on p. 155 (Chow) and then refutes only

the first. Perhaps the refutation of the second has been dropped from the manuscripts. Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 115–116 feels the same uneasiness and suggests that Udayana's definition stands refuted in the last example. Where God's knowledge is eternal, it has no cause, and thus the attribute "being the object of the function of the instrumental cause" would be impossible. If Śrī Harṣa did in fact mean that both are here destroyed, this is perhaps the only example of such rare economy of words on his part. Śrī Harṣa's style tends towards the opposite direction.

<sup>81</sup> Compare *Yogadarśana*, *Bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 19 and *Tattvavaiśārādī*, p. 434; *Ṭīkā*, p. 232 N.E., p. 142 O.E.; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 245 N.E.; *Vakroktijīva*, verse 64, p. 23.

<sup>82</sup> This is in fact the Nyāya admission. See *Kusumāñjali*, pp. 241, 462; *Parīśuddhi*, p. 247 N.E.; *Ṭīkā*, p. 211 N.E., and *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 228.

<sup>83</sup> The arguments that *saṃbandha* leads to *anavasthā* are standard ones in Indian philosophy. The most famous refutation of *saṃbandha* is the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* of Dharmakīrti now published in the Bauddhabhāratī Series. The *Sambandhaparīkṣā* was quoted and refuted by Prabhācandra in his *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, pp. 505 ff. Compare also *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.18, p. 387; 2.2.13, p. 438.

<sup>84</sup> Compare *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 73; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 378; *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 107; *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 84.

<sup>85</sup> It might be suspected that the juxtaposition of the two terms, "*avidyāvidyamāne*" and "*paramārthasatī*", in the text, p. 171 Chow, supports the contention of the commentators that Śrī Harṣa endorses a third truth value. I would, for all the reasons discussed up to this point, prefer the resolution of the first, "*avidyāvidyamāne*" as "*avidyayā jñāyamāne*". There is nothing grammatically amiss in such a resolution of the compound.

<sup>86</sup> *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 167 ff. The doctrine is refuted by Yamuna in the *Siddhitraya*, pp. 41–45.

<sup>87</sup> Compare *Ṭīkā*, p. 386 K, where it is said that *dr̥ṣṭavaidharmya* is not a *bādhaka*; similarly, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 268. In the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 172, Udayana himself remarks that an *anyathānupapatti* destroys all refutations.

<sup>88</sup> The commentaries prefer to take this "*vaktavyadoṣāt*", p. 189 Chow, as "*vakṣyamāṇadoṣāt*" (Varadapaṇḍita, p. 133; *Śaṅkarī*, p. 189 Chow). I have interpreted it as *vaktavya* = *meya* = *lakṣaṇa* on the strength of the immediately preceding statement and the fact that it is used in opposition to the phrase "*vaktr̥doṣāt*". *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 126, seems to do likewise.

<sup>89</sup> Compare *Ṭīkā*, p. 552 K; 239 N.E.; *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 114; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 202; *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 152 for the same notion.



<sup>90</sup> With this should be compared the *Bhāmātī* demonstration of the same concept. The “*anirvacanīyatva*” of that which is revealed in error is described by Vācaspati Miśra on pp. 12–13. A *sadvādin*, possibly a Jain from the statements, (1) that *abhāva* is nothing but *bhāvāntara*, and (2) “*svārūpapararūpābhyām sadasadātmake*”, takes exception to the *Śaṃkarabhāṣya* statement that what appears in error is false (“*satyānṛtamithunīkṛtya*” *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 9). He argues that all objects of cognition must exist. Vācaspati Miśra, having glossed the term “*anṛta*” with “*anirvacanīya*” (p. 11) proceeds to demonstrate that the opponent can never logically establish the existence of the objects of incorrect cognition. He must accept that they are neither really existent nor totally non-existent. On the surface, the demonstration might appear to proceed as Śrī Harṣa’s present argument; Vācaspati Miśra indicates that by the objector’s own contentions “*toya*” in “*marīcījñāna*” cannot be said to be “*sat*” nor “*asat*”. The Jain conception that something can be both is summarily dismissed with a remark which the Jain would not in fact accept, “*parasparavirodhāt*”. The conclusion is then reached that the opponent must admit that “*toya*” is “*anirvācya*”. What prevents any interpretation of Vācaspati Miśra as I have interpreted Śrī Harṣa, namely that Vācaspati arrives at “*anirvacanīyatā*” only “*parābhyupagamarītyā*” is the further qualification he makes: “*evaṃ ca dehendriyādiprapaṇco 'py anirvācyaḥ. apūrvō 'pi pūrvamithyāpratyayopadarśita iva paratra cidātmanyadhyasta ity upapannam*”. This “*apūrva*” implies a contention which no *sadvādin* admits: that the objects of error are actually produced at the time of cognition from *avidyā* as a positive creative force (cf. *Śaṃkarabhāṣya* 2.1.14; *Bhāmātī*, p. 25, p. 401 on 2.1.28). Vācaspati Miśra thus goes one step beyond Śrī Harṣa. He not only indicates by the *pūrvapakṣa*’s own admissions it is untenable to maintain that the objects of incorrect cognition exist, but also introduces as his own theory that they must therefore arise through a process like that governing the objects of supposedly valid cognitions, and thus be inexplicable as either the same or different from their substrate, and as real or unreal (cf. *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 627 on 3.2.13, and Vācaspati Miśra, p. 124 on 1.1.17, and p. 380 on 2.1.17). *Anirvacanīyatva* thus includes more than the opponent’s own contentions.

<sup>91</sup> For the word “*pariplava*” used to describe this situation see the reference to the *Kusumāñjali* given in note 12.

<sup>92</sup> See note 57 for the Nyāya reference on this point.

<sup>93</sup> The example Śrī Harṣa cites (p. 78 Sam) is a standard one for an invalid means which gives rise to a valid knowledge. No one admits that *bāṣpajñāna* can be considered a *pramāṇa* (cf. Pūjyapāda on Umāsvāti, p. 138; *Ślokaṭīkā*, *Anumānapariccheda*, *śloka* 156, p. 395; *Pramāṇanayatatvālokaṅkāra*, 6.37, p. 35).

<sup>94</sup> *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 138–139 suggests that because of these inconsistencies the word “*kim*” is to be taken not as a question but as an objection (*ākṣepa*). This is refuted by the *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. 38b, as it leaves Śrī Harṣa open to the criticism that he has not understood his opponent’s intention, or that understanding it, he purposely misrepresents it and then proceeds to refute what no one would ever say in the first place. I would suggest that the sentence is to be taken as a question and that such an interpretation is in fact legitimate; “*ākṣepa*” is only a secondary meaning. In all cases the primary meaning is first to be applied.

<sup>95</sup> This is accepted by the Naiyāyika, and thus here urged against the Mīmāṃsaka alone. See *Kusumāñjali*, p. 570; *Vyomavati*, p. 306.

<sup>96</sup> On the Agniṣomiya, see *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, p. 55.

<sup>97</sup> For *itaretarābhāva* as *bheda* see *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 237. Both Prabhācandra and Abhinavagupta, like Śrī Harṣa, stress that self-awareness does not reveal the difference of a knowledge from anything else. See *Nyāyakumudacandra*, vol. 1, p. 13, and *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* with *Bhāskari*, vol. 1, p. 129.

<sup>98</sup> *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 162.

<sup>99</sup> For a complete description of Prabhākara's theory of error see *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, *Nayavithi*, pp. 43–62.

<sup>100</sup> Varadapaṇḍita, p. 164, suggests “*vyāvṛttyādidharma*”, and *Śāṃkarī*, p. 84 Sam, “*paraṣparavāidharmyaviśiṣṭa*”. I would agree with *Vidyāsāgarī*'s “*śūktitvataddeśat-vādidharmaviśiṣṭa*”, p. 153. Prabhākara does not admit any “*vaidharmya*” or “*vyāvṛtti*” other than the very nature of an object in question. It is possible that this is what Śaṃkara Mīśra intends by his term “*vaidharmya*”.

<sup>101</sup> For another *pramāṇa* as an aid to scripture, see *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 51.

<sup>102</sup> *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. 42a, sees this as a refutation of Bhāskara. I would consider this as somewhat unlikely. There is no indication that the doctrine of Bhāskara was sufficiently popular at the time of Śrī Harṣa to merit a refutation in his work. It is far more likely that it is against the Jains who as *sadvādins* form one group with the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas and were at the height of their popularity in the same region and at the same time as Śrī Harṣa wrote.

<sup>103</sup> Śaṃkara Mīśra (p. 87 Sam) urges against all of the above demonstration that Śrī Harṣa is guilty of *apasiddhānta*. He argues that Śrī Harṣa violates the tenets of the Vedānta school in asserting that the scriptures make known the identity of *prapañca* and Brahma. To support Śaṃkara Mīśra's contention is the assertion in the *Bhāmatī*, p. 373 on 2.1.14, “*na khalv ananyatvam ity abhedam brūmah, kiṃ tu bhedaṃ vyāsedhāmah*”. It would seem that the Vedāntins were worried that if Brahma were identical with *prapañca* then it too would be insentient and indescribable (cf. Śaṃkara Mīśra, p. 87, and the *Bhūṣāmaṇi* refutation of Śaṃkara Mīśra, ms. 42b, 43a; *Anandagirivākyā* on the *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.14, p. 382, “*nāmarūpe ced Īśvarasyātmabhūte, tarhi so 'pi tābhyām abhinnavāt tadvad eva jaḍaḥ syāt*”; *Bhāmatī*, p. 124 on 1.1.17, “*syād etat. Yathā parameśvarād bhinnō jīvo draṣṭā na bhavati, evaṃ jīvātmano 'pi draṣṭur na bhinnah parameśvara. iti jīvasya anirvācyatve parameśvaro 'py anirvācyah syāt. Tathā ca na vastusanniti ata āha parameśvaras tv avidyākālpitād iti. rajataṃ hi samāropitaṃ na śūktito bhidyate. na hi tad bhedanābhedena vā śakyam nirvaktum. Śūktis tu parāmārthasatī nirvacanīyā. Anirvacanīyād rajatād bhidyata eva*”; *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, p. 741 on 3.3.37). They thus interpreted the scriptures not as an avowal of non-difference, but as a denial of difference, and only of that difference of

*prapañca* from Brahma and not of Brahma from *prapañca* as well (*Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.3.1, p. 206; *Bhāmātī* on the same and *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.9, p. 364).

Behind this conception lies the same illogicality as is implied by the notion of “*sadasadvilakṣaṇatva*”. The question requires intense investigation of the later Vedānta texts in the main unknown to me; however, I would suggest that Śrī Harṣa is unique in rejecting this concept, and that he probably does so for much the same reasons as he repudiates “*anirvacanīyatva*”. Śrī Harṣa argues only in conformity with his opponent’s principles (cf. pp. 194–195 Chow). For the Naiyāyika, to deny difference is tantamount to asserting non-difference or identity. Moreover, even the Vedāntin admits, “*ekasya prthaktve siddhe, 'rthād itarasya prthaktvasiddhiḥ'*” (*Pañcapādikā*, p. 79). To assert that Brahma remains different from *prapañca* implies therefore that *prapañca* must also be different from Brahma. Vacaspati Mīśra’s remark, “*kimtu bhedaṁ vyāsedhāmaḥ*”, is thus meaningless.

Śrī Harṣa is a radical monist; he accepts from the start that Brahma is non-different from *prapañca*. There is no such contradiction in an interpretation such as he proposes. To assume that the assertion that Brahma is one with *prapañca* implies that Brahma is also insentient and *anirvācya* demands that *prapañca* itself be in fact insentient and *anirvācya*. This is incorrect. Insentience is a misnomer, just as much as “potness” is or difference for that matter. Is this not what the scriptures affirm? Just as *bheda* is false, so are all other things which we normally attribute to the visible world. Likewise, *anirvacanīyatā* is but a convenient designation for what would result if one tried to establish the existential status of the world, which Śrī Harṣa tells us, he as a Vedāntin does not do (p. 72 Sam). *Anirvacanīyatā* is thus also not a Vedāntin contention.

I would suggest that another cause for the above confusion in classic Vedānta is the very nature of the task which the earlier writers had set for themselves. It is not to be forgotten that Śaṅkarācārya in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* above all aims at a satisfactory exegesis of the texts (2.2.1, p. 413). He must explain whether a given scriptural passage refers to the *jīva* or to Brahma. This demands their difference. See *Sūtra* 1.2.6, “*Smṛteś ca*”, where Śaṅkara clearly states that the *smṛti* texts make known a difference between Brahma and the individual soul. In response to the obvious question, “then how is it also said that they are identical?”, he offers the explanation that the identity is of *upādhyānavacchinna-jīva* and Brahma and the difference is of *upādhyavacchinna-jīva* and Brahma. There is thus no contradiction. Unfortunately, the situation is not so simple. A further query must arise. Once it has been stated that “*upādhyavacchinna-x upādhyānavacchinna-x-sakāśād bhidyate*” it becomes permissible to ask just what is the status of these *upādhi*, *deha*, *indriya*, etc. If they are “*Brahmaṇo 'nanya*” by *Sūtra* 2.1.14, then *ekaśeṣa* results with the following faults: (1) The very statement “*upādhyavacchinna*” becomes impossible, and (2) Brahma will be *jaḍa*. If they are *anya*, then 2.1.14 is contradicted. If they are *anirvācya*, then the problems outlined by Śrī Harṣa, p. 70 Sam, ensue. There is one solution, and that is similar to the interpretation which Śrī Harṣa here proposes, and which I believe Śaṅkara has in mind on p. 382, in his commentary to 2.1.14. The difference between these things and Brahma and from one to the other is only valid for a given situation. It applies to that level of cognition from which activity still proceeds, and is not in fact real. “*Ananyatva*” remains the true position, but the concept of difference, albeit false, is a necessary aid not only to the process of exegesis, but also to the realization of truth through appropriate meditation, etc. It is not difficult to see that in such an interpretation the statements that the scriptures make known only the non-difference of *prapañca* from Brahma and not that of Brahma from *prapañca* lose their

meaning. As Saṃkara himself asserts, *prapañca* no longer exists for the one who sees the soul through the light of truth. There could be no question that Brahma as identical with the insentient would also be insentient (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 336 on 1.6.22; pp. 394–395 on 2.1.22; p. 649 on 3.2.21; p. 833 on 4.1.3). This requires reading the statement, “*sarvaṃ Brahmeti tu sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ prapañcavilāpanārthaṃ nānekarasatāpratipādanārthaṃ*”, as an assertion not of the difference of Brahma from *prapañca*, but as a statement of method. In fact, both are identical to each other, as non-dual, self-valid consciousness (cf. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 295 on 1.4.1). But the student must first realize that the objects he cognizes are identical with their cause, and thus do not really exist as they are perceived. Once this is understood, it is possible to comprehend that Brahma and *prapañca* are one. If this interpretation is valid, then, Śrī Harṣa would not be departing from Saṃkara at all in essence, but only in method. He chooses to show first that consciousness is non-different from its object, and thereby that all is non-dual. This non-duality is then further made known as self-valid Brahma.

In this assertion of the oneness of all things through the oneness of knowledge and its objects, and the concomitant denial of anything sentient, Śrī Harṣa furthermore shows striking resemblances to the Kashmiri Śaivite school. With this should be compared Utpaladeva’s “*Ajaḍapramātsiddhi*” in the *Siddhitraya*, and Abhinavagupta’s works, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī* and the *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, particularly 6.29, p. 316: “*sarveṣu bhūteṣvātmānaṃ grāhakatayānupraviśantaṃ bhāvayed, ātmani ca grāhyatājñānadvāreṇa sarvāṇi bhūtāny ekikūryāt. .vistaratas tu Bhedavādvaidāraṇādiprakaṇe Devīstotravivaraṇe ca mayāiva nirṇīta iti tatraivādvadhārya*”, 3.11, p. 150: “*Paramaṃ śreyah parasparabhedavigalanalakṣaṇaṃ Brahma*”, and 15.17, “*Sarvamayaṃ mām Brahmatattvaṃ upāśinaḥ*”. The first and last correspond to Śrī Harṣa’s *jñāna* as “*ghaṭapaṭādyātmaka*” (p. 85 Sam), and the last to his unusual demonstration of *advaita* and subsequent equation of this non-duality with Brahma. It would seem to me that there exists an even greater parallel with the thought of Abhinavagupta; Śrī Harṣa’s entire argument on p. 85 Sam may be seen as highly similar to the logic behind Abhinavagupta’s second verse in the *Paramārthacarcā*, p. 4: “*Jñānād vibhinno na hi kaścid arthas; tattatkṛtaḥ samvidi nāsti bhedaḥ/ svayaṃ prakāśacchataṃ kadhāmi prāṭisviki nāpi vibheditā syāt*”. (The reprinted text reads “*syām*” which must be an error.) The first half of the verse simply states that since all objects are non-different from knowledge, one cannot differentiate a cognition of (*x*) from a cognition of (*y*). I would suggest the following reasoning. Just as Śrī Harṣa urges, if  $x = Q$  and  $y = Q$ , then (*x*) and (*y*) must also be non-different from each other. Now, the opponent recognizes that by themselves cognitions do not differ; it is only their objects which lend to them their individual character (*Kusumāñjali*, 4.4, p. 461). It is not difficult to see that if  $x = y$  then  $x$ -*nirūpitajñāna* cannot be different from  $y$ -*nirūpitajñāna* which is thus nothing but  $x$ -*nirūpitajñāna*. Nothing can be different from itself.

Abhinavagupta also has an interesting note on the method Śrī Harṣa here employs. In his commentary to the *Gītā*, 7.11, pp. 355–356, he remarks that the proof of *Advaita* through the demonstration of the oneness of consciousness and its objects is a difficult proof, for which not all minds are suited. For a source prior to Abhinavagupta, compare Rāmakaṇṭha’s *Sarvatobhadra* on the *Gītā*, 6.30, p. 142, and pages 3 and 6. The question of influence cannot be avoided. Śrī Harṣa expresses great regard for the Kashmiri *paṇḍits* in the *Naiṣadhiyacārīta*, 16.131, and I believe that a later passage in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* (p. 319 Sam) may have reference to the now lost *Bhedavādvaidaraṇa* of Abhinavagupta.

<sup>104</sup> The term “*pārṣṇigrāha*” with which *śruti* is designated (p. 89 Sam) is a technical term from the *Arthaśāstra* (Kangle’s edition, 6.2.18, p. 309, Vol. 1 and Vol. 3, p. 249, and note 18, p. 369). It refers to an enemy who attacks from the rear. In effect, *śruti* does the same; it destroys the last cognition and then advances down the line. For a similar usage see *Naiṣadhīyacarita*, 9. 134.

<sup>105</sup> The force of the sentence, “*na hi tad api puruṣāntareṇa*”, p. 90 (Sam), is clearly sarcastic although no commentator sees this (cf. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 173, *Śāṃkarī*, p. 90 Sam, *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 160).

<sup>106</sup> Although this violates the later general rule that the *hetutāvachedaka* and the *pakṣatāvachedaka* cannot be one, we have seen (note 74) that Udayana and his predecessors did not admit that such a difference was necessary for inference to proceed.

<sup>107</sup> It is to be noted that the commentators prefer to consider this statement, “All is different”, not as a scriptural statement, but as a worldly utterance or “*laukikavākya*”. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 180, does note the difficulty in so construing this sentence. As a remark of the *pūrvapakṣa* it would be without any conviction, and thus without any force against the scripture of non-duality. Varadapaṇḍita seeks to avoid this difficulty by asserting that for the Vedāntin knowledge is *svataḥ pramā*, or intrinsically valid. This seems weak. The doctrine of *svataḥ pramā* still does not imply that a doubtful statement should be regarded as true. “*Sarvam bhinnam*” as an assertion of the opponent would remain a poor second to the *advaitaśruti*. For this reason I would adhere to the interpretation given in the translation. One should regard this sentence as a *śrutivākya*. The mention of such a scripture might have some bearing on the history of the *bhedavāda* in the Vedānta. Perhaps Madhva was not the first to propose, or shall we say, compose such texts. Compare *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p. 142.

<sup>108</sup> The statement is curious. It is contradictory to the interpretation of Śrī Harṣa given in note 103 and leaves him open to serious criticism. If *advaitaśruti* makes known the non-difference of Brahma from *prapañca* or of the real from the false, then to assert that one also admits their difference is a blatant contradiction.

Perhaps an answer is to be found in the reasoning of p. 93 (Chow). Śrī Harṣa admits a non-existent difference of the true from the false (cf. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 166; Varadapaṇḍita, p. 181; *Śāṃkarī*, p. 94 Sam, where it is asserted that “*vyāvahārikabheda*” is accepted). I find this explanation equally discomfiting. *Śruti* as valid authority should make known the existent and not the non-existent. Moreover, a non-existent difference need not be confined to that between the true and the false. To admit a non-existent difference of a pot from a cloth would also not destroy the theory of non-duality; whatever the *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* might be, such a non-existent difference is still non-existent! *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. p. 48b, is fully aware of these difficulties, and hopes to avoid them by saying that *śruti* does not in fact make known the identity of Brahma and *prapañca*. *Mithyāto 'bheda* is also false as it cannot be proved by inference, etc., since what is false can never be the object of any proof. But the problem here remains, then what does the scripture mean? If it says “*bhedābhāva*” as *Bhūṣāmaṇi* would have it, then as we have seen before Śrī Harṣa in conformity with the Naiyāyika principles must admit that this implies *abhedaśattva* (cf. p. 194 Chow). The present statement, thus, that their difference is also admitted remains contradictory.

What then is to be done with this peculiar remark? Is it a later insertion? The anonymous commentator 7b does not mention it, nor does Paramānanda Sūri, 6a. They seem to be the earliest commentators. The preceding refutations on p. 93 Sam of which the present is said to be only a repetition name only *vyāghāta* and *viśeṣāsiddhi*. The argument is complete without this *siddhasādhana*. In fact, the very *vikalpa*, “*yasmāt kasmāt*, seems out of place. To say that “everything is different from everything else” could not possibly mean that something is different from some other thing. Such a *vikalpa* is possible only in the case of inference which can be either *pakṣatāvachedakāvachedena*, or *pakṣatāvachedakasamānādhikaraṇena* (cf. *Muktāvalī*, p. 504). I would suspect this statement that a difference is admitted of the true from the false to be a later addition.

The manuscript tradition of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* forms itself a topic of another dissertation. The *Bhūṣāmaṇi* is the only commentary which regularly cites variant readings. It would seem that there existed a Northern and Southern tradition; *Bhūṣāmaṇi* often cites the readings of Guṇḍayabhaṭṭa and calls them “*Dakṣiṇāyapāṭha*” (p. 48a). (The commentary of this Guṇḍayabhaṭṭa is extant. There is a very worn copy of it in medieval Telugu characters on palm leaf in the collection of the Trivandrum University Manuscript Library. Unfortunately the photographs taken for me are not readable.) If the number of variant readings is any indication, the assumption of an insertion in the main text may not be unreasonable. Compare note 80.

<sup>109</sup> For similar remarks see Kumārila, *Ślokavārttika*, *Nirāmbanavāda*, *śloka*s 23, 24, p. 167.

<sup>110</sup> For the same insistence see *Kusumāñjali*, p. 420.

<sup>111</sup> *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 167, here suggests that the reason the *arthāpatti* cannot make known its own difference from its own objects is that nothing demands the existence of such a difference. This is wrong. The very difference between the pot and the cloth is impossible without the difference of this cognition from its objects. This is in fact the entire point of Śrī Harṣa’s arguments!

<sup>112</sup> Some commentaries give as many as four interpretations each for this passage. Unfortunately none succeeds in both connecting the objection of the *pūrvapakṣa* with the *Siddhāntin* refutation and in properly resolving the compound.

The anonymous commentator, 7b, attempts to connect the objection with the previous statement that *arthāpatti* must always be known in order to lead to any conclusion. He suggests that the *pūrvapakṣa* asks, “Why must *arthāpatti* always be known?” This is altogether incorrect. “*Pratipattiyutpattipratibandha*” is clearly “*ajñārūpaprāmāṇya*”. Moreover, I fail to see how any Naiyāyika would object to the fact that *arthāpatti* must be known before it can serve as a proof. One of the cardinal Nyāya principles is that only perception does not require prior knowledge of itself in order to serve as proof of its object. That the verses “*atyan-tam asatyapi*” make no sense under the anonymous commentator’s interpretation is another of its major flaws. The commentator himself on 8b supplies a non-existent *pūrvapakṣa* to account for their existence. His resolution of the compound is also not good; one “*an-vayavyatireka*” seems to be additional.

Varadapaṇḍita, p. 184, assumes that the *pūrvapakṣa* again objects by asserting that *śruti* is false because it is contradicted, further suggesting that this contradiction prevents

knowledge from even arising. The first thing wrong with this is that the very assumption that contradiction might prevent knowledge from arising makes impossible the appearance of any error! It is not a very sensible objection. The second thing amiss Varadapaṇḍita himself notes when he says that the question that scripture is contradicted has already been answered in the negative and thus the objection has no place. He proceeds to state that the long compound gives the reason why *ajñāna* is not to be doubted. *Jñāna's sāmāgrī* exists. Varadapaṇḍita himself is not quite certain what to do with the compound (cf. p. 186, “*dr̥ḍhānvaya, ṣaṣṭīsa-māsa. Dr̥ḍhāḥ padārthā vety arthāl labhyate. Dr̥ḍha iti anvayasya viśeṣaṇam vā*” He finally settles upon the following: “*samskārārūḍhadr̥ḍhānvayaś ca vyatirekānvayavyatirekaś ca*”. Both of these, he says, serve as the causes of “*anvayapratipatti*”. The first he takes to mean something like “objects of memory”; the second, “the absence of wrong relationship”. His idea seems to be that the words of scripture denote common objects and that there is nothing amiss in the relationship of these objects as there is for example in the sentence “*agninā siñcet*” where it is impossible to sprinkle with fire. Thus, scripture is fully capable of giving rise to knowledge. The first statement in the prose is thus for Varadapaṇḍita, as it was for the anonymous commentator, both question and answer (cf. p. 187). This requires again another assumed objection to account for the existence of the verses. It is obvious that such an interpretation is to be avoided. The first statement in the text is clearly objection alone; the word “*yataḥ*” is the clue that the verses are its answer. Moreover, even with these assumed objections which chop up the passage, Varadapaṇḍita still does not make good sense of the whole. The prose is an objection that knowledge cannot arise since scripture is contradicted. The answer is there given that knowledge can arise as its causes, *ākāṅkṣā* and *samnidhi*, exist. Nothing is mentioned about the fact that it has been previously proved beyond any doubt that scripture is in fact free from contradiction. The first half of the verse is assumed to be in answer to the unspoken objection that in the absence of *yogyatā* due to contradiction, knowledge will not arise. Is this not essentially the same as the first objection and has it not already been answered? It would seem to me that to assert that knowledge arises because its causes, *samnidhi* and *ākāṅkṣā*, are present would imply that *yogyatā* is in fact not a cause at all. The second half of verse one is divorced from the first half. Another objection is assumed: Even if knowledge could arise it would still be false as scripture is contradicted. The reply is extraordinary: No, because it is not contradicted. The two together read something like this, “*śrutirapramā, bādhitatvāt*”. “*maivam. Śrutiḥ pramā-bādhitatvāt*”. This is not very meaningful. If *bādhabhāva* has not already been proved, then the *Siddhāntin's* reply is *asiddha*. If it has already been proved then the question is foolish. Varadapaṇḍita is thus guilty on several counts. He introduces an objection which has already been refuted; he breaks up the whole into several discrete units requiring that the reader supply more than one non-existent *pūrvapakṣa*, and then after all this effort fails to make any sense out of the replies.

Vidyāsāgara, pp. 168–171, does little better. The main objection to his first interpretation is that it is “*klīṣṭakalpanā*” and fails properly to resolve the compound. Vidyāsāgara suggests that “*anvayavyatirekānvayatirekānvaya*” should be taken as “*sattvāsattvayoh sambandhabhāva eva anvaya = viśeṣantā*”. He then arrives at the following: “*sattvābhāvaviśeṣanātā*”, “*asattvābhāvaviśeṣanātā*”. The word “*abhāva*” is superfluous and only makes more complicated that which could be easily stated. “*sattvābhāvaviśeṣanātā*” is more clearly expressed as “*asattvaviśeṣanātā*” and “*sattvābhāvaviśeṣanātā*” as “*sattvaviśeṣanātā*”. Vidyāsāgara makes Śrī Harṣa guilty of “*niṣprayojanata*”.

The same is true of Vidyāsāgara's next suggestion. There is no need to express "*abhāva*" by "*vyatirekānvaya*"; "*vyatireka*" alone will do. This would also be an extremely unusual phrase to employ. The sense of this interpretation of the prose as both objection and reply is liable to the same faults as Varadapaṇḍita's interpretation above.

The third explanation which Vidyāsāgara offers also makes the prose serve as both objection and reply. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how "*samskārarūḍhadṛḍha*" can mean "*tucchāvilakṣaṇa*". The introduction of this third truth value is also to be avoided for the various reasons discussed thus far. Vidyāsāgara's other attempts are equally unsatisfactory. He gives no explanation which will allow the passage to be read as a continuous whole.

Without going into detail, Śaṅkara Mīśra's interpretations (p. 96 Sam) similarly center around the already refuted notion that there exists *bhedapramā*. He thus ends up like Varadapaṇḍita with the following; "*Bādhitatvāj jñānam notpadyate iti. Maivam. Bādhe saty api jñānam utpadyate. Atra ca pramotpadyate. Bādhābhāvāt*". As before, either the question or the reply is amiss. The second suggestion he offers also suffers from the fact that it makes the last "*vyatireka*" in the compound superfluous.

*Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. pp. 48 ff., adds his own erroneous suggestions. The only thing worth noting is his remark that Guṇḍayyabhaṭṭa has another reading. Instead of "*anvayavyatirekānvayavyatirekānvaya*" he reads, "*anvayavyatirekānvayavyatirekānvayavyatireka*". Guṇḍayyabhaṭṭa's interpretation is similar in meaning to Vidyāsāgara's first; however, his resolution of the compound requires that we supply the words "*pada*" and "*padārtha*" (*anvayavyatirekau, padānām āropodvāpābhyām, anvayavyatirekau padārthānām grahaṇāgrahaṇābhyām. upasthāpitānavasyāikyasya. vyatireko 'bhāvaḥ*). This is definitely stretching the imagination.

Thus the commentators are all equally unsatisfactory for the passage at hand. Nothing perhaps makes clearer the fact that the tradition of study of the *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya* was broken soon after its author's death.

<sup>113</sup> I am indebted to Śrinivāsa Śāstrī for this example and for assistance in understanding this passage.

<sup>114</sup> This verse is quoted in the *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 51, Chow.

<sup>115</sup> *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 43–62, and 243 ff.

<sup>116</sup> *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 171; *Parisuddhi*, p. 141 N.E.

<sup>117</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, p. 477.

<sup>118</sup> *Ślokaavarttika*, *Codanāsūtra śloka* 47–61; *Bhāmātī*, 7; 625.

<sup>119</sup> *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 171, and *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 235.

<sup>120</sup> The commentators do not see the connection between this passage and the one



immediately preceding it. The anonymous commentator, 8a, suggests that the *pūrvapakṣa* objects, "But if in the case of both the *advaita* and the *dvaitaśruti* a knowledge of *samsarga* is accompanied by an ignorance of its absence, it is not fitting for one to be considered valid and the other invalid. Both must be true." In the first place, the doctrine of *bhedābheda* has already been dismissed on p. 87 (Sam) and on p. 94 (Sam) the validity of a *dvaitaśruti* refuted. There can thus be no question of either in the present passage. Moreover, the very objection at this point would be nonsense, given the verse on p. 96 (Sam), and the demonstration thus far that only *advaitaśruti* is uncontradicted. The verse clearly states that even to the Prābhākara a knowledge of *samsarga* occurs in the absence of contradiction although it is *denied* where contradiction appears. Thus the very suggestion that the refuted *dvaita* scripture and the unrefuted *advaita* scripture both give rise to a knowledge of relationship does no more than to betray total ignorance of all Śrī Harṣa has thus far accomplished.

Varadapaṇḍita, p. 190, seems to consider unfitting that where difference has been proved, its absence should be propounded by the scriptures on non-duality. This is also not adequate. All proof of difference has successfully been refuted in the preceding pages. Even the opponent could not suggest that difference has been established. What can be unfitting about these scriptures thus is only that they violate common convention and in formulating principles which deny the observed are contrary to the practice which all philosophers are to follow. This being the case, *śruti* is to be neglected. Once *śruti* is neglected, it will be possible to prove that difference exists and is established by proof. Varadapaṇḍita is one step ahead.

Śaṃkara Mīśra, p. 97 (Sam), interprets the passage correctly. What he misses is that it is but a rephrasing of the objection on the preceding page.

*Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 173, Varadapaṇḍita and the anonymous commentator all read "*balāham-yuḥ*" for *balavattivāt*. It does not alter the structure of the argument.

<sup>121</sup> See Udayana's assertion in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 252, that the *anuyogin* is to be perceived although the *pratiyogin* may be remembered. This is why Śrī Harṣa has so phrased this difference on pp. 82 ff. (Sam). If the last cognition were the *pratiyogin*, it would not be possible to deny perception of the difference of it from another existent object. Where that object is another knowledge, as in the present case, perception would still be impossible; however, Śrī Harṣa simplifies his refutation by making the *antimabuddhi* the *anuyogin*.

<sup>122</sup> For "*anyatarāśiddhi*" as a major fault vitiating inference see *Ṭīkā*, p. 658 N.E.; *Ślokavārttika*, *Nirāmbanavāda*, śloka 131, p. 188; *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 578.

<sup>123</sup> Śrī Harṣa repeats this very argument later on p. 292 (Sam). Udayana seems to have been led to these conclusions in an attempt to differentiate *parārthānumana* from verbal testimony. See *Parīśuddhi*, p. 242, N.E., 141, N.E. (p. 322 O.E.), and *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 242.

<sup>124</sup> For doubt as the third type of invalidity see *Ślokavārttika*. *Codanāsūtra*, śloka 54.

<sup>125</sup> *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 180, totally misunderstands this passage. He argues that even doubt is not possible without definite cognition. Thus, if difference is nowhere admitted, it cannot either be doubted. This makes the phrase "*sādhyaṁviśeṣādidoṣapratisaṃdhāyina*"

meaningless. Moreover, to say that Śrī Harṣa has no *bhedanīścaya* is simply incorrect (cf. p. 118 Sam). Of course he has a knowledge of difference. This is the whole point of his argument. Such a knowledge is all that is required and not the existence of difference.

<sup>126</sup> For “*brahmāstra*” see *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Bālakāṇḍa*, p. 308 ff. Śrī Harṣa’s metaphor of debate as a battle is not unique to him. Udayana *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 46, and Jayantabhaṭṭa *Āgamaviḍambana*, p. 35, before him used the same.

<sup>127</sup> Compare *Bhojavṛtti* on the *Yogasūtras*, p. 46, for a similar assertion of the fact that one can never know what is in another’s mind.

<sup>128</sup> *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. p. 52a, quotes another interpretation of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya for this passage. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya interprets “*taccintanāder*”, p. 101 (Sam), not as *tat* = *antimabuddhi* but as *abheda*, and urges that the cognition of their difference would then be *anubhāvaviruddha*. This is incorrect. There is no mention of “*abheda*” in the sentence which could serve as the referent for the pronoun ‘*tat*’. Moreover, it would not explain Śrī Harṣa’s next statement that one thing would then be different from itself. *Anubhāvavirodha* is also possible only where that *anubhava* is *pramā*. This would require some justification on the part of Śrī Harṣa. Now, if this difference could be grasped, *śruti* would be of suspected validity and incapable of proving their non-difference. The knowledge of this second individual thus cannot be said to be valid on the basis of the scripture on non-duality. It would have to be shown that the knowledge that (*x*) is different from (*y*) is in fact itself non-different from *śruti* and that in nullifying *śruti* would be nullifying itself. *Śruti* then uncontradicted by this cognition “(*x*) is different from (*y*)” could serve as a valid proof for the second individual’s cognition of their non-difference. Such an interpretation is obviously unnecessarily devious.

*Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 182, is also incorrect. He suggests that the cognition of the difference of (*x*) from (*y*) requires prior cognition of that same difference since the relationship of *pratīyogin* and *anuyogin* is not possible if the two are the same. This would result in *svasya svasmād api bhedaḥ*. Thus cognition of all difference is caught in the fault of *ātmāśraya* and Śrī Harṣa’s statement that the particular difference in question cannot be known stands. Such an interpretation is undesirable for several reasons. For one, it fails to explain the phrase “*pareṇa taccintanāder*”. Moreover that the cognition of difference results in *ātmāśraya* since that same difference between the *pratīyogin* and *anuyogin* must first be perceived for a knowledge of that very difference (*Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 248–252) is dealt with at length in the fourth *pariccheda*, p. 623 ff. (Sam), where the entire section of the *Ātmatattvaviveka* is quoted and meticulously destroyed.

The only interpretation for this passage which seems to me to be correct is that given here in the translation. It is the one given by Varadapaṇḍita, p. 197, and Śaṅkara Miśra, p. 102 (Sam).

<sup>129</sup> The subject is resumed in the fourth *pariccheda*, pp. 622–660 Sam, with a specific refutation of Udayana in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 248 ff. Varadapaṇḍita, who is the only commentator aware of the work as a whole, remarks on pp. 216–217 that the refutation of *bheda* in two places in the text is not a fault, as it is here required in order firmly to refute all objections to the doctrine of non-duality. I would add that the arguments of the two sections are also totally different.

<sup>130</sup> *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 162; *Śrībhāṣya*, *Catuḥsūtrī* p. 146; *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, p. 107; *Ātmātattvaviveka*, pp. 248, 252; *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 154; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 242.

<sup>131</sup> Compare the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 48; and the *Sambandhavārttika* of Sureśvara vs. 920, 921 (vol. 1). The argument seems to me to be originally a Buddhist one. Any aspect of an object which depends upon another object cannot be said to be the “*svabhāva*” or the essential nature of that object. This is the purpose of the Mādhyamika Buddhist emphasis on *pratītyasamutpāda* – to show that all objects of the visible world as depending upon causes have no inherent substance. Cf. *Prasannapadā* on *Mādhyamikaśāstra* 1.1.12; p. 30; *Mādhyamikaśāstra*, “*Svabhāvaparikṣā*”, pp. 114–115, specifically verse 2, “*Akrtrimah-svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca*”. See also *Vigrahavyāvartini*, p. 290, and *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, p. 189. The Jains vehemently deny this contention. See *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 154, and *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa*, p. 480.

<sup>132</sup> *Kusumāñjali*, pp. 446–448.

<sup>133</sup> With this should be compared the arguments of the *Tattvopaplavasimha*, p. 78 lines 10 following, and Abhinavagupta’s *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarśinī* with *Bhāskari*, pp. 48, 62. There is no question that the present argument employed by Śrī Harṣa can be found in these two earlier texts. Śrī Harṣa will utilize this concept that “*x-nirūpita-y* is *z*” implies *x=z* elsewhere, for example in his refutation of *viśayaviśayibhāva*, p. 611 Sam.

<sup>134</sup> Varadapaṇḍita seems to have the idea if “*bheda*” line 2, p. 204, can be read “*abheda*”.

The anonymous commentator, 8b, is confused. He resolves the compound, “*svāpeks-avaśaiśāt*” as “*svasya paṭāder bhedavatvenāpekṣaṇīyaṃ yad ghaṭādi tasya vaiśasam, uktanyāyenābhedavatvam*”. The word “*vaiśasa*” can in no way mean ‘non-difference’. It would appear that he has totally lost the meaning of the verse. The compound actually gives the reason why a cognition of difference cannot be valid. It destroys (*vaiśasa*) that upon which it depends, *abheda*. Without the non-difference of (*x*) from (*y*) their difference as conceived by the opponent would be impossible. Without the existence of such a difference, what further question might there then be of its cognition? For Śrī Harṣa’s similar usage of the term “*vaiśasa*” to mean “destroy”, see the *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, 9.78; 16.9.

These are minor errors, however, in comparison to *Vidyāsāgarī*’s completely incorrect explanation (p. 188). *Vidyāsāgarī* seems to be saying that for the perception of difference a prior perception of the very nature of (*x*) and (*y*) is required. Thus the perception of difference if it were valid would destroy this cognition of the essential unity of (*x*) and (*y*). There are several major flaws in this interpretation. First of all, it is contrary to the text. Śrī Harṣa nowhere states that the knowledge of difference requires prior perception of the non-difference of (*x*) from itself and the non-difference of (*y*) from itself. Secondly, it is illogical. The knowledge that (*x*) is different from (*y*) is not at all contradictory to the knowledge that (*x*) is not different from (*x*). Obviously that a cow is not a horse is irrelevant to the fact that a horse is a horse! For two cognitions to be contradictory, they must have the same object. Finally, and most devastatingly, it would lead to the opposite conclusion – that *bhedañāna* is *pramā* and not *abhedadhī*. Śaṅkara Miśra is quick to discover this (pp. 104–105 Sam). If all knowledge of difference required first a perception of *svarūpa*, and if *svarūpa* itself is difference, then *bheda* is actually the *upajñya*

and not the *upajīvaka*. It is true that this objection can be refuted by saying that it is just this concept, that *bheda* is *svarūpa*, which is here destroyed. If *bheda* is *svarūpa* then (x) and (y) must be non-different. Thus, even if *svarūpa* is first perceived, that perception will still imply the non-difference of the two objects in question.

*Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. p. 54a, otherwise criticizes both *Vidyāsāgarī* and Śaṅkara Mīśra, in the interpretations of whom *bheda* is the *upajīvyā*. The manuscript is corrupt; however, his criticism seems to be the following. The *pratyogin* need not be grasped first as the knowledge of difference is always *savikalpika* (*Kuṣumāṇjali*, pp. 446–448). This seems to me to be a violation of the principles Udayana expresses in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 252. *Pratyogi-* and *anuyogijñāna* are indeed required for *bhedajñāna* although difference itself is only grasped in combination with its counterpositive in determinate knowledge. The interpretation of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya which the *Bhūṣāmaṇi* quotes is similar to that given in the translation with only one slight change. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya argues that a knowledge of the difference of (x) from (y) or “y-*viśiṣṭabheda*” as the nature of (x) cannot occur without a knowledge of (y) as the nature of (x), since knowledge of a qualified is not possible without knowledge of the qualifier as well. This is weak. It is not that difference so qualified could not be known without a knowledge of (y), but that it could not *exist* were (x) and (y) not identical.

<sup>135</sup> This is definitely the translation required for the phrases “*avidyāvidyamānabhāva*” and “*paramārthika*”. “*Avidyā*” is to be taken as “*bhrānti*”, “*vidyamānabhāva*” as “*jñāyamānasattva*”, and “*paramārthika*” only as “*pramāṇasiddha*”. (Cf. text p. 171 Chow and translation note 85.) There is no question that *avidyā* is not “*mūlājñāna*”, nor does “*vidyamāna*” mean existing and “*paramārthika*”, “absolutely real”, whereby the passage might be taken as evidence of Śrī Harṣa’s espousal of the traditional Vedānta third truth value. To the contrary, it is to be kept in mind that Śrī Harṣa here takes a given cognition, “(x) is different from (y)”, and shows that it is valid only for the opposite, “(x) is not different from (y)”. Now, such a non-difference of (x) from (y) is in fact no more real than their difference – from the standpoint of Brahma or absolute reality. It still involves a knowledge of ‘x’ and of ‘y’ as of diverging attributes, which allows us to call them by different designations. To speak of the difference of (x) from (y) as a result of “*mūlājñāna*” and the non-difference of the two as real is thus not possible. Both are of the same status of reality. Therefore, by these terms are to be meant only what the Naiyāyika himself might mean, and what the verse itself explicitly states. By the opponent’s own admissions, the cognition of non-difference must be valid, and the cognition of difference, *bhrānti* or false.

<sup>136</sup> Compare Udayana, *Pariśuddhi*, p. 109 N.E.; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 212; Vācaspati Mīśra, *Tīkā*, p. 28 N.E.; *Brhatī* with *Rjuvimalā*, pp. 238, 239 *Ślokaṇvarttika*, *Pratyakṣasūtra*, *śloka*s 229–231; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 22. The Mīmāṃsaka passages imply the same, for they are assertions that *pratyabhijñā* is both memory and experience. Memory is always invalid and the experience in question is considered to be valid.

<sup>137</sup> Taking the reading, “*ghaṭam prati*” for the printed “*paṭam prati*”, p. 107 (Sam). Of the commentators only Paramānanda Sūri gives this reading (6b). The anonymous commentator (8b) offers “*paṭam prati*” with no explanation. Śaṅkara Mīśra on p. 108 (Sam) simply supplies, “*tadekadeśena*”. I fail to see the meaning of this statement. The question whether “*paṭam prati*” is included in *ghaṭasvarūpa* or not has already been raised and answered in the

negative and the affirmative and the faults of both cases stated. Is this not the intention of the *vikalpa*, is the whole ‘*paṭam prati pratiyogitva*’ the nature of the pot or just ‘*pratiyogitva*’ alone? *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 191, suggests that *pratiyogitva* be allowed to have *ghaṭa*, the *dharmīn* as its *upalakṣaṇa* and then proceeds to ask whether this ‘*paṭam prati*’ is to be the very essence of *pratiyogitva* or not. This is curious. There is no question here of the relationship of *pratiyogitva* to the pot, the *anuyogin*. Moreover, I should think that the previous *vikalpa* in which ‘*paṭam prati*’ is permitted to remain outside and ‘*pratiyogitva*’ alone was considered the nature of the pot would be proof enough that ‘*paṭam prati*’ is not the essential nature of ‘*pratiyogitva*’ at all. If it were, the very suggestion that *pratiyogitva* is the essence of the pot and *paṭam prati* is something else would not be possible! The question is thus still out of place. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 208, also reads ‘*paṭam prati*’. He offers the following explanation. Is this ‘*paṭam prati*’ the very nature of either the pot or *pratiyogitva*? In either case, *advaita* results. Such an explanation is subject to the faults of both Śaṅkara Mīśra and *Vidyāsāgarī*. The second alternative where *pratiyogitva* alone is the nature of the pot precludes the possibility that ‘*paṭam prati*’ be the essence of *pratiyogitva*, and the first alternative has been answered in the assertion of the whole ‘*paṭam prati pratiyogitva*’ as the nature of the pot. Thus nothing would be gained by the present statement. *Bhūṣamaṇi*, ms. 56a, follows Śaṅkara Mīśra.

For these reasons I have preferred Paramānanda Sūri’s reading, “*ghaṭam prati*”. Moreover, on p. 107 Sam the argument does consider both the difference, “*ghaṭāt paṭo bhinnah*”, and the difference, “*paṭād ghaṭo bhinnah*”. It is natural that both should be considered in this passage as well. Even with the printed reading, such must be the meaning. In that case, one must assume the following construction, “*paṭam pratiyuktam. Atrāpi, paṭe ‘pi, ghaṭam prati pratiyogitve, uktadoṣas tadavasthaḥ*”.

<sup>138</sup> The commentators are not clear on this process of reasoning which Śrī Harṣa himself later details, p. 611 Sam. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 210, offers that the non-duality of (x) and (y) results since protagonists of *svarūpasambandhas* hold that such relationships are of the nature of both terms, (x) and (y), and if  $x = z$  and  $y = z$ , then  $x = y$ . This is not correct. The relationship *svarūpasambandha* is generally considered to be the nature of the *anuyogin* or the substratum alone. He also suggests as a second interpretation, pp. 210–211, that since *sambandha* can only be perceived as of (x) to (y) their non-duality results. It is possible to read into this brief statement the reasoning supplied in the translation commentary.

Śaṅkara Mīśra p. 107 (Sam) proposes, “*dharmisvarūpasambandho dharmah, dharma-svarūpasambandho dharmī*”. It is difficult to tell his exact reasoning. It would appear to be as the translation, applied both to the relationship considered as of (x) to (y) and as of (y) to (x). *Dharmisvarūpasambandha* would then mean “*dharmīnirūpitavarūpasambandha*”. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 193, seems to have the idea.

<sup>139</sup> See references in note 129, and *Ṭṭkā*, p. 614 K.

<sup>140</sup> Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 212–213, and Śaṅkara Mīśra p. 108 (Sam), are correct here. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 195, is backwards as usual. He interprets “*vaikalpika*” as “*vyavasthitavikalpa*” and argues that the ablative and nominative cases do have such a limited interchangeable use. Only if they did not (i.e., if they were everywhere alike) could one conceive of the two cognitions as of equal content. Such an interpretation is contrary to the text reading, “*asahamānyaiva*”.

<sup>141</sup> During the course of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, Śrī Harṣa will refute all the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsaka definitions of *anyonyābhāva*. (Cf. *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 237, and *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, pp. 208 ff., for their refutation of this type of absence.) The following passages, then are but a prelude to what is to come. The excellence of Śrī Harṣa's refutation of this concept is exceeded perhaps only by its difficulty. P. 182 (Sam) refutes the definition given by the *Lilāvātī*, p. 574. The reason why this definition, that reciprocal absence exists at the same time and the same locus as its counterpositive, is unacceptable is given as “*yathāsaṃbhavam ātmāśrayādyananubhavasvabhedānanugamatattadavagamānabhyupagama*”. None of the commentators understands. I would suggest the following: *Saṃsargābhāva* is defined as “*anyonyābhāvānyonyābhāvavān*”. *Anyonyābhāva* is thus the *nirūpaka* of *anyonyābhāva*. Now, if this *anyonyābhāva* which serves as the *pratiyogin* is the same as the *anyonyābhāva* which it limits, then there will be *ātmāśraya* in the form, *svajñānādhīnasvajñānatva*, for an absence can only be known when the *pratiyogin* is known. Thus in the phrase, “*anyonyābhāvanirūpitānyonyābhāvavāmsaṃsargābhāvah*”, the first *anyonyābhāva*, *A*, as *pratiyogin* must be different from the second, *B*, which it limits. The difference between these two cannot be either *A* or *B* as the new *anyonyābhāva* in question is described by both these terms. It is *A-niṣṭha-B-pratiyogikānyonyābhāva*. Now, if it be *B*, then as before, where the *pratiyogin* and the absence are identical there will result *ātmāśraya*, *svajñānādhīnasvajñānatva*. It cannot be *A*, as an attribute and its locus can never be the same. It must thus be admitted that “*A-niṣṭha-B-pratiyogikānyonyābhāva*” is a third absence, *C*. Now the same question repeats. For *C* to exist on *A* the two must be different. It is necessary to admit an “*A-niṣṭha-C-pratiyogikānyonyābhāva*”. This cannot be either *A* or *C* as before. If it be *B*, then *anyonyāśraya* results. For establishing “*A-nirūpita-B-anyonyābhāva*” *C* was necessary. Now, for establishing that *C*, *B* is required; *C* *siddhe sati B* *siddhyate*, *B* *siddhe sati C* *siddhyate*. The difference between *A* and *C* must thus be *D*. In the same manner, this *A-niṣṭha-C-pratiyogikarūpa-D-anyonyābhāva* must be different from its locus, *A*. If that difference is *B*, then a *cakraka* results: *B-siddhyartham*, *C* *apekṣyate*. *C-siddhyartham*, *D* *apekṣyate*. *D-siddhyartham*, *B* *apekṣyate* or *BCDB*. Another absence *E* is to be admitted, the question repeats and an infinite regress results. This takes care of the first remark, “*ātmāśrayādī*”. “*ananubhava*” here refers to “*niṣpramāṇikatva*” and repeats the logic of p. 113 (Sam). *A-nirūpita-B* enters into *saṃsargābhāva* as its locus which is either different or non-different from the *pratiyogin*, in this case, reciprocal absence. If different, an infinite series of differences results. Such an infinite series cannot be admitted as it is beset with the faults of *prāglopa* and *avinigama*. For details the reader is referred to the translation of this section. “*tattadavagamānabhyupagama*” is explained by the verse on p. 194 (Sam). It is not possible to say that (*x*) is (*x*) as the *vidheya* and the *uddeśya* must always be different. Thus, it is not possible to say “*anyonyābhāvo 'nyonyābhāvo na bhavati*” and *anyonyābhāva* cannot be excluded by the assertion, “*yo 'bhāvo 'nyonyābhāvo na bhavati*”. The rest is self-explanatory.

Page 184 refutes the definitions of the *Lilāvātī*, p. 547, and the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, p. 37. The refutation is more straightforward than the above. Page 205 finally defeats Udayana's last attempt at defining *anyonyābhāva* in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 220. Udayana sought to avoid the fault that where *tādātmya* is the *pratiyogin* the absence will be *asatpratiyogi* by inserting the word “*abhimāna*” in his definition: “*Tādātmyābhimānapratyoginirūpyaś ca anyonyābhāvah*.” The destruction of this definition proceeds from an examination of the meaning of this “*tādātmyābhimāna*”. It might be noted that the refutation of definitions ap-

pearing in the *Līlāvātī* alone would seem to contradict the statement of D. C. Bhattacharya in the *History of Navya-Nyaya in Mithila*, p. 60, that Śrī Vallabha's work was never cited by Śrī Harṣa.

<sup>142</sup> Compare *Kusumāñjali*, p. 241, *Ṭīkā*, p. 211 N.E., and *Parīśuddhi*, p. 247 N.E.

<sup>143</sup> See *Syādvādaratnākara*, Vol. 1, p. 20, and *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 259, for this rule.

<sup>144</sup> For a chronology of Udayana's works see D.C. Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyaya in Mithila*, Mithila Institute Series (Darbhanga, 1958), p. 67.

<sup>145</sup> This is in fact Udayana's own later conception. Compare his comments on *saṃsārgābhāva* in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 221.

<sup>146</sup> The commentators here understand neither Śrī Harṣa's purpose nor his method of argument. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 202 states, "*vaidharmyamātreṇa bhedavya-vahārapratyayopapattau, tadatiriktābhedaṅvagamō gauravād anupapannaḥ*". This is missing the point entirely. *Svarūpabheda* has already been refuted. The fault is not *gaurava* but *asambhava* as the text, p. 112 (Sam) itself clearly states. Moreover, *Vidyāsāgarī* seems not to have grasped the meaning of the statement, "*kiṃ pratiyoginam kiṃ vālabhanam*". The very cognition of difference has made its own *pratiyogin* impossible, and its *anuyogin* identical to the other object at which the negation is to take place.

Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 223–224, urges *ātmāśraya*. The difference between the *pratiyogin* and the *anuyogin* must first be established before any cognition of *anyonyābhāva* can be valid. If that difference is nothing but the *anyonyābhāva* in question, then the following results: *Anyonyābhāve siddhe pratiyogyanuyoginor bhedaḥ siddhyate; pratiyogyanuyoginor bhede siddhe, anyonyābhāvaḥ siddhyate*. He then refers the reader to the same argument in the fourth *pariccheda*. This is wrong. There is no question here of *ātmāśraya* nor of the difference between the *anuyogin* and the *pratiyogin* being this or that *anyonyābhāva*. Śrī Harṣa's reasoning has thus far shown that *any anyonyābhāva so conceived is impossible*. The reason for this is clearly the preceding sentence, ending "*āvedayatīti*" (p. 112 Sam) where "*iti*" denotes *hetu* or reason. Thus the possibility that that very *anyonyābhāva* serve as the difference of the *pratiyogin* from the *anuyogin* does not even exist, whence *ātmāśraya* would result! Varadapaṇḍita has in fact comprehended nothing of Śrī Harṣa's logic here.

Śaṅkara Miśra, p. 112 (Sam), gives as the essence of the refutation, "*pratiyogitāvaccchedakādhikaraṇatāvaccchedakābhāvāt*". This is again skirting the issue. The impossibility of a *pratiyogitāvaccchedaka* and *adhikaraṇatāvaccchedaka* is not in itself a fault. Were such a cognition of difference valid, *the pratiyogin itself would not exist*, and the *anuyogin* could not be defined as either *ghaṭa* or *paṭa* not only because of the absence of the attributes, *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*, in both, but also because of the *pūrvapakṣa*'s former failure to establish *svarūpabheda*. In Śaṅkara Miśra's interpretation, the phrase "*svarūpabhedasya cāsam-bhavana*" would remain unexplained. No commentator sees that all of this is but an elaborate proof of the verse given earlier on p. 104 (Sam).

The anonymous commentator, 9a, and Paramānanda Sūri, 6b make no attempt to explain the present passage.

<sup>147</sup> The commentators all explain these faults otherwise. Since “*ananubhava*” is actually stated with the first alternative, *vaidharmye vaidharmyāntarasvīkāre*, they take it as a fault specific to that alternative, and not as I have as common to both. Śaṅkara Mīśra, p. 112 (Sam), Varadapaṇḍita, p. 225, and *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. 60a, assert that this “*ananubhava*” means that there is no proof for the existence of any quality in *paṭatva* or in *ghaṭatva*. It would seem to me that such a statement would be unnecessary. It is obvious that if the chain stops, then all are identical. *Vaidharmyaviśrānti* thus requires no other refutation. What is to be refuted then is the *anavasthā*. *Bhūṣāmaṇi* suggests that this *anavasthā* is guilty of *ananubhava* or lack of proof because it cannot be proved on the strength of “*bhedapramānyathānupapattiyā*” as *śruti* contradicts the knowledge of difference and so that knowledge cannot be valid. This is also not good. Śrī Harṣa proceeds along a different course of argument here in his discussion of difference. He shows that by the opponent’s own admissions *bheda* is impossible, and that for the inconsistencies inherent in all concepts of *bheda*, any cognition of difference must in fact be valid for its absence, non-difference. There is no question of *advaitaśruti* here.

*Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 203, likewise suggests that “*ananubhava*” refers to the fact that such an infinite regress is without proof. As Śrī Harṣa will show later (pp. 182, 233), an infinite regress is at fault only where *prāglopa* and *avinigama* result. This is not the case with an infinite series of *vaidharmyas*. Each has a different function and form. The first *bheda*, *paṭatva* is “*paṭānuyogikaghaṭapratīyogikabheda*”. The second is “*paṭatvānuyogikaghaṭatvapratīyogikabheda*” and so on. There is thus neither *prāglopa*, each being different in function, nor *avinigama*, each having a different locus. The *anavasthā* of *vaidharmya* is thus not *niṣpramāṇika*.

For these reasons, I would prefer to interpret “*ananubhava*” as referring to the second *anavasthā* detailed on p. 113, beginning “*kiṃ ca*”. There is nothing in the text to prevent such an interpretation; in fact, I find it better suited to the given statement, “*ananubhavaś ca katham pratyuttaraṇīyaḥ*”. This phrase seems to me to imply a fault entirely different from anything mentioned before with either *vaidharmyaviśrānti* or *anavasthā*. It is really a separate complete sentence. Thus, none of these faults is herein detailed. The first two have already been dismissed, and *ananubhava* will be explained below.

<sup>148</sup> See *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 21, “*sāmānyādīnām asāmānyaviśeṣaṇavattvam*”.

<sup>149</sup> See references in note 89 and *Kusumāñjali*, p. 372.

<sup>150</sup> Compare *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 318 K, where a similar *vikalpa* is raised by the Buddhists with respect to *jāti*: does *gotva* exist in a cow or in that which is not a cow? The *Vārttika*’s answer is that given by the present *pūrvapakṣa*. The question is improper. *Gotva* attaches itself to the object as soon as it is born. Thus, prior to this point there is nothing at all about which one might ask, “It is a cow or not a cow?” In all of this passage Śrī Harṣa is merely applying the same Buddhist argument to *bheda*. The present reply, that the innumerable differences attach themselves to their locus as soon as it is born might thus be taken as representative of what the Naiyāyika view would be in such a situation.

<sup>151</sup> Some of the commentators find difficulty in applying this criticism to the alternative in which all the *bhedas* are to attach themselves to their locus at once, and later in the use of the



word “*carama*” where all are contemporary (*Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 206; *Śāṅkarī*, p. 113 Sam). *Vidyāsāgarī* is puzzled by the fact that if all are to enter at once, how then could it be asked which one goes first? What he has forgotten is that they must still enter a locus already different from the pot. By “*parirabhante*” is to be meant “surround” or “attack” and not “take residence”. *Vidyāsāgarī*’s misinterpretation forces him to take this “*kim vinigamanam*” with “*krameṇa*” and supply another refutation for the *yugapatpakṣa*.

*Vidyāsāgarī* also questions the word “*carama*” and similarly applies this fault to the *kramapakṣa*. Again he is mistaken. *Carama* refers not to the time at which  $D_1$ ,  $D_2$ , etc., enter the locus, but to the succession in conception of these differences. In other words, one accepts the existence of  $D_1$  to account for the difference between the cloth and the pot. To account for this  $D_1$ ,  $D_2$  is thereupon admitted. The succession is thus in the formulation of the chain and applies to both the views where all differences enter the locus at once or where they enter in gradual procession.

In addition, Śaṅkara Mīśra takes exception to Śrī Harṣa here. “*Yadyapi yugapad vartamānānām apy anyonyakalahāḥ katham syāt? Na hi ghaṭatvapṛthivādravyatvasattvādīnāṃ yugapad vṛttau kalahāḥ*”. This shows his total misunderstanding of Śrī Harṣa’s entire argument. The quarrel exists because all of these *bhedas* are identical; they are all “*pañānuयोगikaghaṭapratīyogikabhedas*”. *Pṛthivīva*, etc., are all different. It is a wonder that this fact should have escaped his attention!

<sup>152</sup> *Suśruta*, 1.45, 10, 11.

<sup>153</sup> The commentators do not understand this passage at all. *Śāṅkarī*, p. 115 (Sam), has the curious comment, “*na ca viśeṣavyāvṛtṭyaiva taylor bheda iti vācyam. Svarūpavyāvṛtṭtau svarūpaviśeṣasya parasparam avyāvṛtṭteh. Tadvyāvṛtṭtau vā svarūpavyāvṛtṭter avasyakatayā punaḥ saiva niḥsvarūpateti bhāvaḥ*”. This makes no sense to me. First of all it is not possible to assume that the word, “*svārūpaviśeṣa*” is to mean “*svārūpaś ca viśeṣaś ca*” whence the possibility of the exclusion of “*viśeṣa*” alone and not “*svārūpa*” as well might arise. The word is like the Naiyāyika “*sāmānyaviśeṣa*”, “*sāmānyam eva viśeṣa*”, as it also differentiates its locus from other objects. Moreover, the assertion of *niḥsvarūpatā* is contrary to the text. Śrī Harṣa unmistakably here urges that the two objects would be identical and not that they would be absolute fictions.

*Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 208, gives nothing so outrageous; however, he does not grasp the general principle behind Śrī Harṣa’s arguments – a term denotes a class of individuals. Witness his comments on the question, “*Vaktavyo 'sau svarūpa (viśeṣa) mātrād anyo viśeṣārthaḥ*”, p. 209. All Śrī Harṣa requires is that the term denotes many individuals. It is the only answer possible. (*Viruddhayaḥ prakāraṇītarāsaṃbhavāt*.) *Vidyāsāgarī*’s gymnastics here betray his ignorance of the essentials of Śrī Harṣa’s arguments at this point.

Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 230–231, has a lengthy exposition. It is wholly untenable. The manuscript reads: “*Svarūpaviśeṣavyāvṛtṭyā bhedasvarūpamātravyāvṛtṭyā bheda iti bhedābhedaprasaṅgaḥ*”. I would assume this should be otherwise divided: “*svārūpaviśeṣavyāvṛtṭyā bhedah; svarūpamātravyāvṛtṭyā abhedah*”. Like Śaṅkara Mīśra he takes the word “*vyāvṛtṭi*” to mean difference and not absence as it must. (Otherwise, *svārūpamātravyāvṛtṭi* would never result in *niḥsvarūpatā*.) This interpretation is not correct. Śrī Harṣa explicitly states that only the identity of the two objects in question results. Thus Varadapaṇḍita proceeds. His interpretation of the next section, “*vaktavyaś ca,*” etc., is also

impossible. He argues that Śrī Harṣa intends that such a *svarūpaviśeṣa* cannot be *vaidharmya* as *ātmāśraya* would result (*vaidharmyarūpabhede siddhe vaidharmyarūpabhedaḥ siddhyate*). And thus the *pūrvapakṣa* is incapable of responding to the question at hand. Not at all. The term “*svarūpaviśeṣa*” need not mean the attributes, “*paṭatva*” or “*ghaṭatva*”, earlier taken as *vaidharmya*, but “*trikoṇatva*”, etc., a *saṁsthānaviśeṣa*. This is clearly what both the *Siddhāntin* and the *pūrvapakṣa* intend. The difficulty here, as Śrī Harṣa himself explains has nothing to do with *ātmāśraya* but with whether the word can denote an individual or must denote a universal. Paramānanda Sūri (7a) does not comment; nor does the anonymous commentator, 9a, although he supplies us with the correct reading for the immediately following question (see next note).

<sup>154</sup> This “*svarūpaviśeṣamātrāt*” must be the correct reading and not the printed “*svarūpamātrāt*”, p. 116 (Sam). Only the anonymous commentator supplies this reading (9a). “*svarūpamātrāt*” is wholly out of place here. That the *pūrvapakṣa* intends essential nature in general has already been refuted.

<sup>155</sup> See translation, p. 88, and *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 16.

<sup>156</sup> Compare *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 154, “*ekatvavirodhalakṣaṇatvād bhedasya*”.

<sup>157</sup> *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 155.

<sup>158</sup> *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 155.

<sup>159</sup> Otherwise the commentaries. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 233, for the refutation of “*abhinne bhedo nivīśate*” offers the following. “*Bhedasyābhinnadharmyanekikaraṇasvabhāvatvāt*”. This misses the point. It is not that *bheda* must split (*y*) from itself as that is its very nature. The *pūrvapakṣa* would contend that this *bheda* does not in fact exist in (*y*), and exists only in (*x*). The clue is that to say that difference enters into (*x*) is tantamount to saying that it enters into (*y*). By the *pūrvapakṣa*’s own admission (*y*) and (*x*) are identical at step 2. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 210, is essentially the same as Varadapaṇḍita.

For the second argument here, the refutation of the Jain view, Śaṅkara Miśra, p. 117 (Sam), suggests that the difference will make (*y*) different from itself as (*y*) is also “*udāsīna*”, neither different nor non-different. This is not true. (*y*) is in fact non-different from itself. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 211, does not comment on this passage. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 234, notes a variant reading, “*na bhedānavacchinne nābhedānavacchinne*”, but does not explain the logic. At present the interpretation offered in the translation is the only one which seems possible to me. Śrī Harṣa is definitely familiar with the type of argument used in the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, if not that very text. Compare p. 347 (Sam), arguments against the Jain theories of inference.

<sup>160</sup> Compare *Vyomavatī*, p. 258, *Śloka-vārttika*, Codanāsūtra, *śloka* 62–63, p. 47; *Bhāmātī*, p. 6. Paramānanda Sūri (7a) suggests an interesting alternative here. “*mate*” which has been translated here as a locative is taken by him as “*amate*”, a vocative, “O foolish one”. He suggests that the logic behind this verse is thus the previous demonstrations of the

ineffectuality of inference, *arthāpatti*, *tarka*, etc., against *advaitaśruti*. There is nothing to prevent an interpretation such as this.

<sup>161</sup> This objection has striking resemblances to the objection of Prabhācandra in his refutation of “*paramabrahmavāda*” in the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, p. 155, “*yo 'pi sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ Brahma ity ādy āgamas tatpratipādayakāḥ pratipāditāḥ, so 'pi dvaitaviśayatvād bhedam eva prasādhayati. Na hi vācyavācakapratipādayapratipādayakānām madhye 'nyatamasāpy apāye pramāṇabhūtāgamasattopapadyate*”.

<sup>162</sup> Again the use of the words “*paramārthika*” and “*avidyāvidyamānatva*” is not to be misconstrued. “*Sarvathā*” is to be taken with the verb. For a similar construction see pp. 171, 676 Sam. Thus the statement does not mean, “We do not admit that difference is totally non-existent. We admit some kind of existence for it which is caused by *mūlājñāna*.” As before, it means only this: “We never say that it has no existence. Its existence is perceived in invalid cognition, and thus is said to be non-existent. That of which non-existence is predicated must be admitted to be other than an absolute fiction by Udayana’s own arguments in the *Ātmatattvaviveka* and the *Parīśuddhi*. Thus to urge against us that we deny the existence of difference only betrays your lack of understanding of our intentions.”

With all this should be compared Maṇḍana Miśra’s comments in the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 39. Maṇḍana Miśra there clearly states that the difference required for scripture to exist need not be “*paramārthika*” but only “*vyāvahārika*”. The uniqueness of Śrī Harṣa is in his interpretation of this “*vyāvahārika*”.

The passage in *Bhāmātī*, pp. 6–7 also provides an interesting commentary on Śrī Harṣa’s position amongst his Vedāntin predecessors. The *Bhāmātī* states that scripture does not deny the “*sāmvyāvahārikatva*” of *bhedapratyakṣapramāṇya*, but only its “*tāttvikatva*”. Śrī Harṣa slightly reinterprets this statement. He asserts that the existence of difference is in fact invalidly cognized. This seems to be a perfect illustration of his departure from the traditional Vedānta standpoint. Instead of admitting that there are two levels of existence of validity (*sāmvyāvahārika* in the *Bhāmātī* clearly should not mean “*apramābhūta*”, as Vācaspati Miśra uses the term in combination with the word “*pramāṇa*”, an obvious contradiction as Kumārila has pointed out in the *Ślokavārttika*, *Nirāmbanavāda*, *śloka* 55 ff., pp. 164–165), Śrī Harṣa works only within his own opponent’s accepted categories and asserts that the perception is indeed invalid. See also *Bhāmātī*, p. 377, for the same “*tāttvikam abādhanam*” and “*sāmvyāvahārikam abādhanam*”.

In addition, it should be noted that Śrī Harṣa’s very statement here, “*na vyaṃ bhedasya sarvathaivāsattvam abhyupagacchāmaḥ, kiṃ nāma paramārthikasattvam. Avidyāvidyamānatvaṃ tadīyam iṣyate eva*”, bears striking resemblances to a statement which Abhinavagupta makes in the *Mālinivijayavārttika*, pt. 1, *śloka* 108, p. 11, “*ucyate nādvaye 'muṣmin dvaitaṃ nāstyeva sarvathā. Uktaṃ hi bhedavandhye 'pi vibhau bhedā-vabhāsanam*”. Abhinavagupta then goes on to say that it is on the basis of this *bhedajñāna* that *vyavahāra* proceeds (*śloka* 109–118). Elsewhere in the same text (*śloka* 156–157), he explicitly states that he admits cognitions of difference, but not their objects. It would seem to me that this is an unusual coincidence of thought and words. Both Śrī Harṣa and Abhinavagupta accept *advaita* as the one reality, and account for activity, physical and verbal, on the basis of a knowledge of the various objects which the *bhedavādins* would have existed. It is impossible to determine the depth of Śrī Harṣa’s allegiance to Kashmiri Śaivism, if

any. We have seen before (note 103) that his entire demonstration of *advaita* is somewhat unorthodox by the standards of Śaṅkara Vedānta, and in some ways closer to the methods of Abhinavagupta. Does Śrī Harṣa merely extract from Abhinavagupta those ideas which he finds useful in debate, or does he fully endorse the theories of Kashmiri Śaivism, namely, that Śiva is *sarvamaya* and actually unfolds into the multitude of objects which we perceive? I would tend to support the first of these alternatives; for one, because Śrī Harṣa is still distinct from Abhinavagupta in his demonstration of the fact that *jñāna* is *viśayātmaka*. It is not to be forgotten that Abhinavagupta proves this contention by illustrating that knowledge of an external object would not be possible if God did not so manifest Himself through His wondrous powers. For Abhinavagupta, *sr̥ṣṭi* is *real* as a part of the mysterious unfolding of the omnipotent Lord (*Mālinivijayavārttika*, pt. 1, verse 204). Thus, Abhinavagupta's aim in destroying the *pramāṇas*, etc., is only to prove that all the phenomenal world is but an appearance or "*ābhāsa*" of Śiva through his *Śakti* (*Mālinivijayavārttika*, pt. 1, verses 605, 606). Śrī Harṣa's intentions, at least in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, would seem to me to be otherwise. He demonstrates only that *bheda* is in fact unreal, by showing that by the Naiyāyikas' own contentions, *advaitaśruti* must be uncontradicted. He draws no other conclusions from his destructive arguments than that the existence of the world as perceived and as explained by his opponents is logically untenable. This difference between Śrī Harṣa and Abhinavagupta is largely that between a *vaiṭaṇḍika* and a *vādin*; Śrī Harṣa here has no *siddhānta* to prove, whereas Abhinavagupta clearly desires to establish his own characteristic position.

Perhaps nothing better exemplifies their point of divergence than the following two passages: *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, p. 104 Sam, and *Mālinivijayavārttika*, śloka 627 ff. In both, a *pūrvapakṣa* inquires why it is that only non-difference is admitted and not difference as well. Śrī Harṣa replies that this is because difference is "*niṣpramāṇika*", contradicted by reason. Abhinavagupta replies, "*Seyaṃ badhiragoṣṭhīṣu gītavādyaparrocanaḥ. na hyadvayaṃ dvayāveśabādhenaśmābhīr ucyate. Tvatpakṣopagamo hyeṣa syāt. Dvayaṃ tad dhi susphūṭam. Idam dvaitam, idam na, tad idam ca dvayādvayaṃ iti yatra samaṃ bhāti, tad advayaṃ udāhṛtam*". The *pūrvapakṣa* has misunderstood his intentions. It is not that non-difference is established by the refutation of difference; this would be tantamount to an admission of the same. (For if one were to prove non-difference *y* by denying *x*, difference as it appears apart from cognition, then that *y* as the absence of *x* would be dependent on its *pratiyogin* and *advaitabhaṅga* would result. Compare *Mālinivijayavārttika*, pt. 2, verse 154, p. 118.) *Advaita* is only that place where all cognitions meet, the unbounded consciousness, Śiva, as is proved by the demonstration of *jñāna* as *sarvamaya* and *sarva* as *jñānamaya*. For these reasons I would suggest that if Śrī Harṣa does use Abhinavagupta as a source, then he has indeed removed the original arguments from their context and employed them for his own purposes, much as he elsewhere quotes Kumārila in a meaning far different from what that author had intended (pp. 23, 337 Sam).

<sup>163</sup> This reinterpretation has been partially explained in the immediately preceding note. Vacaspati Miśra's overall intention in the *Bhāmātī* is to show that there is no contradiction between two things which exist on altogether different planes of reality. Śrī Harṣa here demonstrates that there can be no contradiction when the cognition which is to be contradicted is valid, and the cognition which is to contradict is invalid. This is but further proof of his disavowal of the theory of three levels of reality, and is in full accordance with our in-

terpretation of Śrī Harṣa's *saṃvṛtisattva* as *sattvajñāna*. With Śrī Harṣa's present insistence that valid cognition cannot be contradicted by error compare the *upamāna* in the *Naiṣ-adhīyacarita*, 17.184, "*Sā vinītātmā Bhaimī vyarthānarthagrahair aho katham bhavad-vidhair bādhyā pramitir vibhramair iva*".

<sup>164</sup> The use of the term "*paramārtha*" in the compound "*paramārthaśūktimati*" (p. 119 Sam) supports the contention that Śrī Harṣa employs this term to mean no more than "*pramāṇasiddha*".

<sup>165</sup> The commentators miss the point of Śrī Harṣa's reply. *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 218, proposes the *vikalpa*, "Is this knowledge of difference false or true? In the first case there is no *bādhyabādhakabhāva*. The second case is also not possible, for difference is imagined." Such a reply on the part of Śrī Harṣa is incorrect. Difference is false because it is contradicted by scripture, but the *pūrvapakṣa* has just urged here that scripture will not give rise to any valid cognition at all. Śrī Harṣa would thus be disregarding the very objection his opponent has made; the point of that objection is that if *śruti* does not give rise to knowledge how can it be said that difference is false and thereby incapable of being proved? The exchange of words would be something like the following: "*Śruteḥ pramā notpadyata upajīvyabādhat*". "*Śruteḥ pramotpadyata eva. Tatpramayā bhedasya mithyātvadarśanāt*". The reply is guilty of *anyonyāśraya*: *bhedasya mithyātve siddhe, śruteḥ pramotpattum alam; śrutijanyapramāyām ca bhedasya mithyātvam siddhyate*. The interpretation given in the translation avoids any such fault.

Śaṅkara Mīśra, p. 121 (Sam), does not really explain the argument, and Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 244–245, offers another interpretation. To avoid *parasparāśraya* in Śrī Harṣa's reply he suggests that *bheda* is otherwise contradicted, perhaps by the faults of *mānameyabhāva*, and not by scripture. Thus *bheda* must be false. *Advaita* is not so contradicted and so it must be admitted to be "*paramārthika*". If this is not accepted he adds, the opponent will be guilty of *parasparāśraya*. This interpretation seems weak; it must here be assumed that a knowledge of *advaita* then comes not from the scriptures but from some other means. This is in fact contradictory to the opening statement of section three of the introduction, p. 80 (Sam), "*śrutir evādvaite pramāṇam iti brūmaḥ*." One should not say at this juncture that *advaita* being nothing more than the very essence of knowledge is in reality self-proved. The opponent does not agree to this and it is for his purpose that proof is required. It might be possible to urge that "*bhedakhaṇḍanād abhedat siddhyate*" and so *advaitajñāna* need not be *śrutijanya*. This also seems premature; *anyonyābhāva* remains to be discussed again and the fourth *pariccheda* likewise resumes the attack on *bheda*. I would thus not accept Vāradapaṇḍita's methods of avoiding the *anyonyāśraya* to which *Vidyāsāgarī*'s explanation leads.

<sup>166</sup> One might supply here "*viśayasambandhitā*" taking *janyatā* as an *upalakṣaṇa*. The knowledge arising from scriptures is inconsistent not only as a product of given causes, but also as a knowledge aware of an object other than itself, but to which it must somehow be related.

<sup>167</sup> This image of truth as a *cintāmaṇi* or wishing jewel seems very common in both Śrī Harṣa and the Kashmir Śaivaites. Compare *Mrgendratāntra*, p. 31, and *Stavacintāmaṇi*,

*śloka* 26, p. 34. I would take “*āpaneyā*” as “*anyathā prāpaṇīyā*”, meaning destroy, and not simply as “*prāpaṇīyā*” as *Vidyāsāgarī* suggests, p. 224, with an unspoken objection that if such knowledge can be gained by reasoning, then the scriptures would not be required. There is no hint in the text of any such objection. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 251, states, “*āpaneyeti chandasād dīrghaḥ*”. He also gives *Vidyāsāgarī*’s suggestion, “*prāpaṇīyā*”, and adds that in this case the letter “e” must be considered as an archaic substitute for “i.” In this interpretation, he takes the whole to mean that the knowledge of *advaita* is not attained by reasoning, whence it could be refuted by the same. This seems to me to be out of place. It has already been said that such a knowledge arises from scriptures alone.

Śaṅkara *Kāthakopaniṣadbhāṣya* suggests both the interpretation I have followed in the translation and that given by *Vidyāsāgarī* (*Kāthakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, p. 98).

<sup>168</sup> The verse is not without difficulties in interpretation. Both *Vidyāsāgara*, pp. 224–225, and Śaṅkara Miśra, pp. 124–125, understand that “*dr̥ṣṭaphala*” implies that *advaitajñāna* has both unseen fruits (release) and immediate or worldly gains. This is contradictory to all classic Vedānta assertions that *Brahmajñāna* is *sākṣānmokṣasādhana* and nothing else. (Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 74 on 1.1.4.) It also does violence to the standard interpretations of the term “*dr̥ṣṭaphala*” (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 355 on 2.1.4; p. 784 on 3.4.7; p. 788 on 3.4.15; p. 735 on 3.3.32; p. 810 on 3.4.38; p. 848 on 4.1.13). It is clear from the latter references that the fruit, *mokṣa*, can never be called *adr̥ṣṭa* or unseen. *Mokṣa* as *Brahmasvarūpa* is the object of immediate experience.

The interpretation in the translation substantially follows that of Varadapaṇḍita, p. 251. *Advaitajñāna* is *dr̥ṣṭaphala* for reasons: One, in that it consists of a correct and direct experience of an *adhiṣṭhāna*, which, it is commonly observed, destroys all ignorance of attributes therein superimposed, and two, in that it leads thus to a cognition of the oneness of the individual soul with Brahman. As Śrī Harṣa has pointed out, this oneness is nothing but non-dual, self-valid consciousness itself, which is never unknown for any individual. Thus, one may never doubt that as *advaitajñāna* leads to unperceived results there is the possibility that its results sometimes fail to arise. In every instance, those results are directly perceived. Varadapaṇḍita’s interpretation is far preferable in that it succeeds in those very cases in which *Vidyāsāgara* and Śaṅkara Miśra fail. It is in keeping with the accepted explanations of the term “*dr̥ṣṭaphala*” and would conform to the *Gītā* commentators’ insistence that “*mahābhaya*” is “*saṃsāra*”. Śaṅkara Miśra’s “*rājacauravyāghrādibhayāt*” seems mere imagination, unsupported by any text.

With the comment that the tendencies for *advaita* are a result of the Grace of the Lord should be compared the similar remark in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 552 on 2.3.41. The same concept is particularly emphasized in the school of Kashmiri Advaita. See *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarsinī* with *Bhāskari*, p. 44, and Abhinavagupta’s *Bodhipaṇḍitaśikā*, p. 15. The question of the source of this doctrine of “*śaktipāta*” with it related “*prahviḥhāva*” or complete submission to God, remains to be fully investigated. It is common to the Rāmānujas and the Śrī Kaṇṭha dualists as well as appearing in Kashmiri Advaita. Its importance in Kashmiri Advaita is well explained by the *Bodhipaṇḍitaśikā* passage cited above. Just as “*āvaraṇa*” is a function of *Īśvara*’s *svātantrya*, “*tirodhānaśakti*”, so is *mokṣa* but a function of His power, “*anugrahaśakti*”. All is thus in the hands of God. It might be noted that Śrī Harṣa was himself the author of a *Śivaśaktisiddhi*, according to his own statements in the *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, 18.181.

<sup>169</sup> *Vidyāsāgarī*, p. 226, is slightly confused by this verse. He suggests that without any prior consideration, *advaita* is said to be the meaning of the scriptures. On examination that *advaita* proves to be nothing more than *svaprakāśajñāna*, and stands self-valid. This is backwards. “*Bhūtvā*” with the continuative ending implies priority in time. Thus it is first *svaprakāśajñāna* and then “*vicārān nirvahate*”. “*Nirvahate*” can also mean “flow away from” (see translation) as well as “be accomplished” or “stand proved” as *Vidyāsāgarī* takes it. *Vidyāsāgarī*’s interpretation is untenable as it violates the implied time sequence.

Varadapaṇḍita, p. 252, seems to have the proper temporal relationship; however, he does not explain the phrase “*vicārān nirvahate*” correctly. He takes “*nirvahate*” as “*cid-vyatiरेकेṇ tan nāstīty arthaḥ*”. This leaves the word “*vicārāt*” unexplained and is really nothing but a repetition of the previous line of the verse.

<sup>170</sup> Śrī Harṣa here remarks that he has elsewhere described the joys of self-knowledge, in the *Naiṣadhiyacarita*, “*paramapurūṣastutisarga*”. There are some problems with this reference. Śrī Harṣa uses the past tense indicating the completion of that particular *sarga* at the time the statement in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* was made. To my knowledge, the only overt “*paramapurūṣastuti*” occurs in *sarga* 21; however, Śrī Harṣa himself supplies us with the information that the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is the “*sahaja*” of the sixth *sarga* of the *Naiṣadhiyacarita* (*Naiṣadhiyacarita*, 6.113). There are two possibilities; “*sahaja*” can mean either “brother” or more specifically “twin brother”. In the first case it need not imply that the *Khaṇḍana* was completed at the same time as the sixth *sarga* of the *Naiṣadhiya*, but only that it had already been conceived by the same author. (For such an interpretation of *sahaja* as meaning no more than “born of the same father” see *Naiṣadhiya*, 5.138.) It would thus be possible to understand by the “*paramapurūṣastuti*” *sarga* 21. Unfortunately, such an interpretation is still not free from difficulties, for the verses in *sarga* 21 are in the main praises of a deity and in no way portray the joy of knowing one’s identity with the highest soul.

In the second case, where “*sahaja*” is to be taken as “twin” it must be accepted that the *Khaṇḍana* was in fact finished when the sixth *sarga* reached its conclusion. The “*paramapurūṣastuti*” would have to refer to something in the first six chapters of Śrī Harṣa’s poem. This requires that these chapters be read as an allegory, with Nala as the soul, or *paramātman*, and Damayanti as the aspirant yearning for union with Brahma, and thus for *mokṣa*. Such an interpretation is not entirely unfounded. There are several indications that Nala is not to be regarded as an ordinary mortal. One may divide them into two groups: (A) Verses in which it is directly stated that Nala is the highest God, Śiva; and (B) Verses in which Nala is described with words which might apply equally well to Brahma, and those in which Damayanti’s approach to Nala is portrayed in the terms of the standard Vedānta methods of reaching oneness with the Ultimate Real. To the first group belong only a few verses: 1.6, 2.1, 2.6; to the second group definitely belong 1.8, 1.29, 1.35, 1.40, 1.124, 2.13, 3.30, 3.81, 3.82, 3.105, 5.134, 6.8, 6.48, 6.51, 6.52, 6.53, 6.54, 6.96; of which 1.29, 1.35, 1.40, 3.81, 3.82; 6.8, 6.48, 6.51–54 are particularly significant.

In verse 1.29 Nala is described as perceptible through *bhāvanā*, which is one of the standard methods of knowing the soul (*Gītā*, 2.66). In 1.35, it is said that his name, like that of the Lord engenders great joy, and in 1.40 it is asserted that Nala is revealed to Damayanti only in deep sleep, not in discursive thought, nor in sense perception. This is important. The Vedāntins hold that the highest soul is ordinarily experienced in its pure form only in the third

state, *śuṣupti*. In the waking hours and in dreams, the powers of *avidyā* still work, formulating false cognitions of different objects. It is interesting to note that in the immediately preceding verse Śrī Harṣa has said that Damayanti dreams of Nala as her husband. This is clearly *bhrānti*. Here in the state of *śuṣupti* Nala is the “*mahad rahasyam*”, the great secret, concealed from her at all other times. This could well imply that he is her *paramātman*. (Compare, “*satā somya sampanno bhavati*”, *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, 6.81; Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.7; 3.2.8.) In 3.81, Damayanti tells Nala’s messenger, the *haṁsa*, that she desires no one but Nala, whom she describes as “*sakalatrilokīsāra*”, “*nidhi*” and “*padmamukha*”. The first term is a perfect epithet of Brahma (cf. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.14, pp. 372–383). Brahma alone is the essence of all things; they do not exist apart from it and their appearance as finite and distinct forms is unsupportable by any logic. Brahma is also the *nidhi* or the place where all things come to rest. (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 3.1; 3.6, etc). For another explanation of Brahma as “*nidhāna*” see also *Gītā*, 9.18, with commentary of Śaṅkara, p. 428, and for the first see *Gītā*, 11.18, p. 475; 11.37, p. 488. “*Padmamukha*” might correspond to the common appellation “*abjayoni*” (*Amarakośa*, p. 12, 1.17). In 3.82 it is remarked that Nala is known by *darśanaśrvaṇa*, *manana*, and *īśvarānugraha*. There is no question that these are the means to know Brahma.

Moving to the sixth *sarga*, it would seem to me that 6.8 can also be read as affirmation of the fact that Nala is not just the Nāyikā’s lover, but also her real soul. The verse, “*citraṁ tadā kuṇḍinaveśiṇaḥ sā nalasya mūrtir vavṛte na drśyā; babhūva tac citrataraṁ tathāpi viśvaikadrśyaiva yad asya mūrtiḥ*”, literally states that it was a wonder that Nala’s form was not perceptible to the inhabitants of Kuṇḍina, and even more so since that form is “*viśvaikadrśyā*”, the key phrase. The commentator takes it simply as *drśyā* = *sundarā*; “since it is the finest looking of all”. He notes that this is an example of the figure of speech, *virodhābhāsa*, or apparent contradiction. The *virodha*, *drśyā*/*adrśyā*, is removed by assuming that *drśyā* does not mean visible, but handsome. I would suggest another interpretation, in full accordance with the doctrines of the Vedānta, particularly as they are expressed in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*. Nala as the *paramātman* is “*viśvaikadrśyā*” the only really perceptible entity amongst all the things in the world which we mistakenly assume are perceived. A brief explanation may help to clarify this point. Vimuktātman in the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, 1.125; 1.137, has a striking demonstration of the fact that no insentient object can ever be known. The purpose of knowledge is to remove ignorance, *avidyā*; *avidyā*, in turn, functions to obscure awareness. Since that which has no awareness or sentience needs no further obscuration, *avidyā* cannot be associated with any *jaḍavastu*. This makes knowledge of the insentient impossible. Only the soul as obscured by ignorance is really “*drśyā*” or “*prameya*”, etc. This is the great wonder of Nala’s being invisible through the charm of Indra; for in fact, Nala is the only thing which is logically visible! A similar reference appears in 6.48. Damayanti cannot see Nala as he is “*adrśyā*” I would interpret this along the same lines; his *adrśyatva* is not only by reason of the magic charm, but also by reason of his very nature as the *paramātman*. The *Iṣṭasiddhikāra*, having shown that only the soul is *drśyā*, further qualifies this statement, with the remark that this “*drśyatva*” is not to be taken to mean “*drksambandhitva*”, for the relationship “*mānameyabhāva*” is illogical (compare Śrī Harṣa, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, pp. 126, 141 Chow). Thus the *ātman* is *drśyā* only in a special sense, as *svataḥ siddha*. In the etymological meaning of this term as “*drśīkarma*” the highest soul is always *adrśyā* (see also *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, 3.42; *Kenopaniṣad*, 2.3). Verses 6.51–54 continue this allegory, and I would further propose that these might be the very passages to which Śrī Harṣa here refers. Nala



and Damayanti finally find each other. In verse 51, Damayanti reaches out to hold Nala. Unable to distinguish his real form from his imagined aspects, she searches for him everywhere, though he stands immediately before her. This is but a rephrasal of the standard Vedānta description of man's search for his soul. Like the woman who forgets the ornament around her neck and looks for it elsewhere, so do people, unaware of the soul as their innermost reality, look for the truth in distant places (*Kaṇṭhacāmikaranyāya*). The same imagery is present in verse 52. The direct meaning of the first line of this verse is that Damayanti, touching Nala, does not realize it is he; Nala is still invisible (*"sparsaṃ tam asya adhigatāpi Bhaimī mene punar bhrāntim adarśanena"*). In its second meaning, it could also imply that although the aspirant is always aware of his soul (the soul is known in every cognition, in all three states, see *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, p. 44 Sam; *Bhāmatī*, on 2.2.28, p. 475, and *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.1.1, pp. 42–43), he still thinks that he does not know it as he clings to wrong doctrines (*adarśanena* = *viparītadarśanena*). In verse 53, Śrī Harṣa repeats the same idea, adding only *"sparsātiharṣādṛtasatyamatya"*, on one level meaning that Damayanti did think that the Nala she touched was real, because of the great joy which that touch gave her, and on another, perhaps that she was attendant to the right doctrine, *"sparsātiharṣāya"*, in order to gain that great happiness following upon the union with the soul. Verse 54 seems to be imperfect; *ātithyakaram* does not mean *"saukhyakaram"* as the *Naiṣadhiyaprakāśa* states. None the less, the same concept is apparent. *"Sarvatra saṃvādyam"* is the *ātman*, and it is also *"param"*. In addition, with the phrase, *"kelirasāt"* should be compared Śrī Harṣa's statement, in the *Khaṇḍana*, *"avidyāvilāsālāso"* (p. 125 Sam), Śrī Harṣa there tells the Naiyāyika that even he, absorbed in the play of his ignorance, will some day know the truth. Damayanti, as well, though presently too amused in the play of her ignorance to cease from embracing Nala's imagined forms, will soon know his true essence from his likeness at her *svayamvara*. In verse 55 the joy of Damayanti's union with Nala is described in terms of "waves of ambrosia". Compare the *Khaṇḍana*, p. 125 Sam, *"mākṣikarasātiśāyī"*, *"ātmatattvāmṛtasarasi"*.

I suspect that if such a reading of the *Naiṣadhīya* as an allegory of the devotee's union with the soul is correct, then the allegory must go far deeper than these selected examples. It might be noted that none of the commentators is aware of the discrepancy in the present reference, nor does any one attempt to identify the *"paramapuruṣastuti"*. Among the modern writers, M. Kṛṣṇnamachariar (*History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, p. 179 of reprinted edition) does identify the *"paramapuruṣastuti"* with *sarga* 21 and Nilakamala Bhattacharya ('The Naiṣadha and Śrī Harṣa,' *Sarasvatī Bhavana Series*, III, pp. 166–167) maintains that because of such inconsistencies the concluding verses in the *Naiṣadha* must be spurious. Sanskrit literature in fact provides examples of *mahākāvya* in which similar verses have been added on to the end of each canto. Cf. Arisimha's *Sukṛtasamkīrtana* to which Amaraśaṅkara added the closing verses, and the closing verses to Udayaprabhāsūri's *Dharmābhyaudaya*. (B. Sandesara, *Literary Circle of Mahāmāyā Vastupāla*, Singhi Jain Series, vol. 3, pp. 63–66; 103.)

<sup>171</sup> This verse is quoted in the *Laghucandrikā*, p. 205.

<sup>172</sup> With this comment of Śrī Harṣa, that some things can only be refuted by arguing that they are the creation of the Lord, compare the remarks of Kumārila in the *Ślokovārttika*, *Śūnyavāda*, *śloka* 219, p. 331, and *Arthāpatti*, *śloka* 80, p. 470. See also Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, p. 510, on 2.3.7.

<sup>173</sup> See the *Tīkā*, p. 27 K; 40 N.E., for a Naiyāyika example.

<sup>174</sup> The *Mahābhāṣya* is a perfect example of this practice.

<sup>175</sup> Śaṅkara Mīśra, and after him *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, ms. p. 71a. Varadapaṇḍita, p. 260, simply says “*prabandhāntare*”. This makes me suspicious of Śaṅkara Mīśra’s identification. Varadapaṇḍita seems to be the earlier writer, and elsewhere he does give the text by name.

<sup>176</sup> The commentators do not seem to understand Śrī Harṣa’s refutation of Udayana. *Vidyāsāgarī*, pp. 234–235, offers as a fourth type of debate the following:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. <i>A</i> : <i>Svapakṣasādhana</i> ;<br><i>B</i> - <i>pakṣadūṣaṇa</i>                        | 1. <i>B</i> : <i>Svapakṣasādhana</i> ;<br><i>A</i> - <i>pakṣadūṣaṇa</i> |
| 2. <i>A</i> : <i>B</i> - <i>pakṣadūṣaṇa</i> and repetition of<br><i>svapakṣasādhana</i> above. |   |

For one, this violates even Udayana’s conception of a *jalpa*. In such a scheme, *A* never removes the faults which *B* urges against him! Secondly the suggestion that a fourth type of debate be conceived solely on the strength of a repetition of a prior statement is next to nonsense. Udayana might justifiably retort that it is not possible for Śrī Harṣa to urge that similarly two *jalpas* would have to be considered another debate, for the two cases are essentially different. Udayana’s formulated sequence involves a new and purposeful argument at every step. *Vidyāsāgarī*’s scheme involves only repetition. It cannot be argued as he does that such a repetition is necessary, by “*sthūnanikhanananyāya*” – to drill the point into his opponent’s head. One assumes that his opponent is an intelligent and quick witted individual!

Varadapaṇḍita, pp. 260–261, does not supply any information on Śrī Harṣa’s reasoning. He merely states that there is no difference in format or in result between *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. This is contrary to Udayana’s statements in the *Parīśuddhi*. Neither the anonymous commentator, 9a–9b, nor Paramānanda Śūri, 7a, explains the passage at hand. The sheer variety of explanations and their incorrectness lead me to believe that the text in which the original argument was stated must have been lost at an early date and thus unavailable to any of our commentators.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT SOURCES

- Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, ed. with *Sphuṭārthavyākhyā* of Yaśomitra by N. N. Law. Calcutta Oriental Series, 31 (Calcutta, 1949–1957).
- Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, ed. with *Bālabodhinī* of Dr. Yogendranath Bagchi by Dr. Sitanushekhara Bagchi (Benaras: Tārā Publications, 1971).
- Āgamaviḍambana* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series (Darbhanga, 1970).
- Akalaṅkagranthatrayī* of Akalaṅka, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. Singhi Jain Series, 10 (Śāntiniketan, 1936).
- Amarakośa*, ed. with commentary of Bhānujādīkṣita, by Śivadattakovidā (Bombay: Nirṇayaśāgara Press, 1889).
- Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, ed. Jugakiśor Mukhtār (Benaras: Vīrasevā Mandir, 1967).
- Āptaparīkṣā* of Vidyānanda, ed. Bihārīlal Kathaner Jain (Bombay: Vaibhava Press, 1930).
- Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya, ed. R. P. Kangle (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1960–1965).
- Āryāsaptasatī* of Govardhana, ed. with Anantapaṇḍita's *Vyaṅgyārthadīpanā* by Paṇḍit Durgāprasāda and Kāśinātha Pāṇḍuraṅga. Kāvyaṃālā, 1 (Bombay, 1895).
- Aṣṭasatī* Akalaṅka, ed. Gajadharlal Jain. Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā, vol. 7–8 (Benaras, 1914).
- Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānanda, ed. Gajadharlal Jain. Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā, vol. 7–8 (Benaras, 1914).
- Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana, ed. with *Nārāyaṇīya* by Paṇḍit Dhundhirāja Śāstri. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 463–464 (Benaras, 1940).
- Bhagavadgītā*, ed. with Ānandagiri's *Śaṅkarabhāṣyavivarāṇa*, Nilakaṇṭha's *Nilakaṇṭhī*, Dhanapati's *Utkarṣinī*, Śrīdhara Svāmī's *Subodhinī*, Abhinavagupta's *Gītārthasaṃ-*

*graha*, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*, and Dharmadatta Jha's *Gūḍhārthatattvāloka* by V. L. S. Pansikar (Bombay: Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1912–1936).

———, ed. with Rāmakaṇṭha's *Sarvatobhadra* by Paṇḍit Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, LXIV (Bombay, 1943).

*Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Miśra, see *Brahmasūtra*.

*Bodhapañcadaśikā* of Abhinavagupta, ed. with commentary of Haribhadra Śāstrī by Jagaddharajāḍu Śāstrī. Kashmir Sanskrit Text Series, 76–77 (Bombay, 1947).

*Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva, ed. with *Pañjikā* of Prajñākaramati by P. L. Vaidya. Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, 12 (Darbhanga, 1960).

*Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra, ed. with Śaṃkhaṇḍi's commentary by S. Kuppuswami Śāstrī. Madras Government Oriental Series, 4 (Madras, 1937).

*Brahmasūtras*, ed. with *Śaṃkarabhāṣya*, *Ratnaprabhā* of Govindānanda, *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Miśra and *Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagiri by Rāmcandra Śāstrī Dhupakar and Mahādeva Śāstrī Bākre (Bombay: Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1904).

*Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara, ed. with *Rjvivimālā* of Śalikanātha Miśra by Chinnaswāmi Śāstrī. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 69 (Benaras, 1929–1933).

*Dharmottarapradīpa*, see *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.

*Haracaritacintāmaṇi* of Jayadratha, ed. Paṇḍit Śivadatta. Kavyamālā, 61 (Bombay, 1897).

*Hetubinduṭīkā* of Arcaṭa, ed. with *Āloka* of Durveka Miśra by Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Jinavijayaji. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 113 (Baroda, 1949).

*Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, ed. Mysore Hirianna. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 65 (Baroda, 1933).

*Īśvarapratyabhijñānāvimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta, ed. with *Bhāskari* by K. A. Subramania Iyer and Dr. K. C. Pandey. Prince of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts, No. 70 (Allahabad, 1938).

*Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivṛtivismarśinī* of Abhinavagupta, ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, LX (Bombay, 1938).

*Kāṭhapaniṣad*, ed. with *Śaṃkarabhāṣya* by Dr. E. Roer. Bibliotheca Indica, 7 (Calcutta, 1850).

*Kāvyaṇuśāsana* of Hemacandra, ed. R. C. Parikh (Bombay: Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, 1938).

*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* of Śrī Harṣa, ed. with Ānandapūrṇa's *Khaṇḍanaphakki-kavibhañjana* by L. S. Dravida Śāstri. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 21 (Benaras, 1904–1914). Cited as *Vidyāsāgarī*.

———, ed. with Citsukha's *Bhāvadīpikā*, Śaṃkara Miśra's *Ānandavardhana*, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Bhūṣāmaṇi*, Pragalbha Miśra's *Darpana* and editor's *Ratnamālikā* by S. N. Śukla. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 82 (Benaras, 1936). Cited as Chow.

———, ed. with Hindi Commentary by Candraprasāda Śukla (Benaras: Acyuta Granthamālā, 1928).

———, ed. with editor's *Śāradā* by Śaṃkara Caitanya Bhārati (Benaras: Viśvanāth Press, 1938–1940, 1945).

———, ed. with Śaṃkara Miśra and Hindi commentary *Tattvabodhinī* of Svāmī Hanumāndās Śaṭśāstri by Dr. Navikanta Jha. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 197 (Benaras, 1970). Cited as Sam.

*Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana, ed. Jitendra S. Jetly. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 154 (Baroda, 1971).

*Kīrtikaumudī* of Someśvara, ed. Puṇyavijayasūri. Singhi Jain Series, 32 (Bombay, 1961).

*Lakṣaṇamālā* of Udayana, ed. with editor's commentary by Śaśināth Jha. Mithila Institute Series, 13 (Darbhanga, 1964).

*Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana, ed. with Keśavabhaṭṭa's *Prakāśa* by Śaśināth Jha. Mithila Institute Series, 14 (Darbhanga, 1963).

*Mādhyamikaśāstra* of Nāgārjuna, ed. with Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* by P. L. Vaidya. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, 10 (Mithila, 1960).

*Mālinivijayavārttika* of Abhinavagupta, ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstri. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, XXXII (Bombay, 1921).

*Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa, ed. and trans. by C. Kunhan Rājā and S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri (Adyar, 1933).

*Mīmāṃsakośa*, ed. Kevalānandasarasvatī (Satara: Prājña Pāṭhaśālā, 1952–1966).

*Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* of Āpadeva, ed. and trans. by Franklin Edgerton (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929).

- Moharājaparājaya* of Yaśaḥpāla, ed. Muni Caturvijaya. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 9 (Baroda, 1918).
- Mrgendratāntra*, ed. with *Nārāyaṇakaṇṭhāvṛti*, by Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, L (Bombay, 1930).
- Mudritakumudacandraprakaraṇa* of Yaśaścandra (Benaras: Candraprabhā Press, 1906).
- Naiṣadhacarita* of Śrī Harṣa, ed. with Nārāyaṇa's *Naiṣadhaprakāśa* by Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍit Śivadatta (Bombay: Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1928).
- Nayaviveka* of Bhavanātha Mīśra, ed. with Ravideva's *Vivekatattva* by S. K. Rāmanāth Śāstrī, Madras University Sanskrit Series, 12 (Madras, 1937).
- Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, ed. by G. S. Tailanga. Vizianagara Sanskrit Series, 9 (Benaras, 1896).
- , ed. by Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, 20 (Darbhanga, 1967). Cited as *Nyāyabhāṣya* N.E.
- Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* of Udyottakara, ed. Vindhyeśvarīprasād Dvivedin. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 33 (Benaras, 1916). Cited *Nyāyavārttika* K.
- , ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, 20 (Darbhanga, 1967). Cited as *Nyāyavārttika* N.E.
- Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikatātparyatīkā* of Vācaspati Mīśra, ed. Rājeśvara Śāstrī Dravid. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 24 (Benaras. 1925). Cited *Ṭīkā* K.
- , ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, 20 (Darbhanga, 1967). Cited *Ṭīkā* N.E.
- Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikatātparyatīkāparīśuddhi* of Udayana, ed. with Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa*, by Vindhyeśvarīprasād Dvivedin. Bibliotheca Indica, 205 (Calcutta, 1914). Cited *Parīśuddhi* O.E.
- , ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, 20 (Darbhanga, 1967). Cited *Parīśuddhi* N.E.
- Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikatīkāvivaraṇapañjikā* of Aniruddha, ed. Anantal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, 19 (Darbhanga, 1969).
- Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, ed. Swāmī Yogīndrānanda (Benaras, 1968).
- Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmakīrti, ed. P. Peterson. Bibliotheca Indica, 128 (Calcutta, 1889, 1929).

———, ed. with *Dharmottarapradīpa* of Durveka Miśra by Paṇḍit Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 2 (Patna, 1955).

*Nyāyikalikā* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. Gaṅgānāth Jha. Prince of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Texts, 17 (Bombay, 1925).

*Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara, ed. Durgadhara Jha Śarma. Gaṅgānāth Jha Granthamālā, 1 (Benaras, 1963).

*Nyāyakaṇikā* of Vācaspati Miśra. See *Vidhiviveka*.

*Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. Manikacandra Digambara Granthamālā, 38 (Benaras, 1938); 39 (Benaras, 1939).

*Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana, ed. with Varadarāja's *Bodhinī*, Meghaṭhakkura's *Prakāśikā*, Rucidatta's *Makaranda*, Dharmadatta's *Ṭippanī* and Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa* by Padmaprasādopādhyāya. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 30 (Benaras, 1950). Cited as *Kusumāñjali*.

———, ed. with editor's *Kusumāñjalivistara* by T. Vīrarāghavācārya (Tirupati, 1941).

*Nyāyalīlāvati* of Vallabha, ed. with commentaries of Vardhamāna, Śaṅkara Miśra, Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura, by Paṇḍit Harihara Śāstrī and Dhundhirāja Śāstrī. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 64 (Benaras, 1934).

*Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. by S. N. Śukla. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 106 (Benaras, 1934–1936).

*Nyāyaratnākara* of Parthasārthi Miśra. See *Ślokaṇvarttika*.

*Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena, ed. with *Vivṛti* of Siddharṣi by A. N. Upadhye (Bombay: Jain Sāhitya Vikās Mandal, 1971).

*Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda, ed. with Citsukha's *Tātparyapradīpikā*, Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa*, Nṛsimhāśrama's *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, Ātmasvarūpa's *Prabodhapariśodhinī*, and Vijñānātman's *Tātparyārthadyotini*, by S. Śrīrāma Śāstrī and S. R. Kṛṣṇamūrti Śāstrī, Madras Government Oriental Series, 155 (Madras, 1958).

*Parātrīṃśikā* of Abhinavagupta, ed. Mukunda Rāma Śāstrī. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, XVIII (Bombay, 1918).

*Pavanadūta* of Dhoyika, ed. Śrī Cintāharaṇacakraṇvartīśarma. Sanskrit Sāhitya Parishad, 13 (Bombay, N.D.).

- Prabandhacintāmaṇi* of Merutuṅga, ed. Jinavijaya Muni. Singhi Jain Series, 1 (Śāntiniketan, 1933).
- Prabandhakośa* of Rājaśekharaśūri, ed. Jinavijaya Muni. Singhi Jain Series, 56 (Śāntiniketan, 1931).
- Prabhākaravijaya* of Nandisvara, ed. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī and Rāmanāth Śāstrī. Sanskrit Sāhitya Parishad Series, 11 (Calcutta, N.D.).
- Prabhāvākacarita* of Prabhācandra, ed. Jinavijaya Muni. Singhi Jain Series, 13 (Śāntiniketan, 1940).
- Prakaranapañcikā* of Śalikanātha Miśra, ed. with *Nyāyasiddhi* of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, by A. Subrahmanya Śāstrī. Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series, No. 4 (Benaras, 1961).
- Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra, ed. and trans. by Satkari Mookerjee and Nathhmal Tatia. Prācya Bhāratī Series, II (Benaras, 1970).
- Pramāṇanayatattvālokaṇkāra* of Vādidevasūri. Yaśovijayagranthamālā, 1 (Benaras, 1867).
- Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, ed. and trans. by Masaaki Hattori. Harvard Oriental Series, 47 (Cambridge, 1968).
- Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, ed. with Manorathanandin's *Vivṛti* by Swāmī Dwārikadās Śāstrī. Bauddha Bhāratī Series, 3 (Benaras, 1968).
- Pramāṇavārttikālokaṇkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, ed. Rahul Sāṃkṛtyāyana. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 1 (Patna, 1953).
- Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa* of Prabhācandra, ed. Mahendra Kumar Śāstrī, Second edition (Bombay: Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1941).
- Praśastapādabhāṣya* ed. with Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavati*, Padmanābha Miśra's *Setu* and Jagadīśa's *Sūkti* by Gopināth Kavirāj and Dundhirāj Śāstrī. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 61 (Benaras, 1924–1931).
- Purāṇanaprabandhasaṃgraha*, ed. Jinavijaya Muni. Singhi Jain Series, 2 (Śāntiniketan, 1936).
- Rājatarāṅginī* of Kalhaṇa, ed. V. Viśvabandhu (Hoshiarpur: Viśveśvarānand Vedic Research Institute, 1963).



*Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, III (Patna, 1957).

*Śābarabhāṣya*, ed. Maheśchandra Nyāyaratna. Bibliotheca Indica, 965, 986, 1017, 1055, 1091, 1159 (Calcutta, 1873).

———, ed. Ratnagopālabhaṭṭa (Benaras: Vidyāvilās Press, 1910).

*Sambandhavārttika* of Sureśvarācārya, ed. with Ānandagiri's *Śāstraprakāśikā*, by K. S. Agase. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, 16 (Poona, 1892–1894).

*Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, ed. with Raghunātha's *Sāṃkhyatattvavilāsa* by Rameshcandra. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 15 (Calcutta, 1935).

*Sanmatitarkaṭikā* of Abhayadevasūri, ed. Muni Śrīśivānanda. Jaina Grantha-prakāśakasabhā, 29 (Ahmedabad, 1940).

*Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Vidyāranya, ed. V. S. Abhyankar. Bhandarkar Oriental Series, 1 (Poona, 1924).

*Sarvārthsiddhi* of Pūjyapāda, ed. with editor's Hindi commentary by Phulcandra. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtideva Jainagranthamālā, 13 (Benaras, 1955).

*Śāstradīpikā* of Parthasārathi Miśra, ed. with *Mayūkhmālā* of Somanātha, and *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī* of Rāmakṛṣṇa by Dharmadattasūri (Bombay: Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1915).

*Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, ed. with Brahmānanda Sarasvatī's *Nyāyaratnāvalī* by Harihara Śāstri. Advaita Mañjarī Series, 3 (Kumbakonam, 1893).

*Siddhāntaśaṣaṃgraha* of Appayadīkṣita, ed. with Kṛṣṇānanda's *Kṛṣṇālakāra*, by V. S. Aiyar. Advaita Mañjarī Series, 5 (Kumbakonam, 1894).

*Siddhāntamuktāvalī* ed. with Narasiṃha's *Prabhā*, Dinākara's *Dinākarī*, Rāmarudra's *Rāmarudrī*, Gaṅgāramabhaṭṭa's *Ṭippaṇa* and editor's *Mañjuṣā* by C. Śaṃkara Rāma Śāstri. Śrī Bālaṃanorama Series, 6 (Madras, 1923).

*Siddhitraya* of Yamuna, ed. Rama Miśra Śāstri. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 10 (Benaras, 1900).

*Siddhitraya* of Utpaladeva ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstri. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, XXXIV (Bombay, 1921).

*Siddhiviniścaya* of Akalaṅka, ed. with auto-commentary, *Ṭikā* of Anantavīrya and editor's

- Āloka* by Mahendra Kumar. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtideva Jainagranthamālā, 22 (Benaras, 1956–1959).
- Ślokaavārttika* of Kumārila, ed. with Parthasārathi Miśra's *Nyāyaratnākara*, by Rāmasāstri Tailaṅga. Chowkambha Sanskrit Series, 11 (Benaras, 1898). Parts I, II, reprinted, N.D.
- Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānujācārya, ed. V. S. Abhyankar (Poona, 1904). Reprinted, N.D.
- Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* of Maṅkhaka, ed. with the commentary of Jonarāja by Paṇḍita Durgāprasāda and Kāśinātha Paṇḍuraṅga Paraba. Kāvya-mālā, 3 (Bombay, 1887).
- Stavacintāmaṇi* of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, ed. with commentary of Kṣemarāja by Paṇḍit Mukunda Rāma Śāstri. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, X (Bombay, 1918).
- Syādvādaratnākara* of Vādidēvasūri, ed. Motilal Ladhaji. Arhatamataprabhākara, 4 (Poona, 1926–1930).
- Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta, ed. with Jayaratha's commentary by Mukunda Rāma Śāstri, and Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstri. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, 23, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 47, 52, 58, 59 (Bombay, 1918–1938).
- Tantrasāra* of Abhinavagupta, ed. Mukunda Rāma Śāstri. Kashmir Sanskrit Texts Series, XVII (Bombay, 1918).
- Tantravārttika* of Kumārila, ed. with Kumārila's *Tupptika*, Vaidyanāth Prabhā and Murāri Miśra's *Aṅgatvanirukti* by Śubha Śāstri. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, 97 (Poona, 1929–1933).
- Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, ed. Narayan Nathji Kulkarni. Poona Oriental Series (Poona, 1953).
- Tarkabhāṣā* of Moksākaragupta, ed. Embar Kṛṣṇamācārya. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 44 (Baroda, 1942).
- Tārkikarakṣā* of Varadarāja, ed. with commentary of Mallināthasūri, *Jñānapūrṇa* by Vindhyeśvarīprasād Dvivedin (Benaras, 1903). Reprinted from *Paṇḍit*.
- Tattvārthādhiḡamasūtra* of Umāsvāti, ed. with Bhaṭṭākalaṅka's *Tattvārtharājavārttika*, by Gajadharlal Jain. Singhi Jain Series, 4 (Śāntiniketan, 1913).
- Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, ed. with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* by Svāmī Dwārikadās Śāstri. Bauddha Bhāratī Series, I (Benaras, 1968).
- Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, and R. C. Parikh. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 87 (Baroda, 1940).

*Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti, ed. with commentary of Śāntarakṣita by Rahul Sāmkṛtyāyana. Appendix to *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vols. XXI, XXII (December, 1935).

*Vaiśeṣikadarśana* ed. with Candrānanda's *Vṛti* by Jain Muni Jambuvijayaji. Gaekwad Oriental Series, 136 (Baroda, 1961).

*Vedārthasaṃgraha* of Rāmānuja, ed. J. A. B. van Buitenen. Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute Monograph Series, 16 (Poona, 1956).

*Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra, ed. with *Nyāyakaṇikā* of Vācaspati Miśra, by Rāma Śāstrī Tailāṅga. Reprint from *Pañḍit* (Benaras, 1907).

*Vigrahavyāvartini* of Nāgārjuna, ed. P. L. Vaidya. Buddhist Texts Series, 10 (Darbhanga, 1960).

*Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa, ed. with commentaries of Rājānaka Ruyyaka and Śāhityācārya, by Madhusūdana Miśra. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 121 (Benaras, 1936).

*Vyomavati* of Vyomaśiva. See *Prasastapādabhāṣya* above.

*Yogadarśana* of Patañjali, ed. with *Tattvavaiśārādī* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Bhāṣya* of Vyāsa and *Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhikṣu by Nārāyaṇamiśra (Benaras: Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśan, 1971).

## SECONDARY SOURCES

Bhattacharya, D. C., *History of Navya Nyāya in Mithila*, Mithila Institute Series (Darbhanga, 1958).

———, 'Udayana and Śrī Harṣa', *Siddha Bhāratī*, vol. II, pp. 138–144 (Hoshiarpur, 1950).

———, 'More Light on Sanskrit Literature in Bengal', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XXII (1946), pp. 131–149.

Bhattacharya, Nilakamala, 'The Naiśadha and Śrī Harṣa', *Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, III, Bombay (1924), pp. 159–194.

Handiqui, K.K., *The Naiśadhacarita of Śrī Harṣa*, Punjab Oriental Series, 23 (Lahore, 1934).

Kṛṣṇnamachariar, R., *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1970).

- Lorenzen, David, *The Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas* (University of California, 1972).
- Majumdar, R. C., *History of Bengal, Vol. I* (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1943).
- Majumdar, R. C., ed., *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol. V, *The Struggle for Empire* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1957).
- Sandesara, Bhogilal J., *The Literary Circle of Mahāmātya Vastupāla and its Contribution to Sanskrit Literature*, Singhi Jain Series, 32 (Bombay, 1958).
- Śāstrī, S. Kuppaswami, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Madras: P. Varadachary & Co., 1932).
- Tripathi, R. S., *History of Kanauj* (Benaras, 1937).

## INDEX

- 'abādhītānubhūtiḥ pramā', 38, 39.  
*abhāva*, see also *anyonyābhāva*, *sam-*  
*sargābhāva*, 16, 66 n. 26, 123, 124,  
 180-184, 258 n. 68.  
 Abhayadevasūri, 1, 12, 36, 39, 48, 59 n. 3,  
 63 n. 19, 67 n. 30.  
*abhidhānābhidheyabhāva*, 124, 125, 126.  
*Abhidharmakośa*, 227 n. 72.  
 Abhinavagupta, 1, 2, 49, 53, 62 n. 9, 62  
 n. 11, 67 n. 28, 68 n. 35, 69 n. 43, 201,  
 209 n. 1, 221 n. 52, 222 n. 52, 223  
 n. 55, 227 n. 65, 231 n. 97, 233 n. 103,  
 240 n. 133, 251 n. 168.  
 absence, see *abhāva*.  
*Ācārāṅgasūtra*, 225 n. 61.  
*advaita*, 145-201.  
*Advaitasiddhi*, 67 n. 28.  
*advaitaśruti*, 138-201.  
*Āgamaviḍambana*, 211 n. 13, 215 n. 28,  
 217 n. 35, 225 n. 61, 239 n. 126.  
 agent, see *kartr*.  
*āhāryasaṁśaya*, 35, 39.  
*āhāryaviparyaya*, 35, 39.  
*Akalāṅka*, 1, 3, 4, 35, 139, 212 n. 25.  
*akhyāti*, 29.  
 Amaracandra, 254 n. 170.  
*Amarakaṇḍana*, 3.  
*Amarakośa*, 228 n. 78, 253 n. 170.  
 Ānandagiri, 231 n. 103.  
*ananugama*, 32.  
*anavasthā*, 62 n. 14, 78, 81, 86, 87, 88, 94,  
 95, 98, 99, 102, 108, 112, 113, 114,  
 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 131, 134,  
 143, 144, 155, 156, 176, 184, 185, 187,  
 191, 192, 212 n. 24, 224 n. 57, 226  
 n. 62, 226 n. 64, 226 n. 65, 227 n. 65,  
 229 n. 83, 243 n. 141, 245 n. 147.  
 Aniruddha, 209 n. 3, 218 n. 40, 219 n. 40,  
 221 n. 51.  
*anirvacanīya*, 62 n. 9, 137-142, 230 n. 90,  
 232 n. 63.  
 anonymous commentator, 56, 63 n. 14, 66  
 n. 27, 209 n. 5, 210 n. 8, 215 n. 28, 216  
 n. 33, 218 n. 38, 220 n. 45, 220 n. 46,  
 220 n. 47, 224 n. 57, 225 n. 57, 226  
 n. 64, 228 n. 66, 235 n. 108, 235  
 n. 112, 236 n. 112, 238 n. 120, 240  
 n. 134, 241 n. 137, 244 n. 146, 247  
 n. 153, 247 n. 154, 255 n. 176.  
*anubhava*, see *anubhūti*:  
*anubhūti*, 4-31, 49, 68 n. 41.  
 Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, 56, 223 n. 55, 239  
 n. 128, 241 n. 134.  
*anubhūtitva*, 11-31, 39, 49.  
*anvayavyatireka*, 100-102, 218 n. 40.  
*anyatarāśiddhi*, 167, 170, 238 n. 122.  
*anyonyābhāva*, 24, 39, 171, 177, 180-184,  
 243 n. 141, 244 n. 146.  
*anyonyāśraya*, 15, 21, 27, 30, 62 n. 14, 78,  
 81, 101, 102, 108, 111, 155, 207, 210  
 n. 9, 226 n. 65, 243 n. 141.  
*apasiddhānta*, 9, 63 n. 14, 206, 213 n. 27,  
 217 n. 35, 217 n. 37, 231 n. 103.  
*apohavāda*, 51.  
*apratibhā*, 167.  
*Āptamīmāṃsā*, 4, 209 n. 3, 212 n. 20.  
*Āptaparīkṣā*, 209 n. 3, 224 n. 58.  
*āptavacana*, 167.  
 Arisimha, 58 n. 1, 254 n. 170.  
*arthakriyā*, see *arthakriyākāritva*.  
*arthakriyākāri*, see *arthakriyākāritva*.  
*arthakriyākāritva*, 8, 9, 33, 35, 37, 67  
 n. 32, 68 n. 33.  
*arthāpatti*, 80, 81, 111, 112, 114, 121,  
 122, 123, 126, 135, 136, 137, 152, 158,  
 165, 168, 170, 185, 192, 193, 226  
 n. 65.  
*Arthasāstra*, 234 n. 104.  
*asatkāraṇavāda*, 84-110, 212 n. 25, 213  
 n. 25, 213 n. 26, 221 n. 48.  
*asiddhi*, 166, 167, 206, 210 n. 9, 214 n. 27,  
 224 n. 57.

- āśrayāsiddhi*, 209 n. 4.  
*Aṣṭasahasrī*, 35, 211 n. 16, 212 n. 20.  
*Aṣṭaśatī*, 35, 139, 209 n. 3, 212 n. 25, 218 n. 39.  
*asvarūpaprakāra*, 6.  
*atideśa*, 35, 37, 38, 180.  
*ativyāpti*, 8, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 43, 45, 46, 67 n. 32, 128, 228 n. 74.  
*ātmāśraya*, 9, 18, 47, 62 n. 14, 63 n. 14, 95, 116, 185, 191, 192, 213 n. 27, 239 n. 128, 243 n. 141, 243 n. 146.  
*Ātmatattvaviveka*, 10, 31, 38, 40, 42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 67 n. 29, 67 n. 31, 86-88, 97, 107, 112, 113, 115, 119, 137, 138, 191, 209 n. 3, 210 n. 6, 212 n. 20, 212 n. 25, 213 n. 27, 218 n. 40, 221 n. 50, 221 n. 52, 224 n. 61, 227 n. 73, 229 n. 82, 229 n. 84, 229 n. 87, 229 n. 89, 237 n. 119, 238 n. 121, 239 n. 126, 239 n. 129, 240 n. 130, 241 n. 134, 244 n. 143, 248 n. 162.  
*atyantāsatpratīyogitva*, 182, 183, 184, 243 n. 141.  
*avinigama*, 20, 81, 184, 186, 192, 243 n. 141, 245 n. 147.  
*‘avidyaśamvādyanubhavaḥ pramā’*, 35, 67 n. 32.  
*‘avyabhicāryanubhavaḥ pramā’*, 35.  
*avyāpti*, 7, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42, 46, 50, 130, 228 n. 74, 228 n. 78.  
*Bādarāyaṇa*, 72.  
*Bengal*, 60-61 n. 5.  
*Bhagavadgītā*, 200, 251 n. 168, 252 n. 170, 253 n. 170.  
*Bhāmātī*, 28, 29, 54, 195, 196, 209 n. 4, 211 n. 12, 221 n. 52, 224 n. 60, 230 n. 90, 231 n. 103, 237 n. 118, 247 n. 160, 248 n. 162, 249 n. 163, 254 n. 170.  
*Bhānujadicṣita*, 228 n. 78.  
*‘bhāsamānakārendriyasamprayogajam pratyakṣam’*, 45-47.  
*Bhāsarvajña*, 1, 3.  
*Bhāskara*, 231 n. 102.  
*Bhavanātha Miśra*, 2, 48, 49, 52.  
*bheda* (refutation of), 145-201.  
*Bhedavādaviḍāraṇa*, 49, 53, 233 n. 103.  
*Bhojavṛtti*, 35, 48, 239 n. 127.  
*Bhūṣāmaṇi*, 56, 68 n. 42, 111, 210 n. 8, 214 n. 27, 217 n. 35, 219 n. 40, 223 n. 54, 223 n. 55, 224 n. 57, 227 n. 70, 230 n. 94, 231 n. 102, 231 n. 103, 233 n. 108, 235 n. 108, 237 n. 112, 239 n. 128, 241 n. 134, 242 n. 137, 245 n. 147, 255 n. 175.  
*Bodhapañcadaśikā*, 69 n. 43, 251 n. 168.  
*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, 84, 86, 209 n. 3, 211 n. 19, 212 n. 21, 212 n. 22, 212 n. 25, 221 n. 48, 221 n. 52, 224 n. 57, 224 n. 58, 224 n. 60, 227 n. 72, 240 n. 131.  
*Brahma*, 124-125, 134, 135, 141, 144, 168, 194, 198, 199, 200, 213 n. 25, 231 n. 103, 232 n. 103, 233 n. 103, 234 n. 108, 241 n. 135, 248 n. 161, 251 n. 168, 252 n. 170, 253 n. 170.  
*Brahmasiddhi*, 54, 240 n. 131, 248 n. 162.  
*Brahmasūtraśamkarabhāṣya*, 212 n. 25, 224 n. 58, 227 n. 70, 229 n. 83, 230 n. 90, 231 n. 101, 231 n. 103, 232 n. 103, 233 n. 103, 251 n. 168, 253 n. 170, 254 n. 170, 254 n. 173.  
*Brhadāranyakopaniṣad*, 148, 198, 253 n. 170.  
*Brhaspati*, 72.  
*Brhatī*, 12, 49, 50, 64 n. 20, 210 n. 15, 241 n. 136.  
*Buddhism*, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 23, 24, 28, 35, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61 n. 9, 62 n. 9, 63 n. 14, 63 n. 19, 66 n. 26, 67 n. 30, 67 n. 32, 68 n. 33, 71 ff, 84-88, 105, 115, 119, 123, 124, 137, 138, 181, 203, 206, 213 n. 27, 221 n. 52, 227 n. 68, 240 n. 131, 245 n. 150.  
*Buddhist*, see *Buddhism*.  
*cakraka*, 36, 78, 81, 108, 197, 243 n. 141.  
*Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita*, 60 n. 5, 61 n. 6.  
*‘caramavyāpāravattvaṁ karaṇatvam’*, 43-44.  
*Cārvāka*, 72, 77, 213 n. 27.

causality, *see kāranatva*.

cause, *see kāraṇa*.

*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 253 n. 170.

circuitous reasoning, *see anyonyāśraya*,  
*ātmāśraya*, *cakraka*.

Citsukha, 56, 66 n. 23, 209 n. 5, 211 n. 12,  
213 n. 27, 216 n. 30, 216 n. 33, 216  
n. 35, 217 n. 38, 219 n. 40, 219 n. 42,  
220 n. 46, 224 n. 61, 226 n. 63, 227  
n. 66.

*Citsukhī*, *see* Citsukha

concomitance, positive and negative, *see*  
*anvayavyatireka*.

counterpositive, *see pratiyogin*.

debate, rules for, 71-91.

*dhārāvahikajñāna*, 27-28.

*Dharmābhyudayaamahākāvya*, 254 n. 170.

Dharmakīrti, 3, 36-38, 39, 51, 52, 67  
n. 32, 68 n. 33, 84-85, 224 n. 60, 229  
n. 83.

Dharmottara, 3, 37, 52, 67 n. 30.

*Dharmottarapradīpa*, 37, 44, 67 n. 30.

Dhoyika, 57 n. 1.

difference, *see bheda*.

doubt, *see saṁśaya*.

Durgā, 60 n. 6.

*Dvirūpakosa*, 2.

*Gadhādhārī*, 215 n. 29.

*Gāhaḍavāla*, 2, 59 n. 1, 60-61 n. 5.

*Gaudorviśaprasasti*, 60 n. 5.

*Gītārthasaṁgraha*, 201, 233 n. 103.

God, 42, 43, 44, 61 n. 9, 100, 101, 202,  
215 n. 28, 251 n. 168.

Govindacandra, 2, 59 n. 1, 60-61 n. 5.

*Granthatrayi*, 35.

'*grhīṭasya jñānam smṛtiḥ*', 27.

Guṇḍayyabhaṭṭa, 235 n. 108, 237 n. 112.

Hemacandra, 1, 23, 58 n. 1, 63 n. 19, 64  
n. 19, 226 n. 65.

*Hetubinduṭīkā*, 24, 227 n. 68.

*hetutāvaccchedaka*, 225 n. 61, 228 n. 74,  
234 n. 106.

*hetvantara*, 81.

*indriyajatva*, 13, 14, 43, 45, 68 n. 37.

inherence, *see samavāya*.

instrumental cause, *see kāraṇa*.

Isānadeva, 60 n. 5.

*Iṣṭāpatti*, 131.

*Iṣṭasiddhi*, 227 n. 67, 253 n. 170.

*Īśvarābhisamdhī*, 148, 204, 206.

*Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarsinī*, 49, 209 n. 1,  
220 n. 45, 222 n. 52, 231 n. 97, 231  
n. 103, 240 n. 133, 251 n. 168.

*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtītmarsinī*, 68  
n. 35, 224 n. 60, 233 n. 103.

Jain, *see* Jainism.

Jainism, 1, 3, 12, 13, 23, 32, 35, 39, 44,  
47-48, 49, 52, 54, 56, 63 n. 19, 67  
n. 30, 71 ff, 84, 141, 150, 152, 164,  
171, 172, 173, 181, 191, 197, 202, 204,  
212 n. 25, 225 n. 61, 230 n. 90, 231  
n. 102, 240 n. 131, 247 n. 159, 250  
n. 167.

*jalpa*, 205-208, 255 n. 176.

*jāti*, *see sāmānya*.

Jayacandra, 2, 60-61 n. 5.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, 5, 26, 30, 35, 209 n. 4, 211  
n. 13, 239 n. 126.

Jayarāsi, 24, 27, 53, 66 n. 26, 68 n. 42, 69  
n. 42.

Jayasimha (of Gujarat), 59 n. 3.

Jayasimha (of Kashmir), 59 n. 1.

*jijñāsā*, 117, 118, 167, 222 n. 53.

*Jñānaśrīmitra*, 224 n. 60.

*kāla*, 7-8, 213 n. 27.

Kalhaṇa, 61 n. 5.

Kamalaśīla, 37.

*Kāṇṭhacāmikaranyāya*, 254 n. 170.

Kanyākubja (Kanauj), 2, 59 n. 1, 60-61  
n. 5.

*kāraka*, 41.

*karaṇa*, 39-44.

*kāraṇa*, 8, 9; existence of 84-110.

*kāraṇatva*, 8, 10, 28, 50, 61 n. 6, 84-110,  
219 n. 40.

*karma*, 127-131.

*kartr*, 40, 42-43.

- Kashmir, 49, 56, 58 n. 1, 59 n. 1, 60 n. 5, 233 n. 103, 248 n. 164, 249 n. 162, 250 n. 167, 251 n. 168.  
*Kāthakopaniṣad*, 200.  
*Kāthakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, 251 n. 167.  
*Kāvyaaprakāśa*, 58 n. 1.  
*Kenopaniṣad*, 252 n. 170.  
Keśava Miśra, 1, 31, 35, 42, 59 n. 3, 224 n. 57, 243 n. 141.  
*khaṇḍanayukti*, 4, 144, 171, 202-206.  
*Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, 60 n. 5.  
*Kiraṇāvalī*, 9, 18, 21, 28, 30, 32, 35, 41, 62 n. 10, 62 n. 13, 63 n. 14, 63 n. 17, 68 n. 40, 211 n. 16, 219 n. 40, 224 n. 58, 224 n. 61, 229 n. 89, 237 n. 116, 237 n. 119, 238 n. 123, 241 n. 136, 243 n. 141, 244 n. 145, 245 n. 148, 247 n. 155.  
*kriyā*, 126-131.  
*kriyākarmabhāva*, 126-131.  
‘*kriyāyogavyavacchedena Sambandhi karaṇam*’, 40-42.  
Kumārila, 2, 3, 5, 38, 45-47, 50, 52, 54, 61 n. 9, 80-81, 219 n. 42, 235 n. 109, 248 n. 162, 249 n. 162, 254 n. 172.  
*Kusumāñjali*, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 20, 22, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 62 n. 10, 62 n. 12, 63 n. 14, 63 n. 18, 64 n. 21, 66 n. 26, 67 n. 29, 68 n. 41, 70, 116, 117, 119, 120, 126, 137, 140, 145, 174, 181, 194, 211 n. 11, 211 n. 12, 211 n. 13, 211 n. 16, 211 n. 17, 213 n. 26, 213 n. 27, 215 n. 28, 217 n. 38, 218 n. 39, 218 n. 40, 221 n. 49, 224 n. 57, 224 n. 61, 226 n. 62, 226 n. 63, 226 n. 65, 227 n. 73, 228 n. 74, 228 n. 76, 228 n. 77, 228 n. 79, 229 n. 82, 229 n. 84, 230 n. 91, 230 n. 95, 231 n. 103, 233 n. 110, 235 n. 117, 240 n. 132, 241 n. 134, 244 n. 142, 245 n. 149.  
*Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*, 213 n. 27, 214 n. 27, 225 n. 62, 228 n. 79.  
*Laghucandrikā*, 254 n. 171.  
*Laghumañjuṣā*, 212 n. 23.  
*Lakṣaṇamālā*, 4-31, 228 n. 74.  
*Lakṣaṇasāra*, 68 n. 42.  
*Lakṣaṇāvalī*, 50, 182, 217 n. 38, 228 n. 74.  
Lakṣmaṇasena, 60-61 n. 5.  
*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 137.  
*Līlāvatī*, see *Nyāyālīlāvatī*.  
*Liṅga*, 63 n. 14.  
*Liṅgadarśana*, 63 n. 14.  
*Lokāyatasūtra*, 72.  
Madhyamika, 37, 52-53, 55, 71 ff, 84-110, 123, 126, 137, 138, 141, 203, 204, 212 n. 25, 221 n. 52.  
*Mādhyamikaśāstra*, 220 n. 43, 240 n. 131.  
*Mahābhāṣya*, 255 n. 174.  
Mahimabhāṭṭa, 1, 58 n. 1, 62 n. 11.  
*Mālinivijayavārttika*, 62 n. 6, 67 n. 28, 227 n. 65, 248 n. 162, 249 n. 162.  
Māmalladevī, 2, 59 n. 5.  
*mānameyabhāva*, 196, 197, 223 n. 55, 227 n. 60.  
*Mānameyodaya*, 12, 64 n. 20, 240 n. 130, 241 n. 136.  
Maṇḍana Miśra, 248 n. 162.  
Maṅkha, 59 n. 1.  
Manorathanandin, 37, 222 n. 52.  
memory, see *smṛti*.  
mental traces, see *saṃskāra*.  
Merutuṅga, 212 n. 25.  
Mīmāṃsā, 1, 3, 12-15, 23, 24, 44, 45-47, 52, 62 n. 9, 71, 84, 141, 148, 164, 171, 181, 197, 202, 204, 230 n. 95, 231 n. 102, 239 n. 136, 241 n. 141.  
Mīmāṃsaka, see *Mīmāṃsā*.  
*Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, 231 n. 96.  
*Moharājaparājaya*, 211 n. 11.  
Mokṣākaragupta, 38.  
*Mrgendratāntra*, 250 n. 167.  
*Mudritakumudacandraprakaraṇa*, 212 n. 25.  
*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 198.  
Nāgārjuna, 81, 85, 220 n. 43.  
Nageśa, 212 n. 23.  
*Naiṣadhīyacarita*, 2, 59 n. 2, 50 n. 5, 61-



- 62 n. 6, 126, 138, 201, 211 n. 11, 228 n. 78, 233 n. 103, 234 n. 104, 240 n. 134, 250 n. 163, 252-255 n. 170.
- Naiyāyika, *see* Nyāya.
- Nārāyaṇa, 60 n. 5.
- Nayaviveka, 24, 48, 49, 50, 68 n. 35.
- nigrahasthāna, 77.
- niranuyojyānuyoga, 76, 85, 90, 118, 153, 173, 194.
- nirvikalpikajñāna, 46, 179.
- non-duality, *see* *advaita*.
- non-existent: as cause 84-110; as qualifier 107-110; as possessed of defining characteristics 97, 109-110.
- Nyāya, 1, 4-12, 15-31, 34-35, 39-46, 53, 61 n. 9, 62 n. 9, 62 n. 14, 63 n. 14, 65 n. 23, 66 n. 26, 68 n. 41, 71 ff, 212 n. 25, 213 n. 27, 214 n. 27, 215 n. 27, 215 n. 29, 215 n. 30, 216 n. 34, 216 n. 35, 217 n. 35, 217 n. 37, 218 n. 38, 219 n. 40, 220 n. 43, 220 n. 45, 221 n. 50, 222 n. 53, 224 n. 57, 224-225 n. 61, 226 n. 62, 228 n. 74, 229 n. 82, 230 n. 95, 231 n. 102, 232 n. 103, 234 n. 108, 235 n. 112, 241 n. 135, 243 n. 141.
- Nyāyabhāṣya, 50, 52, 76.
- Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, 17, 32, 38, 49, 225 n. 61.
- Nyāyabindu, 37.
- Nyāyabinduṭīkā, 67 n. 30.
- Nyāyakalikā, 30, 209 n. 4, 218 n. 140.
- Nyāyakandalī, 31, 181, 217 n. 38, 219 n. 42, 228 n. 79, 238 n. 122.
- Nyāyakumudacandra, 32, 48, 212 n. 25, 218 n. 39, 229 n. 89, 231 n. 97, 240 n. 130, 240 n. 131, 243 n. 141, 247 n. 156, 247 n. 157, 247 n. 158, 247 n. 159, 248 n. 161.
- Nyāyalīlāvati, 21, 59 n. 3, 67 n. 31, 182, 243 n. 141, 244 n. 141.
- Nyāyamañjarī, 5, 25, 35, 41, 44, 63 n. 18, 64 n. 21, 223 n. 52, 225 n. 61.
- Nyāyaratnamālā, 31.
- Nyāyasūtra, 77, 115, 139, 167, 205, 208, 209 n. 4, 214 n. 27.
- Nyāyavarttika, 31, 39, 41, 52, 209 n. 3, 209 n. 4, 217 n. 38, 219 n. 40, 227 n. 73, 228 n. 74, 245 n. 150.
- Nyayavatara, 38, 68 n. 34, 209 n. 3.
- overextension, *see* *ativyāti*.
- pakṣa, 41-42.
- pakṣatāvacchedaka, 225 n. 61, 228 n. 74, 234 n. 106.
- Pañcapādikā, 27, 49, 54, 67 n. 28, 68 n. 36, 212 n. 23, 232 n. 103.
- Pāṇini, 133.
- Paramānanda Sūri, 56, 63 n. 14, 66 n. 27, 138, 203, 209 n. 5, 212 n. 25, 219 n. 40, 220 n. 46, 224 n. 57, 235 n. 108, 241 n. 137, 242 n. 137, 244 n. 146, 247 n. 153, 247 n. 160, 255 n. 176.
- Paramarthacarcā, 233 n. 103.
- pararthanumana, 47, 167, 170, 238 n. 123.
- pariṇāmavāda, 212 n. 25, 213 n. 25.
- Parīśuddhi, 5, 6-9, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 62 n. 12, 62 n. 13, 63 n. 14, 64 n. 21, 65 n. 23, 67 n. 29, 97, 112, 113, 117, 119, 206, 209 n. 4, 210 n. 6, 211 n. 16, 213 n. 27, 223 n. 57, 224 n. 57, 224 n. 58, 224 n. 61, 227 n. 73, 228 n. 74, 228 n. 75, 229 n. 81, 229 n. 82, 237 n. 116, 238 n. 123, 241 n. 136, 244 n. 142, 248 n. 162, 255 n. 176.
- Parthasārathi Miśra, 2, 52.
- Pavanadūta, 58 n. 1.
- perception, *see* *pratyakṣa*.
- Prabandhacintāmaṇi, 212 n. 25.
- Prabandhakośa, 58 n. 1, 60 n. 5.
- Prabhācandra, 1, 48, 64 n. 19, 212 n. 25, 229 n. 83, 231 n. 97, 248 n. 161.
- Prabhākara, 1, 3, 14-15, 20, 22, 24, 29, 30, 31, 47-48, 49, 50, 52, 63 n. 16, 66 n. 24, 69 n. 42, 75, 123, 124, 134, 135, 137, 150, 151, 162-163, 171, 172, 173, 217 n. 35, 231 n. 99, 231 n. 100, 238 n. 120.

Prābhākara, see Prabhākara.

*Prabhākara-vijaya*, 24, 50, 51, 68 n. 42, 69 n. 42.

*Prabhāvākacārīta*, 58 n. 1, 62 n. 9.

*prāglopa*, 184, 186, 243 n. 141, 245 n. 147.

*Prajñākara-gupta*, 3, 12, 37, 52, 67 n. 32, 68 n. 33.

*Prajñākara-mati*, 85, 212 n. 24.

*Prakaranapañcikā*, 11, 20, 24, 27, 28, 64 n. 20, 66 n. 24, 217 n. 35, 229 n. 86, 231 n. 98, 231 n. 99, 237 n. 115, 240 n. 130.

*pramā*, 3-39, 62 n. 11, 67 n. 29, 67 n. 30, 67 n. 32, 68 n. 33, 68 n. 41.

*pramāṇa*: existence of required for debate 71-91.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 23, 32, 63 n. 18, 63 n. 19, 64 n. 19, 209 n. 3, 223 n. 54, 224 n. 60, 226 n. 65.

*Pramāṇanayatatvāloka-lāṅkāra*, 35, 48, 209 n. 3, 230 n. 93.

*Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, 32, 49.

*Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 48.

*Pramāṇayārttika*, 28, 35, 37, 84-85, 222 n. 52, 226 n. 63.

*Pramāṇaviniscaya*, 224 n. 60.

*pramāṭva*, 9.

*Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, 12, 38, 48, 50, 209 n. 3, 212 n. 25, 218 n. 39, 223 n. 54, 224 n. 60, 226 n. 65, 229 n. 83, 240 n. 131, 243 n. 141.

*Prapañcasāratikā*, 225 n. 61.

*Prasannapadā*, 240 n. 131.

*Prasastapādabhāṣya*, 63 n. 14, 227 n. 72.

*pratibandhi*, 22, 66 n. 25, 89, 90, 100, 103, 165, 212 n. 25, 220 n. 46, 226 n. 64.

*pratiñāvivirodha*, 77.

*pratiyogin*, 25-26, 64 n. 23, 65 n. 23, 66 n. 23, 66 n. 27, 123, 163, 170-187, 190, 191, 219 n. 41, 243 n. 141, 244 n. 146.

*pratyabhijñāna*, 12-22, 63 n. 19, 64 n. 21.

*pratyakṣa*, 2, 44-52, 62 n. 11.

*prṛthaktva*, 171, 177, 191-193.

*Pūjyapāda*, 3, 4, 230 n. 93.

Raghunātha Śiromani, 56.

Rājasekharasūri, 58 n. 1, 60 n. 5, 61 n. 5.

*Rājatarāṅginī*, 61 n. 5.

Rāmakaṇṭha, 233 n. 103.

Rāmānuja, 2, 209 n. 3, 251 n. 168.

Ratnakīrti, 67 n. 30.

Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali, 12, 67 n. 30, 229 n. 84.

recognition, see *pratyabhijñāna*.

refuting principles, see *khaṇḍanayukti*.

*Rjuvimalā*, 12, 27, 50, 241 n. 136.

*Śābarabhāṣya*, 45.

*śabdaprativṛttinimitta*, 228 n. 74.

*sadasadvilakṣaṇatva*, 54, 55, 62 n. 6, 137-142, 214 n. 27, 232 n. 103.

*sādhyā*, 41-42.

*sahānavasthāna*, 25.

Śaivism, see Kashmir.

*sākāravāda*, 48, 62 n. 19.

*sākṣātkāritva*, 43, 44, 47-51.

'sākṣātkāritvaṃ pratyakṣam', 47-51.

*sākṣin*, 221 n. 52.

*Śaktisūtra*, 69 n. 43.

'śaktiviśeṣaḥ pramā', 38.

Śalikanātha Mīśra, 1, 27, 52.

*Śālistambasūtra*, 212 n. 21.

*sāmagrī*, 89, 90, 92, 212 n. 27, 214 n. 29.

*sāmagrīsattvavyavahitottaratva*, 90-93, 215 n. 29.

Samantabhadra, 3, 4.

*sāmānya*, 11, 51, 66 n. 26, 94, 96, 187, 189, 225 n. 61, 245 n. 148, 245 n. 150.

*sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*, 22 n. 61, 224 n. 61.

*samavāya*, 6.

*samavyāpti*, 39, 68 n. 35.

*sambaddhaviśeṣanātā*, 16-21, 64 n. 21, 65 n. 23.

*Sambandhaparīkṣā*, 229 n. 83.

*Sambandhavārttika*, 240 n. 131.

Samkara, 72, 201, 212 n. 25, 213 n. 25, 221 n. 52, 232 n. 103, 233 n. 103, 249 n. 162, 251 n. 167, 251 n. 168, 253 n. 170, 254 n. 173.

- Śamkara Miśra, 55, 56, 62 n. 14, 65 n. 23.  
 66 n. 23, 66 n. 27, 125, 135, 206, 209  
 n. 5, 210 n. 9, 211 n. 12, 211 n. 14, 213  
 n. 27, 214 n. 27, 215 n. 27, 215 n. 29,  
 216 n. 35, 217 n. 35, 219 n. 40, 219  
 n. 43, 220 n. 45, 220 n. 46, 222 n. 53,  
 223 n. 54, 223 n. 55, 224 n. 57, 224  
 n. 60, 225 n. 61, 225 n. 62, 226 n. 62,  
 226 n. 64, 227 n. 69, 227 n. 70, 228  
 n. 74, 229 n. 88, 231 n. 100, 231 n. 103,  
 234 n. 105, 234 n. 108, 237 n. 112, 238  
 n. 120, 239 n. 128, 240 n. 134, 241  
 n. 134, 241 n. 137, 242 n. 137, 242  
 n. 138, 242 n. 140, 244 n. 146, 245  
 n. 147, 246 n. 151, 246 n. 153, 247  
 n. 159, 250 n. 165, 255 n. 175.  
*sām̐k̐arya*, 12-22, 39.  
 Sām̐k̐hya, 20, 24, 68 n. 41, 103.  
*Sām̐k̐hyatattvakaumudī*, 24.  
*samsargābhāva*, 24, 39, 66 n. 26, 181-182,  
 243 n. 141, 244 n. 145.  
*samśaya*, 16-17, 29-30, 168, 187, 190, 223  
 n. 54.  
*samśkāra*, 13, 14, 15, 16-21, 43, 64 n. 21,  
 65 n. 23.  
*samśkāradhīnatvamātra*, 20.  
*'samśkāramātrajam jñānam smṛtiḥ'*, 28.  
*samvṛtisattva*, 54-55, 84-89, 105, 107,  
 108, 221 n. 52, 250 n. 163.  
*'samyakparicchittiḥ pramā'*, 32-35, 39.  
*sāmyāpādana*, 88.  
*Sanmatitarkatīkā*, 12, 36, 38, 48, 63 n. 19,  
 67 n. 30, 209 n. 3, 218 n. 39, 218 n. 40,  
 223 n. 56, 224 n. 58.  
 Śāntarakṣita, 51.  
 Śāntisūri, 62 n. 9.  
*'sāpekṣajñānam smṛtiḥ'*, 28.  
*sāpekṣapadārtha*, 13, 42, 63 n. 14.  
*Śārdā* (commentary on the  
*Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*) 211 n. 12,  
 211 n. 14, 213 n. 26, 228 n. 80.  
 Śārādā (goddess), 56.  
*sarvatantrasiddhānta*, 209 n. 4.  
*Sarvatobhadra*, 233 n. 103.  
*Śāstraḍīpikā*, 45, 48, 67 n. 31.  
*sattā*, 10, 93-97, 99, 134, 216 n. 33, 216  
 n. 34, 216 n. 23, 217 n. 35.  
*savikalpikajñāna*, 42, 46, 179.  
 scripture, *see śruti*.  
 self-awareness (of knowledge), *see*  
*svayamprakāśatā*.  
*Siddhāntabindu*, 237 n. 114.  
*Siddhāntaleśasamgraha*, 54.  
*Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, 235 n. 108.  
 Siddharṣi, 1, 67 n. 34.  
 Siddhasena, 38.  
*Siddhitraya* (Utpaladeva), 233 n. 103.  
*Siddhitraya* (Yamuna), 229 n. 86.  
*Siddhiviniścaya*, 35, 212 n. 25.  
*Śiṣyahiṭaiṣiṇī*, 223 n. 55.  
*Śivaśaktisiddhi*, 251 n. 168.  
 sleep, *see svapna*.  
*Śloka-vārttika*, 12, 22, 38, 45-47, 51, 52,  
 64 n. 20, 81, 87, 105, 130, 136, 139,  
 140, 153, 161, 162, 163, 181, 209 n. 3,  
 210 n. 7, 212 n. 20, 224 n. 57, 227  
 n. 72, 230 n. 93, 235 n. 109, 237  
 n. 118, 238 n. 122, 238 n. 124, 241  
 n. 136, 247 n. 160, 248 n. 162, 254  
 n. 173.  
*smṛti*, 11-28, 49, 69 n. 42.  
*Smṛtīva*, 12-31.  
*smṛtilakṣaṇarahitātva*, 11.  
 space, 7-8.  
*Śrībhāṣya*, 240 n. 130.  
 Śrīdhara, 1, 181.  
 Śrī Hira, 2, 62 n. 6.  
 Śrīkaṇṭha, 2, 251 n. 168.  
*Śrīkaṇṭhacarita*, 59 n. 1.  
 Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī, 210 n. 8, 216 n. 30, 222  
 n. 53, 228 n. 78, 237 n. 113.  
*śruti*, 124-126, 137, 138-201.  
*Stavacintāmaṇi*, 250 n. 167.  
*sthūnanikhānananyāya*, 255 n. 176.  
*Sukṛtisamīrtana*, 58 n. 1, 254 n. 170.  
*śūnyatā*, 62 n. 9.  
 Sureśvara, 240 n. 131.  
 Suśruta, 246 n. 152.  
*svapna*, 36, 49, 67 n. 31, 68 n. 33, 68 n. 41,  
 69 n. 42.  
*svarūpabheda*, 171-180.  
*svarūpānubhūti*, p. 5.

'svarūpānubhūtiḥ pramā', 6.  
*svārūpasambandha*, 132, 133, 176, 177, 180, 242 n. 138.  
*svārūpasattā*, 94, 96, 99, 100, 114, 115, 134.  
*svārthānumāna*, 167.  
*svayamprakāśatā*, 99, 110, 137, 197, 212 n. 25, 226 n. 65, 227 n. 72.  
*sveṣṭahāni*, 81, 210 n. 9.  
*Syādvādamāñjarī*, 225 n. 61.  
*Syādvādaratnākara*, 35, 209 n. 3, 211 n. 11, 211 n. 15, 212 n. 25, 229 n. 84, 244 n. 143.  
*tādātmya* 181-182.  
*tadguṇasaṃvijñānabahuvrīhi*, 133-135.  
*Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 253 n. 170.  
*Tantrāloka*, 223 n. 55.  
*Tantravārttika*, 5.  
*tarka*, 35, 39, 163, 168, 219 n. 43.  
*Tarkabhāṣā* (Buddhist), 38.  
*Tarkabhāṣā* (Nyāya), 11, 31, 35, 42, 224 n. 57, 243 n. 141.  
*Tārikakarakṣā*, 7, 11, 12, 31, 33, 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, 63 n. 16, 68 n. 42, 227 n. 72, 228 n. 76.  
*Tātparyatīkā*, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16, 20, 29, 33, 35, 38, 39, 40, 44, 50, 52, 62 n. 13, 63 n. 14, 64 n. 21, 117, 127, 130, 209 n. 3, 209 n. 4, 213 n. 27, 217 n. 38, 218 n. 40, 219 n. 40, 221 n. 51, 223 n. 54, 224 n. 61, 225 n. 61, 227 n. 73, 228 n. 74, 228 n. 76, 229 n. 81, 229 n. 87, 229 n. 89, 238 n. 122, 241 n. 136, 242 n. 141, 243 n. 142, 255 n. 173.  
*tattva*, 5-31, 39.  
*'tattvajñānam pramā'*, 4.  
*'tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā'*, 4-31, 39, 41.  
*Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*, 4.  
*Tattvārtharājavārttika*, 4.  
*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, 36, 37, 68 n. 38, 224 n. 60.  
*Tattvavaiśārādī*, 27, 48, 227 n. 72, 229 n. 81.  
*Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, 24, 27, 38, 53, 66 n. 26, 68 n. 37, 68 n. 42, 68 n. 42, 69

n. 42, 224 n. 58, 225 n. 61, 240 n. 133.  
*Tikā*, see *Tātparyatīkā*.  
time, see *kāla*.  
Trilocana, 44-45.  
*trīṭyaliṅgadarśana*, 41-44.  
Udayana, 1, 3-12, 15-35, 39-44, 45, 48, 51, 52, 61 n. 6, 62 n. 12, 63 n. 14, 64 n. 21, 64 n. 23, 66 n. 26, 67 n. 29, 68 n. 31, 84, 86, 97, 107, 108, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 137, 138, 167, 182, 190, 206-208, 209 n. 4, 211 n. 12, 211 n. 15, 212 n. 25, 213 n. 26, 213 n. 27, 217 n. 35, 217 n. 38, 218 n. 38, 218 n. 40, 219 n. 40, 221 n. 50, 221 n. 52, 223 n. 57, 224 n. 58, 224 n. 61, 227 n. 73, 228 n. 74, 228 n. 79, 228 n. 80, 229 n. 80, 229 n. 87, 234 n. 106, 238 n. 121, 238 n. 123, 239 n. 126, 239 n. 129, 241 n. 134, 241 n. 136, 243 n. 141, 244 n. 144, 244 n. 145, 248 n. 162, 255 n. 176.  
Udayaprabhāsūri, 254 n. 170.  
*uddeśya*, 95, 243 n. 141.  
Udyottakara, 39, 44.  
Umāsvāti, 4, 230 n. 93.  
underextension, see *avyāpti*.  
universal, see *sāmānya*.  
*upajīvyā*, 193, 194, 195, 196, 241 n. 134.  
*upalakṣaṇa*, 124-125.  
Utpaladeva, 69 n. 43, 233 n. 103.  
Vācaspati Mīśra, 1, 3, 5, 8, 15, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 35, 39, 44, 52, 53, 54, 64 n. 21, 68 n. 41, 128, 130, 136, 195, 209 n. 4, 211 n. 12, 221 n. 52, 224 n. 61, 225 n. 61, 227 n. 73, 228 n. 74, 228 n. 79, 228 n. 80, 230 n. 96, 232 n. 103, 241 n. 136, 248 n. 162, 249 n. 163.  
Vācaspati Mīśra II, 60 n. 5.  
*vāda*, 203.  
*Vādanyāya*, 51, 211 n. 10, 211 n. 18.  
*Vādanyāyavipañcitārtha*, 51.  
Vādidevasūri, 1, 35, 59 n. 3, 212 n. 25.  
*vaidharmya*, 171, 177, 183-191, 245

- n. 147.  
 Vaiśeṣika, 49, 216 n. 34.  
*Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, 49, 216 n. 34.  
*vaitaṇḍika*, 203, 204, 205, 226 n. 64.  
*vākchala*, 115, 119.  
*Vakroktiṭīvita*, 229 n. 81.  
 valid knowledge, *see* *pramā*.  
 Vallabha, 1, 59 n. 2.  
 Varadapaṇḍita, 56, 63 n. 14, 66 ff. 27, 135, 209 n. 2, 209 n. 5, 210 n. 5, 210 n. 9, 211 n. 12, 215 n. 27, 216 n. 35, 217 n. 38, 219 n. 40, 219 n. 43, 220 n. 45, 220 n. 46, 221 n. 52, 223 n. 55, 223 n. 57, 224 n. 60, 224 n. 61, 225 n. 61, 226 n. 64, 226 n. 66, 229 n. 80, 229 n. 88, 231 n. 100, 234 n. 105, 234 n. 107, 234 n. 108, 235 n. 112, 236 n. 112, 237 n. 112, 238 n. 120, 239 n. 128, 239 n. 129, 240 n. 134, 242 n. 137, 242 n. 138, 242 n. 140, 244 n. 146, 245 n. 147, 246 n. 153, 247 n. 159, 250 n. 165, 251 n. 167, 251 n. 168, 252 n. 169, 255 n. 175, 255 n. 176.  
 Varadarāja, 1, 69 n. 42.  
 Vardhamānaprakāśa, 213 n. 27, 214 n. 27, 225 n. 62.  
*Vārttikā*, *see* *Nyāyavārttika*.  
 Vasubandhu, 50.  
 Vastupāla, 58 n. 1.  
 Vedānta, 53, 55, 70, 84-85, 110 ff, 137, 141, 171, 204, 214 n. 27, 221 n. 52, 232-233 n. 103, 234 n. 108, 248 n. 162, 249 n. 162, 252 n. 170, 254 n. 170.  
*Vedārthasaṃgraha*, 209 n. 3, 240 n. 130.  
*vidheya*, 95, 243 n. 141.  
*Vidhiviveka*, 38.  
*Vidyānanda*, 3.  
 Vidyāsāgara, 56, 62 n. 14, 63 n. 14, 66 n. 23, 66 n. 27, 111, 112, 135, 209 n. 5, 210 n. 5, 210 n. 9, 213 n. 27, 215 n. 27, 216 n. 35, 217 n. 35, 217 n. 38, 218 n. 41, 219 n. 41, 219 n. 43, 220 n. 45, 220 n. 46, 223 n. 54, 223 n. 55, 224 n. 57, 224 n. 61, 225 n. 61, 227 n. 66, 227 n. 69, 229 n. 88, 231 n. 94, 231 n. 100, 234 n. 105, 234 n. 108, 235 n. 111, 236 n. 112, 237 n. 112, 238 n. 120, 238 n. 125, 239 n. 128, 240 n. 134, 241 n. 134, 242 n. 137, 242 n. 138, 242 n. 140, 244 n. 146, 245 n. 147, 246 n. 151, 246 n. 153, 247 n. 159, 250 n. 165, 251 n. 167, 251 n. 168, 252 n. 169, 255 n. 176.  
*Vidyāsāgarī*, *see* *Vidyāsāgara*.  
*Vigrahavyāvartini*, 81, 209 n. 3, 211 n. 19, 220 n. 43, 240 n. 131.  
 Vijayasena, 60 n. 5.  
 Vijnānavāda, 62 n. 6, 221 n. 52.  
 Vimuktatman, 253 n. 170.  
*viśayaviśayibhāva*, 113, 114, 121, 122, 131-137, 223 n. 55, 240 n. 133. *See also* *mānameyabhāva*.  
*vitaṇḍā*, 205, 208, 214 n. 27, 255 n. 176.  
*vyāghāta*, 74, 77, 170.  
*Vyaktiviveka*, 1, 58 n. 1, 62 n. 11, 166.  
*vyañjaka*, 92.  
*vyāpāra*, 40-44.  
*vyāvahārikī sattā*, 84-85, 248 n. 162. *See also* *saṃvṛtisattva*.  
 Vyomaśiva, 211 n. 15.  
*Vyomavati*, 227 n. 72, 230 n. 95, 247 n. 160.  
 'yadabhāvātkaṛṭkarmanī kriyām na-jānayatasaṭkaraṇam', 42-43.  
 Yamuna, 2, 229 n. 86.  
 Yaśāscandra, 212 n. 25.  
 'yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā', 31-32, 39.  
*Yogabhāṣya*, 48, 67 n. 41, 229 n. 81.  
*Yogācāra*, 221 n. 52.  
*Yogasūtra*, 35, 48.  
*Yogavārttika*, 20.